The Fallacy of the Stolen Concept was coined by Ayn Rand, to point out the absurdity of arguing against a position when the argument depends upon that position – setting up a kind of indirect (and hence not so obviously paradoxical) version of Epiminedes-style “this sentence is false”. For example, to argue that all consciousness is really dreaming requires that there be some state one could recognise as ‘waking’, in order that dreaming could be distinct from it. One steals the concept of ‘waking’ (on whose existence ‘dreaming’ depends) in an attempt to argue there is no such thing.
It’s rather a misnomer, as it conjures up an implication that there is some principle of concept ‘ownership’. And self-referentially, a common illustration of the fallacy is ‘property is theft’ – the supposed fallacy being that, as theft has no meaning without a concept of ownership, the statement is a paradox. (That slogan was never intended as a formal philosophical argument, of course, and a much less pretentious retort to such a definitional declaration could legitimately be “no it isn’t”).
We are, of course, familiar with the “stolen concept”; it is a regular slogan of William J Murray. However, I submit that his usage is frequently incorrect. Despite correcting others who fall into the ‘ownership’ trap, his usage all too frequently invites, or makes, that tumble. For WJM, “I”, “moral”, “true”, “right”, when used by the “atheo-materialist”, are stolen concepts. However, there is nothing fallacious about simple usage. Unless one is trying to deny the existence of one of these concepts using something which depends upon it – eg “I do not exist”, or “There are no true statements” – then there is nothing fallacious going on. Murray’s misuse relates to an apparent understanding of the stolen concept as a declaration that such concepts cannot be derived from materialism. Which is not, I think, what Rand was saying – and, further, is incorrect. One does not need a supernatural entity before one can talk of what one ‘ought’ to do, or whether Truth etc exist. And the presence of such a supernatural entity offers no guarantees that they ground morality, or that they render anything True other than truth-propositions on the existence of supernatural entities.
If an atheist were to argue that (for example) it was immoral to care about one’s actions, they would be committing the fallacy of the stolen concept. But to simply talk of ‘morality’ (merely: what one ‘ought’ to do), or ‘moral duty’, ‘moral fibre’, ‘amorality’, ‘immorality’ – no attempt is being made to disprove the concept by its usage outside of religion. Even if it is definitionally the case that morality refers only to those oughts and ought-nots adjudicated by a spiritual arbiter, usage in another context (such as by someone who does not believe in said arbiter) is still not a stolen concept, sensu Rand.
An atheist can mean something by ‘moral’, and be in broad agreement with a theist about what it means, simply disagreeing about the source – human sensibility or divine decree. Ironically, Rand’s own moral writing was grounded in the kind of thinking that Murray would dismiss as materialistic ‘concept-stealing’. That which is moral, for Rand, is that which a human should value in relation to his own survival. We only have values because we can be destroyed, and we’d like to avoid that, ta very much. Theists extend that – as they have a sense in which we can be spiritually destroyed as well, after death, they care about morality because they care about preventing that spiritual destruction. But to dress up the implicit egoism that remains, they invoke an entity that cares as much about objective ‘values’ as they do about what they fundamentally value – their permanent identity.
FWIW, I disagree with Rand on morals. I think we possess an altruistic sense, that I am happy to term ‘moral’, which derives from our sociality as a species, and is sustained by both genetics and culture. It is not a matter of pure egoism, but the balance of the ‘requirements of the self’ and other constraints that arise from our desire to fit in with society. It is manifest by the sense of warmth we experience on witnessing or doing ‘good’, and an abhorrence for ‘bad’. Our morality articulates these shared sensations (shared by most, that is); religion packages them with additional carrots, sticks and reification. Society has proved a great survival feature of our species. We experience positive sensations on helping others, negative on hurting, because our ancestors who possessed these characteristics were more successful at procreating (thanks to sociality) than those who went it alone. As a sense, it is developed to a varying degree by society’s present members. Some possess it not at all, others to a very high degree, just as with a sense of humour, or beauty.
It is of course in the nature of things that religious and cultural norms can directly mould this individual sense – outrage against homosexuality, promiscuity, contraception or cussing, for example, appears viscerally felt, whereas those with (ironically) more personal freedom in such matters tend to be less prone to shock-horror at such things, while being at least as opposed to murder, torture and dishonesty.
This is exactly what I’m talking about. If you are an atheist/materialist, and you hold that even if the whole world disagreed you would maintain your view that the behavior is wrong, then you only have one option to retain logical consistency. You must hold that morality is individually subjective, and that your view that it is wrong in the face of consensus otherwise is in principle as valid as the consensus.
Unfortunately, this view puts you in a predicament; under atheism/materialism, you must then hold that each individual who disagrees with you (for whatever reason) is as right as you about what is moral (since it is individually subjective), giving you no right or reason to be concerned with their behavior, much less try to change it or stop it. They are operating under the same moral principle as you – doing what they relatively believe to be moral. Thus, you cannot say their behavior is wrong; only that it would be wrong for you, as an individual, to engage in it; and as long as they believe it right, it is right for them to engage in it.
You have no logically consistent principle by which to disagree with the consensus and promote your individual view other than individual subjectivism, which necessarily validates what everyone else is doing as being as moral as what you would do.
If you try to define morality a particular way so that your personal view is derivable from the definition and the rest of the world’s behavior is not, that begs the question of what principle grants you the right to define morality your way and wouldn’t grant others the right to define morality however they see fit.
Unless you agree (under this example) that morality is individually subjective, you cannot derive your view of morality from atheistic/materialist premises. If you agree that morality is individually subjective, then you have no rational reason to claim that what others are doing is immoral. As long as you don’t engage in it, nothing immoral is occurring under the subjective morality principle.
If you are claiming that it is wrong for them to engage in the behavior, then you are emplying a stolen concept, because you cannot derive that opinion or belief from your premises, and such a concept can only be derived from that which you deny is true – theism.
Who said it was, or needs to be?
Those that hold that their views are rationally reconcilable with their worldview premises. I certainly have no rational argument against beliefs/opinions that are not claimed to be rational.
Not to me it ain’t! It is logically consistent to consider ‘wrong’ to be that which my subjective experience, on contemplating the behaviour, dissuades me from doing. On your hypothetical planet, populated only by bickering logicians agonising over ‘logical’ courses of action and torturing babies just to piss me off and prove a point, I might feel somewhat isolated. But on this one, where most people are broadly like me – there are not 7 billion surprising individuals out there – I find a nontheistic view of morality, even being entirely a construct of the human mind, to work out just dandy. There is a plausible physical reason why there are not 7 billion different opinions on the ‘big’ moral questions.
You are slipping across the boundary between what I think is right/wrong for me as an individual and what people individually and collectively think is wrong for others.
The fact that ‘individual moralities’ may be perceived as equally valid does not mean one is stunned into inaction when one feels a ‘wrong’ is being perpetrated. Waving some aged scrolls is hardly more persuasive. Not every standard to which I aspire is a standard I would foist on others – what arrogance that would be! But there are some things – eg murder – where my personal abhorrence of committing the act extends to a likelihood of action against. The motivation is the same – call me selfish, inconsistent even, but I consider murder to be best avoided (including state-sponsored). Many people tend to agree, but not all. Which is why we enact laws, and have ethical debates.
Your example (of defining “banana” as striped predator”) and your use of terms “oddities” and “grab bag” indicates a stolen concept. “Striped Predator” is an objectively existent commodity. The idea that one would redefine that in a way that would mean the same thing as “banana” cannot be called an “oddity” under the atheistic premise, because subjective definition would be the rule, not an “oddity”.
Under subjective morality, you calling a thing immoral, or defining a principle as moral, is the exact equal to anyone else calling anything else immoral, or defining anything else as a moral principle. There is no logical room for you to characterize it in the way you have above, implying that there is an objective standard of moral views and definitions by which certain views would be considered “odd” or like calling a banana a “striped predator”.
This is what I mean when I say that in every post a self-described atheist/materialist/naturalist makes, their use of terms necessarily implies concepts that cannot be derived from their ideological premises. You just did it above – and I only pointed out the obvious case of stolen concept. The structure of your post indicates other stolen concepts in use, such as truth, self, etc.
Since an opinion cannot be logically derived from theism either, I don’t see the point of bringing it up. “I think it can be objectively wrong to do X if there is an external arbiter of such questions. “.
Is there such an external arbiter? Do you know what it says for any given X?
The rational materialist version of ‘always wrong’ is that ‘everyone has always had the subjective experience that it is so’. Probably not the case, which is why it is not my opinion.
Not if you consider it wrong for others to engage in.
I didn’t say they should be “stunned into inaction”. I said they had no rational support for taking action, because nothing immoral is going on – regardless of who is doing what – as long as each individual subjectively believe what they are doing is right.
If you are selfish, you are selfish in the same way that the murderer is selfish by imposing (by might of some sort) their own morality upon their victim, making the two of you equally moral.
If you agree that you are being rationally inconsistent with your worldview premises, there is no more need for us to debate that particular point.
All you are doing after conceding that point is using rhetoric and emotional pleading to irrationally justify your admitted inconsistency and obscure the lack of any significant rational distinction between a murderer and one that would prevent a murder (under atheist/materialist subjective morality).
If you are saying that you do not have a rationally supportable reason that justifies a use of force to stop a murder (or child abuse or whatever you deem appropriate for action), then you are necessarily saying that people can use force wherever they subjectively deem morally appropriate – including murdering others and abusing children.
IOW, your perspective is full of hypocrisy; you would use force as you see fit to stop others from using force as they see fit, with no objective standard to refer to that rationally justifies any distinction between the two.
What are you talking about? It depends on what the opinion is, and what the premise is, as to whether or not the opinion in question can be derived from the premises given.
Fer’instance?
William J. Murray,
Two separate, if overlapping, concepts. Neither is illogical. If I consider it wrong to do something myself, it is wrong by my standard of ethics. This need not trouble anyone else. But if I think that someone else is doing something I would rather they did not do, there is absolutely no error of logic should I attempt to dissuade them from the act, by whatever means seem appropriate. This is simply the pragmatism of action. We may wish to arrange the world into something approaching a personal ideal. This can involve attempting to influence others, with no violation of any logical principle. It is rationally justifiable to prevent murder, just as it is rationally justifiable to move a school when it is threatened by a crumbling cliff-face – and not just ‘under theism’. The only difference is that, in place of uncaring Nature, you invent some malign individuals who think it ‘moral’ to kill, for debating points. This is a fantasy. As with Mill’s “I will call no being good”, the same goes for such actions that someone else might like to call ‘moral’. Except in your posts, I have never encountered such individuals, so they have never caused me any trouble.
If one would rather the perpetrator did not do what they are attempting to do, one has all the rational support one needs. You are making the preposterous claim that someone who can say “My Invisible Friend Wants You To Stop” has somehow more logical warrant for action than someone who says “I (or We) Want You To Stop”. What if the ‘someone else’ says “My Invisible Friend Wants Me to Carry On”?
‘Call me inconsistent’ lightheartedly welcomes you to take that stance. It is not an admission that I consider myself to be being inconsistent in my distaste for murder, whether perpetrated by me or anyone else. .
Which I am not saying, so let’s hear no more about it. But wait …
Yes, of course, that happens all the time, doesn’t it? The Murdering-is-Good and the Child-Abuse-is-Moral brigades, against whom the only legitimate weapon is a Holy Screed. That’ll sort them out. “Nope, it’s watertight, boys. He really does have the right to stop us, because of Objective Morality. Curses!”
An objective standard to refer to? How, for the millionth time, does one access it, without subjective interference? Or adjudicate between competing versions of what it says? A hypothetical and disputable objective standard serves no useful purpose other than to make a syllogism that depends upon its existence work.
keiths:
William:
An impressive refutation. I’m sure everyone has been swayed.
I did that for your benefit!
If you leave the final clause in, your statement is absurd:
If you leave the final clause in place, then you have defined theists and idealists as being exempt from the stolen concept fallacy, which is obviously ridiculous and can be rejected out of hand. I figured that even you would not be silly enough to make such a claim, and that the final clause was a mistake on your part.
By omitting the final clause, I converted your statement from something ridiculous to something that is at least defensible, though it still differs from the original Objectivist definition of the stolen concept fallacy.
Are you defending that final clause? If so, then we can reject your criterion out of hand, because you have defined yourself as being exempt from the stolen concept fallacy.
Silly William.
What’s especially funny is that immediately after I posted the defensible version of your statement, you corrected your own definition of the fallacy! (Without acknowledging it, of course.):
What was that you were saying about “not arguing in good faith”?
And even after revising your definition, you still have the following problem:
Your conclusion doesn’t follow from your premises. That’s a big problem, William.
I don’t regard “naturalism” as consisting of “premises” from which anything can be “derived.”
The premise-conclusion model of reasoning is appropriate for tightly constrained semantic domains, but world-view construction is a much looser affair. The rationality of a world-view lies in its overall consistency, simplicity, fecundity, and so on — indeed, very much like the rationality of a scientific theory, post-Kuhn, and very much unlike the rationality of a logic or mathematical proof.
So I reject entirely everything about how WJM is setting up the problem with which he supposes I’m engaged.
My way of setting up the problem turns on how to think about the norms of thought (epistemology and logic) and conduct) ethics and politics) as modes of animal behavior. We have the well-known quip from Pat Churchland about “the Four Fs” — feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproduction — as the basic motives of animal behavior. Contrast that with the much less-well-known point made by the philosopher of language Huw Price, who writes about “the Four Ms”: mind, morality, modality, and meaning. Clearly (to me) the cardinal sin of “reductionism”/”scientism” would be to dismiss the Four Ms under the mistaken impression that they cannot be satisfactorily reconciled with the Four Fs.
(Half-way between F and M is H, which stands for Habit, and in my view that’s the key to connecting the account of the Four Fs which we get from neuroscience, ethology, and evolutionary theory with the account of the Four Ms we get from philosophical reflection on everyday life, experience, and discourse.)
Needless to say, achieving high-order reflective equilibrium between science and philosophy is very different than deriving conclusions, in a semi-formal fashion, from (arbitrary?) premises.
KN,
By talking about the “premises” of a worldview, William does give the impression that he thinks that everything within that worldview is derivable from those premises. However, I don’t think he really means that.
After modifying his definition of the stolen concept fallacy, I think he is merely arguing, in effect, that a rational worldview must be internally consistent — just as you state above.
Here’s his modified definition:
I think he is allowing for concepts that are neither derivable from the stated premises nor from antithetical premises. However, if you must implicitly assume “antithetical premises” in order to make an argument, then your worldview is not internally consistent.
So I think William is right that such a fallacy exists, but he hasn’t shown that “atheism/materialism” commits the fallacy.
He also hasn’t corroborated his own claim that the existence of objective morality is derivable from the premises of “theism/idealism”.
“A pedantic objection. “Sense” does not solely refer to the receipt of external stimuli, but covers the entirety of perception, internal and external. See Latin sentire, to feel, whose root gives ‘sentient’, and sensus, whose literal translation “feeling” does not refer solely to the sensation of touch.”
Well Alan, when a materilist talk about “feeling” What are he talking about? What is suffering? A materilist can talk about pain, but when he talks about “feeling suffering” he is making the stolen concept capacity.
“Measurable in principle does not mean measurable in practice. The possibility of a physical cause does not depend upon an empirical demonstration of that cause. As I say, the atheist argues that there is no God, not that everything is measurable.”
Wrong. The materialistic model claim that everithing that exists should be testable and have materialistic explanation. That is why ID is not scientific for materilists. If you claim that not measurable things exists ID should be scientific.
“I don’t claim to “know”. I consider it to be the case, but I could be wrong. It seems a perfectly reasonable hypothesis, in accord with the clear benefits to human reproductive output arising from the cohesion of our social groups.”
Ok, you do not “know” but I give you hypothesis of this scenario that will not derive in morality. Why do you believe your hypothesis is the correct one?
“I don’t claim that morality is genetically determined. Genetics, in a flexible species such as ourselves, produces a set of predispositions, not absolutes. Culture produces still more, and we have some capacity to override – to ‘choose’. Unlike some organisms, we do not universally do X in response to stimulus Y (though we do for some things).”
Ok, but then again you are making the stolen concept fallacy, how do we learn if we are nothing more than chemicals? How the “culture is transmitted under this assumptions?
“A hypothesis of a genetic basis for morality does not legitimise all genetic excuses for its abandonment. If we assume that the genetic predisposition to ‘do right’ is fixed in the species, then someone arguing for a genetic excuse for ‘doing wrong’ must be a carrier for a mutation. My response to such a miscreant would be: “prove it”. It’s not unheard of that such mitigation is possible – we don’t hold everyone to the same standard, eg where mental conditions are apparent – but the possibility is a weak reason for considering materialism to be have unpalatable consequences.”
I think that you have to prove it. How I can do the “good” whatever is it if my genes are making me to do the “bad”? More, if one set of genes make a human to do something and other set of genes makes the human do the contrary, how do you determine wich behavior is “good” and wich is “bad”.
“In the matter of eugenics, it tends to be frowned upon. Why? Because people think it ‘wrong’ to breed humans like domestic animals. Why? Sorry, I cannot give a detailed causal account of that sensation. But wait – aren’t you stealing concepts here? You argue that someone would try to ‘improve’ humanity under your caricature of materialism. But why (under that caricature) would anyone care about improving humanity?
Tatally true, I´m not thinking as a materilist here. I hope when someone, based in whatever model of the reality he has would try to “improve” humanity just because his genes push him to do it, your and my kids be in the “right side”.
“Sure, I’m not offering universals here. Social interaction, and evolutionary theory, involve many subtleties. But you seem to think that everyone could be a ‘big boss’, and thereby everybody gets to have more offspring that way … you could think that through, or model it, and you may see why it does not work as an evolutionary ‘strategy’.”
Do you mean that apes failed evolutivly speaking because they have the big boss and not the moral kidness of the golden rule?
“But there is agreement. We compare notes, and discover we broadly share the same internal conceptions of what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’. I argue that the causal basis for that is a combination of the genetic and the cultural. How do you get agreement on the theistic model?”
You see agreement because you are living in a civilization that for 17 centuries now, had the christianity as religion and more than 70% of the people believe in God, afterlife and thinks that this God is something close to what christian religion says. Dr Liddle agrees that everybody follows the golden rule, not because is scientifically confirmed but because he was for many years educated as christian. But if materialism is true, that agreement is based on a fantasy, and then wrong, and you using it again are doing the stolen concept fallacy.
In my teistic model I agree that every human due his consciuness has the idea that there things that are morally good and others morally bad. But there is no natural way to see why and wich are one or the others.
There are people that says that there are self evident moral truths, like “torture babies for pleasure is bad”, to that I usually say remember that people killed babies for baal god.
This makes no sense to me. Are you suggesting that materialists don’t have emotions? That we don’t have desires about the future or that we can’t recognize the difference between “sickness” and “health”, and that when we are experiencing the former we can’t possibly wish for the latter and thus feel “sadness” or “frustration” or “anger” and thus “suffer” over the illness? Are you suggesting that as a materialist, I’d actually dismiss my feelings as mere atomic processes and thus ignore them? What kind of strawman robot do you think materialists are supposed to be, Blas?
Let me just say that as a materialists who was born without functioning kidneys, I’m fairly familiar with the suffering and find your claim to the contrary more than a little insulting. Ooo…check that out…yet another feeling!
Yeah…those silly materialists! I mean, how does a car run when the whole thing is just made of atoms! The moment the first spark comes out of the plug, the whole car should just vaporize!
(sigh)…Blas, here’s a clue: there’s more than one “chemical” out there. Different chemicals have different properties and in turn, when those different properties are put into proximity with other chemicals, entirely new properties arise. There’s nothing in the materialist understanding that prohibits some chemical and physical systems from creating differential states (among other properties) and those states being the basis of memory.
Blas,
Could I ask as a favour that you wrap quotes in a <blockquote> </blockquote> tag pair? Just helps people following a long quote-response discussion to distinguish discussed content from discussion. I will address the substance later.
Ta
Allan
Robin,
No, I do not suppose materialist are robots or do not suffer. What I´m saying is if materialism is true, only pain has a meaning, because is a signal that neurons send to our brain. Suffering like other feelings should be reduced to that. Signals that alert us that we are in dangerous.
Again, Blas, this makes no inherent sense. What you seem to be saying is that if materialism is true, then everyone would be automatons because all they could actually process and react to would be direct stimili, memory and plans be damned.
But that’s the thing Blas – if materialism is true (and I certainly think it is given the evidence), nothing about materialism dismisses memory or plans, or even hopes and dreams for that matter. And materialism certainly doesn’t dismiss relative comparison capability or the feeling of “fairness” vs “unfairness” when someone gets something you don’t have.
Heck, on a shallow level, it’s pretty easy to understand the chemo-mechanical system that could assess “those manly features correlate to lots of beautiful arm candy” and “I don’t have those features or the arm candy; life isn’t fair!” That’s a pretty straight-forward emotional response to a given situation based on simple differentiation assessment.
So what is it about materialism that you think dismisses the assessment and associated feeling of “unfairness” in the above scenario?
I have no idea what you mean by:
Are you suggesting that if materialism is true, there should be no way to assess increase in the amount of pain one is experiencing or assess different kinds of pain? I mean, it seems pretty straight forward to me that there’s a difference between pain stimuli and the reaction to the awareness of pain. Given that difference, it makes sense that compounding pain or introducing multiple sources of pain would produce different reactions. In some cases, the amount of pain or type of pain is going to cause a reaction of frustration, anger, sadness, disappointment or any number of other emotions. I can’t understand why you think this would not be the case for materialism. Are you saying that material neurons can’t create “sadness”? If so, what makes you say that?
(Part 1)
I don’t see how. He can certainly feel his own suffering. And he is capable of visualising, and responding to, the actual and potential suffering of others. As to ‘stolen concept’ … really, this has just become an empty slogan in your and WJM’s hands, devoid of meaning. I see no justification for asserting that the capacity for empathy can only be derived from theism.
Ummm … no, right! Since when did atheism mean “everything is measurable”?
This is just muddled. I talk of atheism, you respond using materialism, but you really seem to be talking about methodological naturalism. Even then, there is a curious false dichotomy implicit – either everything that exists is measurable, or naturalism is false and there is a God.
There are many things that are measurable in principle but not in practice. The density at the core of the sun, for example, or the temperature at a particular location on Friday 14th March 2000 BC. I may struggle to locate the sensation of love, or empathy, or amusement, or hunger, or lust using scientific instruments. I couldn’t find the conception “Yippee! a frisbee!” in a dog either. Does this mean these things are therefore not physical in nature?
We have a very good account of the genetic basis of many behavioural traits in many organisms. We have a sound theory of the evolution of social behaviours in a competitive world. We have a strong rational capacity to understand what makes for societies that we wish to live in. That is, I only need appeal to known causes to account for the shared sense of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviour that pervades all human societies. I don’t see the need to import ‘God-sense’ into the mix. It is an ad hoc cause, with many unanswered questions regarding its means of interaction with the physical. Unless it is clearly shown to be otherwise, I’m happy to stick with ‘material’ causes.
(Part 2)
I think it’s something to do with the brain! 🙂 Neural networks can learn, and they are little more than electricity and metal/silicon substrates. Again, you are misusing the term ‘stolen concept’. How do we learn under theism? How is culture transmitted under theism? What makes these concepts derivable from theistic premises but not materialistic ones?
I think you are wrong. You are saying that if I hold a hypothesis of a genetic basis for morality – currently unproven – then a logical consequence is that I must let all transgressors off unless I can prove that their genetic equipment (which I do not know how to locate) is intact? I don’t think legal principles tend to work that way. We tend to assume responsibility unless the opposite can be shown. The actor does not have to be a spiritual one.
Because you are not a genetic determinist. And neither am I, and nor is anyone else. Not even Richard Dawkins. Genes don’t ‘make’ you do things; they don’t control our every response to every situation. Theists and atheists alike possess genes, and they demonstrably push us in certain directions – when I see a pretty girl, it ain’t my soul responding! – but ‘we’ – our conscious selves – are also involved in the causal chain leading to action.
Who are the ‘value’ labels for? There are activities which a majority in a society would prefer its citizens did not do. That’s democracy. The basis of that sense, however, is what we are arguing about. The majority of human beings are provisionally ‘nice’, and tend to adopt each other’s norms to some degree. To the extent this has a genetic basis and was reproductively beneficial (and I do not know) I contend that selection would concentrate such social traits, in a mixed population, such that the modern descendant population is enriched in social traits. There is no conflict between us all being descended from a few social individuals and most of us possessing the traits that tend to enhance sociality – quite the reverse. Calling those traits ‘good’ is simply the convention.
I don’t think the apes did fail. But it’s important to separate out heritable differences from temporary ones; being this generation’s ‘big boss’ does not have an evolutionary impact unless your descendants inherit ‘big boss’ genes. And there are limits to how far such genes can spread before everyone is a normal-sized boss.
There are many features of our respective evolutionary trajectories that could lead to differences in social structure. Gorillas, for example, have significantly greater gender size differentials which have an impact. They never developed opposable thumbs, or language, or bipedalism, farming, warfare … evolution does not have any sure-win strategy. Our model of sociality worked for us.
Hmmm… 17 centuries? We were out evolving on the savannahs for well over ten thousand centuries! That’s where most of our genetics was honed; that’s where I think ‘moral agreement’ has its basis. When we meet a new human, we are not greatly surprised by how it acts, because we have encountered many similar genetic constructs. Including ourselves.
If materialism is true, religion was merely an attempt to codify and reify common moral sense into something outside humanity. It happened so long ago they have almost forgotten, and some believe that first there was religion, then it was abandoned by atheists, a few of whom are now trying to thieve concepts!
No, I don’t think there are self-evident moral truths either.
Since the “theists” don’t understand what the “non-theists” here actually think, and consistently accuse us of varying degrees of incoherence or confusion because we don’t think what they think we should think, and the same holds conversely, I’m sure, in the other direction, here’s a suggestion: the non-theists suggest some books, articles, movies, or videos that articulate the non-theist world-view, and the theists do the same. Maybe it will help advance mutual understanding if we took the time to understand what other people really think, and not just what we think they should think.
Awwwe…but strawpeople are so much easier to argue against!
😛
I don’t require someone else to speak for me. I figured out around age 12 that revealed religion simply wasn’t factually true. Since then I’ve read widely looking for “wisdom” on the subject of why is there something rather than nothing, without finding anything I didn’t figure out on my own.
As for morality, there appear to be nice people and mean people and a lot in between.
Allan Miller:
(Part 1)
I see no justification for asserting that the capacity for empathy can only be derived from theism.
Big point here. I´m not asserting that the capacity of empathy can only been derived from theism. My point and is related with the stolen concept fallacy is if naturalism is true the meaning of empathy is completly different if naturalism is false. I´ll try to explain you say:
Allan Miller:
(Part 1)
I see no justification for asserting that the capacity for empathy can only be derived from theism.
Big point here. I´m not asserting that the capacity of empathy can only been derived from theism. My point and is related with the stolen concept fallacy is if naturalism is true the meaning of empathy is completly different if naturalism is false. I´ll try to explain you say:
Allan Miller:
He can certainly feel his own suffering. And he is capable of visualising, and responding to, the actual and potential suffering of others.
True, no matter what are your ideas about naturalism every “normal” person can feel suffering and understand that other are suffering. The point is the interpretation, if naturalism is true “feel suffering” is nothing more than your neurons telling your brain you are in dangerous or unconfortable change your situation. If this is the case, in which way am I involved with your situation? If my neurons in the same time are sending to my brain a signal of happines and joy am I responsible because I`m joying while you are suffering?
Allan Miller:
This is just muddled. I talk of atheism, you respond using materialism,
I thought that your atheism is binded with a materialistic view, the other possible option is that you are a pantheist. If you are not a panteist please tell me what view of the world you match with atheism.
Allan Miller:
either everything that exists is measurable, or naturalism is false and there is a God.
No, I never mentioned God. I said if something exists that is not matter or energy, and then not mensurable naturalism is false.
Allan Miller:
There are many things that are measurable in principle but not in practice. The density at the core of the sun, for example, or the temperature at a particular location on Friday 14th March 2000 BC. I may struggle to locate the sensation of love, or empathy, or amusement, or hunger, or lust using scientific instruments. I couldn’t find the conception “Yippee! a frisbee!” in a dog either.Does this mean these things are therefore not physical in nature?
That is the point, materialism claims that all that thingd love, empathy, amusement, hunger, lust, suffering, altruistic sense desire to fit, good and bad are physical in nature and only physycal. Then as I exlained above change the meaning of that words and when you use them as a non materialist does you are falling in the SCF.
Allan Miller:
We have a very good account of the genetic basis of many behavioural traits in many organisms. We have a sound theory of the evolution of social behaviours in a competitive world. We have a strong rational capacity to understand what makes for societies that we wish to live in. That is, I only need appeal to known causes to account for the shared sense of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviour that pervades all human societies. I don’t see the need to import ‘God-sense’ into the mix. It is an ad hoc cause, with many unanswered questions regarding its means of interaction with the physical. Unless it is clearly shown to be otherwise, I’m happy to stick with ‘material’ causes.
But then you are in contradiction with this: See part 2
Allan Miller:
He can certainly feel his own suffering. And he is capable of visualising, and responding to, the actual and potential suffering of others.
True, no matter what are your ideas about naturalism every “normal” person can feel suffering and understand that other are suffering. The point is the interpretation, if naturalism is true “feel suffering” is nothing more than your neurons telling your brain you are in dangerous or unconfortable change your situation. If this is the case, in which way am I involved with your situation? If my neurons in the same time are sending to my brain a signal of happines and joy am I responsible because I`m joying while you are suffering?
Allan Miller:
This is just muddled. I talk of atheism, you respond using materialism,
I thought that your atheism is binded with a materialistic view, the other possible option is that you are a pantheist. If you are not a panteist please tell me what view of the world you match with atheism.
Allan Miller:
either everything that exists is measurable, or naturalism is false and there is a God.
No, I never mentioned God. I said if something exists that is not matter or energy, and then not mensurable naturalism is false.
Allan Miller:
There are many things that are measurable in principle but not in practice. The density at the core of the sun, for example, or the temperature at a particular location on Friday 14th March 2000 BC. I may struggle to locate the sensation of love, or empathy, or amusement, or hunger, or lust using scientific instruments. I couldn’t find the conception “Yippee! a frisbee!” in a dog either.Does this mean these things are therefore not physical in nature?
That is the point, materialism claims that all that thingd love, empathy, amusement, hunger, lust, suffering, altruistic sense desire to fit, good and bad are physical in nature and only physycal. Then as I exlained above change the meaning of that words and when you use them as a non materialist does you are falling in the SCF.
Allan Miller:
We have a very good account of the genetic basis of many behavioural traits in many organisms. We have a sound theory of the evolution of social behaviours in a competitive world. We have a strong rational capacity to understand what makes for societies that we wish to live in. That is, I only need appeal to known causes to account for the shared sense of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviour that pervades all human societies. I don’t see the need to import ‘God-sense’ into the mix. It is an ad hoc cause, with many unanswered questions regarding its means of interaction with the physical. Unless it is clearly shown to be otherwise, I’m happy to stick with ‘material’ causes.
But then you are in contradiction with this: See part 2
If morality is a product of evolution then is genetically determined, if it is not genetically determined can´t be the product of evolution.
Allan Miller:
I think you are wrong. You are saying that if I hold a hypothesis of a genetic basis for morality – currently unproven – then a logical consequence is that I must let all transgressors off unless I can prove that their genetic equipment (which I do not know how to locate) is intact?
No need to prove anything, if you hold the genetic basis for morality, different actions implies different genes. Are we morally responsible for the genes we are carrying on? You have to prove, from a materialistic point of view that I can overcame the genes I have in order to act according to the genes of others.
Allan Miller:
I don’t think legal principles tend to work that way.
Legality do not cover morality.
Allan Miller:
Who are the ‘value’ labels for? There are activities which a majority in a society would prefer its citizens did not do. That’s democracy. The basis of that sense, however, is what we are arguing about.
No, legality do not implies morality and there is no enforcement of morality in the societies. You do not broke the law if you are not kind or helpful or altruistic with others.
Allan Miller:
The majority of human beings are provisionally ‘nice’, and tend to adopt each other’s norms to some degree.
In the discussion with atheist always we reach this point and I confirm that they never read the news. And you said: No, I don’t think there are self-evident moral truths either.
Allan Miller:
There is no conflict between us all being descended from a few social individuals and most of us possessing the traits that tend to enhance sociality – quite the reverse. Calling those traits ‘good’ is simply the convention.
Sociality is not a problem for materialism, but it is not what we are discussing here. Sociality do not implies morality.
Allan Miller:
There are many features of our respective evolutionary trajectories that could lead to differences in social structure. Gorillas, for example, have significantly greater gender size differentials which have an impact. They never developed opposable thumbs, or language, or bipedalism, farming, warfare … evolution does not have any sure-win strategy. Our model of sociality worked for us.
Sorry, I do not understand we developed opposable thumbs, language, bidpedalism, farming, warfare and moral sociality in which order?
Allan Miller:
Hmmm… 17 centuries? We were out evolving on the savannahs for well over ten thousand centuries! That’s where most of our genetics was honed; that’s where I think ‘moral agreement’ has its basis. When we meet a new human, we are not greatly surprised by how it acts, because we have encountered many similar genetic constructs. Including ourselves.
17 centuries ago there was not very agreement in what moral is. Most of the societies at that time have very different ideas about what were good and bad with what we think today.
Allan Miller:
When we meet a new human, we are not greatly surprised by how it acts, because we have encountered many similar genetic constructs. Including ourselves.
Yes, like Robinson Crusoe when met the cannibals.
Allan Miller:
If materialism is true, religion was merely an attempt to codify and reify common moral sense into something outside humanity. It happened so long ago they have almost forgotten, and some believe that first there was religion, then it was abandoned by atheists, a few of whom are now trying to thieve concepts!
True. And then morality are no more than rules that make the society works. And what make society works is debatable. Stalin and Polpot tried to make society work. Very good guys them!
Thank you for make my point.
Blas,
I’m afraid our discussion has become rather laborious. Too many points, too many side-issues, too many areas where, through linguistic differences and/or differentials in the degree of familiarity with the science, we cannot conduct a sensible discussion.
Just one example:
I’m afraid the misconceptions in that sentence alone would take a full semester to unpick.
Regards
Allan
I missed this. It illustrates perfectly the misuse of the SCF, and why William and Blas will never get it:
It appears that everything and anything referenced by an atheist is a ‘stolen concept’ – or at least, the usage above and elsewhere indicates that the application of the term is at best somewhat indiscriminate.
The Stolen Concept Fallacy (in the Objectivist sense) is committed if one uses a concept in denying or contradicting the validity of concepts on which it depends. WJM’s version differs slightly: “concepts that cannot be derived from your premises (but can from mine)”. Obviously, I do deny the existence of objective morality in their terms, but not everything I say is an argument against it. In fact, hardly anything I say is an argument against it, but is instead a defence of the rationality of atheism. But it appears one cannot even say what amounts to “definitions are subjective, and there may be majority and minority views” without the Stolen Concept Police being passed the files.
This is where they elide from an approximation of the Objectivist version to the ‘ownership’ stance, unnoticed by themselves. My sentence above is obviously not committing Rand’s “Stolen Concept Fallacy”TM (since no attempt is being made to argue against a concept by using a dependent concept), nor is it clearly the WJM version “concepts that cannot be derived from your premises (but can from mine)”. The ability of individuals to conceptualise ‘morality’, and differentials in their conception of what is and what isn’t, simply do not depend upon there being an external entity that ultimately cares what is or isn’t and whether we do them or not.
No supporting argument is provided when WJM.Blas use “stolen concept” as to how the term so labelled is respectively not derivable under atheism, but is under theism. We are left with sloganeering – “stolen concept” is the equivalent of a spray can and graffiti template that you can apply ad lib.
It is illustrative of why it is such a poor name – ‘stolen’ is a loaded word that almost demands to be viewed as dishonest appropriation of terms ‘belonging’ to another realm, not WJM’s (avowed, but rarely honoured) version, or Rand’s. But it sounds good; it sounds like a solid argument in itself; it’s got a name and everything!
Morality is an “objectively existent commodity”: a code of conduct. This does not have to be externally derived or adjudicated to be existent. Nor does it need to be intimately controlled in its every nuance by genes to be meaningful under ‘materialism’. One can illustrate these principles by replacing any reference to “moral” expectations with “manners”, and seeing if anything changes. Or is that a stolen concept too?
One way of thinking about the problem at work here is whether there is a difference that makes a difference between ethics and etiquette.
So, one might claim to have a sense, or an intuition, that somehow ethics is different from etiquette — that the rightness or wrongness of an action is different from whether it is polite or rude, or that what counts as right and wrong holds for anyone, in any situation, whereas manners and etiquette are historically and culturally variable.
In the discussions we have at Uncommon Descent and The Skeptical Zone, the theists typically claim that this distinction is fundamental to the very meaning of “ethics,” but that it only makes sense as a distinction if one believes in God, so only people who believe in God are able to put their intellectual house in order about ethics. (As I understand him, this line of thought is central to Murray’s claim that there’s no via media between theism and nihilism.)
But there are two questions here — one question is, “do we have good reasons to draw a distinction between ethics and etiquette?” — another question is, “does the intelligibility of that distinction depend upon one’s belief in God?” And I suppose I’m in a minority here in holding that the answer to the first question is “yes” and that the answer to the second question is “no”. More emphatically, answering “no” to the second question doesn’t imply that one ought to answer “no” to the first question.
Kantian Naturalist,
I don’t think you are in the minority on that. Etiquette is clearly not derived directly from one’s personal sense, whereas certainly a proportion of morality is, hence my offering that semantic experiment as a comparative. I do think that things distinguish those two concepts, but the applicability of the SCF does not IMO change (ie, it is inapplicable to both).
One’s manners are clearly shaped by one’s culture, and any genetic influence extends no further than our wish to belong and conform, rather than directing our every move (as in Blas’s infuriating caricature of the genetic argument).
But for morality, we potentially come against a different set of restraints, plus others that more readily overlap with etiquette, or even simply a desire that others should not do things one finds distasteful (that is, into one’s ‘grab-bag’ of morality may go both murder and masturbation). ‘Morality’ as a piece is a complex mix of desires to conform to local norms and a real underlying sense that one really ‘should not’ do certain things. It could be that the Whole Thing derives from local conformity – ie, morality itself is entirely cultural. But certain things – protectiveness of females by males, or protectiveness towards children by both – can be sensibly hypothesised to have a genetic basis, and near-universality as a consequence. Counterexamples do not disprove the rule – Blas’s ‘Stalin and Pol Pot’ are but two out of 7 billion people.
I’m not so sure you are in a minority here. In any case, I agree with you on those answers.
Yes off course is better give up. But it is not problem with familiarity of science is the bogus logic that materialist needs to use. For example you are calling me ignorat because I stated:
““if you hold the genetic basis for morality, different actions implies different genes.”
But that statement is totally true with disregard of biology.
If the morality is genetically determined then the same genes should lead to the same actions and different genes to different actions.
If the same genes lead to different actions then morality is independant of the genes.
Off course in the same or similar circumstances.
Off course you can say genetic is only one factor. But then if it is an important factor morality is mainly genetically determined and then there is no difference with the other case, or you can say it is a minor factor but as before how could be selected a minor factor to allow the darwinian evolution of morality?
It is important to distinguish between:
The first of those seems unlikely, while the second seems very likely.
I’ve done so many, many times. Unfortunately, no matter how many time I explain something to an atheist/materialist, 2 days later they claim it never happened.
William,
I’m still awaiting your reply to these three comments.
I’m particularly interested in this:
Ah, well, the materialists have worked out how to get around that.
All you have to do is publish your work! Then when you get asked yet again to explain the same thing you can simply say
And problem solved! There are plenty of ID journals desperate for content, so that won’t be a problem.
So what are you waiting for?
BTW, “links” are a thing on the internet whereby if you’ve done something “many times” you only have to link to it, rather then write it out all again. You should try it!
Blas:
Blas,
If I appeared to call you ignorant, I apologise. It is simply frustrating to be repeatedly misunderstood. The meaning I intend when I talk about genetics is clearly not the meaning you receive, and no small part of that must be down to the differences in the way we have come to apprehend the terms used.
One problem is with differences in the meanings of the word “determined”. The same issue arises in discussions of ‘free will vs determinism’. One sense of ‘determined’ is simply that ‘every effect has a cause’, not that ‘everything that happens could not have been otherwise’.
So when I say I am not a genetic determinist, I mean that not every action has a direct causal link to a gene involved somewhere in development or operation of my brain, nor does every alternative action trace back to an allele of that gene, or a different one. In the matter of behaviour, genes generate predilections, not absolutes, certainly among the kinds of behaviour we are talking of in the ‘higher’ organisms. We have a strong sense of self-preservation, but can still commit suicide (there is not necessarily a ‘suicide gene’, but self-preservation is likely to have a genetic basis). We like to make love, but people can be celibate (there is not a ‘celibacy gene’). And so on.
OK, there are occasions when you discuss the rationale, but more frequently (for example in the case quoted, relating to what people ‘mean’ by morality), you are content to merely pepper the discussion with the term, which becomes an empty rhetorical device.
Which is rather the point of the OP. When a ‘atheist/materialist’ explains how they figure the concepts under their worldview, you indiscriminately spray around yet more of this knee-jerk ‘stolen concept’ labelling. This is a stolen concept! And that! And that! But under Rand’s version and under your own, the usage is frequently unjustified.
When said atheist attempts to further explain their rationale, there is more of the same. They haven’t forgotten the prior discussions, they simply didn’t buy it previously and don’t buy it now. You want people to accept your assertion that the concept in question cannot be derived from their worldview. Clearly, to them, it can. Maybe (as you frequently assert) people who disagree with you only do so because they ‘use their free will to deny the obvious’. Or maybe they have a point, and you aren’t getting it.
Unfortunately, that statement isn’t even written in good English. By any translation of the premise, the conclusion is at best a non-sequitur, at worst gibberish. I challenge anyone to give a sensible interpretation of “different actions implies different genes” that has any relation to biological reality.
It’s only a “rhetorical device” for those that refuse to be aware of (1) the definition I’ve repeatedly referred to, and (2) the more in-depth explanations I’ve repeatedly offered on several subjects.
That you don’t understand why something is a stolen concept doesn’t mean that I am using the term “indiscriminately”, in a “knee-jerk” fashion, or that am “spraying it around”. I suggest that all you are doing now is using derogatory terms and phrasings in an attempt to rhetorically diminish my position and increase yours in this “debate”.
Please note that even though I repeatedly referred to the Wiki definition, and repeatedly explained what I meant by “stolen concept”, I still had several people here claim that what I meant by “stolen concept” was something as ridiculous as who had the concept first, or that one was using a concept from outside of their ideology, or my use was based solely on the criteria that the concept was not derivable from that person’s premises.
It was about a week ago, that I seem to have gotten the idea across about what “stolen concept” actually means, and have achieved some agreement (except from KN, who refuses to have his arguments “bound” to any set of premises) that the stolen concept objection, as specifically defined, is a valid objection to an argument.
Yet you go on to say:
But clearly, they were not “getting it”, because they were clearly arguing against misunderstood conceptualizations of what “stolen concept” meant. They were arguing that they had as much a “right” to use the concept as anyone else, regardless of who came up with it “first”, or that theists didn’t “own” those concepts. They had no idea what “stolen concept” actually entailed and meant – they were refusing straw man interpretations of the objection.
Furthermore, on several occasions I explained why they had no premise-grounded right to use the conceptualizations of “objective moral rule” or “moral obligation” or “self-evident truth” that they were employing (especially in Dr. Liddle’s case). I explained that they had a right to “redefine” those terms, but those redefinitions result in a different concept that is not the same as the one they employed in the first place.
An example of this is the idea of an objectively true moral statement. Depending on how you define it, this can mean “moral statement accepted as true by the consensus” (Liz’s definition), or “moral statement that is true regardless of consensus agreement, authority, decree, law, scripture, culture, individual feelings, etc.” (theistic concept). If you say “X is an objectively true moral statement, and is true regardless of what the consensus agrees to”, and then define “objective” as “consensus agreement”, then you have stolen a concept – the idea of something being true regardless of consensus, and the idea that the truth of a moral statement depending on consensus, are irreconcilable ideas and cannot be derived from reconcilable premises.
I’ve explained this several times. Objective (or absolute) moral laws are incompatible with atheism; one can only obtain that kind of “objective” moral law from theism, because theism allows for morality to be ground in an absolute – the nature of god, and in relation to an absolute purpose – the purpose of creation, where we can expect there to be moral statements that are fundamentally, objectively true.
Because one can be an atheist, AND believe that there objective (absolute) moral laws, doesn’t mean that such a belief is rational derivable from atheistic premises; it just means we have an atheist that cannot reconcile their beliefs with their premise. Having such a belief doesn’t violate any physical or social law, even though it is a case of “stolen concept”.
IMHO, what we have here are a bunch of atheists that don’t really even understand the concept of making sure one’s beliefs and argued concepts are derivable from their ideological premises. That’s probably due to their disdain for philosophy – they aren’t really interested in checking their premises, inferences and conclusions for logical consistency because, frankly, they already know they’re right, so there’s no real reason for any such introspective analysis. Or, in the case of KN, one can always abandon (or, in his terms, “redefine”) reason itself so he isn’t subjected to such trivial matters like reconciling his views with his premises.
Is that your current view, or have you changed your mind?
William J. Murray,
William,
I made it pretty clear in the OP that the stolen concept is not a question of ‘ownership’, but note that it does invite that interpretation by its very name. That others make that mistake is not something to lay at my door; the distinction is clearly laid out in the OP. I’ve also made it pretty clear that I do not think that there are ‘objective moral truths’ in the theistic sense. So whatever other people have had to say on the matter, it’s no good arguing with me about it.
I do, nonetheless, contend that the indiscriminateness with which you (and Blas – do you think he is always correct?) apply the term undermines your claim that you only ever mean it in the ‘Wiki sense’: ” the act of using a concept while ignoring, contradicting or denying the validity of the concepts on which it logically and genetically depends.”
More frequently it is more accurately interpreted as ‘using a term and, incidentally, denying the validity of certain other concepts which I think are only valid under theism’, whatever your intent. I refer you to the exchange that started this further discussion:
Under your own terms, the use of ‘stolen concept’ in that context is simply nonsensical – unless it is my daring to use the word ‘Moral’, even subordinately to the idea being put across: things an individual might consider moral. In which case, people getting the idea that you think theism ‘owns’ the concept ‘Moral’ might be understandable.
That people here deny theism is undenied, but to assert that morality is ‘logically and genetically dependent on it’ is unjustified. One is simply giving a different account of the phenomenon of morality. I’ve sketched out a version of materialism that sees morality as an outgrowth of sociality: a complex set of behaviours and restraints that involve input from both the genetic and the cultural. There is nothing irrational about this, and it is derivable from materialism. As you like to claim, your version does not depend on theism actually being true; likewise I can exclude mine from any need to accord with an actual state-of-affairs! To dismiss a logical argument, it is not necessary to provide evidence, simply to show that the reasoning is flawed. And, on the plus side, my view does accord with known causes, even if I can’t point to a gene that makes people queasy about killing.
If you say that “objectivity” can only be derived from “God”, then of course that is a nonsense statement to an atheist. I am just unconvinced that you are not making stuff up to suit your current outlook and culture. There lies the problem with your “objectivity”. One person’s “objective” morality is a conglomeration of culture, history, selection (rejecting burning people at the stake as an acceptable method of moral guidance, for instance). I still think you are experiencing a failure to communicate.
Cognitive dissonance is not exclusive to atheists. I agree with KN that one can be neither theist nor nihilist. We can be sceptical. We can admit “we don’t know”. We can say “well, believe what you will, just don’t try pushing those beliefs into my life and my choices”.
And that makes no sense to me.
Problem 1: concepts are never derivable from premises.
Problem 2: I don’t start with a set of ideological premises.
William J. Murray:
Says the guy who cannot derive his own belief…
…from its “ideological premises”:
Prove me wrong, William. Show your derivation.