The Disunity of Reason

Last night I was talking with an old friend of mine, an atheist Jew, who is now in the best relationship of her life with a devout Roman Catholic. We talked about the fact that she was more surprised than he was about the fact that their connection transcends their difference in metaphysics. He sees himself as a devout Roman Catholic; she sees him as a good human being.

This conversation reminded me of an older thought that’s been swirling around in my head for a few weeks: the disunity of reason.

It is widely held by philosophers (that peculiar sub-species!) that reason is unified: that the ideally rational person is one for whom there are no fissures, breaks, ruptures, or discontinuities anywhere in the inferential relations between semantic contents that comprise his or her cognitive grasp of the world (including himself or herself as part of that world).

This is particularly true when it comes to the distinction between “theoretical reason” and “practical reason”. By “theoretical reason” I mean one’s ability to conceptualize the world-as-experienced as more-or-less systematic, and by “practical reason” I mean one’s ability to act in the world according to judgments that are justified by agent-relative and also agent-indifferent reasons (“prudence” and “morality”, respectively).

The whole philosophical tradition from Plato onward assumes that reason is unified, and especially, that theoretical and practical reason are unified — different exercises of the same basic faculty. Some philosophers think of them as closer together than others — for example, Aristotle distinguishes between episteme (knowledge of general principles in science, mathematics, and metaphysics) and phronesis (knowledge of particular situations in virtuous action). But even Aristotle does not doubt that episteme and phronesis are exercises of a single capacity, reason (nous).

However, as we learn more about how our cognitive system is actually structured, we should consider the possibility that reason is not unified at all. If Horst’s Cognitive Pluralism is right, then we should expect that our minds are more like patchworks of domain-specific modules that can reason quite well within those domains but not so well across them.

To Horst’s model I’d add the further conjecture: that we have pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “theoretical reason” (abstract thinking and long-term planning) with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and also pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “practical reason” (self-control and virtuous conduct) with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (and especially in its dense interconnections with the limbic system).

But if that conjecture is on the right track, then we would expect to find consistency between theoretical reason and practical reason only to the extent that there are reciprocal interconnections between these regions of prefrontal cortex. And of course there are reciprocal interconnections — but (and this is the important point!) to the extent that these regions are also functionally distinct, then to that same extent reason is disunified. 

And as a consequence, metaphysics and ethics may have somewhat less to do with each other than previous philosophers have supposed.

 

 

1,419 thoughts on “The Disunity of Reason

  1. Kantian Naturalist: Except that (1) no reasons have been offered for the claim that anyone else here has “foundations” to his or her worldview,

    I don’t hold that most of you have foundations.

    In fact when it comes down to I would venture to bet that most of you have no real basis at all for your claims to knowledge and others hold to circular arguments that taken together aren’t sufficient to support such a claim.

    What I’d like to do is see you examine this instead of simply assuming there is some there there behind it all

    Kantian Naturalist: (2) the only reason why you think that we haven’t examined our assumptions is because we don’t share your conclusions,

    No the reason is that you are unable to offer a concise and coherent answer to the question of how you know stuff.

    Instead when I ask the question I get long monologues explaining how truth is irrelevant and you how don’t have to know how you know to know stuff….

    and long name dropping paragraphs about the efforts other have put into trying to come up with a cogent answer to the question……..

    I just what to know how you know stuff given your worldview

    peace

    Kantian Naturalist: (3) our efforts to highlight the unquestioned assumptions at work in your worldview have fallen on deaf ears.

    Of course I have unquestioned assumptions we all do.
    For instance
    1) I assume that you are a real person and not a figment of my imagination
    2) I assume that things like logic and reason are valid means to getting at the truth
    3) I assume that induction is valid

    I feel confident in assuming these things because God exists

    What I would like to know is what is the warrant for making these sorts of assumptions given your worldview

    peace

    peace

  2. Neil: You completely misinterpreted what I said. Your attempt to refute your misinterpretation does not count as an argument against my position.

    keiths: Then answer my questions:

    LoL. I could have predicted that. Questions are not arguments either.

  3. fifth,

    This has been explained to you probably twenty times by now, if not more.

    Please read through KN’s argument carefully and actually think about it.

    Here’s my version:

    1. We are fallible.

    2. Any particular belief of yours might therefore be incorrect — that is, you could have gotten it wrong because of your fallibility.

    3. That includes the belief that something has been infallibly revealed to you by God.

    4. Therefore, any time you believe that something has been infallibly revealed to you by God, in such a way that there can be no doubt whatsoever of its truth, you are wrong.

    5. It is logically impossible for you, as a fallible person, to be absolutely certain of any thought you have, including the thought that you have experienced a divine revelation. God’s omnipotence doesn’t change that. Omnipotence doesn’t include the ability to do logically impossible things.

  4. Kantian Naturalist: it is not possible for me to be certain that any such experience really is of His presence.

    1) Are you certain that it is not possible?
    2) Is certainty necessary for knowledge?
    3) Is it possible that an Omnipotent God can reveal stuff in such a was as to make knowledge possible?

    peace

  5. keiths: Here’s my version:

    Keith If I ever have the desire to have a discussion about certainty I will look you up.

    Right now I’m interested in knowledge any knowledge whatsoever.

    How do you know stuff in your worldview?

    Your “version” does not even address that so it is irrelevant to this conversation

    peace

  6. Robin: And here’s the proof: “I’m hungry”.

    If you can’t demonstrate the presupposition that leads to the state (not the statement) and the process of changing the state (and then repeating that process), then your claim is nonsense.

    How do you know it’s nonsense?

    peace

  7. fifth, to KN:

    1) Are you certain that it is not possible?
    2) Is certainty necessary for knowledge?

    [Emphasis added]

    fifth, in the very next comment:

    Keith If I ever have the desire to have a discussion about certainty I will look you up.

    You’re a hoot, fifth.

  8. Patrick: So since you could be wrong about any or all of your beliefs, being fallible and all, on what basis do you think that any are justified without having any objective, empirical evidence to support them?

    As I have repeatedly told you I do have objective empirical evidence for my beliefs.

    How do you know that objective, empirical evidence is a valid way to evaluate beliefs?

    Patrick: And while I’m responding, in what sense do you mean “exists” when you say “Truth exists”?

    It depends of what the definition of is is 😉

    peace

  9. keiths: You’re a hoot, fifth.

    Thank you.

    by the way you did see my comments were to KN who is apparently making the same mistake you are when it comes to certainty and knowledge.

    peace

  10. Mung,

    Questions are not arguments either.

    Who said they were?

    Those questions are designed to reveal whether I’ve really misunderstood Neil’s position or whether he is just blowing smoke in an effort to avoid admitting his mistake. My money is on the latter.

  11. Neil Rickert: I’m not a foundationalist.

    Cool
    I’m not a flutist or a botanist
    What does that have to do with the cost of tea in China? When I said I was hoping to get you to examine the foundations of your worldview I did not mean it in a sense of foundationalism,

    I meant it as in “how do you know stuff?”.
    What is your justification for your claim to have knowledge about the world?

    Peace

  12. keiths: a) show that I’ve misunderstood your position, and
    b) tell us what you really meant by the two quotes above.

    I have long since given up any hope of (b), at least with respect to keiths understanding it.

    I have better things to do with my time than repeatedly do (a) for every topic, particularly because it happens so often with keiths.

    Now kindly click that “ignore commenter” and be done with it. You can save time and effort for both of us with one simple click.

  13. keiths:

    You accuse me of a “near total misunderstanding” of your position. If you’re right about that, you should be able to

    a) show that I’ve misunderstood your position, and
    b) tell us what you really meant by the two quotes above.

    That you refuse to do so suggests that I didn’t misunderstand your position.

    Neil:

    I have long since given up any hope of (b), at least with respect to keiths understanding it.

    Then do it for everyone else’s benefit, so they can understand what you are arguing. Perhaps I’m too dense to understand your deep views, but surely there are others here with sufficiently refined minds.

    It’s exactly as I said:

    Neil,

    Your pattern is stale, predictable, and dishonest:

    1. You say something.

    2. Someone points out that you’re wrong.

    3. You say they’ve misunderstood you, but you don’t explain where they’ve gone wrong and you don’t tell us what you really do mean.

    4. Someone asks you what you really meant.

    5. You dodge the question.

  14. fifthmonarchyman: As I have repeatedly told you I do have objective empirical evidence for my beliefs.

    Are you sure? Do others who don’t happen to share your beliefs, nonetheless agree that your evidence is both objective and empirical? My own experience is that while evidence may be objective, it is meaningless unless it is interpreted somehow, and those interpretations are NOT objective.

    How do you know that objective, empirical evidence is a valid way to evaluate beliefs?

    The best method yet discovered, which is far from perfect, is to compare our interpretations of the evidence with those who disagree, to isolate the points of disagreement. And then to construct tests of those specific points, to see who (if anyone) seems more nearly probably correct pending the next iteration of this process.

    Which leads me to wonder why not everyone shares your beliefs, and what tests have been conducted on which aspects of those beliefs, to see which more closely fits predictions based on them.

  15. fifthmonarchyman: I meant it as in “how do you know stuff?”.

    I’ve explained that in the past. I take knowledge to be “knowing how”. And that comes from trying stuff out to see what works. No foundation or presupposition required.

  16. Flint: Do others who don’t happen to share your beliefs, nonetheless agree that your evidence is both objective and empirical?

    Some do. Do others have to agree for evidence to be empirical and objective?

    Flint: My own experience is that while evidence may be objective, it is meaningless unless it is interpreted somehow, and those interpretations are NOT objective.

    It’s depends on who is doing the interpretation God’s interpretations are objective by definition

    Flint: The best method yet discovered, which is far from perfect, is to compare our interpretations of the evidence with those who disagree, to isolate the points of disagreement.

    How do you know it’s best?

    How could you possibly know given that your interpretation of the evidence is subjective?

    Flint: Which leads me to wonder why not everyone shares your beliefs

    You have already answered that question. There is disagreement because human opinions are necessarily subjective.

    Flint: what tests have been conducted on which aspects of those beliefs, to see which more closely fits predictions based on them.

    How do you know that correspondence to predictions is the way to evaluate the merit of beliefs?
    How could you possibly know this given that your opinions are necessarily subjective?

    peace

  17. keiths: At least this time you’re not pulling the “my thoughts are too profound for mere words” stunt.

    Except that I never said what you falsely quote me as saying.

  18. Neil Rickert: I’ve explained that in the past. I take knowledge to be “knowing how”. And that comes from trying stuff out to see what works.

    How do you know this?

    Are you just saying that you choose to define knowledge that way? If so How do you know your definition is correct?
    How do you know that “knowing how” comes from trying stuff out to see what works?

    Please try and think deeply about this instead of sloughing it off as a game.

    I assure you it is not.

    peace

  19. fifthmonarchyman: Some do. Do others have to agree for evidence to be empirical and objective?

    Nope. But they do serve somewhat as a check on one’s one biases. Wise people regard things they like to hear with deep suspicion, because the temptation to swallow what’s congenial is very strong.

    It’s depends on who is doing the interpretation God’s interpretations are objective by definition

    But gods themselves are entirely subjective. My interpretation is that there is no evidence for any gods. Now, the question becomes how we TEST to see who is more nearly correct. Whole wars have been fought over opposing positions BOTH sides claimed came directly from the SAME god.

    How do you know it’s best?

    By the track record. This method has produced more knowledge (measured in terms of both accurate predictions and consiliant cumulative success) in a couple centuries than all of human history beforehand. No other method has achieved anything close.

    How could you possibly know given that your interpretation of the evidence is subjective?

    Here we are using a product of that process to discuss this matter. We seem to have the same subjective impression that the internet and this site exist, and that our questions produce (usually) relevant responses.

    How do you know that correspondence to predictions is the way to evaluate the merit of beliefs?

    This isn’t so much a matter of knowledge, as a matter of preferring the observed results.

  20. Kantian Naturalist: Thus while it is possible for God to reveal Himself to me in such a way that I do not and cannot doubt His presence, it is not possible for me to be certain that any such experience really is of His presence

    Unless god sends batman to confirm the authenticity of the revelation. That would pretty much settle it.

  21. fifthmonarchyman: As I have repeatedly told you I do have objective empirical evidence for my beliefs.

    Please present it.

    Also please answer the question about in what sense(s) you mean “Truth exists.”

  22. Patrick: Please present it.

    I did in the other thread. Here you go again. In case you missed it,

    God’s opinion is objective by definition and he says he reveals himself empirically (in the things that are made)

    Patrick: Also please answer the question about in what sense(s) you mean “Truth exists.”

    Again it depends on what the definition of is is.

    Please try to keep up. i would just assume not repeat myself.

    thanks

  23. Neil Rickert: Think of it as an operational definition.

    How do you know that operational definitions definitions are tentatively valid? If that is what you believe. If not please explain how you know this?

    peace

  24. fifthmonarchyman: I did in the other thread. Here you go again. In case you missed it,

    God’s opinion is objective by definition and he says he reveals himself empirically (in the things that are made)

    You’re assuming your conclusion. What objective, empirical evidence do you have that anything like your god actually exists?

    Again it depends on what the definition of is is.

    It’s your claim. If you don’t want to clarify what you mean, just say so.

  25. keiths: 1. We are fallible.

    You are fallible. But how do you know you are fallible? And what is more, how do you know others are fallible as well? Assuming you’re actually fallible.

  26. keiths: Those questions are designed to reveal whether I’ve really misunderstood Neil’s position or whether he is just blowing smoke in an effort to avoid admitting his mistake. My money is on the latter.

    You don’t have to convince the rest of us of your disdain for the rules. It is well known.

  27. fifthmonarchyman: God’s opinion is objective by definition and he says…

    So you guys define god to say the things you want. Cool. Religion is like ventriloquism, but a lot more comedic

  28. Since the presuppostionalist is unable to give non-circular answers to how he knows what he knows, I don’t see why the pragmatist is expected to fare any better.

    Nevertheless, I think we can make sense of knowledge in pragmatic, naturalist lights by thinking of justified true belief as what happens when more-or-less reliable animal cognition is transformed by a shared, natural language.

    The trick here is to recognize how the emergence & acquisition of language makes it possible for creatures with differently embodied, more-or-less reliable cognitive processes to share their environmentally embedded perspectives and coordinate information.

    Doing so allows them “triangulate” (so to speak) on what sensible and intelligible features should be ascribed to the objects in the environment and what sensible and intelligible features should be ascribed to their respective perspectives on those environments.

    In that way, the medium of intersubjective communication is the site of the emergence of both objectivity and also subjectivity.

  29. fifthmonarchyman: Did I ever tell you that I like your style.

    Subjectivity is the original sin of all non-christian worldviews.

    There is simply no way sans God to get beyond “my particular representation” to objective reality.

    The only problem is that without God we have no way to know if our thoughts are sound or incoherent insanity.

    I agree,

    We all start with the reality of thought whether it is the finite fumblings of the creature or the pure perfect reflection of the creator.

    peace

    Hi FFM

    I believe you did tell me.

    As the term means so many things to different people and because I believe that views on religion are something that each individual must work out for themselves I prefer to leave God out of my arguments. But each of us argues as we see fit and I admire your faith and your attitude.

    Peace to you too.

  30. Kantian Naturalist:

    CharlieM: A naive outlook considers the world outside as reality, but anyone who begins to reflect will see that the world of our experience is, to begin with, our representation of reality. I have a subjective view of the plant in front of me. If I see another plant of the same species in the distance it will appear to be much smaller. By adding the correct concepts to this plant I begin to see it in its full reality. These concepts are not something we invented, but something we discover, they belong to the plant.

    The introduction of “representation” here relies on a bad description of what experience is like. (A faulty phenomenology.) I do experience partial, limited perspectives on objects, yes — but I do not experience representations of those objects. I experience the objects themselves, but from the finite, limited, fallible, and embodied perspectives that I occupy as I move through space and time.

    I am happy to agree that through our senses we experience the outer world as a partial reality. But IMO your criticism of the use of representations is just wordplay. To try to comprehend what experience would be like without any thinking we have to describe what it would be that we experience. We can call it representation, the given, the percept, the appearance or whatever, it doesn’t matter. What matters is that we attempt to imagine that this something is entirely different from the world of our experience after thinking has gone to work in adding the concepts to it. The terms you use such as “I”, “space” and “time” are concepts which you have arrived at through thinking.

    The whole subjective/objective, appearance/reality framework is the product of interesting but bad metaphysics, imposed on the experience of perceiving and judging. If we put those framework aside and inquire into perceiving and judging with a sort of feigned innocence, we’re not going to find the materials for supporting the subject/object and appearance/reality distinctions.

    Well there is truth in this as far as perceiving is concerned. But these terms are not imposed on the experience of judging, it is through our judgements that we arrive at these concepts. When you look at an oak tree what do you see? Do you see the essential nature of the tree? Say that it is the middle of winter. The entity you see is just one bare snapshot of this organism. But once thinking is applied to it you transcend the limited point of view given by this perception. You understand its growth in space and time, its changing with the seasons, the coming and going of leaves, the laying down of dead cells which forms the wooden bulk of the tree, the budding in the spring.

    The appearance/reality distinction only makes sense if you agree with Plato that both Parmenides and Heraclitus were right —the problem of the one and the many, of Being and Becoming. But to get the ball rolling here, one first has to think that there’s some distinction between being and becoming. Already one is engaged in high-altitude metaphysical speculation far removed from the nitty-gritty details of describing the experiencing of perception and thought.

    The appearance/reality distinction makes sense for any normal developing human. I can remember as a very young child travelling on a bus. I watched the moon beyond the houses and trees following the bus. As far as my understanding went the moon was actually moving in this way, that is how it appeared to me and I had no reason to doubt it. Then as I gained the concept of perspective I realized that the reality of the situation was diffent to how it appeared to my senses. I knew nothing of ancient Greece at that time and I certainly wasn’t engaging in high-altitude metaphysical speculation.

    Likewise, the subject/object distinction only makes sense if you agree with Descartes that we have incorrigible, perfect access (via “introspection”) to our mental contents, but only problematic access (via “sensation”) to physical objects. But Descartes only needs to say this so that he can reconcile his commitment to an Augustinian conception of free will with his commitment to a Galilean conception of mechanistic physics. Once you can see your way past the need for either free will or determinism, the whole subject/object framework loses its importance.

    Instead the subject/object distinction, we can think of the phenomenologically basic distinction as one between the embodied subject and the affordances and solicitations of his or her environment, with that distinction taken up and modified, by the need for more-or-less successful cooperation, into a distinction between how I take the world to be, how you take the world to be, how we take the world to be, and how the world really is.

    The subject/object distinction makes sense to us as soon as your awareness is such that you can look in a mirror and understand that the object in front of you is actually an image of yourself. In the above sentence you are still making the distinction between subject and object only you are clouding it with extraneous waffle.

    Arguably, the idea of how the world really is, independent of how any culture takes it to be, really comes on the scene during the Axial Age. Prior to that, my conjecture is that most cultures didn’t distinguish between how the world really is and how the members of that culture took the world to be. The concept of objectivity has a long history!

    Yes the concept of objectivity has a long history tied in with the rise of self-consciousness.

  31. Neil Rickert: Since it is tentative, it doesn’t matter.

    1) Since the validity (i.e. truth) of your definition does not matter why should I care about what you have to say?

    2) Is it true that it does not matter?

    3) how do you know?

    peace

  32. Kantian Naturalist: Since the presuppostionalist is unable to give non-circular answers to how he knows what he knows, I don’t see why the pragmatist is expected to fare any better.

    There are vicious and virtuous circles.

    A virtuous circle begins and ends with something that is capable of giving warrant to belief.

    A vicious circle is not grounded in anything solid. it is suspended so to speak in mid air just looping back and forth against itself.

    peace

  33. Kantian Naturalist: I think we can make sense of knowledge in pragmatic, naturalist lights by thinking of justified true belief as what happens when more-or-less reliable animal cognition is transformed by a shared, natural language.

    How do you know this is the case? Please answer in a non viciously circular fashion.

    peace

  34. fifthmonarchyman:
    A vicious circle is not grounded in anything solid. it is suspended so to speak in mid air just looping back and forth against itself.

    Unevidenced god claims being an excellent example.

  35. Patrick: You’re assuming your conclusion.

    No God is revealing himself to you

    Patrick: What objective, empirical evidence do you have that anything like your god actually exists?

    See above. Or look around

    Patrick: It’s your claim. If you don’t want to clarify what you mean, just say so.

    Do you really not get it?
    To say something exists is just to say it is.
    That is why it depends on what the definition of is is.

    This is not difficult
    think man

    hint: does a definition of exist exist?

    peace

  36. Patrick: Unevidenced god claims being an excellent example.

    How do you know this?
    How could you possibly know this or anything given your worldview?
    What evidence do you offer to support your claim?

    peace

  37. Robin: “I’m hungy.” “I’m hungry” provides the knowledge that your claim is nonsense.

    how do you know? Please answer in a non circular fashion?

    peace

  38. Robin: “I’m hungy.” “I’m hungry” provides the knowledge that your claim is nonsense.

    How does this “I’m hungry.” thingy provide anything let alone knowledge?
    How can it? Are the letters endowed with some secret magical power I’m unaware of?

    peace

  39. Provide- 1) make available for use; supply.
    2) make adequate preparation for (a possible event).

    How can a string of letters “make” anything? Are they conscious or animate?

    I’m really having a hard time following your claim. You are going to have explain your self and the power of this incantation of yours

    peace

  40. fifthmonarchyman: how do you know? Please answer in a non circular fashion?

    peace

    There is no circularity. The basis is “I’m hungry.” I know that your claims are nonsense because of “I’m hungry”. It’s that simple.

    If you can’t address the “I’m hungry”, your claims must, by association be nonsense. I don’t even need to know it; that’s just the automatic outcome. I will eventually discover it (thus I do end up knowing that your claims are nonsense simply from the “I’m hungry” process), but the knowing is irrelevant. The awareness provided by “I’m hungry” (and by association – the awareness ultimately of not “I’m hungry”) is all that matters.

    And until you can address that, your god is no better than used tissue and your presuppositionalism no better than late night, self-help fraud.

  41. fifthmonarchyman: How does this“I’m hungry.” thingy provide anything let alone knowledge?
    How can it?Are the letters endowed with some secret magical power I’m unaware of?

    peace

    It’s not about the letters or the word. You can use the symbol “4rxQNY67” if that works better for you. Or “glorp”. Or “happy”. What you call it is irrelevant. It’s the foundation of awareness: “I’m hungry” is a state of desire.

    It doesn’t matter if you know what the desire is. In fact, in most cases, you can’t know what the desire is. But that’s irrelevant. It is simply the fact that the moment you feel desire (state A) and encounter a means to change that state (state B), you have the basis of comparison. That comparison allows action in the world. And, action based on comparison is knowledge. From there all knowledge follows.

    Thus, your claims are nonsense.

  42. fifthmonarchyman:

    You’re assuming your conclusion.

    No God is revealing himself to you

    No, you are assuming a god exists in your argument intended to demonstrate that a god exists.

    What objective, empirical evidence do you have that anything like your god actually exists?

    See above. Or look around

    I looked around. I see no objective, empirical evidence to support the claim that any gods exist. Can you be more specific?

    It’s your claim. If you don’t want to clarify what you mean, just say so.

    Do you really not get it?
    To say something exists is just to say it is.
    That is why it depends on what the definition of is is.

    It appears that at least one of us doesn’t get it.

    As has been pointed out to you repeatedly, “truth” is an abstract noun. What exactly do you mean when you say “Truth exists”?

    Note carefully that this is a question about what you mean. Asking me questions in return is simply evasive.

  43. Various epistemological stances I nonchalantly clump under the umbrella of “Empirical Reductionism” are all lethal to any version of religious belief, no question; the problem is that all such empirical reductionist stances all beg various questions. (an inconvenient truth that various confused participants at sandwalk.blogspot cannot wrap their heads around)

    First of all, any empiricist criterion of meaning is itself not empirically verifiable.

    Second there MAY still exist alternate ways of “knowing” where non-empirical statements can still be meaningful although unamenable to empirical examination. (some of us should really review Popper on this very subject)

    I know (so far) of no a priori argument capable of dismissing non-empirical statements as “meaningless” which are themselves not circular from the outset. I welcome correction.

    ITMT, I am grateful to this site for alerting me to the efforts of Okasha & van Fraassen in this regard. I have much reading to do.

  44. fifthmonarchyman: There are vicious and virtuous circles.

    A virtuous circle begins and ends with something that is capable of giving warrant to belief.

    A vicious circle is not grounded in anything solid. it is suspended so to speak in mid air just looping back and forth against itself.

    These are just word clangs. “Vicious circle” denotes a self-reinforcing process that has an outcome we regard as negative – e.g. opiate drug addiction. It has nothing to do with argumentation, flawed or otherwise. “Virtuous circle” is a more recent coinage that denotes a self-reinforcing process that has a positive or desired outcome, similarly unrelated to valid or invalid argumentation.

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