Last night I was talking with an old friend of mine, an atheist Jew, who is now in the best relationship of her life with a devout Roman Catholic. We talked about the fact that she was more surprised than he was about the fact that their connection transcends their difference in metaphysics. He sees himself as a devout Roman Catholic; she sees him as a good human being.
This conversation reminded me of an older thought that’s been swirling around in my head for a few weeks: the disunity of reason.
It is widely held by philosophers (that peculiar sub-species!) that reason is unified: that the ideally rational person is one for whom there are no fissures, breaks, ruptures, or discontinuities anywhere in the inferential relations between semantic contents that comprise his or her cognitive grasp of the world (including himself or herself as part of that world).
This is particularly true when it comes to the distinction between “theoretical reason” and “practical reason”. By “theoretical reason” I mean one’s ability to conceptualize the world-as-experienced as more-or-less systematic, and by “practical reason” I mean one’s ability to act in the world according to judgments that are justified by agent-relative and also agent-indifferent reasons (“prudence” and “morality”, respectively).
The whole philosophical tradition from Plato onward assumes that reason is unified, and especially, that theoretical and practical reason are unified — different exercises of the same basic faculty. Some philosophers think of them as closer together than others — for example, Aristotle distinguishes between episteme (knowledge of general principles in science, mathematics, and metaphysics) and phronesis (knowledge of particular situations in virtuous action). But even Aristotle does not doubt that episteme and phronesis are exercises of a single capacity, reason (nous).
However, as we learn more about how our cognitive system is actually structured, we should consider the possibility that reason is not unified at all. If Horst’s Cognitive Pluralism is right, then we should expect that our minds are more like patchworks of domain-specific modules that can reason quite well within those domains but not so well across them.
To Horst’s model I’d add the further conjecture: that we have pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “theoretical reason” (abstract thinking and long-term planning) with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and also pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “practical reason” (self-control and virtuous conduct) with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (and especially in its dense interconnections with the limbic system).
But if that conjecture is on the right track, then we would expect to find consistency between theoretical reason and practical reason only to the extent that there are reciprocal interconnections between these regions of prefrontal cortex. And of course there are reciprocal interconnections — but (and this is the important point!) to the extent that these regions are also functionally distinct, then to that same extent reason is disunified.
And as a consequence, metaphysics and ethics may have somewhat less to do with each other than previous philosophers have supposed.
Neil:
And:
That isn’t how humans categorize. Someone who is in a park a thousand miles east of the river, looking for a grassy place to spread her picnic blanket, needn’t note that she is on the east side of the river, as would be necessary in order to correctly traverse her “already existing binary tree”. She simply distinguishes grassy from non-grassy areas and spreads the blanket in a grassy area. The river, being a thousand miles away, needn’t enter her mind at all.
This is not a communication issue, Neil. I understand what you’ve written, but the idea itself is wrong.
Ditto, petrushka.
You wrote:
As with Neil, the issue isn’t miscommunication. What you’re saying is clear, but it’s also clearly wrong:
Sometimes true statements have those characteristics, but only sometimes. They aren’t necessary, or defining, characteristics.
A naive outlook considers the world outside as reality, but anyone who begins to reflect will see that the world of our experience is, to begin with, our representation of reality. I have a subjective view of the plant in front of me. If I see another plant of the same species in the distance it will appear to be much smaller. By adding the correct concepts to this plant I begin to see it in its full reality. These concepts are not something we invented, but something we discover, they belong to the plant.
We cannot observe our thinking as we are in the process of dong it but there is nothing to stop us from examining our past thoughts. And there is one thing of our experience in which the perception and the concept are not separate for us, and that is thinking. We experience thinking in its full reality, and so there is no need for us to add the concept to what we experience. “Thinking is therefore I am”, would have been a better phrase IMO. I only know that I am because thinking occurs within me. Any opinions put forward in this forum presuppose thinking. If we wish to know reality then thinking must be our starting point. Without thinking we would hold no concepts such as subject, object, brain, neurocomputational state, environment.
When clockwork watches and other mechanical devices were the state of the art living systems were thought of in those terms. Now that software, computers and IT have taken over, the activity of an organism is thought of in neurocomputational terms. And no doubt when the next big technological breakthrough occurs life will be thought of in those terms too. We project our latest technology onto life and then decide that there we have it in reality; until our next inventions come along and we discover that nature is already using that technology too.
Did I ever tell you that I like your style.
Subjectivity is the original sin of all non-christian worldviews.
There is simply no way sans God to get beyond “my particular representation” to objective reality.
The only problem is that without God we have no way to know if our thoughts are sound or incoherent insanity.
I agree,
We all start with the reality of thought whether it is the finite fumblings of the creature or the pure perfect reflection of the creator.
peace
We all have presuppositions
If you don’t know what they are how can you possibly examine them? You know what they say about an unexamined life
The bot is simply my effort to help you discover the unquestioned foundations of your worldview.
You are welcome
Yes, FMM, everyone has presuppositions. But the stuff you think follows from that doesn’t follow from that.
Thinking that it does obviously makes you happy, though. There is that to be said for the doctrine.
I can put this more simply. We don’t know everything and are still learning. The thing about your guru Steiner is that he knew almost nothing and is not learning anymore.
Care to elaborate?
What stuff and how do you know it doesn’t follow?
peace
Been there, FMM. Read the Van Cleve.
Or just re-read our last seven discussions of this issue.
Ah the literature bluff.
The answer must be out there somewhere in the literature. (or the cloud)
Have a great day. Let’s try and find something more pleasant to discuss next time. I really need to get back to work
peace
I know you will enjoy YOUR day, FMM, safe in the delusion that nobody can refute your position, which has been refuted even here at this site about one hundred times. You don’t need to read any “literature” if you don’t want to. You only need to read what people have written to you here many times over.
However, it’s more important for you to remain safe in your comfy delusion. I can understand that. Truth isn’t everything.
Or you can just make it up, to each his own I suppose.
Hey Walto,
Did you ever think that the refutation you believe you have given is beside the point.
Is it even possible in your worldview that you don’t understand what is being proffered?
I think a lot of the misunderstanding comes from the fact that we are coming from such radically different starting points there is simply no way to bridge the gap.
My only hope is to get you to slow down and think
peace
I believe it’s possible that I am mistaken, FMM. Can you say the same?
This belief of mine makes me careful. As you believe you cannot be mistaken, you don’t really need to be careful, do you? Why should you “slow down and think”? You’re quite sure you’re right, and, what’s more, you’re happy!
A nicer person than me wouldn’t want to burst that bubble. But alas….
Just saw this posted someplace:
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/308996.php
Except that (1) no reasons have been offered for the claim that anyone else here has “foundations” to his or her worldview, (2) the only reason why you think that we haven’t examined our assumptions is because we don’t share your conclusions, and so you think that that of course we would we agree with your conclusion if we had examined our assumptions; and (3) our efforts to highlight the unquestioned assumptions at work in your worldview have fallen on deaf ears.
When Walto says, “read the Van Cleve article, please”, it’s not a “literature bluff”. It is one article that you could read in an afternoon and it just might do you some good. It just might show you that there are very serious errors in your thinking. And there’s no substitute for actually doing the reading for yourself. Walto’s summary would not do the same work as you’re actually putting in some real effort to learn something.
We’re cruel bastards here at TSZ.
Descartes makes exactly this move in the Meditations and its been a disaster for philosophy ever since. And it is false, too. Sanity or soundness consists in whether our thoughts can be understood by other people. Intersubjectivity, communication, agreement and disagreement, cooperation and conflict, dialogue — this is all the very substance of normativity, rationality, and meaning.
God has nothing to do with any of it, whether He exists or not.
You are aware of theological objections to presuppositionalism, right?
Exactly. It’s an error that dates back at least to the 17th Century, and you’d think if FMM were really interested in the TRUTH (i.e, for him, GOD) he might want to investigate the issue with an open mind a bit instead of just putting his program on “Rinse and Repeat”.
No soap.
Here’s why I care: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/health/paralysis-limb-reanimation-brain-chip.html?_r=0
No truth, no souls, no gods, no myths…
Just humans knowing (and now knowing more) about how the brain actually works (predictably, repeatably, and consistently) and thus being able to predict how – and then implementing – a device could overcome damage.
Funny how your “truth” can’t even cure the common cold.
Real knowledge will allow men to become the gods that theists can only dream about.
It is a game, because you can’t get past the idea that everyone has presuppositions.
Sure, but it won’t be an accurate assessment. Not much use in that…
A completely absurd statement.
And here’s the proof: “I’m hungry”.
If you can’t demonstrate the presupposition that leads to the state (not the statement) and the process of changing the state (and then repeating that process), then your claim is nonsense.
BTW, neither Craig nor Bahnsen were able to do it. I have doubts you’ll even be able to attempt it.
The introduction of “representation” here relies on a bad description of what experience is like. (A faulty phenomenology.) I do experience partial, limited perspectives on objects, yes — but I do not experience representations of those objects. I experience the objects themselves, but from the finite, limited, fallible, and embodied perspectives that I occupy as I move through space and time.
The whole subjective/objective, appearance/reality framework is the product of interesting but bad metaphysics, imposed on the experience of perceiving and judging. If we put those framework aside and inquire into perceiving and judging with a sort of feigned innocence, we’re not going to find the materials for supporting the subject/object and appearance/reality distinctions.
The appearance/reality distinction only makes sense if you agree with Plato that both Parmenides and Heraclitus were right —the problem of the one and the many, of Being and Becoming. But to get the ball rolling here, one first has to think that there’s some distinction between being and becoming. Already one is engaged in high-altitude metaphysical speculation far removed from the nitty-gritty details of describing the experiencing of perception and thought.
Likewise, the subject/object distinction only makes sense if you agree with Descartes that we have incorrigible, perfect access (via “introspection”) to our mental contents, but only problematic access (via “sensation”) to physical objects. But Descartes only needs to say this so that he can reconcile his commitment to an Augustinian conception of free will with his commitment to a Galilean conception of mechanistic physics. Once you can see your way past the need for either free will or determinism, the whole subject/object framework loses its importance.
Instead the subject/object distinction, we can think of the phenomenologically basic distinction as one between the embodied subject and the affordances and solicitations of his or her environment, with that distinction taken up and modified, by the need for more-or-less successful cooperation, into a distinction between how I take the world to be, how you take the world to be, how we take the world to be, and how the world really is.
Arguably, the idea of how the world really is, independent of how any culture takes it to be, really comes on the scene during the Axial Age. Prior to that, my conjecture is that most cultures didn’t distinguish between how the world really is and how the members of that culture took the world to be. The concept of objectivity has a long history!
No, this isn’t right at all. The very most one can say is that one cannot apply the appearance/reality distinction to the concept of appearance. That is true, but not as impressive as Descartes made it out to be.
I’m not able to make a phenomenologically salient distinction between my conscious thoughts and their phenomenologically hidden causes, but that doesn’t mean that there’s no distinction to be made. It just means that the distinction can’t be drawn on phenomenological grounds.
Put it this way: phenomenologically, the leaf of a plant has the property of being green. I experience the leaf as having the intrinsic property of being green.
But when I adopt a scientific perspective, then the green is no longer an intrinsic property of the leaf but a vastly complicated relational property between photon frequencies, the electrons in magnesium ions embedded inside chlorophyll molecules, and the electrons in the photopsin molecules embedded in the cone cells of my retina.
But just as this is true for the phenomenology of physical objects, like leaves, so too it is true for the phenomenology of mental “objects”, like thoughts, feeling, memories, etc. The ontological status of the latter is on a par with the ontological status of the former — in both cases, the phenomenological description can be explained and even to some extent corrected by scientific explanation.
Put slightly otherwise, the correct distinctions here are between the physical and the mental and between the manifest image and the scientific image. These are orthogonal, not co-extensive as Descartes thought. There’s the manifest image of the physical and of the mental, and also the scientific image of the physical and of the mental.
That’s actually not true. Descartes attempted a mechanistic treatment of life but everyone at the time saw how inadequate it was. Subsequent attempts by La Mettrie and others didn’t fare any better. Mechanistic treatments of life were actually not successful until the rise of molecular biology in the 20th century.
On the more general point: yes, we do make sense of the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar, and we do proceed by way of analogy. But I’m certainly not claiming that the brain is a computer. (I am not a Turing machine, though it was briefly fashionable in the 1960s for philosophers to say so.) Nor are organisms machines. Some analogies are more helpful than others, depending on what one is trying to explain. Heck, there are still insights waiting to be mined from the mind-as-city analogy that Plato exploits in Republic!
Robin, my view is that everybody DOES have presuppositions. We can’t step outside our categories and see the world from a “Gods-eye view.” Whether this position is correct or not, you’d think that those who believe it would be even less sure that they are right about stuff, wouldn’t you?
Having presuppositions is like wearing lenses, they could be making things clearer or turning them yellow-green. It is extremely confused to infer from the the fact (if it is one) that we are stuck with our presuppositions that we may have infallible knowledge of the world.
keiths,
keiths,
In two consecutive comments (though they show up on different comments pages), keiths makes remarks that show a near total misunderstanding of my positions. And, in both comments, keiths then declares that he understands me perfectly.
I don’t know what you mean by “concepts”. In my view, concepts are ours, and have to do with how we understand the world. They cannot “belong to the plant.”
But we clearly do observe our thinking. That we observe it, is part of how thinking works.
I’m not a foundationalist.
I certainly accept that people can (and do) adopt presuppositions. They, like profiling and categorizing, are tools we use to help us process the world using shortcuts (if less accurately). As George Clooney’s character Ryan Bingham said to Natalie Keener (played by Anna Kendrick) when looking at security lines (and promptly getting behind a group of Asian men): “I’m like my mother. I stereotype. It’s faster.”
I reject the notion that all people have them though and, further, that anyone starts with them. That’s what the “I’m hungry” exercise demonstrates in fact. That and it demonstrates that not only can people live without a single presupposition, they can thrive.
But I do agree with you that it’s rather bizarre for people who do hold to presuppositionalism to assume it puts them on firmer ground in terms of knowledge about the world. Even if, like FMM, you hold that all people have presuppositions (and hold that the vast majority even hold the same presuppositions, even with regard to some god), it would still be rather presumptive (heh heh…I’m such a card…) to assume that your handle on said presuppositions is somehow superior to everyone else’s.
But hey…wacky people are…well…wacky. Why should they be consistent?
I’m fine with the idea that we all navigate the world with conceptual frameworks that rely on constitutive rules or principles. I just don’t think that those constitutive rules can function as rock-bottom “foundations” as the Cartesian thinks they do. The idea of “presuppositions” conflates these two quite distinct concepts.
Yes, I agree. And I think it’s easy to do that because the issues are really complicated. I just read a short paper by Gilbert Harman on Quine’s indeterminacy thesis that Bruce suggested, and it SEEMED to me to ball up immanent, transcendent, relativized, and non-relativized propositions. And Harman is a very smart guy. Maybe he’s right and I’m wrong.
The point is that It’s really hard to suss out what having “presuppositions” actually entails for knowledge claims. Wildly confusing stuff about which nobody should be embarrassed getting confused.
Exactly, except there is no ” may ” about it. It is infallible knowledge from the Christian God directly revealed. Therefore it is you who are confused.
Oh yeah. I guess I forgot that.
But wouldn’t you expect some enhanced capacity for knowledge if it were true? Like, wouldn’t you understand what a crock presuppositionalism is? Oh, wait, self-refuting…
The only actual benefit seems to be smug self-assuredness (at least if one doesn’t suspect that it’s nonsense), however. Somehow it doesn’t seem to provide enormous insight into quantum mechanics, to prevent delusions, to safeguard against hallucinations or optical illusions, or give one an understanding of others (indeed, quite the opposite in FMM’s case, as he “knows” about others what no real scientist would recognize). So we’re still pretty much stuck with teasing out everything as if those presuppositions did not exist, with nothing gained other than self-righteousness, along with a loss in understanding others (at least in the case we have before us).
And why don’t we see that as a wondrous gift of God? Clearly it’s because we’re atheists who love our sins.
Glen Davidson
fifth:
Why not reprogram it to help you discover the unjustified foundations of your worldview?
You’re welcome.
It is more blessed to give than to receive.
When it’s advice, anyway.
Glen Davidson
Neil:
Neil,
Your pattern is stale, predictable, and dishonest:
1. You say something.
2. Someone points out that you’re wrong.
3. You say they’ve misunderstood you, but you don’t explain where they’ve gone wrong and you don’t tell us what you really do mean.
4. Someone asks you what you really meant.
5. You dodge the question. In one case you actually argued that you couldn’t tell us what you really meant because your position was too profound for words:
Neil,
Your comments concerning the binary tree were straightforward:
And:
I’ve shown that your model is incorrect. You accuse me of a “near total misunderstanding” of your position. If you’re right about that, you should be able to
a) show that I’ve misunderstood your position, and
b) tell us what you really meant by the two quotes above.
That you refuse to do so suggests that I didn’t misunderstand your position.
Can you defend your claims or not?
You have done no such thing.
Neil,
Then let’s hear your counterargument(s).
And not just because he’s been dead for a century, either — but because he wandered off into a fairytale world which was no longer confirmable or disconfirmable by experience. I’m actually a fan of Steiner/Waldorf schools, for little kids, emphasizing hands-on / creative activities more than getting the “right answer” – but at some point kids have to grow up and rejoin the world. And, surprise, it turns out German mysticism isn’t a good match for reality.
I wonder if Steiner ate a few little red polka dot mushrooms when he was off communing with nature in the dark woods around his village.
I addressed this claim earlier but you chose not to respond. I’ll ask again (hope springs eternal):
I do not know or believe that any god or gods exist. I have never seen any evidence, or even an internally and externally coherent definition, for such an entity.
Before I ask my questions, I’d like to remind you of a few of the site rules:
– Assume all other posters are posting in good faith. For example, do not accuse other posters of being deliberately misleading
– . . . accusing others of ignorance or stupidity is off topic
– As is implying that other posters are mentally ill or demented.
And, of course, the prime directive: Park your priors at the door.
So, to participate within the rules, you must assume I’m posting in good faith (which I am). You must assume that I am not being dishonest or deliberately misleading (which I am not). You must assume that I am neither ignorant with respect to my statements about my lack of belief nor am I too stupid to understand what I am saying (roll with it). You must assume that I am not mentally ill or demented (ad arguendo).
Given the rules and my clear statement that I lack belief in a god or gods, your assertion that “Everyone knows he exists” is refuted. As per the site rules, you’ve parked your priors by the door. How does this new knowledge change your argument, if at all? That is, what else is different about your mental model of the world now that you know that at least one atheist really does exist?
We briefly looked at a nearby Waldorf school when our older daughter was little. We liked that none of the kids watched TV, that it seemed like everybody there could sing (and knit!), that all the toys were wooden rather than plastic ray guns, that they encouraged meditation in the classroom, etc. Basically, all the kids seemed really nice.
But then we learned that you had the same teacher (good or bad) and classmates for eight years, that the science curriculum was bad, and that a number of Steiner’s views were entirely crazy. Oh, and that they wanted a lot of money.
Interesting. So since you could be wrong about any or all of your beliefs, being fallible and all, on what basis do you think that any are justified without having any objective, empirical evidence to support them?
And while I’m responding, in what sense do you mean “exists” when you say “Truth exists”?
Jock and RB, this is what happens when you feed a Golem.
It revealed that you are not an atheist, isn’t that wondrous enough?
And against all that I think and know.
It’s amazing, all right. In a shake your head sort of way, at least.
Glen Davidson
There’s no argument to counter-argue.
You completely misinterpreted what I said. Your attempt to refute your misinterpretation does not count as an argument against my position.
Neil,
Then answer my questions:
I’m not sure how you ever got the idea that I believe I can not be mistaken.
It’s my position that human intellect in the best case scenario is prone to error and the world we live in is far from the best case scenario. I also believe that even when our faculties are performing perfectly our opinions are subjective and we are limited in our capacity to reason soundly and effectively.
That is why we need God.
If I understand you correctly you think that we don’t need God for knowledge.
What I’m interested in knowing is just exactly that works given your worldview.
IOW…….Oh you know the rest
peace
Given that, it is unclear how divine revelation be of any assistance. Here I am, a finite and fallible mind, often prone to errors. I have an experience that I believe to be one of divine revelation. But of course I am using my very own finite, fallible, and error-prone mind to judge that this is experience is really one of divine revelation. Surely I can be mistaken in that judgment, no?
Thus while it is possible for God to reveal Himself to me in such a way that I do not and cannot doubt His presence, it is not possible for me to be certain that any such experience really is of His presence. At the very most I can feel supremely confident, but that is not real justification.
Justification requires that there be reasons which are compelling qua reasons to other rational beings like myself. All the presuppositionalist has here is the subjective, psychological feeling of certainty — not the normative status of being justified in what he or he says.