The Disunity of Reason

Last night I was talking with an old friend of mine, an atheist Jew, who is now in the best relationship of her life with a devout Roman Catholic. We talked about the fact that she was more surprised than he was about the fact that their connection transcends their difference in metaphysics. He sees himself as a devout Roman Catholic; she sees him as a good human being.

This conversation reminded me of an older thought that’s been swirling around in my head for a few weeks: the disunity of reason.

It is widely held by philosophers (that peculiar sub-species!) that reason is unified: that the ideally rational person is one for whom there are no fissures, breaks, ruptures, or discontinuities anywhere in the inferential relations between semantic contents that comprise his or her cognitive grasp of the world (including himself or herself as part of that world).

This is particularly true when it comes to the distinction between “theoretical reason” and “practical reason”. By “theoretical reason” I mean one’s ability to conceptualize the world-as-experienced as more-or-less systematic, and by “practical reason” I mean one’s ability to act in the world according to judgments that are justified by agent-relative and also agent-indifferent reasons (“prudence” and “morality”, respectively).

The whole philosophical tradition from Plato onward assumes that reason is unified, and especially, that theoretical and practical reason are unified — different exercises of the same basic faculty. Some philosophers think of them as closer together than others — for example, Aristotle distinguishes between episteme (knowledge of general principles in science, mathematics, and metaphysics) and phronesis (knowledge of particular situations in virtuous action). But even Aristotle does not doubt that episteme and phronesis are exercises of a single capacity, reason (nous).

However, as we learn more about how our cognitive system is actually structured, we should consider the possibility that reason is not unified at all. If Horst’s Cognitive Pluralism is right, then we should expect that our minds are more like patchworks of domain-specific modules that can reason quite well within those domains but not so well across them.

To Horst’s model I’d add the further conjecture: that we have pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “theoretical reason” (abstract thinking and long-term planning) with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and also pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “practical reason” (self-control and virtuous conduct) with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (and especially in its dense interconnections with the limbic system).

But if that conjecture is on the right track, then we would expect to find consistency between theoretical reason and practical reason only to the extent that there are reciprocal interconnections between these regions of prefrontal cortex. And of course there are reciprocal interconnections — but (and this is the important point!) to the extent that these regions are also functionally distinct, then to that same extent reason is disunified. 

And as a consequence, metaphysics and ethics may have somewhat less to do with each other than previous philosophers have supposed.

 

 

1,419 thoughts on “The Disunity of Reason

  1. Robin: Once again I’m left wondering whether theists use the same English I do…

    🙂

    We use only the King James English!

  2. Kantian Naturalist: I suppose I’ll never understand the temptation to treat concepts as abstract entities.

    What do you mean? You can’t be saying that abstractions don’t exist as concepts.

  3. BTW Charlie, I chose that particular rendering of a circle quite specifically for this site because of it’s graphical generation.

    So I get the point you’re actually trying to make, but I find it dubious at best. That we define shapes using the representative language of geometry does not then render physical examples “non compliant” by definition. On the contrary, the geometric definitions are the representations; real examples are the actual ideals. Math makes discussion of such ideals possible, but math is not a more perfect substitute or understanding of the world than actually experiencing it. So, really…I can’t embrace the basis for your argument. Or Fifth’s for that matter…

  4. CharlieM: That image is not a circle by definition. You do know how images are formed on our screens don’t you?

    Yes, I am well aware of how images are generated on screens. I chose this image specifically for how it would be generated on this site.

    Where is the single line that follows a path which is equidistant from the centre?

    If you don’t think it’s there, show your work. Give me the data you get from a laser meter if need be. I’m in no hurry…

    What you have given us is a coarse approximation of a circle.

    No, what I’ve given you is a real circle. But you’re complaining that it doesn’t meet the geometric representation. Your argument boils down to insisting that the language we use to describe maps should trump the actual territory we work with and live in, but, just as with my curry example, I don’t actually eat the epicurean representation; I eat the real thing. Maps and language are useful for describing what we can and do experience, but they are no substitute for the real thing.

  5. Kantian Naturalist:

    Logical and mathematical truth might be coherentist, I guess? But plausibly what makes a logical truth true is its correspondence with all possible worlds? (Hopefully that does not commit me to modal realism.)

    I only listed coherentism as an alternative to standard big-C Correspondence formulations of truth. I agree that at least as originally formulated it is not appealing

    And especially it does not settle the criteria for talking about truth in different domains — science versus ethics, as you point out.

    I believe Putnam understands truth this way, but of course his conception is more sophisticated and nuanced. He gives a short summary of it in his reply to Boyd in Reading Putnam. I only had a hard copy from this but did take a scan which I will attempt to upload as a pdf.

    Apologies for the poor quality of the scan; zooming in your pdf reader should help with readability.

    The upload to the blog feature does not seem to be working; here is a dropbox link to try instead (2.5 meg pdf). You may need to hit download button or direct download button. You don’t need to sign up; ignore any prompts to do so.

    The material on truth starts halfway down page 97.

    Reply to Boyd

  6. CharlieM: But there is no such thing as perfect circles.

    Not in reality. But I can easily imagine one. And anyone who has been taught Euclidean geometry could too.

    There is only one true ideal circle.

    Can you prove that? 🙂 I say there are an infinite number of perfect circles. I think I can prove it too, at least in Euclidean terms.

    If you think that the ideal circle is multiple, explain the difference between your idea and my idea of a circle?

    I can explain my own ideas. Not being a mind-reader, I can only understand your ideas inasmuch as you are prepared to disseminate them. And then only through the distorting lens of language.

  7. Kantian Naturalist: For any point, the set of all points equidistant to that point is a circle. I did take 7th-grade geometry.

    It’s the path swept by the dimensionless point!

  8. Alan Fox: It’s the path swept by the dimensionless point!

    I don’t think you can define a circle without implying some sort of action or procedure.

    Anyway, a Euclidean circle is defined in a fictitious space.

    Of course one can talk about true circles. They are defined that way.

  9. Robin: No, what I’ve given you is a real circle. But you’re complaining that it doesn’t meet the geometric representation.

    I get it.

    Well done, Robin.

  10. Mung: What do you mean? You can’t be saying that abstractions don’t exist as concepts.

    I have a pretty good handle on what I think concepts are, but I am not quite sure what it means to say that concepts “exist”.

    If all it means is that concepts play an indispensable role in our phenomenology and an important role in cognitive psychology, then sure.

  11. CharlieM: But there is no such thing as perfect circles.

    Alan Fox:
    Not in reality. But I can easily imagine one. And anyone who has been taught Euclidean geometry could too.

    You cannot imagine a perfect circle. Or perhaps you can. But if you can, then materialism is false.

    You cannot form a perfect circle by thinking about a perfect circle. If you can form a perfect circle by thinking about a perfect circle, then a perfect circle can physically exist in reality. It physically exists as a perfect circle in your brain. Or not.

  12. Robin: Hmmm…not seeing the zoom. Be that as it may, are you suggesting that it is impossible to generate a configuration of equidistant points on a plane via gui? If so, I’d like to see how you measured my figure.

    It isn’t even possible to generate a single point via gui. A mathematical point has no width, a point generated by gui will have width.

  13. Robin:
    BTW Charlie, I chose that particular rendering of a circle quite specifically for this site because of it’s graphical generation.

    So I get the point you’re actually trying to make, but I find it dubious at best. That we define shapes using the representative language of geometry does not then render physical examples “non compliant” by definition. On the contrary, the geometric definitions are the representations; real examples are the actual ideals. Math makes discussion of such ideals possible, but math is not a more perfect substitute or understanding of the world than actually experiencing it. So, really…I can’t embrace the basis for your argument. Or Fifth’s for that matter…

    Then you are in the unfortunate position of claiming physical circles which only approximate circles and are impermanent have a greater reality than the ideal circle which is eternal and holds for any two dimensional plane.

  14. Mung:

    You cannot imagine a perfect circle. Or perhaps you can. But if you can, then materialism is false.

    You cannot form a perfect circle by thinking about a perfect circle. If you can form a perfect circle by thinking about a perfect circle, then a perfect circle can physically exist in reality. It physically exists as a perfect circle in your brain. Or not.

    Mung is one of those people who look inside the TV to see where all the little people are.

    Too funny.

  15. And by the way, that was no momentary lapse. Mung actually believes it.

    An exchange from the George Ellis thread:

    keiths:

    Suppose I think about a diamond-encrusted quiche lorraine with a bullfrog sitting in the middle of it. Does that really commit me, in Mung’s view, to the physical reality of a diamond-encrusted quiche lorraine, complete with frog?

    Mung:

    Yes.

    keiths:

    Why?

    Why should the fact that thoughts are physical phenomena make it impossible to think about counterfactuals?

    Mung:

    Where does this diamond-encrusted quiche lorraine complete with frog exist, if not in your brain and as a result of the physical state of your brain?

    keiths:

    It doesn’t exist at all. The quiche is a lie.

    Mung:

    If it exists in your brain then it is physical.

    keiths:

    It doesn’t exist in my brain. What’s in my brain is a representation, not the thing itself.

    Likewise, a perfect circle can be represented in my brain without physically existing in my brain.

    Mung, can you explain why smoke doesn’t come out of the TV when the building onscreen is burning?

    Too, too funny.

  16. keiths: Mung is one of those people who looks inside the TV to see where all the little people are.

    I used to think that they were inside the TV, but not anymore, not since I got a flat screen TV.

  17. CharlieM: It isn’t even possible to generate a single point via gui.A mathematical point has no width, a point generated by gui will have width.

    See…I was betting you didn’t get that. Here you are proving once again I should not assume things.

    Quite right, a geometric idealized mathematical point is quite dimensionless. A geometric line has no width. Neither of them could be perceivable in any sense. One could never visualize a geometric idealized mathematical circle because such an entity, by definition, cannot exist either practically or actually. Such entities are no more than maps; they are conceptualized models for communicating ways of understanding, using, and predicting the outcomes of use of something that does actually exist.

    So, when are you going to get around to admitting I won your challenge with my representation of a real circle?

  18. Alan Fox: FMM, do you think we can bottle truth?

    No,
    Do you think only things that can be put in a bottle exist?

    peace

  19. KN:

    For any point, the set of all points equidistant to that point is a circle. I did take 7th-grade geometry.

    Don’t forget the “on a plane” part. Otherwise a sphere also qualifies.

    Alan:

    It’s the path swept by the dimensionless point!

    No, because points don’t move. This isn’t a quibble — if points moved, then the points that form a circle at time t0 might no longer form a circle at t1.

    petrushka:

    I don’t think you can define a circle without implying some sort of action or procedure.

    Why? A circle is just a set of points sharing a particular property, and that property holds regardless of whether anyone actually does the measurement.

  20. CharlieM: Then you are in the unfortunate position of claiming physical circles which only approximate circles and are impermanent have a greater reality than the ideal circle which is eternal and holds for any two dimensional plane.

    I don’t know about unfortunate…

    How sad, however, for all those souls who for centuries had only, and were content with, real physical circles to work with until the language came along to make up some idealized myth…

  21. walto: Your understanding of truth is hardly orthodox–it’s about as wildly different from what most people mean by the term as it’s possible to be.

    1) I think if you were to ask the average crowd at the Walmart if truth exists. The answer would be yes for the overwhelming majority of muggles.

    2) That Truth is a person in not only orthodox it is down right hyperbibical

    Quote;
    Jesus said to him, “I am the way, and the truth, and the life
    (Joh 14:6A)
    and
    Sanctify them in the truth; your word (Logos) is truth.
    (Joh 17:17)

    etc

    end quote:

    walto: I’m still hoping you’ll comment on your “placement” among the Presuppositionalists

    I’m a Presuppositionalist in that among other things

    1) I believe that we begin with presuppositions
    2) The only sufficient grounding for knowledge is the Christian God
    3) non-christians can’t consistently reason from their presuppositions and must borrow from the Christian worldview.

    I have no specific “placement”

    I like Van til and Clark and Reid and Plantinga but my favorite philosophers excepting the Truth itself are the ones you meet at a tractor pull or fishing hole.

    peace

  22. fifth,

    …my favorite philosophers excepting the Truth itself are the ones you meet at a tractor pull or fishing hole.

    That explains more than you probably intended.

  23. Kantian Naturalist: If truth is not a relation between propositions and reality, then I have no idea what the word could possibly mean.

    You have three things the proposition relation and reality.

    All three are eternal and omnipresent and eternally dependent on each other.

    a glimpse of the Trinity

    peace

  24. keiths:
    And by the way, that was no momentary lapse.Mung actually believes it.

    An exchange from the George Ellis thread:

    keiths:

    Mung:

    keiths:

    Mung:

    keiths:

    Mung:

    keiths:

    Likewise, a perfect circle can be represented in my brain without physically existing in my brain.

    Mung, can you explain why smoke doesn’t come out of the TV when the building onscreen is burning?

    Too, too funny.

    Mung–you need to learn what an intentional object is according to your beloved scholastics. keiths is completely right here. Golden mountains don’t exist in anybody’s heads–after all mountains are generally bigger than heads, no? What exists in heads are brain processes.

    According to the non-materialist, these processes may have mental properties. Indeed, if one is a substance dualist, one may even insist that, in addition to the brain processes (and other physical stuff going on), there are mental events happening there too.

    But nobody thinks that there are golden mountains or perfect circles in there. Ideas of them only (at best).

  25. keiths: That explains more than you probably intended.

    No.
    I have no need to try and appear all scholarly. Average folks have no trouble with simple concepts. All to often that ability gets lost in the shuffle of the academy.

    peace

  26. fifthmonarchyman: 1) I think if you were to ask the average crowd at the Walmart if truth exists. The answer would be yes for the overwhelming majority of muggles.

    What percentage do you think would describe truth as a person?

  27. fifthmonarchyman: 1) I think if you were to ask the average crowd at the Walmart if truth exists. The answer would be yes for the overwhelming majority of muggles.

    2) That Truth is a person in not only orthodox it is down right hyperbibical

    Quote;Jesus said to him, “I am the way, and the truth, and the life
    (Joh 14:6A)
    and
    Sanctify them in the truth; your word (Logos) is truth.
    (Joh 17:17)

    etc

    end quote:

    I’m a Presuppositionalist in that among other things

    1) I believe that we begin with presuppositions
    2) The only sufficient grounding for knowledge is the Christian God
    3) non-christians can’t consistently reason from their presuppositions and must borrow from the Christian worldview.

    I have no specific “placement”

    I like Van til and Clark and Reid and Plantinga but my favorite philosophers excepting the Truth itself are the ones you meet at a tractor pull or fishing hole.

    peace

    Thanks for your response, FMM.

    By orthodox, I didn’t mean Othodox! I just meant, it’s not what fisherman and tractor drivers generally mean when they say that some statements are true–or even that truth exists. The guy who delivers my mail would not call truth “He” anymore than most of the posters here would.

    I’m about as far from a Biblical scholar as it’s possible for anyone to be, but I take those quotes to be metaphorical. “I am truth” means something like “Everything I say is true” “I am the way” means “The way I instruct you to live is the way to heaven.” Etc. If he meant something else than those, it doesn’t make any sense to me.

  28. walto:

    I wrote a book on that subject (keith read it in about seven minutes, so I guess it’s a page-turner 🙂 ).

    keiths:

    You’re making shit up again. What’s the point of pretending that I raced through your book?

    You already got caught claiming that I outed you via your book. Haven’t you learned your lesson?

    walto:

    keiths, Catherine of Sienna has been in the news lately. I’ve been meaning to ask you how you liked my treatment of her.

    Thus proving my point. You have absolutely no evidence that I raced through your book, so you’re fishing for some, hoping to get lucky.

    Next time you might want to wait and make your accusation after you have some evidence for it.

    Unless you actually want to make yourself look like a dishonest idiot. In which case: Carry on, you’re doing great!

  29. walto,

    I just meant, it’s not what fisherman and tractor drivers generally mean when they say that some statements are true–or even that truth exists. The guy who delivers my mail would not call truth “He” anymore than most of the posters here would.

    Right. This “God is Truth” business, along with the whole “God is X” trope, is just an equivocation on the meaning of “God”. Sometimes motivated by the misbegotten concept of “divine simplicity”.

  30. Robin:

    CharlieM: That image is not a circle by definition. You do know how images are formed on our screens don’t you?

    Yes, I am well aware of how images are generated on screens. I chose this image specifically for how it would be generated on this site.

    Where is the single line that follows a path which is equidistant from the centre?

    If you don’t think it’s there, show your work. Give me the data you get from a laser meter if need be. I’m in no hurry…

    Well I can tell that your representation doesn’t show it. But besides that your circle is limited in that it is contained within the bounds of my computer screen. An ideal circle is not limited by a relative dimension of something external to itself.

    What you have given us is a coarse approximation of a circle.

    No, what I’ve given you is a real circle. But you’re complaining that it doesn’t meet the geometric representation. Your argument boils down to insisting that the language we use to describe maps should trump the actual territory we work with and live in, but, just as with my curry example, I don’t actually eat the epicurean representation; I eat the real thing. Maps and language are useful for describing what we can and do experience, but they are no substitute for the real thing.

    I am not complaining about anything what I am stating is that your representative circle does not meet the mathematical definition of a circle which is very precise. And as we are discussing truth, your circle cannot by definition be a true circle. It is an approximation.

    It is you who are confusing the map for the territory. A map is a representation in the same way that your circle is a representation.

  31. Mung: You cannot form a perfect circle by thinking about a perfect circle.

    I said I could quite easily imagine a perfect circle – and I can.

  32. keiths:
    walto:

    keiths:

    walto:

    Thus proving my point.You have absolutely no evidence that I raced through your book, so you’re fishing for some, hoping to get lucky.

    Next time you might want to wait and make your accusation after you have some evidence for it.

    {additional insults elided here so they may be linked as ‘proof’ of something or other later and to highlight the weirdness of the above ‘proof, which is kind of awesome all by itself.’}

    Re luck–I am always hoping to ‘get lucky.’ I mean, I had Xavier and the charge call at the end of the Wiscony game was absurd and destroyed my bracket.

    And speaking of Xavier, you really have no insights to share on my treatment of St Catherine? That’s even worse luck, I think. I’m sorely disappointed, anyhow. She’s was such a strange character.

  33. walto,

    Re luck–I am always hoping to ‘get lucky.’

    Indeed, but then you look ridiculous when the evidence doesn’t magically materialize.

    Smarter folks wait for the evidence and then make their accusations, if warranted.

  34. You can demonstrate that for yourself by trying to axiomatize your “moving-point geometry”.

  35. One of the biggest regrets of my life is that I haven’t collected keiths’ various “arguments,” “proofs,” examples of “evidence” and the like since I’ve been here.

    It’s a treasure trove, I tell you!

  36. Alan Fox: CharlieM:

    But there is no such thing as perfect circles.

    Not in reality. But I can easily imagine one. And anyone who has been taught Euclidean geometry could too.

    The laws of the circle are not derived from any material circle but from the ideal circle.

    There is only one true ideal circle.

    Can you prove that? 🙂 I say there are an infinite number of perfect circles. I think I can prove it too, at least in Euclidean terms.

    Can you falsify my claim? An ideal circle is relative to nothing outwith its own laws. If you are imagining a circle of a certain dimension then you are thinking about an actual physical circle and not the singular ideal circle.

    If you think that the ideal circle is multiple, explain the difference between your idea and my idea of a circle?

    I can explain my own ideas. Not being a mind-reader, I can only understand your ideas inasmuch as you are prepared to disseminate them. And then only through the distorting lens of language.

    I think I have made my idea quite clear of what constitutes an ideal circle. It obeys its own laws and is not bounded by anything independent of it. This ideal circle does not become a multiplicity just because separate minds hold it. Anything other than this which is imagined is just a copy of a physical approximation.

    If you give the circle relative special dimensions then you are adding something which does not belong to the laws of the circle.

  37. Robin: No, what I’ve given you is a real circle. But you’re complaining that it doesn’t meet the geometric representation.
    hotshoe_: I get it.

    Well done, Robin.

    But is Robin’s real circle a true circle?

  38. Robin: See…I was betting you didn’t get that. Here you are proving once again I should not assume things.

    Quite right, a geometric idealized mathematical point is quite dimensionless. A geometric line has no width. Neither of them could be perceivable in any sense. One could never visualize a geometric idealized mathematical circle because such an entity, by definition, cannot exist either practically or actually. Such entities are no more than maps; they are conceptualized models for communicating ways of understanding, using, and predicting the outcomes of use of something that does actually exist.

    So, when are you going to get around to admitting I won your challenge with my representation of a real circle?

    You are quite right that the ideal circle cannot actually exist in the physical. Because the physical world is an imperfect copy of the ideal world. The objects of the physical world are defined by human sense perceptions, the entities of the ideal world are defined out of their own being.

    Sense impressions do not give us true reality they give us unconnected sensations. It is only through thinking that we approach true reality.

  39. CharlieM: It is only through thinking that we approach true reality.

    Hey CharlieM,

    I don’t know if we have ever spoken but I really like your style.

    peace

  40. walto: One of the biggest regrets of my life is that I haven’t collected keiths’ various “arguments,” “proofs,” examples of “evidence” and the like since I’ve been here.

    They are just lists of questions.

  41. Mung:

    According to keiths all circles are identical.

    No.

    Mung, you’re better off saying nothing than saying something stupid and false.

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