The Disunity of Reason

Last night I was talking with an old friend of mine, an atheist Jew, who is now in the best relationship of her life with a devout Roman Catholic. We talked about the fact that she was more surprised than he was about the fact that their connection transcends their difference in metaphysics. He sees himself as a devout Roman Catholic; she sees him as a good human being.

This conversation reminded me of an older thought that’s been swirling around in my head for a few weeks: the disunity of reason.

It is widely held by philosophers (that peculiar sub-species!) that reason is unified: that the ideally rational person is one for whom there are no fissures, breaks, ruptures, or discontinuities anywhere in the inferential relations between semantic contents that comprise his or her cognitive grasp of the world (including himself or herself as part of that world).

This is particularly true when it comes to the distinction between “theoretical reason” and “practical reason”. By “theoretical reason” I mean one’s ability to conceptualize the world-as-experienced as more-or-less systematic, and by “practical reason” I mean one’s ability to act in the world according to judgments that are justified by agent-relative and also agent-indifferent reasons (“prudence” and “morality”, respectively).

The whole philosophical tradition from Plato onward assumes that reason is unified, and especially, that theoretical and practical reason are unified — different exercises of the same basic faculty. Some philosophers think of them as closer together than others — for example, Aristotle distinguishes between episteme (knowledge of general principles in science, mathematics, and metaphysics) and phronesis (knowledge of particular situations in virtuous action). But even Aristotle does not doubt that episteme and phronesis are exercises of a single capacity, reason (nous).

However, as we learn more about how our cognitive system is actually structured, we should consider the possibility that reason is not unified at all. If Horst’s Cognitive Pluralism is right, then we should expect that our minds are more like patchworks of domain-specific modules that can reason quite well within those domains but not so well across them.

To Horst’s model I’d add the further conjecture: that we have pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “theoretical reason” (abstract thinking and long-term planning) with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and also pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “practical reason” (self-control and virtuous conduct) with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (and especially in its dense interconnections with the limbic system).

But if that conjecture is on the right track, then we would expect to find consistency between theoretical reason and practical reason only to the extent that there are reciprocal interconnections between these regions of prefrontal cortex. And of course there are reciprocal interconnections — but (and this is the important point!) to the extent that these regions are also functionally distinct, then to that same extent reason is disunified. 

And as a consequence, metaphysics and ethics may have somewhat less to do with each other than previous philosophers have supposed.

 

 

1,419 thoughts on “The Disunity of Reason

  1. FAITH, n. Belief without evidence in what is told by one who speaks without knowledge, of things without parallel.

    ditto

  2. TRINITY, n. In the multiplex theism of certain Christian churches, three entirely distinct deities consistent with only one. Subordinate deities of the polytheistic faith, such as devils and angels, are not dowered with the power of combination, and must urge individually their claims to adoration and propitiation. The Trinity is one of the most sublime mysteries of our holy religion. In rejecting it because it is incomprehensible, Unitarians betray their inadequate sense of theological fundamentals. In religion we believe only what we do not understand, except in the instance of an intelligible doctrine that contradicts an incomprehensible one. In that case we believe the former as a part of the latter.

    (last one, I promise)

  3. Patrick:

    The question is whether any god or gods exist.You cannot use the assumption that a god exists as one of your premises.

    Nonsense. He most definitely can; in point of fact, he has. That FMM is begging the question by doing so, and thus invalidating his point to those of us who care about such things, is his problem.

    But here lies the crux of the issue in engaging in such discussions with people like FMM. Clearly he accepts presuppositional apologetic arguments. And in doing so, he accepts their premise that everyone holds to them as well. KN has demonstrated that such is not a valid position and plenty of folk have noted the internal inconsistency (including begging the question) of the arguments, but clearly folks who buy into presuppositional apologetics either don’t understand those points or don’t care. So around and around we go…

  4. fifthmonarchyman:

    I might be mistaken about everything but that does not change the fact that God can reveal stuff if he chooses to.

    Uhhh…

    Just curious there FMM, but if you might be mistaken about everything, where exactly does your assurance that some god can reveal stuff fall?

  5. Patrick: My point is that capital-T Truth, the abstract noun, cannot be said to exist in the way that, say, a rock exists.

    First, I think you’re assuming this. Second, now you’re off into metaphysics. What, demands for objective empirical evidence no good here?

  6. Mung: I am. It’s how I know you’re hungry.

    Alas, you keep demonstrating you really don’t know that…

  7. Robin: I don’t need to nor do I care about “knowing” it

    nuff said.

    Robin: It is, of course, subjective. How could such an exercise not be?

    1) So far we have established that you don’t know and your opinion is subjective anyway. I would agree on both points. It sounds like you have conceded the argument

    2) An “exercise” can only be objective if it is conducted by a being who is objective ie God. His opinions are objective fact by definition

    Robin: The point is that the exercise of “I’m hungry” demolishes presuppositionalism.

    So you say with absolutely no evidence. Perhaps you could explain what demolishing presuppositionalism would look like?

    Are you claiming that the phrase “I’m hungry” somehow proves that you don’t have presuppositions?

    Please explain how in the world you reached that odd conclusion and how you know that it is the correct one?

    peace

  8. Kantian Naturalist: I think that any epistemological position that starts off with a subjectivist starting-point — “I have immediate access to how things appear to me, but how do I know whether things really are as they appear?” — will not be able to avoid any of the slippery slopes that lead to idealism, skepticism, or solipsism.

    I agree that is why It’s important to start with God.

    Kantian Naturalist: Once you’ve retreated into the subjectivist starting-point, there’s no magical bridge that will get one back to objective knowledge.

    It’s not a retreat it is in fact where all those who deny God must start there is no other ground to defend

    Kantian Naturalist: there’s no magical bridge that will get one back to objective knowledge. The only winning move is not to play.

    The problem is you are forced to “play” if you deny God.

    There is no magical Bridge and there is no free pass on playing. Everyone who chooses to claim rational autonomy must play eventually.

    All the denyer can do is try to avoid the obvious for as long as possible. Mockery and ignoring the question seems to be the method of choice that is most often employed.

    peace

  9. fifthmonarchyman: It’s not a retreat it is in fact where all those who deny God must start there is no other ground to defend

    And that assumption is precisely what I deny.

    I reject it because it relies on the idea that we can ever be in a condition in which we know what is subjectively available to us but still be in doubt about what is objectively real. I do not think this is even logically possible. In fact I do not think it is even conceptually coherent.

    Rather — and here I stand in radical contrast to all of the non-theists at TSZ as well — I think that the subjective and the objective are conceptually interdependent. You just cannot have without the other.

    A simple example: my awareness of a subjective change in my visual field as I move around my apartment necessarily presupposes my awareness of the objective reality of my apartment as a spatial-temporal unity. If it were not for this awareness of the objective reality of my apartment, I would not be able to tell that the changes in my visual field were my subjective changes.

    My awareness of subjective perspectives and my awareness of objective reality necessarily presuppose each other. They are not separable, not even conceptually.

    But this means that one cannot ever really be in the position of radical doubt that Descartes pretends to be in. In that position, one in effect draws a line between appearance and reality, and puts appearances on the subjective side of that line and reality on the objective side of that line. And then one says, “I can immediately discern through introspection what’s on the subjective side, the side of appearances, but I can’t tell what’s on the other side of that line, the side of objective reality”. That’s why it seems that one needs God to “break through”, so to speak, piercing the wall that separates subjective appearance from objective reality.

    But there is no need for God to do this, because there is no wall.

    (Anyone who wants to see the complete version of this argument in all its glory is welcome to read the Transcendental Deduction in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Good luck — you’re going to need it!)

  10. Kantian Naturalist: I reject it because it relies on the idea that we can ever be in a condition in which we know what is subjectively available to us but still be in doubt about what is objectively real.

    It does not rely on that idea at all. It does not rely on any idea whatsoever. It’s simply self examination.

    Kantian Naturalist: Rather — and here I stand in radical contrast to all of the non-theists at TSZ as well — I think that the subjective and the objective are conceptually interdependent. You just cannot have without the other.

    How exactly do you know that?
    Not that I disagree mind you that after all is part of what the incarnation is all about.

    Kantian Naturalist: That’s why it seems that one needs God to “break through”, so to speak, piercing the wall that separates subjective appearance from objective reality.

    I don’t think you understand I don’t only need God to pierce the wall of my subjectivity. I need God to reason at all.

    Kantian Naturalist: But there is no need for God to do this, because there is no wall.

    You have once again erected a strawman and proceeded to knock it down.

    I would think you would grow tired of this eventually and instead try and address the actual question at hand.

    hint; Ask yourself how you know there is no wall

    peace

  11. Patrick: What things, specifically?

    The things that have been made. But I already said that

    Patrick: You cannot use the assumption that a god exists as one of your premises.

    sure I can
    It’s the only fact in the universe that is necessarily true and the only sure starting point with which to reason from.

    Patrick: Given the rules and my clear statement that I lack belief in a god or gods, your assertion that “Everyone knows he exists” is refuted.

    Argument by internet rules.
    That is a new one.

    How do you know that your rules have the power to refute obvious truths?

    How could you possibly know?

    peace

  12. Patrick: How does this new knowledge change your argument, if at all?

    How is new (or any) knowledge even possible given your untenable starting position?

    peace

  13. fifthmonarchyman: 1) He doesn’t suck. He does it well enough so that you are without excuse

    Oh really? So you happen to know how he has revealed to me but I never noticed?

    fifthmonarchyman:
    2) You already know he exists

    No I don’t. You are so deluded that not only you think you know what your imaginary god thinks and how he goes about ruling the universe, you even think you know what other people believe that they don’t. Hilarious

    fifthmonarchymants
    3) Jumping through hoops for you is not God’s priority. If it was you would be acting as god instead of him.

    Ahhhh, cute. This narcissistic god you believe in needs me to believe first so he doesn’t need too do the “hard” work of showing up and say hi like he supposedly did time and again to those guys in the bible. Because why bother showing up when the guy already believes blindly?

    Makes complete sense… not

    fifthmonarchymants
    If it was you would be acting as god instead of him.

    Oh the irony. You keep pretending to be god’s spokesman. It’s you who pretends to be god here

  14. What I think most theists don’t understand is that even if one was to accept that a god is by definition needed to ground objectivity, it’s a useless exercise. They don’t realize that defining some unreachable objectivity into existence tells us nothing about any objective facts because by definition, those are out of reach for anyone other than “god”.

    It’s mind boggling how FMM thinks he knows what others believe, but can’t realize that all that doesn’t make any sense if you don’t belong to some particular creed in the first place. I don’t think a single theist ever began from objectivity and these “fundamental problems” and then worked his way to christianity, islam or whatever religion. The only way to find these obviously fallacious arguments compelling is if one has been indoctrinated in some particular religion first. There’s no way to connect the dots

  15. dazz: I don’t think a single theist ever began from objectivity and these “fundamental problems” and then worked his way to christianity.

    Of course we don’t work our way to Christianity.

    Instead it’s God who does the work. It’s called grace and it is a fundamental tenant of Christianity.

    I don’t think you get what is going on here. I am not trying to “win” you to God with a convincing argument. I would not presume to do such a thing. You will cease your rebellion if and when God chooses to show you grace.

    I’m simply trying to understand how you justify your claims to knowledge and to glorify God by demonstrating the futility of your position for those that might be interested.

    peace

  16. dazz: This narcissistic god you believe in needs me to believe first so he doesn’t need too do the “hard” work of showing up and say hi like he supposedly did time and again to those guys in the bible. Because why bother showing up when the guy already believes blindly?

    I have no idea what this sentence is even supposed to mean.

    God does not need you to believe. God does not need anything.

    The fact that you don’t understand that makes me wonder if you have a clue about the God you reject.

    It’s been my experience that when folks claim to be atheist they generally mean the imaginary deity they thought they understood as a young child doesn’t exist.

    I agree that such a being does not exist except in the atheist imagination.

    peace

  17. fifthmonarchyman: Instead it’s God who does the work

    Is that by definition?

    fifthmonarchyman: It’s called grace

    Is that by definition?

    fifthmonarchyman: it is a fundamental tenant of Christianity

    Is that by definition?

    fifthmonarchyman: You will cease your rebellion if and when God chooses to show you grace

    you know that based on some definition of god?

    fifthmonarchyman: God does not need you to believe. God does not need anything.

    by definition perhaps?

    fifthmonarchyman: makes me wonder if you have a clue about the God you reject.

    I most definitely don’t have a clue because I reject your god and everyone else’s and I have no idea what your god is, and I couldn’t care less. Simply because we’re not talking about any gods but some definition of something that is only in your mind

  18. Robin: Just curious there FMM, but if you might be mistaken about everything, where exactly does your assurance that some god can reveal stuff fall?

    Again
    My assurance rests in God’s ability to reveal not in my cognitive strength.

    one more time

    My knowledge does not depend on me but on God

    Surely you would grant that an omnipotent being can do any thing that is not logically impossible. That is what omnipotent means after all.

    Are you claiming that knowledge logically impossible?

    I would love to see the you make that argument

    peace

  19. dazz: Is that by definition?

    Yes words have meanings.
    If they did not all reasoning would be impossible. Do you disagree?

    dazz: I most definitely don’t have a clue because I reject your god and everyone else’s and I have no idea what your god is, and I couldn’t care less.

    Wow, you don’t have a clue about him but you reject him. Do you reject everything you don’t understand?

    For example do you reject Quantum Mechanics?

    peace

  20. fifthmonarchyman: For example do you reject Quantum Mechanics?

    How many QM definitions do you know?
    How many god definitions are there?
    I can try and understand QM, but I can’t be bothered with your god and the myriad of other definitions of it out there. Can you spot the difference?

  21. dazz: How many QM definitions do you know?

    If Wikipedia is any guide there are at least 15 interpretations or rather 15 families of interpretations.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics

    dazz: How many god definitions are there?

    Just one if you are talking about the true God.

    dazz: I can try and understand QM, but I can’t be bothered with your god and the myriad of other definitions of it out there. Can you spot the difference?

    Yes, apparently you have vested interest in remaining willfully ignorant when it comes to God despite the amount of time and energy you put into rejecting him.

    I think I know why that is but I won’t speculate here

    peace

  22. fifthmonarchyman,

    Interpretations are not definitions, and at any rate, the correct interpretation can only be settled by evidence. Until then there’s no a-priori believing in any interpretation.

    fifthmonarchyman: Just one if you are talking about the true God.

    Or maybe zero if there’s no such thing. But the fact is that there’s a definition of god for every believer out there. Take theological fatalism for instance. Some define god as having perfect foreknowledge and some prefer to stick to libertarian free will. In the mind of the believer, his definition of god is supposed to be the true one. Only one can be right, and most likely you’re all wrong

  23. fifthmonarchyman: Ask yourself how you know there is no wall

    Phenomenology: careful description of my experience, and reflection on that experience, shows that the subjective, intersubjective, and objective dimensions or ‘poles’ of experience and knowledge are inconceivable independently of each other. Self-knowledge, knowledge of others, and knowledge of things grow up (and die) as our mode of being-in-the-world. Subjectivity independent of intersubjectivity and objectivity is a philosopher’s fantasy.

    Some folks seem to think that if we were bereft of divine revelation, all experience and knowledge would be completely subjective. (The question between theists and non-theists here is whether to accept the antecedent, but both accept the conditional.) I reject the conditional, because I think it does not actually make sense. I think it relies on the misbegotten idea that we can even make sense of what subjectivity is independent of all intersubjective and objective experience.

    But making sense of the interdependence of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectivity doesn’t require God or anything else like that. It requires embodiment (for there to be multiple perceptual-practical perspectives) and language (for information to be shared across those perspectives, thereby securing some degree of cognitive access to what is objectively real via a sort of “triangulation”).

    This means that embodiment and language are fundamental to the most basic characterization of our cognitive situation. They are not inferred, or posited, or introduced subsequently — they are woven into the account from the very beginning, on phenomenological grounds (the description of experience).

    Now, someone might be tempted to deny this and say that we need to begin with a much more sparse description of “the mind” and say that embodiment and language are only introduced into the model at some later stage (say, after divine revelation has grounded objective knowledge?). But from what I can tell, they would be motivated to say this only if they have assumed a Cartesian conception of the cognitive agent. But we have many reason to reject that conception, and no reasons to accept it.

  24. fifthmonarchyman

    Robin: I don’t need to nor do I care about “knowing” it

    nuff said.

    Yet, you’ve completely ignored the further point. ‘Nuff said’ indeed…

    Robin: It is, of course, subjective. How could such an exercise not be?

    1) So far we have established that you don’t know and your opinion is subjective anyway. I would agree on both points. It sounds like you have conceded the argument

    2) An “exercise” can only be objective if it is conducted by a being who is objective ie God. His opinions are objective fact by definition.

    Actually, you already conceded the point by not address “I’m hungry”. Do let me know when you get around to attempting it…

    As for your comment regarding exercises, even if some god existed, that would still not make any exercise “objective”, by definition. And no…gods are no more objective than humans, by definition. You might want to look up the meaning of “objective” some time…

    But I will grant you that you have a very interesting subjective opinion there. OOPS! There it is!

    Robin: The point is that the exercise of “I’m hungry” demolishes presuppositionalism.

    So you say with absolutely no evidence. Perhaps you could explain what demolishing presuppositionalism would look like?

    Already provided:

    Robin:So long as the state changes and that state change can be repeated, your claims become nonsense, because there is no need for your presuppositionalism to change the states. Your claims have been thus rendered moot.

    Fifthmonarchyman: Are you claiming that the phrase “I’m hungry” somehow proves that you don’t have presuppositions?

    Once again, since you seem to have trouble following the discussion: http://theskepticalzone.com/wp/the-disunity-of-reason/comment-page-17/#comment-121502

    It’s not about the letters or the word. You can use the symbol “4rxQNY67” if that works better for you. Or “glorp”. Or “happy”. What you call it is irrelevant. It’s the foundation of awareness: “I’m hungry” is a state of desire.

    Fifth: Please explain how in the world you reached that odd conclusion and how you know that it is the correct one?

    What do you mean by “correct one”? It shows that presuppositionalism is nonsense. There may well be other exercises that show presuppositionalism is nonsense too, some that are “more correct” for all I know, but this one works just fine. That’s all that matters for this discussion.

    This does illustrate one of the key reasons I slowly gave up Christianity. There seems to be this overriding perspective that just because something works and shows consistent results, such results can easily be dismissed because the universe might behave differently tomorrow (or you never know…some god might intervene and change the rules.) But, when push comes to shove, they all believe that the internal combustion engine in their cars will behave predictably. That perspective whiplash was just something I could not hold to for very long.

  25. Robin:

    The question is whether any god or gods exist.You cannot use the assumption that a god exists as one of your premises.

    Nonsense. He most definitely can; in point of fact, he has.

    I stand corrected.

  26. fifthmonarchyman:

    What things, specifically?

    The things that have been made. But I already said that

    This is non-responsive. What specifically are you saying is the objective, empirical evidence for the existence of a god or gods?

    You cannot use the assumption that a god exists as one of your premises.

    sure I can

    You can, but it makes your argument invalid.

    It’s the only fact in the universe that is necessarily true and the only sure starting point with which to reason from.

    Please support this claim. Provide objective, empirical evidence that a god or gods exist without assuming your conclusion.

    Given the rules and my clear statement that I lack belief in a god or gods, your assertion that “Everyone knows he exists” is refuted.

    Argument by internet rules.
    That is a new one.

    How do you know that your rules have the power to refute obvious truths?

    There is nothing “obvious” about your unsupported claim that a god or gods exist.

    I’m asking the question in the context of the site rules for three reasons:

    a) To remind you that this site does have goals and rules. I invite you to participate in that context.

    b) To point out how rude you are being by claiming to know what people believe better than those people themselves.

    c) To find out if you are capable of parking your priors at the door.

    So, I’ll repeat my questions. Given the rules and my clear statement that I lack belief in a god or gods, your assertion that “Everyone knows he exists” is refuted. You’ve parked your priors by the door. How does this new knowledge change your argument, if at all? That is, what else is different about your mental model of the world now that you know that at least one atheist really does exist?

  27. fifthmonarchyman:

    How does this new knowledge change your argument, if at all?

    How is new (or any) knowledge even possible given your untenable starting position?

    That is non-responsive and assumes the validity of a claim you have repeatedly, utterly failed to support.

    You’re the one making claims about other peoples’ beliefs. Why is it so important to you? Does the existence of atheists threaten your faith somehow?

  28. fifthmonarchyman:
    It’s been my experience that when folks claim to be atheist they generally mean the imaginary deity they thought they understood as a young child doesn’t exist.

    You need to meet more atheists. We actually do exist and many of us have considered far more religions than you apparently have.

  29. Robin: Just curious there FMM, but if you might be mistaken about everything, where exactly does your assurance that some god can reveal stuff fall?

    fifthmonarchyman: Again
    My assurance rests in God’s ability to reveal not in my cognitive strength.

    *sigh*…

    You are a continuous contradiction, FMM…

    Again, if you might be mistaken about everything, you might well be mistaken about some god’s ability to reveal anything.

    one more time

    My knowledge does not depend on me but on God

    Whether your knowledge depends on you or little green men from Alpha Centuri doesn’t change the fact that your ability to rely on said knowledge is still based in you and your acknowledgement that you might be mistaken about everything.

    Surely you would grant that an omnipotent being can do any thing that is not logically impossible. That is what omnipotent means after all.

    I have no problem with that hypothetical in principle. But that hypothetical concept of omnipotent does not, however, have anything to do with your assurance and your reliance on anything. The fact is, your assurance about said god still depends on you.

    Are you claiming that knowledge logically impossible?

    I would love to see the you make that argument

    So long as knowledge is based on human learning, then yes, knowledge is possible. The moment you insist that knowledge must originate with some other entity, then “knowledge” becomes an irrational contradiction.

  30. fifthmonarchyman:
    sure I can
    It’s the only fact in the universe that is necessarily true and the only sure starting point with which to reason from.

    Um…no. It is, as has been shown, simply begging the question. Nothing particularly interesting about it.

  31. fifthmonarchyman:

    Wow, you don’t have a clue about him but you reject him. Do you reject everything you don’t understand?

    For example do you reject Quantum Mechanics?

    peace

    This is an interesting discussion point. Keith and Patrushka have been having a discussion that has some relationship.

    Here’s my response: I do not reject quantum mechanics because it has quite clear, consistent, predictable, and repeatable entailments. Your supposed god, FMM…not so much…

  32. Kantian Naturalist: Some folks seem to think that if we were bereft of divine revelation, all experience and knowledge would be completely subjective.

    Leaving the existence of God out of the picture, would it be such a bad thing if all experience and knowledge were completely subjective?

  33. Robin: Actually, you already conceded the point by not address “I’m hungry”.

    Actually he did address it and you ignored his response.

  34. Kantian Naturalist: Phenomenology: careful description of my experience, and reflection on that experience, shows that the subjective, intersubjective, and objective dimensions or ‘poles’ of experience and knowledge are inconceivable independently of each other. Self-knowledge, knowledge of others, and knowledge of things grow up (and die) as our mode of being-in-the-world. Subjectivity independent of intersubjectivity and objectivity is a philosopher’s fantasy.

    Some folks seem to think that if we were bereft of divine revelation, all experience and knowledge would be completely subjective. (The question between theists and non-theists here is whether to accept the antecedent, but both accept the conditional.)I reject the conditional, because I think it does not actually make sense. I think it relies on the misbegotten idea that we can even make sense of what subjectivity is independent of all intersubjective and objective experience.

    But making sense of the interdependence of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectivity doesn’t require God or anything else like that. It requires embodiment (for there to be multiple perceptual-practical perspectives) and language (for information to be shared across those perspectives, thereby securing some degree of cognitive access to what is objectively real via a sort of “triangulation”).

    This means that embodiment and language are fundamental to the most basic characterization of our cognitive situation. They are not inferred, or posited, or introduced subsequently — they are woven into the account from the very beginning, on phenomenological grounds (the description of experience).

    Now, someone might be tempted to deny this and say that we need to begin with a much more sparse description of “the mind” and say that embodiment and language are only introduced into the model at some later stage (say, after divine revelation has grounded objective knowledge?). But from what I can tell, they would be motivated to say this only if they have assumed a Cartesian conception of the cognitive agent. But we have many reason to reject that conception, and no reasons to accept it.

    Hi NK

    The more I read what you write – the more I am convinced you are rehashing much of what Berkeley already wrote.

    ITMT – I am intrigued by your calling out how your detractors “…assumed a Cartesian conception of the cognitive agent…”

    I agree – that much of what is being discussed is Philosophical Pablum for freshman university students to sharpen their teeth on.

    Let’s bring it to a pragmatic level.

    Stephen Jay Gould ‘s Non-overlapping magisteria (NOMA) is premised on a correct understanding of Popper. (… which many present seem to lack)

    That means (according to Gould and Popper) it is possible for non-empirical statements to be meaningful (as you and I discussed before)

    That non-empirical statements are possibly meaningful does not ipso facto validate the cogency of any and all non-empirical statements. Therein lies the rub.

    The fact remains, that once two parties agree that a non-empirical POV is being discussed and that such POV does not represent pseudo-science (OK – I concede we are getting into murky water) the two parties can honestly agree to disagree (as it were) part paths and move on.

    Demands for empirical validation of the non-empirical begs the question that only the empirical criteria are to be considered valid in further discourse.

    Furthermore, puerile attempts by others (here and on other fora) magnanimously suggesting “sceptics” have left ample opportunity for “gods” to make their presence known “empirically” is of course a circular non-sequitur.

  35. Patrick: This is non-responsive.

    It is not non-responsive. This is just a pathetic dodge on your part.

    First, fifth has clearly indicted in a prior post what he means by “things that are made.” Second, he has clearly indicated how you may locate them. They are, in fact, all around you. You cannot avoid them and remain alive.

  36. Patrick: b) To point out how rude you are being by claiming to know what people believe better than those people themselves.

    Seems to me he is trying to encourage you to “know thyself.”

  37. Mung:
    So the evidence for dazz is all those posts made by dazz?

    Only if there’s evidence that I’m posting them. What’s god’s handle here?

  38. Mung: Leaving the existence of God out of the picture, would it be such a bad thing if all experience and knowledge were completely subjective?

    On the only sense of the word “subjective” that makes sense to me, it is impossible that all experience and knowledge were completely subjective. A complete or pure subjectivism would be indistinguishable from solipsism. In fact, it not even be solipsism. The solipsist is someone who says that she is fully aware of her own experiences, but flatly denies that there is any cause of those experiences other than herself.

    But I think that the contrast between what we experience subjectively and what we experience objectively is central to our understanding of both. (We understand, for example, the difference between an object that is moving closer to us and us moving closer to an object, even though in both cases there’s an increase in the percentage of the visual field occupied by the image.) The solipsist is unable to give a satisfactory account of this fact.

    If that’s right, then solipsism is not even a fully coherent position, and so complete subjectivism is not even a fully coherent position. And so it doesn’t matter whether complete subjectivism would be good or bad?

  39. Mung: Actually he did address it and you ignored his response.

    I’ve gone back through the entire list and nowhere does FMM address “I’m hungry”. In fact, I’ve had to correct him twice that “I’m hungry” has nothing to do with the words themselves. Sorry Mung, but you’re clearly not getting it either.

  40. Robin: In fact, I’ve had to correct him twice that “I’m hungry” has nothing to do with the words themselves.

    So he’s addressed it at least twice. If it’s not about the words then feel free to leave the words out next time you bring it up. 🙂

    So you have a sensation of hunger. You may as well you have a sensation of pain. As in hunger pains. What does that have to do with fifth’s position? What does your sensation of pain have to do with knowledge and how you know things?

  41. Mung: So you have a sensation of hunger. You may as well you have a sensation of pain. As in hunger pains. What does that have to do with fifth’s position? What does your sensation of pain have to do with knowledge and how you know things?

    Sensations (“sense-impressions”) are certainly necessary for empirical knowledge, but even then are not sufficient.

  42. Mung: So he’s addressed it at least twice. If it’s not about the words then feel free to leave the words out next time you bring it up.

    He still hasn’t addressed it even once.

    So you have a sensation of hunger. You may as well you have a sensation of pain. As in hunger pains.

    Sure…fine. Whatever sensation floats your boat for the exercise. Maybe you’d prefer “annoyed”? “Frustrated” works too…

    What does that have to do with fifth’s position?

    As explained, no presupposition is necessary in any way to change the state.

    What does your sensation of pain have to do with knowledge and how you know things?

    Once one establishes the foundation of state change, one has the basis to define and acquire knowledge. Again, without any need for presuppositions.

  43. Robin,

    I don’t know if one must presuppose that God exists in order to know that one is hungry (a “subjective” state). But FMM thinks that I must presuppose that God exists in order to know that I’m sitting on my patio (an “objective” state, since it is a claim about the world).

  44. For the record, I don’t think that it is necessary to have acquired a language in order to feel hungry, but I do think it is necessary to have acquired a language in order to know that one is hungry.

  45. Kantian Naturalist: t FMM thinks that I must presuppose that God exists in order to know that I’m sitting on my patio (an “objective” state, since it is a claim about the world).

    It’s much more than that.
    God must exist in order for you to know anything at all.

    peace

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