The Fallacy of the Stolen Concept was coined by Ayn Rand, to point out the absurdity of arguing against a position when the argument depends upon that position – setting up a kind of indirect (and hence not so obviously paradoxical) version of Epiminedes-style “this sentence is false”. For example, to argue that all consciousness is really dreaming requires that there be some state one could recognise as ‘waking’, in order that dreaming could be distinct from it. One steals the concept of ‘waking’ (on whose existence ‘dreaming’ depends) in an attempt to argue there is no such thing.
It’s rather a misnomer, as it conjures up an implication that there is some principle of concept ‘ownership’. And self-referentially, a common illustration of the fallacy is ‘property is theft’ – the supposed fallacy being that, as theft has no meaning without a concept of ownership, the statement is a paradox. (That slogan was never intended as a formal philosophical argument, of course, and a much less pretentious retort to such a definitional declaration could legitimately be “no it isn’t”).
We are, of course, familiar with the “stolen concept”; it is a regular slogan of William J Murray. However, I submit that his usage is frequently incorrect. Despite correcting others who fall into the ‘ownership’ trap, his usage all too frequently invites, or makes, that tumble. For WJM, “I”, “moral”, “true”, “right”, when used by the “atheo-materialist”, are stolen concepts. However, there is nothing fallacious about simple usage. Unless one is trying to deny the existence of one of these concepts using something which depends upon it – eg “I do not exist”, or “There are no true statements” – then there is nothing fallacious going on. Murray’s misuse relates to an apparent understanding of the stolen concept as a declaration that such concepts cannot be derived from materialism. Which is not, I think, what Rand was saying – and, further, is incorrect. One does not need a supernatural entity before one can talk of what one ‘ought’ to do, or whether Truth etc exist. And the presence of such a supernatural entity offers no guarantees that they ground morality, or that they render anything True other than truth-propositions on the existence of supernatural entities.
If an atheist were to argue that (for example) it was immoral to care about one’s actions, they would be committing the fallacy of the stolen concept. But to simply talk of ‘morality’ (merely: what one ‘ought’ to do), or ‘moral duty’, ‘moral fibre’, ‘amorality’, ‘immorality’ – no attempt is being made to disprove the concept by its usage outside of religion. Even if it is definitionally the case that morality refers only to those oughts and ought-nots adjudicated by a spiritual arbiter, usage in another context (such as by someone who does not believe in said arbiter) is still not a stolen concept, sensu Rand.
An atheist can mean something by ‘moral’, and be in broad agreement with a theist about what it means, simply disagreeing about the source – human sensibility or divine decree. Ironically, Rand’s own moral writing was grounded in the kind of thinking that Murray would dismiss as materialistic ‘concept-stealing’. That which is moral, for Rand, is that which a human should value in relation to his own survival. We only have values because we can be destroyed, and we’d like to avoid that, ta very much. Theists extend that – as they have a sense in which we can be spiritually destroyed as well, after death, they care about morality because they care about preventing that spiritual destruction. But to dress up the implicit egoism that remains, they invoke an entity that cares as much about objective ‘values’ as they do about what they fundamentally value – their permanent identity.
FWIW, I disagree with Rand on morals. I think we possess an altruistic sense, that I am happy to term ‘moral’, which derives from our sociality as a species, and is sustained by both genetics and culture. It is not a matter of pure egoism, but the balance of the ‘requirements of the self’ and other constraints that arise from our desire to fit in with society. It is manifest by the sense of warmth we experience on witnessing or doing ‘good’, and an abhorrence for ‘bad’. Our morality articulates these shared sensations (shared by most, that is); religion packages them with additional carrots, sticks and reification. Society has proved a great survival feature of our species. We experience positive sensations on helping others, negative on hurting, because our ancestors who possessed these characteristics were more successful at procreating (thanks to sociality) than those who went it alone. As a sense, it is developed to a varying degree by society’s present members. Some possess it not at all, others to a very high degree, just as with a sense of humour, or beauty.
It is of course in the nature of things that religious and cultural norms can directly mould this individual sense – outrage against homosexuality, promiscuity, contraception or cussing, for example, appears viscerally felt, whereas those with (ironically) more personal freedom in such matters tend to be less prone to shock-horror at such things, while being at least as opposed to murder, torture and dishonesty.
I’ve frequently pointed out that WJM’s use of this fallacy relies on an illicit conflation of conditions of validity and conditions of genesis. Curiously, this criticism has not received a response from WJM, which iniducates to me his lack of interest in being taken seriously.
It appears that ID/creationists do everything badly; whether it is science, mathematics, or philosophy.
I suspect that the only reason UD and other ID/creationist “debating” sites exist is because it allows them to hone their socio/political arguments for the next round of political action. It’s the “grunts” being sent into battle and assigned point positions by the incompetent “junior officers” of ID/creationism in order to test their evolving tactics and “arguments.”
Fortunately they even screw up politics, as evidenced by their repeated defeats in the courts.
If William posts a rebuttal, perhaps it will be titled “The ‘The stolen “Stolen Concept Fallacy” fallacy’ Fallacy.”
“It is of course in the nature of things that religious and cultural norms can directly mould this individual sense – outrage against homosexuality, promiscuity, contraception or cussing, for example, appears viscerally felt, whereas those with (ironically) more personal freedom in such matters tend to be less prone to shock-horror at such things, while being at least as opposed to murder, torture and dishonesty.”
This is why I’ve found it useful to differentiate between ethics and morality. One is based on human empathy and tangible concern for their well-being, and applies pretty much across all humanity, while the other is rooted in social mores and cultural roles. Morality can encompass ethics (although all too often it undermines them) but it also piles on a plethora of seemingly arbitrary rules that might make sense in one culture but not another.
It can be fun to be “ethically immoral”!
Yep – I was trying to work a duplicate ‘concept’ into it too, but decided it was a bit contrived! 🙂
I’ve tried to point this out to WJM on a few occasions. The most recent was here:
And here’s a link to my objection to “the stolen concept fallacy”.
A slightly clearer way of putting my objection is that there’s a difference between concepts and conceptions. Concepts are general, ‘thin’ terms, the meaning of which is determined by their logical role within sentences. Conceptions are ‘thick’ terms that have their sense determined by the conceptual status and their complicated entanglements within theories (or “world-views”).
Here’s an example: when we say that “Christians and ancient Greeks had very different notions of virtue,” what we’re saying is that they had different conceptions of the same concept — i.e. virtue. There are metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and political complexities that “fill out” the “thin” concept of virtue in different ways — resulting in different conceptions.
Likewise, the theist and the naturalist will have different conceptions of such concepts as “responsibility,” “obligation,” “correctness”, “freedom,” and so on. But there’s nothing suspect or illegitimate about any attempt to develop a new conception of a familiar concept — on the contrary, that is precisely the creativity of thought in action! — and there is no reason to think that the theistic conceptions of those concepts are the only ones available, let alone better in any significant ways to the naturalistic conceptions of those concepts.
Probably the fallacy starts here:
“I think we possess an altruistic sense, that I am happy to term ‘moral’, which derives from our sociality as a species, and is sustained by both genetics and culture. It is not a matter of pure egoism, but the balance of the ‘requirements of the self’ and other constraints that arise from our desire to fit in with society. It is manifest by the sense of warmth we experience on witnessing or doing ‘good’, and an abhorrence for ‘bad’.”
Let go step by step
“I think we possess an altruistic sense,”
From a materialistic point of view, we have or not a sense for altruism. If we have it should defined and measurable.
“which derives from our sociality as a species,”
This is a fallacy, we know other species that ar social species and do not have morality.
“ is sustained by both genetics and culture”
I didn´t know that the gene for morality was discovered. How did they tested it? Can we select human embrios that have a strong expression of that gene?
“ is not a matter of pure egoism, but the balance of the ‘requirements of the self’ and other constraints that arise from our desire to fit in with society.”
Yes probably also a materialistic model can explain that we want to “fit in the society”. But that is a problem for morality, because there are many ways to “fit” in the society. You can fit as the “boss” and morality becomes nothing more than the way the non boss accept his ruling.
“It is manifest by the sense of warmth we experience on witnessing or doing ‘good’, and an abhorrence for ‘bad’”
The same as before, everything depends of what everyone thinks is good and what is bad.
More fallacies here:
“because our ancestors who possessed these characteristics were more successful at procreating (thanks to sociality) than those who went it alone. As a sense, it is developed to a varying degree by society’s present members.”
KN:
You might ponder why the phrase is “stolen concept” and not “stolen term“. The issue is not that they (atheists/materialist/natralists) are employing a term utilizing the concept/definition they say is attached to that term under their philosophical context; the issue is that their use of the term necessitates a different concept/definition than the one they claim is attached to the term.
Thus, they say “true” means X, but employ it in a way where “true” must mean Y, where “Y” is only available under the theistic/idealist premise. Same with the terms “right”, “wrong”, “I”, etc. They are constructing arguments that require those terms mean what they mean under theism, not what they mean under atheism.
As Blas illustrates, atheists/materialists depend upon a general agreement and use of the theistic/ideal concepts under most of the terms they employ when making a statement, much less an argument. The framework for such employments of concept is theistic/idealist, even when arguing against idealism or theism. It’s like trying to make an argument that rationality doesn’t exist; what does “argument” even mean in a case where rationality doesn’t exist? How would one go about making such an argument, and why should anyone listen to it?
The problem is, those atheistic materialist arguments are riddled with theistic paradigm concepts and assumption. If they were to try and make an argument rooted in the native atheistic/materialist format, there’d be no rational reason to make such an argument in the first place; no basis by which to justify it in the second; no means by which to hope for proper evaluation in the third, and no one (essentially) to make it to in the fourth.
Blas, your analytical skills need some work.
Gaaah! What a silly, erroneous claim. There is nothing inherent in materialism that would prevent an altruistic outlook. Simple empathy – that is, the analytical ability to determine how others feel in given situations based upon one’s own feeling and the reactions of others – explains altruism. There is nothing in materialism that prevents empathy – or the experience of any other emotional state for that matter. Basically, you’re trying to knock down a strawman. Go you…
This is a false dichotomy coupled with fallacy of the general rule, Blas. Other species being social without morality does not preclude human sociality from contributing to our morality. In fact, your claim that other species are social without morality is begging the question – how do you know? Because they don’t display human moralty? Ummm…hmmm…wonder why that would be? Oh…riiight…because they aren’t human.
Oh c’mon…now you’re just being obtuse. Behavior does not have to be coded in a specific gene to be sustained genetically. Certain people have greater analytical capabilities than others and those characteristics are indeed inherited by their offspring. Given that altruism (the subject of the sentence; not sure where you got morality) is related to analytical ability, it makes perfect sense for it to be sustained genetically. Similarly, as a social species, such behaviors would be sustained through cultural practices of approval and celebration.
You might want to reconsider your assessment of the comment.
Oh yeah…and even if you were 100% correct in your assessment, it still does not demonstrate that the fallacy in question is a Stolen Concept Fallacy, which is the whole point of the OP.
This might carry more weight if it was more then simply your opinion.
Not even wrong sums it up I think.
Yeah, yeah, and we “atheists/materialists” still use statements riddled with inaccurate anachronisms too – statements like “watching a sun rise” because they are defined phrases for understood concepts. The thing is, theists have no “ownership” over phraseology or concepts; anyone is free to any old term to get a concept across. William’s protestations that atheists can’t use such phrases because they are rooted in theistic meaning is just plain old silly. William would only have a valid case if atheists were using those theistic concepts to show those concepts were invalid, which, it is clear, is not the case here. Ergo – no stolen concept.
So William… you might make a better sales pitch if you get some cheese and bread to go with that whine of yours…
.
Blas,
I think we can safely conclude from Blas’s post that he or she doesn’t know what the word “fallacy” means.
Yes, people are quite free to string any old collection of fundamentally irrational and unsupportable statements together they wish.
This demonstrates that you don’t understand the objection I’m making whatsoever. Once again, it’s not “stolen term”, it’s “stolen concept”. If you used the terms in a way consistent with atheism, true to whatever “compatibalist” redefinitions you offered, there would be no problem. But that’s exactly the problem; when atheists argue, they employ the theistic concepts; when challenged, they provide the atheistic definitions – definitions not compatible with the concepts they employed in the arguments they make.
EL and I went around this with the terms “objective morality” and “self-evidently true moral statement”.She defines them as “consensus morality” and “consensus true moral statements”; fine – but, that’s not how she argues.
She has said before that it is always wrong, in any circumstance, whether the consensus agrees or not, for anyone who agrees or not, that it is immoral to torture children for personal pleasure. That statement cannot be derived from her definitions of “objective morality” or “self-evidently true moral statements”. The statement that it is always wrong for anyone, regardless of culture, personal feelings and beliefs, consensus, authority, society or circumstances, to torture children for personal pleasure, can only be derived from a theistic concept of “objective morality” and “self-evidently true” moral statements.
If you have certain sets of premises you are arguing from, that means that your argument must employ those concepts that can be derived from those premises. Otherwise, you’re just employing emotion and rhetoric and being irrational.
So what? No one has claimed that this is paradise nor that we can make it into paradise. But how is that any different from theist/supernatural model? If you guys win, we’re going to have a world with “god” as the big boss, and morality nothing more than how we get along with the rulings of the sicko priests, mad mullahs, imams, mohels, or elders of whichever denomination happens to dominate. How is that any better for morality?
Theism is not better, it’s worse.
If secular humanists (including most atheist/materialists) are not able to persuade the global society that we all have inherent dignity as humans and should be treated with compassion and justice for all, then we’re going to have to fit into a theist society where innocent teenage girls unlucky enough to be raped get stoned to death, where innocent old women unlucky enough to attract the attention of a priest get burned to death for witchcraft, where loving couples get brutally murdered by the “virtue squad” merely for holding hands in public. And all because the big bossman god says so! (Or, so they claim god says)
How on earth is that better? How can you possibly justify that?
If you attack our morality, what can you possibly offer to replace it with?
Be honest.
No. xe doesn’t. You’re either deluded or lying to say so. There may be some third, even fourth, possibility I haven’t mentioned, but none of the possibilities are that you actually are stating the objective truth here.
FTFY.
William,
I suspect you’ll ignore this, as usual, but here goes.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that all of the following are true:
1. God exists.
2. God created us.
3. God has a purpose for us that he wants us to fulfill.
Let’s further assume that we know exactly what God wants us to do, though this is clearly a counterfactual.
You argue that we should fulfill God’s purpose for us. Your nemesis, Milton J. Worry, argues that God is evil and should be defied.
A number of very smart, very rational people approach you and Milton for moral guidance. They want to know whether they are morally obligated to obey God or defy him, or neither. They make it clear that they are not asking you to tell them what they are better off doing, or what is in their best interest. They only want to know what their moral obligation is.
What do you say to these people to persuade them that obeying God is their moral obligation?
WJM
Do you have an example? Of course, one example does not prove the generalisation, but it would be helpful to see an actual case, as I cannot envisage this hypothetical situation where an atheo-evo-materio-ist would say “true” (or ‘right’, or ‘wrong’, or ‘moral’) in a manner that can only be meant in a theistic sense.
Blas, first off, a fallacy is an argument that uses poor reasoning. It’s not a statement you may happen to disagree with, and says nothing about the truth or otherwise of the claim. Is this a language thing? ‘Falacia logica’.
From any point of view, we have or have not a sense for altruism. If you think it should be defined and measurable, then presumably that applies whether we derive it from shared genetics/culture or from shared access to the Divine Wish. It would be a fallacy to argue against materialism on the basis that all of its claims must be ‘measurable’. We can’t, for example, measure the absence of God. I agree that I make a claim about a state-of-affairs, without offering extensive empirical support, but all you are offering is the bare counter-claim.
No, your response is a fallacy. I would not presume to know how bees perceive their ‘duty’ to the hive; I don’t even really know how other human beings feel! I prefaced the remark with “I think”, another key word is our sociality, and you have morphed my “altruism” to “morality”. I did not say that all sociality leads to morality. I would not chuck all social organisms into the same bucket. Haplodiploidy, asymmetries between partners and between parents/offspring, the extent of instinct vs flexibility, etc, all have a part to play in the social character of a species. Biology is stuffed with counterexamples to just about any principle you’d care to offer. Nonetheless, a social species where the individuals do not provide some kind of assistance to each other is an oxymoron.
Yes, hee hee, you got me, Cap’n Sarcasm. Note again the “I think” at the beginning, and your own swithcheroo from altruism to morality. Altruism is the fact of inter-individual assistance, morality the sense that may or may not be involved in the causal chain.
I consider the presence of a shared sense in favour of ‘fair’ behaviours and against ‘unfair’ ones to be due, in part, to Natural Selection, it is true. But the developmental pathways to fully-functioning adults are, of course, under the influence of many genes and environmental factors, so your caricature that a single ‘morality gene’ must be isolated before I can dare to hold that hypothesis is naive. What’s the alternative? We do not have any moral sense? Or we do, but it resides as a ‘still, small voice’ from deep within our God-given souls? How do you propose to isolate that, for empirical confirmation?
Nope. Any society will likely develop a structure. As I noted in another passage, cultural and other influences will mould our moral sense – but only up to a point. Morality is a complex mix of the negotiable and non-negotiable. And note that the ‘big boss’ can be religious or secular in nature. It can mould natures to some degree, suppress and subjugate to some extent, but they are not infinitely malleable. If we do have an innate sense of ‘fairness’ (genetic or divine) it provides a limit to the ability of influential individuals to make us indefinitely mean. Yes, I am aware of Nazi Germany. But the ‘big boss’ model is no more a problem for the materialist view than it is for theism.
So?
I suppose what I’m left wondering, presupposing everything William says is true, is what good it’s done the theists?
I mean, they are (according to William) able to construct arguments with terms that they can all agree on yet despite that there are as many religions as there are colours and a history of war on the unbeliever (i.e. everyone but your particular group).
To be honest I have less respect for a group that “knows” what “right” and “wrong” are but then proceeds to ignore them anyway.
You can hardly expect atheists to behave in a way that differentiates right from wrong (under Williams schema) but you’d expect it of theists.
Yet under many measures theists behave worse then atheists.
So it seems to me William has “won” a battle but the war in fact ended years ago and everybody has already gone home.
I’d like to know William where this leaves your argument – theists behave worse then atheists despite knowing the difference between right and wrong, something that atheists cannot know under your schema.
So something is terribly terribly wrong with your idea. Hence the “not even wrong” label.
Here’s one example: http://pss.sagepub.com/content/18/9/803.short
Which is odd as you’d expect the opposite, no?
And please explain this William:
If marriage is an unbreakable bond sanctified before god then that seems not to matter very much if you are a believer.
http://atheism.about.com/od/atheistfamiliesmarriage/a/AtheistsDivorce.htm
So please keep those concepts. They don’t seem to be doing you any good! That or theists are better at ignoring them!
“Blas, first off, a fallacy is an argument that uses poor reasoning. It’s not a statement you may happen to disagree with, and says nothing about the truth or otherwise of the claim. Is this a language thing? ‘Falacia logica’.”
True, I should start my observations like a silogism:
Materials states only matter and nergy exists
A sense of soffering exists
Then the fallacyis explicite but my comment would be too long
“From any point of view, we have or have not a sense for altruism.”
No, from a materialistic point of view we have five senses, we can sensese the light, the vibration of the air, the surfaces and his temperatur and chemical substances intwo different forms. Then our brain processes that signal to produce concepts in a way that materilism cannot explain.
“If you think it should be defined and measurable, then presumably that applies whether we derive it from shared genetics/culture or from shared access to the Divine Wish. It would be a fallacy to argue against materialism on the basis that all of its claims must be ‘measurable’. We can’t, for example, measure the absence of God. I agree that I make a claim about a state-of-affairs, without offering extensive empirical support, but all you are offering is the bare counter-claim. “
No the requirement that everithing shpuld be measurable derives from the materialistic claim that only matter and energy exist. So all the phenomena we perceive shoild be product of matter and energy then measurable.
“No, your response is a fallacy. I would not presume to know how bees perceive their ‘duty’ to the hive; I don’t even really know how other human beings feel! I prefaced the remark with “I think”, another key word is our sociality, and you have morphed my “altruism” to “morality”. I did not say that all sociality leads to morality. I would not chuck all social organisms into the same bucket. Haplodiploidy, asymmetries between partners and between parents/offspring, the extent of instinct vs flexibility, etc, all have a part to play in the social character of a species. Biology is stuffed with counterexamples to just about any principle you’d care to offer.”
My point is if not all sociality leads to morality, how do you know that our morality comes from our sociality?
“Nonetheless, a social species where the individuals do not provide some kind of assistance to each other is an oxymoron. “
Yes, but as you said sociality at least not always lead to morality, so give assistance to each other is not the same of morality.
“I consider the presence of a shared sense in favour of ‘fair’ behaviours and against ‘unfair’ ones to be due, in part, to Natural Selection, it is true. But the developmental pathways to fully-functioning adults are, of course, under the influence of many genes and environmental factors, so your caricature that a single ‘morality gene’ must be isolated before I can dare to hold that hypothesis is naive.”
Yes my demand of a gen of morality ois an hyperbple, but you do not realize the consequences of the materialistic claim that morality is genetically determined. First any behavior can be justified: “I’m didn’t do it, it was my genes”, second someone can try to improve humanity eliminating bad genes.
“What’s the alternative? We do not have any moral sense? Or we do, but it resides as a ‘still, small voice’ from deep within our God-given souls? How do you propose to isolate that, for empirical confirmation?”
The alternative is materialism is right and then morality is an illusion that helps us to survive or materialism is wrong and other things exist not sujected to empirical confirmation that make us morals.
“Nope. Any society will likely develop a structure. As I noted in another passage, cultural and other influences will mould our moral sense – but only up to a point. Morality is a complex mix of the negotiable and non-negotiable. And note that the ‘big boss’ can be religious or secular in nature. It can mould natures to some degree, suppress and subjugate to some extent, but they are not infinitely malleable. If we do have an innate sense of ‘fairness’ (genetic or divine) it provides a limit to the ability of influential individuals to make us indefinitely mean. Yes, I am aware of Nazi Germany. But the ‘big boss’ model is no more a problem for the materialist view than it is for theism.”
That was my counterargument to your claim that kindness is a behavior adapted to fit in. But there are many ways to fit in, not only kindnes, servilism and authorithy are other two, and I guess they give more chance to have offsprings.
Blas:The same as before, everything depends of what everyone thinks is good and what is bad.
“So?”
So, if there is no agreement in what is good and what is bad there is no morality.
And as you admit it would make no difference at all to the world we live in. So you are arguing for a position that if accepted changes nothing.
It’s fundamentally that, isn’t it? You want to be more then just a collection of atoms. Let’s assume that the universe is created and there is a deity. Don’t you think it would be somewhat annoyed at your ungratefulness? After all, if you (and William and everybody else) is unable to tell if reality is “materialist” or not then it makes no difference (and you can point to no difference) if it is or not. Yet despite that you still want more.
I propose that your deity would be surprised at your ungratefulness.
Do you mean besides the one I outlined above about EL & my issue over the terms “objective morality” and “self-evident moral truth”? Do you mean besides the many such cases where I made that objection that has apparently led to initiating a thread about it?
In any event, I’m showing that you are incorrect about what “stolen concept” means, and how it is completely valid and not itself a fallacy. There are certain concepts that are derivable from atheistic/materialistic premises; there are other concepts that are derivable from theistic premises. Obviously, certain fundamental terms do not carry the same conceptual meaning under the two different sets of premises.
Therefore, if one uses a term in a way that necessarily implicates a concept not derivable from their premises, but only derivable from the other set of premises (which is the antithesis of the first set), they are using a stolen concept and engaging in a self-refuting argument.
This is a valid objection in principle, whether or not I can demonstrate any particular case of it – however, I have pointed out and argued many such cases, otherwise, why the thread about it?
No, it doesn’t. I suggest you are improperly understanding the actual argument I am making about the concept being employed by the atheist/materialist. I do not use the phrase “stolen concept” in the sense that some particular ideology has exclusive rights to use a term, or that they have exclusive rights in defining that term, or that they used the term “first”.
When I make a case that someone is employing a stolen concept, it is exclusively intended to be about where I hold that someone is using a term in a context that is necessarily implying a conceptual interpretation/definition of that term that is not derivable from that person’s premises, and is only derivable from theistic/idealism premises.
In principle, it is an entirely valid objection to an argument being made. There are concepts/usages of “I”, “right”, “morality”, “truth”, etc. that are only derivable from theistic/idealist/dualistic/trialistic premises, just as there are fundamental concepts of those terms that are only derivable from atheism/materialism/naturalism.
Because you have pointed out many such cases.
Actually, not that many cases. A few, repetitively.
William,
By that criterion, your own concept of objective morality is stolen. As I pointed out earlier, you can’t derive the conclusion
…from these premises (taken from my earlier comment):
If you disagree, then show us how you derive the former from the latter.
keiths,
If you are going to claim that I am stealing a concept, then tell me from what ideological premises am I stealing it? Under what premises is it a valid concept?
If you cannot tell me that, then I cannot be “stealing” the concept. I might be making an erroneous conclusion, but that in and of itself doesn’t make for a “stolen concept”.
In any event, I would like Allan Miller, Kantian Naturalist and others here to admit that the “stolen concept” fallacy, as I have explained it above, is indeed a valid objection to any argument that employs concepts not derivable from the stated premises, but are in fact necessarily attached to antithetical premises.
William,
I’m going by your definition:
By your own standard, objective morality is a stolen concept unless you can show that it is derivable from your premises.
I doubt that you can, because there is nothing in this…
…that leads to this:
Can they do this? I mean, is antithesis a stolen concept?
Perhaps William can make a list of what concepts are available to who and then everyone will know what they are “allowed” to use.
When I get that list I’ll file it next to “how to calculate FSCO/I” and “the rules of objective morality”.
AM
WJM
No I mean an actual example, not a handwavy waft in the direction of another post where you handwavily waft towards many other conversations. An actual example of this:
I’d just like to see an example of a usage that demands that a term mean what it means under theism. It’s not a trap. The thread is about your use of the stolen concept fallacy. I think that most of your usage is incorrect under Rand’s conception, but you are entitled to borrow her name for something else, and be correct under that. But what that ‘something else’ is is rather opaque without a specific instance to get one’s teeth into. It is not clear to me how an atheist might use a term that means what it means under theism, except arguendo or in constructing a reductio ad absurdum.
No, I’m not saying you do, but the name of the term is problematic – if you don’t want people to think it is a question of ownership, ‘stolen concept’ is a particularly poor choice of term. The choice was Rand’s, of course ***. But in adopting this as your slogan, you inherit that same baggage. Which is why I say “invites, or makes” the ownership connection.
*** But you aren’t using Rand’s version either.
Yes, the stolen concept is a valid objection to some arguments. I just haven’t seen a good case for it in these discussions regarding the various terms offered. I certainly don’t attempt to disprove theistic morality using the theistic version of the concept, for example (or any other – how could you disprove theistic morality?). All I do is explain how I rationalise the concept in the absence of a deity.
There is a shade of ‘Godelianism’ to this – that conceptual frameworks are a series of onion-skins; conceptual frameworks at any given level cannot be fully validated at that level. If theism means wrapping everything in a final skin, with nothing outside it, it ‘owns’ and validates all concepts below. That IMO would be an artificial way of wrapping things, derived perhaps from a dislike of loose ends, but looking decidely untidy from where I sit.
Keiths said:
You are ignoring what came after your ellipses:
keiths said:
Nope.
Also, keiths, considering that you edited out a necessary aspect of my “standard” and replaced it with an ellipse, and did so again even after I corrected you, and attempted to portray that edited version as “my” standard even after corrected, with the full version in full view only a few posts above, my conclusion is that you are not arguing in good faith.
I gave one in this very thread about the different meaning/concepts of “objective morality” and spelled out what concept is being stolen, how, and why.
A pedantic objection. “Sense” does not solely refer to the receipt of external stimuli, but covers the entirety of perception, internal and external. See Latin sentire, to feel, whose root gives ‘sentient’, and sensus, whose literal translation “feeling” does not refer solely to the sensation of touch.
Measurable in principle does not mean measurable in practice. The possibility of a physical cause does not depend upon an empirical demonstration of that cause. As I say, the atheist argues that there is no God, not that everything is measurable.
I don’t claim to “know”. I consider it to be the case, but I could be wrong. It seems a perfectly reasonable hypothesis, in accord with the clear benefits to human reproductive output arising from the cohesion of our social groups.
I don’t claim that morality is genetically determined. Genetics, in a flexible species such as ourselves, produces a set of predispositions, not absolutes. Culture produces still more, and we have some capacity to override – to ‘choose’. Unlike some organisms, we do not universally do X in response to stimulus Y (though we do for some things).
A hypothesis of a genetic basis for morality does not legitimise all genetic excuses for its abandonment. If we assume that the genetic predisposition to ‘do right’ is fixed in the species, then someone arguing for a genetic excuse for ‘doing wrong’ must be a carrier for a mutation. My response to such a miscreant would be: “prove it”. It’s not unheard of that such mitigation is possible – we don’t hold everyone to the same standard, eg where mental conditions are apparent – but the possibility is a weak reason for considering materialism to be have unpalatable consequences.
In the matter of eugenics, it tends to be frowned upon. Why? Because people think it ‘wrong’ to breed humans like domestic animals. Why? Sorry, I cannot give a detailed causal account of that sensation. But wait – aren’t you stealing concepts here? You argue that someone would try to ‘improve’ humanity under your caricature of materialism. But why (under that caricature) would anyone care about improving humanity?
Sure, I’m not offering universals here. Social interaction, and evolutionary theory, involve many subtleties. But you seem to think that everyone could be a ‘big boss’, and thereby everybody gets to have more offspring that way … you could think that through, or model it, and you may see why it does not work as an evolutionary ‘strategy’.
But there is agreement. We compare notes, and discover we broadly share the same internal conceptions of what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’. I argue that the causal basis for that is a combination of the genetic and the cultural. How do you get agreement on the theistic model? “Masturbation is an abomination to the Lord. Anyone found performing this act will – regardless of their own opinions on the matter – be severely punished. All those in agreement, raise your right hand. Ah, I see some of you don’t actually have right hands. Hey ho.”
Blas,
Exactly so! There is no agreement between religions as what is moral (fish on Friday much?) therefore there is no ‘theistic morality’ as there is no theistic agreement in what is good and what is bad!
Thanks for making the case on my behalf Blas!
Anyone is “allowed” to use any concept they wish, whether or not it is logically derivable from the premises they claim to hold. There is no law that one must have logically consistent beliefs.
I’m pointing out that if one is employing a concept in an argument that is only logically derivable from an irreconcilable or antithetical set of premises, they are expressing a view that is logically inconsistent with their stated premises and so their argument fails.
Put more simply, if you hold the view that it is always immoral to torture children for personal pleasure, regardless of the personal feeling or belief of the person committing the act, regardless of social consensus in regards to the act, regardless of any authority or writ or scriptural decree about the act, regardless of law or cultural perspective, then this concept of “objective morality” is antithetical to atheistic materialism.
You cannot be a logically consistent atheistic materialist/naturalist and hold the view that torturing children for personal pleasure is always immoral, in every case.
If you are a atheist/naturalist/materialist, you must logically hold that under various possible circumstances, such as personal belief and social consensus, that torturing children for personal pleasure is necessarily as moral, in that case, as anything else in other particular cases.
So, let’s look at an argument where the necessary implication is that one is using a stolen concept. In a debate, an atheist/materialist claims that slavery was immoral, or that treating women and children as property was immoral, or argues that it is moral for two members of the same sex to marry.
By what rational principle, derivable from atheism/materialism, can such claims be made? What reasoning, derivable from the atheistic/materialist premises, allows one to conclude that slavery was wrong, holding women and children as property was wrong, and that it is wrong to deny two members of the same sex the same legal standing as heterosexuals?
Certainly not by the principle of relative morality, nor by the principle of social consensus. If, as EL claims, it is by the principle of “what makes the most happy and productive society”, then many questions are left begging. First and foremost, why should anyone agree to that standard? What atheist/materialist principle makes that standard “the” standard by which to arbit morality? What principle should prevent any individual, group, society from defining “morality” differently, such as “obeying the word of god”?
The fact is, such statements that something “is” morally wrong (in and of itself, regardless of community standards, personal beliefs or definitions of principles otherwise) are not derivable from atheistic standards. The atheist has no logical right to say that “slavery is wrong”; what they have a logical right to say is “slavery is wrong in our society”. Necessarily true (under atheism/materialism) would be “slavery is right in societies that approve of it” (if using the social consensus principle) or “slavery is right is societies that have defined morality in such a way that slavery is logically derivable from said definition”. Etc.
Unless an atheist/materialist agrees that morality is subjective (whatever any individual, group, or society happen to believe or define it as), they are being inconsistent with their premises. When they make such statements, they are stealing the theistic concept of “objective morality” because they are referring to a kind of “objective morality” that cannot be derived from their premises, and can only be derived from theistic/idealist premises.
I didn’t borrow Rand’s name for anything. I have posted exactly what I mean by “stolen concept” . From Wiki:
The fallacy is valid wherever it was generated, whomever came up with it, and regardless of what ideology it is associated with. It is irrelevant that this is how “objectivists” define the fallacy, if the fallacy as defined is a valid objection in an argument. Atheists/materialists are ignoring, contradicting or denying the validity of the concepts upon which the concept they are employing depends, as I have explained in preceding posts in this thread.
Then please list for me the concepts which are and are not logically derivable from an irreconcilable or antithetical set of premises!
The irony is, of course, that you are arguing with people who have already made a failed argument in your mind due to the concepts they are using. That’s very good of you William! Very charitable!
Whereas of course in the past all it took for slavery to be moral (aka “right”) was a priest interpreting the word of god in favour of it.
So it seems to me that the atheist consistently says slavery is wrong, whereas the theist does not. The morality of slavery is decided by a whim of your deity, whereas of course for the atheist that is not the case.
So I’ll take the atheist position here rather then yours I think, it seems less likely to change at the whim of an “interpreter”.
After all, if William was king of the word and William suddenly started to believe (as he is wont to do) that slavery is not only moral but commanded by god then where would we be! Slaves, that’s what!
At least the atheist does not have the excuse of passing the buck as to what’s wrong or right off onto some figure in the shadows. The high priest does not want anybody questioning him and his interpretations. They are, after all, the source of his power.
Yes, I saw that, but did not consider it an actual example, more a statement that an actual example exists. You’re reporting that a conversation took place where the fallacy was committed, not the context or content.
The statement that it is always wrong for anyone, regardless of culture, personal feelings and beliefs, consensus, authority, society or circumstances, to torture children for personal pleasure, can only be derived from a theistic concept of “objective morality” and “self-evidently true” moral statements.
Well, one can have the opinion it is always wrong … presumably God does! I don’t see this as a stolen concept fallacy, since ‘always-wrongness’ cannot solely refer to something outside of humanity deciding X is always wrong. It could simply be that every human held that opinion, and invocation of the fallacy demands a little more probing to see if your interlocutor means ‘wrong’ in any sense outside of individual or collective … I hesitate to use the word again, but here goes … opinions.
I think it important to separate out morality as a standard one tries personally to adhere to, and morality as a standard one would wish others to buy in to. The one can inform the other, but not necessarily so, and neither is intrinsically derivable solely from theism, which is where I think you err.
To me, the only ‘self-evident’ statements are analytic ones. I don’t think it ‘self-evidently true’ that baby-torture is always wrong. I think it would always be ‘wrong’ for me. I would feel bad about it. It seems that most people feel the same way. But if I was the only person in the world who felt that way, I would still feel that way. Feeling that it was ‘wrong’ for me would, in such a case, extend to my feeling it was ‘wrong’ for everyone, because protectiveness towards children extends beyond simply avoiding harmful action personally, to preventing harmful action. Whereas homosexual activity, say, is something I would find personally repulsive – men just don’t do it for me – but it bothers me not one jot if other people are that way inclined.
Still, as a practical matter, in this imaginary world where a majority has the subjective experience that baby-torture is ‘right’, I would be a lone voice: so be it. Should I try to kid them that I had a Powerful Friend who thought it was wrong too?
I don’t seek validation in the consensus, but the existence of a consensus suggests to me that this – what I vaguely dub ‘moral sense’ – is a fundamental fact about our species. It does not have to be universal to be so. And certainly doesn’t have to come from God.
Such an opinion is not logically derivable from atheistic/materialist premises.
If an individual exists who tortures babies and declares it ‘moral’, this has no impact on what I understand by the term ‘moral’. If I were that individual, I would not expect the rest of the world to agree that what I was doing was ‘moral’. People putting oddities in their own grab-bag of ‘Things I Call Moral’ is no more an issue than that they should choose ‘banana’ as their term for a striped predator.
Suppose, contrariwise, that two religious sects are in absolute agreement that some things are always, in all circumstances, ‘moral’. Their wars are just about the minor details!