Last night I was talking with an old friend of mine, an atheist Jew, who is now in the best relationship of her life with a devout Roman Catholic. We talked about the fact that she was more surprised than he was about the fact that their connection transcends their difference in metaphysics. He sees himself as a devout Roman Catholic; she sees him as a good human being.
This conversation reminded me of an older thought that’s been swirling around in my head for a few weeks: the disunity of reason.
It is widely held by philosophers (that peculiar sub-species!) that reason is unified: that the ideally rational person is one for whom there are no fissures, breaks, ruptures, or discontinuities anywhere in the inferential relations between semantic contents that comprise his or her cognitive grasp of the world (including himself or herself as part of that world).
This is particularly true when it comes to the distinction between “theoretical reason” and “practical reason”. By “theoretical reason” I mean one’s ability to conceptualize the world-as-experienced as more-or-less systematic, and by “practical reason” I mean one’s ability to act in the world according to judgments that are justified by agent-relative and also agent-indifferent reasons (“prudence” and “morality”, respectively).
The whole philosophical tradition from Plato onward assumes that reason is unified, and especially, that theoretical and practical reason are unified — different exercises of the same basic faculty. Some philosophers think of them as closer together than others — for example, Aristotle distinguishes between episteme (knowledge of general principles in science, mathematics, and metaphysics) and phronesis (knowledge of particular situations in virtuous action). But even Aristotle does not doubt that episteme and phronesis are exercises of a single capacity, reason (nous).
However, as we learn more about how our cognitive system is actually structured, we should consider the possibility that reason is not unified at all. If Horst’s Cognitive Pluralism is right, then we should expect that our minds are more like patchworks of domain-specific modules that can reason quite well within those domains but not so well across them.
To Horst’s model I’d add the further conjecture: that we have pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “theoretical reason” (abstract thinking and long-term planning) with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and also pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “practical reason” (self-control and virtuous conduct) with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (and especially in its dense interconnections with the limbic system).
But if that conjecture is on the right track, then we would expect to find consistency between theoretical reason and practical reason only to the extent that there are reciprocal interconnections between these regions of prefrontal cortex. And of course there are reciprocal interconnections — but (and this is the important point!) to the extent that these regions are also functionally distinct, then to that same extent reason is disunified.
And as a consequence, metaphysics and ethics may have somewhat less to do with each other than previous philosophers have supposed.
bingo.
It seems only obvious that this would be the case.
peace
If by abstract you mean not real or actual I would beg to differ. Truth is a very real thing.
There is a difference between Standard English and “Standard Materialist English”.
the definition of abstract noun is—a noun that refers to a thing that does not exist as a material object:
I have no problem with that definition
Materialists presuppose that the only real things are materiel things. This is an unwarranted and unsupported leap that the vast majority of English speakers do not make.
To anyone but the materialist I am not attempting to reify Truth.
Truth is real already and I’m not claiming it is physical.
Truth is not physical but real and physical are not synonyms
That your worldview does not allow you to see this is your problem not mine
peace
What I mean by “abstract noun” is the dictionary definition: “a noun denoting an idea, quality, or state rather than a concrete object.”
At the moment I don’t understand what you mean when you assert that “Truth exists”, hence my questions.
When you say “Truth exists”, do you simply mean that it is possible to make statements that are “in accordance with fact or reality” (the definition of “true”) to some level of accuracy? Do you mean that individual human beings can have a concept labeled “truth”?
If it’s neither of these, what exactly do you mean by “Truth” and in what sense(s) do you claim that it exists?
If you don’t want to answer these, please just say so and I’ll be content in not understanding you.
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/abstract-noun
peace
no I mean
Truth —–the quality or state of being true.
exists ——-has objective reality or being.
This is not rocket science and these aren’t big words
peace
Of course! The quality or state of being true has objective reality or being!
What could possibly be more obvious?
Truth has to be about something, doesn’t it?
Should have checked out Royce earlier. There’s more to him than “error exists”.
Is it true that truth has to be about something?
Think about that deeply if you would
peace
Do you have a problem with the existence of qualities or states of being?
peace
Truth has no independent existence. Trueness is a property we can ascribe to stuff.
Please don’t motive-monger.
Is it true that truth has no independent existence?
If there were no stuff would it be true that there were no stuff?
please try and think deeply about this
peace
Is that directed at me? I’m not sure what motive-mongering is but if you explain I will try and avoid it
peace
fifthmonarchyman,
In this case, yes. You are presuming I haven’t already given idealism some deep thought. You could say “have you thought about…” etc.
They are, however, words that don’t make sense together in English without clarifying your definitions more.
So, you don’t mean that it’s possible for some statements to be true. Do you mean that individual human beings can hold in their minds the abstract concept “truth”?
If you mean something more than that, in exactly what sense are you using “exists” when you claim that an abstract concept like “truth” exists?
FMM, do you think we can bottle truth?
That’s how I made my fortune.
Glen Davidson
If truth is not a relation between propositions and reality, then I have no idea what the word could possibly mean.
FMM, how are your definitions above consistent with calling truth “he” as you have above? It seems pretty clear that they don’t define a male person.
Also, as I know you like to be polite, you might lose the “this is not rocket science” biz. Your understanding of truth is hardly orthodox–it’s about as wildly different from what most people mean by the term as it’s possible to be. So you shouldn’t be surprised if people look at you like you’re a little dotty when you suggest it.
Also, Fifth, I’m still hoping you’ll comment on your “placement” among the Presuppositionalists in that Wiki article to which KN linked. Thanks.
It could possibly mean only coherence of propositions.
Or there could be no common property among true propositions (deflationism), each could be true in its own way (or at least in a way that is applicable to the domain of the proposition, such as science versus ethics).
I imagine participating in debates with certain posters in this thread would be good practice for dealing with recalcitrant students.
Sure. 2+2 equaling 4 holds true regardless of whether a given individual understands what the word “true” means. However, that’s a completely different issue from:
So, let’s change your question to:
Then the answer is certainly no. In such a situation, 2+2 (and all other conditional concepts) would be meaningless. There could be no such thing as “true” or “untrue”.
I never cease to marvel at folks who think that human external reality isn’t contingent on human understanding.
Odd then that you appear to have difficulty proving this to be true…
Truth is unity. There are no true circles to be found in the world of the senses. There is one true circle, the ideal circle.
That is absolutely true.
If there was no stuff, then there could be no true or false about the stuff as there would be nothing “outside the lack of stuff” to evaluate the conditional situation. Ergo, there could be no “trueness” or “falseness” to any consideration about the lack of stuff.
Basically, your question suffers from the stolen concept fallacy. In short, you think that the logic and values that must be applied to given equation within a framework of “stuff” can be ported to a conceptual framework of “no stuff”. But the same rules apply to both frameworks; one is limited to considering the “no stuff” framework from within that framework, but one can’t because of the rules of that framework (e.g., “no stuff”). Thus, there can be no such thing as “truth” in a framework of “no stuff”.
Think about this in regards to the above, Fifth: could God exist if there was nothing? If so, is God therefore nothing?
In vino veritas?
Truth by definition is circular. So to speak.
But this statement is false, by definition.
Fair enough. I agree. Perfect circles exist only in human imagination. Useful fiction. Do you think there is one true truth, though?
One might note that abstractions such as circles are defined by operations.
I’ve never really understood the appeal of coherentism. I’ve read Davidson and was initially sympathetic, but shortly after I read McDowell’s Mind and World.
McDowell famously complains that Davidson’s picture condemns meaning, truth, and justification to “frictionless spinning in the void” (his phrase), because on the Davidsonian picture, mental contents are only caused by objects and never truly answerable to them. I decided right away that McDowell was right, though his own view is no longer as compelling to me as it used to be because he does not have a sufficiently rich conception of embodiment and its role in perception.
At least with regard to objectively valid judgments about empirical matters justified by perceptual states (“synthetic a posteriori“), coherentism is inadequate.
Logical and mathematical truth might be coherentist, I guess? But plausibly what makes a logical truth true is its correspondence with all possible worlds? (Hopefully that does not commit me to modal realism.)
What I like about the deflationary approaches, and in particular the prosentential theory of truth, is that they account for the semantics of “is true” in most ordinary contexts. But that still leaves open all of the epistemological questions! And especially it does not settle the criteria for talking about truth in different domains — science versus ethics, as you point out.
You have no idea how right you are.
But there is no such thing as perfect circles. There is only one true ideal circle. If you think that the ideal circle is multiple, explain the difference between your idea and my idea of a circle?
I have no idea what this even means…
The “perfect circle” is defined by an algebraic equation. Ancient Greek mathematics is a poor basis for metaphysics, because we know things about geometric operations that the Greeks did not know.
Do you know what a circle is? If so can you give me an example of a circle that is not just a representation of a circle?
Once again I’m left wondering whether theists use the same English I do…
Looking up the words “example” and “representation”, in what sense is an example of something not a representation of said thing?
I like curry. I make it quite a bit. I’m confident I know what curry is. I can toss together an example of curry pretty quickly. And it would be a solid representation of curry (I’ve been told such by authorities on the subject). That there are literally thousands upon thousands of types and variations of curry is completely and totally irrelevant to the accuracy of my previous statements. More so for a circle and the supposed “truthiness” of knowing what a circle is vs some “perfect ideal circle” (which is utterly incoherent conceptually).
FWIW, I’m very favorable to the requirement for correspondence being plumped for here. OTOH, as you may know, I’m not too fond of propositions, myself. I think I might rewrite what take to be your sentiment here in something like the following way:
If truth is not a relation between sentences, utterances, thoughts or the like and reality, then I have no idea what the word could possibly mean.
I also agree with the disdain for coherence theories you express in your response to Bruce. Maybe coherence plays an important role wrt justification but its mention in connection with truth offends my “robust sense of reality.”
The difference being that all your thousands of examples of curries will be by definition curries. I can guarantee that any physical example of a circle that you give me will not be a circle by definition.
Are you trying to say that there is no such thing as the conception of a circle?
How is this:
O
not a circle by definition?
Of course not. I’m saying that all circles meet that conception by definition.
For any point, the set of all points equidistant to that point is a circle. I did take 7th-grade geometry.
I don’t know what this distinction is supposed to be between representations and examples. I can define a circle formally (see above) or give you the algebraic equation that defines a circle.
Obviously you have something else in mind, but I have no idea what it could possibly be. You seem to think that there is something else — THE CIRCLE — that is neither the definition nor the equation.
I suppose I’ll never understand the temptation to treat concepts as abstract entities.
I tried to provide a zoomed in image of your “circle” but it didn’t quite work as intended. But my point can still be made. Your circle is made up of square pixels its edge has thickness, so which edge do you take as having points equidistant from the centre?
Quite honestly I’m no fan of propositions myself and I prefer your version over mine. I’m quite happy with intensional semantics but things get wobbly when those get treated as “intensional entities”.
It offends mine as well,. (Is that a Hall quote? I should know it from somewhere.)
I think that if inferentialist semantics is right, then “coherence” is a criteria of discursively articulable conceptual content, so the role of “coherence” in justification is based on that. (Though I would not want to reduce epistemology to semantics! That way lies madness!) But yeah, truth has to be correspondence or it’s just one more predicate in the language. The harder question for someone with my commitments is what correspondence can amount to under pragmatic naturalism. But that’s my problem to solve.
Hmmm…not seeing the zoom. Be that as it may, are you suggesting that it is impossible to generate a configuration of equidistant points on a plane via gui? If so, I’d like to see how you measured my figure.
The ideal circle is an example of a cicle which is not a representation of a circle.
Russell, originally. IIRC, it’s from the “Lectures on Logical Atomism.”
Sorry, I don’t see any “pixels” in the picture I provided. If you have to “enlarge” the image to find some distortion in it, then I have to ask how you know that the enlargement function isn’t creating that distortion of “pixels” you claim are there? Further, I’ll simply note the challenge you put forth: “I can guarantee that any physical example of a circle that you give me will not be a circle by definition.” So, I stand by my example as a circle. I provided a physical example. By any measure of that particular physical representation that I provided it’s a circle by definition. If you say it isn’t, show your work using that representation as that was the condition of your challenge. If you wish to change the conditions of your challenge, what was the point of it in the first place?
Innocent as the newborn baby Jesus.
That image is not a circle by definition. You do know how images are formed on our screens don’t you? Where is the single line that follows a path which is equidistant from the centre? What you have given us is a coarse approximation of a circle.