Last night I was talking with an old friend of mine, an atheist Jew, who is now in the best relationship of her life with a devout Roman Catholic. We talked about the fact that she was more surprised than he was about the fact that their connection transcends their difference in metaphysics. He sees himself as a devout Roman Catholic; she sees him as a good human being.
This conversation reminded me of an older thought that’s been swirling around in my head for a few weeks: the disunity of reason.
It is widely held by philosophers (that peculiar sub-species!) that reason is unified: that the ideally rational person is one for whom there are no fissures, breaks, ruptures, or discontinuities anywhere in the inferential relations between semantic contents that comprise his or her cognitive grasp of the world (including himself or herself as part of that world).
This is particularly true when it comes to the distinction between “theoretical reason” and “practical reason”. By “theoretical reason” I mean one’s ability to conceptualize the world-as-experienced as more-or-less systematic, and by “practical reason” I mean one’s ability to act in the world according to judgments that are justified by agent-relative and also agent-indifferent reasons (“prudence” and “morality”, respectively).
The whole philosophical tradition from Plato onward assumes that reason is unified, and especially, that theoretical and practical reason are unified — different exercises of the same basic faculty. Some philosophers think of them as closer together than others — for example, Aristotle distinguishes between episteme (knowledge of general principles in science, mathematics, and metaphysics) and phronesis (knowledge of particular situations in virtuous action). But even Aristotle does not doubt that episteme and phronesis are exercises of a single capacity, reason (nous).
However, as we learn more about how our cognitive system is actually structured, we should consider the possibility that reason is not unified at all. If Horst’s Cognitive Pluralism is right, then we should expect that our minds are more like patchworks of domain-specific modules that can reason quite well within those domains but not so well across them.
To Horst’s model I’d add the further conjecture: that we have pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “theoretical reason” (abstract thinking and long-term planning) with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and also pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “practical reason” (self-control and virtuous conduct) with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (and especially in its dense interconnections with the limbic system).
But if that conjecture is on the right track, then we would expect to find consistency between theoretical reason and practical reason only to the extent that there are reciprocal interconnections between these regions of prefrontal cortex. And of course there are reciprocal interconnections — but (and this is the important point!) to the extent that these regions are also functionally distinct, then to that same extent reason is disunified.
And as a consequence, metaphysics and ethics may have somewhat less to do with each other than previous philosophers have supposed.
This might be relevant if we were discussing how states are changed.
We are not so it is not
How exactly do you know that?
peace
Can you provide some objective empirical evidence that you are posting them rather than someone pretending to be you or a sophisticated chat bot ?
Why?
How do you know what makes arguments invalid?
peace
What state change? Given the constant need for fuel to stay alive I believe you are always hungry.
Perhaps you mean the state change to dead. But then what of knowledge?
I have no “ability” to do anything unless it is granted to me from God .
I am totally dependent on the Sovereign Lord of the universe. So it is not based in me at all.
It depends on God’s ability to reveal not on my ability to understand.
1) This discussion is about knowledge not assurance
2) do you think certainty is necessary for knowledge? Are you certain of this?
2) see Acts 17:31.
3) Do you deny that an omnipotent God could give assurance to me if he chose to?
Peace
But is that a justified belief?
1) what specific belief are you referring to?
2) Surely you acknowledge that God can reveal something to me in such a way so that I can be justified in believing it.
peace
So you keep saying, but thus far no argument has been given for why this is true.
in this context it is a hypothesis not an argument,
It will be falsified if a cogent consistent explanation can be given for how something can be known sans God.
So far nothing has been offered that does not rely on something that is incapable of offering justification for knowledge.
Some here assume that their cognitive faculties are reliable others assume that that the law of non contradiction is universal or that induction is valid.
What folks don’t explain is how they can know these things if God does not exist.
peace
fifth,
We’ve explained it to you again and again, over a period of months, but you still don’t get it. If you understood, you would either a) agree with us, or b) point out a flaw (or flaws) in our arguments. You do neither. Instead you just robotically repeat your questions as if doing so could somehow negate the answers you’ve already been given.
I’m afraid you just don’t have the smarts to participate in this discussion. More than once you’ve described the topic as “deep” and advised us to “buckle up”, but this isn’t complicated. You’re making a couple of simple, basic logical errors. We can describe them again and again, but at some point you’re going to have to do the work of actually thinking things through for yourself.
Here’s an idea: spend some time studying our comments. Then, when you think you understand what we’re arguing, come back and state our arguments in your own words. If you get to that point, then there’s at least some hope that we can guide you the rest of the way toward understanding where you’ve gone wrong.
Keiths is right about this, FMM. As i’ve explained about a zillion times, knowledge is completely consistent with not knowing how or that one knows. If one is sufficiently justified and what one believes is true, one knows–and your questions about how are irrelevant.
What’s worse for your position is that NOT knowing is consistent with your utter sureness that you know. These psychological properties provide no guarantees of anything.
In a word, you’re wrong on both counts.
If it’s any consolation, however, one of your critics, patrick, is as confused as you about the nature of this dispute when he asks for ‘objective, empirical evidence’ for claims such as ‘By “God” I mean that entity that provides undeniable truth.’ That is a stipulated premise to an ontological argument that neither needs to nor should be expected to provide such ‘evidence’.
Though I think your argument is unsound, Patrick’s silly request is tantamount to responding to St. Anselm, ‘Oh yeah, prove there’s this fool that keeps sayething that in his heart. I don’t see him. Can you provide his picture? If not, shut up.’
And I have said several times I agree.
We all know stuff. The question is not whether we know stuff it’s can we justify that knowledge in our given worldviews.
Irrelevant to what? My questions are very relevant to whether your knowledge is justified?
Is it possible that when I say “How do you know stuff?” you are reading “Do you know stuff?”
The answer to the second question is obvious of course you know stuff. The answer to the first not so much given your worldview.
Again this discussion is not about certainty it’s about knowledge.
I know I’ve pointed that out many times I’m not sure why you guys keep bringing it back up.
Apparently it is you who are wrong on both counts. For some reason you are ascribing views to me that I don’t hold.
Again instead of trying to figure out what my angle is why don’t you try and answer the question
How do you know stuff?
“I don’t know” is a perfectly acceptable answer
peace
what arguments?
AFAICT You all have failed to offer a single argument as to how you can know stuff in your worldview.
You’ve offered several arguments against what you apparently think my position is. In all cases that I’m aware of you are mistaken as to what that is. You are fighting strawmen of your own construction.
Instead of trying to figure out what I think so you can refute it why not just offer a justification for knowledge in your worldview.
That is after all what I’m asking for
peace
If you want a hint of what a positive argument might look like check this out with geared specifically toward mathematical knowledge
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jerrybowyer/2016/04/19/where-does-math-come-from-a-mathematiciantheologian-talks-about-the-limits-of-numbers/#5630d7e871df
I hope you will notice that the argument if I was to make it would be quite different than the one you all seem to think you have refuted.
peace
Fifth:
Click…whirrr…ticka ticka ticka ticka…*spoink*
Several of us — including myself — have done exactly that, many times. Each time you either ignore it entirely or demand that our conception satisfy your requirements on what an adequate conception of knowledge must be. And every articulation of why your requirements are deeply mistaken has been ignored or misinterpreted.
Since I can no longer maintain the pretense of believing that you are arguing in good faith, I shall be ignoring you henceforth.
“It depends on God’s ability to reveal not on my ability to understand.”
Maybe, using my fallible mind and the human definition of omnipotent, but without God’s revelation ,as I understand your position, that assumption of reason is not justified.
So I think you are saying, the ability of my fallible mind the assume the belief of revelation is the result of revelation is justification for the belief of revelation. But in that case the belief of revelation is a justified belief whether it is true or false. That seems erroneous.
I don’t see either recognition as significantly different. Whether you “know” you are sitting on your patio or simply define the state of pleasure you are experiencing as “sitting on your patio” seems somewhat irrelevant to me. Even getting some form of confirmation from others about your experience (thus granting it an objective status) doesn’t strike me as the issue. Simply experiencing any given state (“pleasure” from sitting on a patio or “I’m hungry” from lack of nourishment) and, subsequently experiencing a change in that state is sufficient to establish the basis of knowledge (even if it’s merely subjective, it’s still consistent for me).
So I just don’t see the need for either gods or presuppositions in anyway.
I totally agree with this KN. The thing is (and apparently this has gone over the heads of the likes of Mung and FMM), initially what one designates a state is irrelevant. Designating “I’m hungry” as “gloob” or “A” makes no difference. Similarly, designating “not hungry” as “klob” or “3” makes no difference either. Initially, recognizing the logic of “A” vs “not A” is not necessary. The only importance is having the capacity to recognize that the state changed.
As of yet, no presuppositionalist has been able to come up with an explanation for why that recognition requires some presupposition and from there, why any presupposition is necessary for knowledge.
We actually are though. Because such an exercise demonstrates no silly gods are necessary for knowledge. But feel free to show where the exercise fails.
I don’t need to “know” it; states just have to change. And since they do, I simply define the change as knowledge. Thus, I have knowledge.
No mythological ghosts, demons, or omnipotent pink unicorns necessary.
Even if you could establish this, there’s still be a state change between need to go to the bathroom and not needing to. Or do you have some odd condition whereby you can never get off the john?
‘Fraid there really can’t be any recognition of state change there. Yet another problem with FMM’s premise…
Indeed…
I’m not happy with the idea that awareness of a change in sensory states counts as knowledge all by itself. As Sellars famously put said, “in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.” Though one can be (and often is) justified in saying what it is one is aware of, the awareness itself is not sufficient for the justification.
Justification is about authority. To have reasons for one’s beliefs is to be in the position to demand of others that they either accept or challenge those reasons. That makes justification a social practice governed by implicit (or sometimes explicit) norms of appraisal and conduct. One’s own awareness of sensory states and changes from one state to another can’t function as knowledge because there is all the difference in the world between merely being aware and making a claim about that awareness.
Only claims can be the sorts of things that can be backed up by reasons in a social practice of justification, and hence only the latter but not the former can count as knowledge (if justification is required for knowledge).
You keep saying this, but oddly can’t seem to validate the claim in anyway. So, I’m sure you won’t mind that I dismiss it as absurd. I mean…unless you can…you know…actually defend it with something other than merely repeating the claim over and over and over ad nauseum.
In any event, if you have no “ability” to do anything, then you can never assess anything regardless of any divine foundation. That you recognize this isn’t the case means that you must have some ability before any deity does anything (there would be no way for any deity to establish anything in you for knowledge if you didn’t first have some capacity to have something established in you – that capacity *is* an ability to do something. So right there you are wrong).
And, if you then admit that you could be wrong about everything regardless of whatever “magical ability” some deity then establishes that then allows you to “know” things, then you could be wrong about said deity establishing said “magic ability”. Heck, you could be totally wrong about said deity even existing…how could you possibly know?
Bottom line, your claim that you rely on some deity for knowledge is totally suspect. A) because there’s no way to objectively demonstrate the existence of said deity and B) because you acknowledge your faculty for knowledge is faulty in spite of the supposed perfection of said deity.
Makes your claim questionable, to say nothing of moot.
Yeah, yeah…make claim, repeat claim, repeat again. And then insist you’re right, regardless of whether you’re then contradicting your other claims. Rinse and repeat…
Do let me know when you get a new claim.
Still requires your ability to receive what your deity supposedly reveals. Even a Kleenex requires that ability. Are you saying you have less ability than a Kleenex?
It’s one in the same, FMM. You lack any ability, apparently, and thus have no assurance there is even any deity, let alone that you have any knowledge of anything.
What does this have to do with anything being discussed?
Indeed. What makes you think I’m not one of the appointed?
I deny that you can know any such assurance without the capacity to receive it first.
Why would anyone need to justify knowledge with a worldview? If it works (is repeatable, consistent, and predictable), in what way does it need to be justified?
Now this is the right way to call someone ignorant! But it still violates the rules. Frankie should learn from keiths. We all ought to learn from keiths.
How do you know this? 😉
You’ve yet to provide any argument or explanation for why the “I’m hungry” exercise fails. Until you do, your hypotheses of any other requirement is not valid.
“I’m hungry” establishes this.
Sure, but what if you believe things that don’t work, like the claim that atheists know that God exists?*
Then you need a worldview of similar quality to justify what is contrary to the evidence.
Glen Davidson
*To be fair, and depending on what you mean by it, one does justify according to a “worldview,” even if that’s empiricism. But that’s not the same thing as a “worldview” imposed via presuppositions that merely serve religious beliefs rather than reflecting what actually does work (depends on what that means, too, but I think most of us know).
So in your view at least two things are required for knowledge.
1. Change.
2. A capacity to recognize change.
Is that right?
For two reasons:
1. You claim to have knowledge
2. You claim others lack knowledge.
Are you willing to drop these two claims?
Ah. At least three things then:
1. Change.
2. A capacity to recognize change.
3. The ability to define knowledge as being a change from one state to a different state.
Is that right?
I can sort of understand why you would want to dismiss it, why you might disagree with it, but why dismiss it as absurd just because you disagree?
I think that’s absurd. So I will dismiss your absurd dismissal.
Yes. I agree completely with Sellars (and your) perspective here. I’m not equating state change with knowledge. I do think that the very existence of state change and the associated acknowledgement of state change is the initial foundation of what constitutes knowledge.
Yep. Still in agreement.
While I don’t disagree, I don’t think claims or reasons are the essence of knowledge and I don’t think claims are knowledge themselves, though claims (and support for said claims) do demonstrate one has knowledge.
Knowledge, to me however, is specific information and the ability to act on said information so as to influence some future outcome.
Here’s an example: I may well make some claim about FTGTOP Ceylon, but until and unless I do something based on that impression (like brew and drink some of that tea), I don’t believe there’s any way for someone to determine I have any actual knowledge or even for me to assess that what I think I know is actual knowledge.
Not quite. That’s merely the foundation for knowledge. Knowledge, as KN notes, must include language. Conceptualization (and the ability to act on said conceptualization) requires the ability to organize thought, which in turn requires some form of language.
Never made claim 2, so I don’t really care about it. Claim 1 I feel I can make without justification. If you don’t think I have knowledge or you don’t think my knowledge is valid, you are not obligated in anyway to accept it. Doesn’t faze me in the least.
Closer. See above.
If you prefer the word “fallacious”, fine, but either way, it’s an incredibly illogical perspective. For a start, FMM claims beg the question. His claims boil down to:
So yeah…I think that’s absurd.
And you are welcome to think my perspective is absurd Mung. In point of fact, if you don’t find FMM’s claim absurd, I would certainly hope you find my perspective absurd. You’d really look silly if you dismissed them both…
It is an unsupported claim that you have asserted a number of times here.
You’ve got the burden of proof backward. Your baseless assertions are not the default. If you have evidence or a rational argument to support your claim, present it.
And before you start asking questions in return, just don’t. I’m asking you to support your claim. Lay out what you’ve got.
Acknowledgement is the foundation of knowledge?
The nice thing about presuppositionalist apologetics is that the baseless assertions are the default, and the burden of proof is on everyone who is not a Christian.
That’s the entire position — everyone other than the True Christian must defend their rejection of True Christianity (and of course they will not be able to, but they are welcome to try).
At any rate justification, truth, and belief all require language. There has to be a distinct kind of knowledge that many animals have and that isn’t JTB-style knowledge. Ernest Sosa has a distinction between “animal knowledge” and “reflective knowledge” that I need to look into here, with commentary by Michael Williams.
It might be an interesting exercise to have folks say just what the question is that fifth is allegedly begging. What do you say?
Whether knowledge is possible in a world without God.
What is required for knowledge.
What is the foundation or ground for knowledge.
Although, I think fifth as said he’s not making an argument, so that may be moot. So perhaps what we should be asking is just what is he asking from others when he asks how they know stuff?
Is it what is it that makes knowledge possible and how do you know that the elements that you believe make knowledge possible are in fact what make knowledge possible? That seems to pose quite the conundrum. It would seem that any answer will be circular. Will be question begging, even.
So who is really begging the question?
‘Awareness of’, if you prefer. Definition #2.
You can start your research here. Your fallacious argument is at the top of the article.
Even if such an entity existed (a claim you have yet to support), you as a fallible human would have no way of distinguishing between being given assurance by a god or being mistaken about believing you have been given assurance by a god.
Everything you believe could be wrong.
Yes, I was wondering whether a bacteria has knowledge in the “state change” view of knowledge.
First, “begging the question” has nothing to do with actually begging any questions. It’s a translation from Latin (pepititio principii), which more literally translates to “assuming the initial point”. Which is precisely what FMM is doing.
So, FMM is assuming God. And he then proceeds to conclude all sorts of things based on this initial assumption. And from there, he concludes God. You tell me where the problem lies…
The issue is, premising those things does not then then validate a conclusion of those things.
Technically, he’s not making an argument. He’s merely assuming that which he insists is true. And then insisting that everyone else accepts it true too. Oookaay…
I’m having trouble parsing this. Can you rephrase it? I suspect you wanted to drop the “Is” and “it” from the beginning, but since I’m not sure, I’m not sure how to read it.
You’re welcome to point out where the circularity lies in what I posed. Even better, show where KN’s response is circular.
FMM. Hands down.
Where has fifth claimed that you have the burden of proof?
Also, if you don’t like having to defend your silly claims, stop making them. Simple.
Yes, we know. It’s your baseless assertions that are the default. The sooner you can get them codified the better.
Nice to see Patrick admit that authority is a source of knowledge.
Why do I get the feeling that not only do you not wonder whether bacteria have knowledge based on “state change”, but that you actually wonder anything at all.
Seriously Mung, have you ever considered what is behind bacteria moving toward food sources and away from toxins? Is it God simply moving the bacteria around Himself? If not, then what explains their movement patterns?