The Christian God and the Problem of Evil

Both Mung and KeithS have asked me to weigh in on the question of whether the existence of evil counts as a good argument against Christianity, as KeithS has maintained in a recent post, so I shall oblige.

It is important to understand that the problem of evil is not an argument against the existence of God or gods, but against what KeithS calls the Christian God (actually, the God of classical theism), Who is supposed to be omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent. KeithS succinctly formulates the problem as follows:

Let’s say I claim that an omniGod named Frank exists — omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. Suppose I also claim that Frank regards seahorses as the absolute height of evil. The world contains a lot of seahorses, and Frank, being omnipotent, has the power to wipe them off the face of the earth. Why doesn’t he? Why does he countenance a world full of seahorses?

KeithS emphasizes that it is not enough for the Christian to show that God is on balance benevolent. Rather, the Christian needs to defend the claim that God is omnibenevolent:

The Christian claim is that God is omnibenevolent — as benevolent as it is logically possible to be. Finding that the items on the “good” side of the ledger outweigh those on the “bad” side — if that were the case — would not establish God’s omnibenevolence at all.

Finally, KeithS provides his own take on the problem of evil:

The problem of evil remains as much of a problem as ever for Christians. Yet there are obvious solutions to the problem that fit the evidence and are perfectly reasonable: a) accept that God doesn’t exist, or b) accept that God isn’t omnipotent, or c) accept that God isn’t perfectly benevolent. Despite the availability of these obvious solutions, most Christians will choose to cling to a view of God that has long since been falsified.

He even suggests how he would resolve the problem if he were a theist (emphasis mine – VJT):

Suppose God hates evil and suffering but is too weak to defeat them, at least at the moment. Then any such instances can be explained by God’s weakness.

It addresses the problem of evil without sacrificing theism. I’m amazed that more theists don’t seize on this sort of resolution. They’re too greedy in their theology, too reluctant to give up the omnis.

I think KeithS is onto something here. In fact, I’d like to ditch the conventional Christian views of God’s omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence. It’s time for an overhaul.

Why a God Who constantly watches His creatures cannot be omniscient

First, the conventional notion of God’s omniscience needs to be jettisoned. As I argued in an earlier post on the problem of evil, the problem of evil depends on the assumption that God’s knowledge of our choices (and of Adam and Eve’s choices) is logically prior to those choices. In that post, I upheld the contrary view (defended in our own time by C.S. Lewis), that God is like a watcher on a high hill: He timelessly knows everything that we choose to do, but His knowledge is logically subsequent to the choices we make, which means that He doesn’t know what we will do “before” He decides to make us. I have to acknowledge, however, that this is very much a minority view among the Christian Fathers and/or Doctors of the Church, and I can only think of two who argued for this view: namely, the somewhat heterodox theologian Origen (185-254 A.D.) and possibly, the Christian philosopher Boethius (c. 480- c. 524 A.D. – although his own personal views on the subject remain in dispute, as he elsewhere seems to reject the “watcher on the hill” analogy which he develops in Book V, Prose 6 of his Consolation of Philosophy, in which he declares that God “sees all things in an eternal present just as humans see things in a non-eternal present.”) Whether they be predestinationists or Molinists, the vast majority of Christian theologians who are orthodox – and I’m not counting “open theists” here – maintain that God’s knowledge of our choices is logically prior to those choices. I haven’t taken a straw poll of lay Christian believers, but judging from Christians I’m acquainted with, the “watcher on the hill” view of God remains a popular way of reconciling His foreknowledge with human free will, to this day. I believe the common folk are wiser than the theologians here.

Why are theologians so reluctant to accept the Boethian solution? In a nutshell, because they see it as detracting from God’s sovereignty, as it makes Him dependent on His creatures for information about what is going on in the world. God has to (timelessly) observe us in order to know what we are getting up to. I have to say I don’t see the problem here, provided that God freely and timelessly chooses to rely on His creatures for His knowledge of what they do. If He wants to impose that limitation on Himself, who are we to stop Him?

But if God’s knowledge of our choices is (timelessly) obtained from observing those choices, then we can no longer say that God knows exactly what I would do in every possible situation. On the Boethian account, God does not possess counterfactual knowledge: He knows everything I do, but not everything I would do, in all possible situations. Why not? For one thing, in many situations, there simply is no fact of the matter as to what I would do. What would I do if I won $10,000,000? I don’t know, and neither does God. Nor is this a bad thing: after all, if God knows exactly what I would do in every possible situation, then it makes no sense to say that in a given situation, I could have acted otherwise. (That, by the way, is why I find Molinism utterly nonsensical.)

And what about mathematics? Does God know the answer to every possible mathematical problem? I would argue that He doesn’t, as there are many branches of mathematics where the “rules of the game” are determined by the mathematicians theorizing in that area. In a different world, we would have had different mathematicians, and different branches of mathematics, with different rules. I see no reason to suppose that God knows all possible choices that could be made by all possible (as well as actual) persons.

The upshot of all this is that while God knows everything there is to know about His creatures, He is not omniscient. There are many counterfactuals that He doesn’t know, and there are many possibilities that He never contemplates, either. All we can say is that God knows everything about what we do (past, present and future), and that we can keep no secrets from Him.

Why God is a lot less powerful than many Christians think

Second, the traditional notion of God’s omnipotence needs to be discarded. On the classical view defended by St. Thomas Aquinas, God can do anything which it is logically possible for Him to do, as God. In recent years, however, the classical view has come under fire, from the Reformed theologian Alvin Plantinga, who refuted it using the humorous counter-example of a being whose nature allows him to do nothing but scratch his ear (which he does, making him omnipotent) in his book, God and other minds (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), and also from the Catholic philosopher Peter Geach, who sharply criticized the traditional view in an influential article titled “Omnipotence” (Philosophy 48 (1973): 7-20 – see here for a discussion). In his article, Geach argued that God is not omnipotent but almighty: since He maintains the world in existence, He has power over all things, but He does not have the power to do all things.

What relevance does this have to the problem of evil? On the traditional view of God’s omnipotence, God could have preserved each of us from sin throughout our earthly lives, without violating our free will, as he did with Jesus and (according to Catholics and Orthodox) the Virgin Mary: we would still have possessed full libertarian freedom when choosing between alternative goods, but not when choosing between good and evil. And there are many Protestants who believe that individuals who are “born again” are infallibly elected by God, so that even if they sin, their final salvation is Divinely guaranteed. Why, one might ask, didn’t God make us all like that? The Catechism of the Catholic Church attempts to resolve the problem by appealing to the “greater good” of the Incarnation and Redemption – a response which I find unsatisfactory, since (as Blessed John Duns Scotus argued) there was nothing to stop God from becoming incarnate even if Adam had never sinned.

For normal human beings, their personal identity is determined by their parentage, and by the gametes from which their bodies were created. (I would not be “me” if I had had a different mother or father, or if I had been conceived from a different sperm or egg.) But what if God’s act of specially electing a saint to glory also determines that individual’s personal identity? In that case, there is no way that God could have refrained from electing that saint without making him or her a different person. And if I am not elected in this fashion, but possess the power to choose between being saved and being damned, then I cannot coherently wish to have been predestined for eternal life without wishing myself to be a different person. It follows from this that while God could have made a world of human beings who were all preserved from sin, or who were all infallibly elected, not even God could make a world in which each of us is preserved from sin or infallibly elected. In that case, God is significantly less powerful than Christian theologians like to imagine.

In recent years, New Atheists have argued that the designs we find in living things are inept, and that if a Creator existed, He could have done a much better job of making these creatures. Creationists and Intelligent Design advocates reply that living things are subject to numerous design constraints, and that just because we can imagine a more elegant design does not mean that it is possible to create such a design. Picturability does not imply possibility. Recent scientific discoveries regarding the vertebrate eye (see here and here) have done much to vindicate this line of argument. (The same goes for the laryngeal nerve in the neck of the giraffe.) We are a long way here from the traditional view that God can make anything, as long as no logical contradiction is involved. Physical and nomological constraints (relating to the structure of matter, and the laws of Nature which obtain in our cosmos) also need to be taken into account.

An additional reason for rejecting the traditional notion of omnipotence is that it commits one to maintaining that God can bring about states of affairs which are not properly described. When someone claims, for instance, that God could make a horse capable of flying, like the mythical Pegasus, what, exactly, are we supposed to conceive of God doing here? And how would Pegasus fly, anyway? Are we supposed to imagine God working a miracle, by raising a horse in the air? But in that case, shouldn’t we really say that the horse is not flying (by its own natural power), but rather that God is holding it up? Or are we meant to imagine an alternative world, where the laws of Nature are changed so as to allow horses to fly – in which case, should we call the creature in this alternate world a horse, or should we rather call it a shmorse? Or are we to suppose that God could come up with a physical design for a horse that would enable it to fly, even with the laws of Nature that hold in this world? But in that case, how do we know that such a design exists? There is not the slightest evidence for such a design, and aerodynamic considerations suggest that the enterprise of attaching natural wings that would allow an animal with the dimensions of a horse to fly, would be altogether unworkable.

Goodbye to omnibenevolence

Finally, the concept of God’s omnibenevolence needs to be tossed out, lock, stock and barrel. Theologians have always maintained, of course, that God could have made a world that was better than the one He did, simply by adding a few extra bells and whistles. There is no “best possible world,” as the philosopher Leibniz falsely imagined. But that does not prevent God from making a world which is free from all natural and moral evil – which raises the obvious question of why an omnibenevolent Deity would create such a world as ours. One traditional answer, given by St. Augustine in his Enchiridion, Chapter III, is that God allows evil for the sake of a “greater good”: “For the Omnipotent God, whom even the heathen acknowledge as the Supreme Power over all, would not allow any evil in his works, unless in his omnipotence and goodness, as the Supreme Good, he is able to bring forth good out of evil.” I think its time to candidly acknowledge, as Orthodox theologian David Bentley Hart has already done, that this kind of talk simply won’t wash:

Being infinitely sufficient in Himself, God had no need of a passage through sin and death to manifest His glory in His creatures or to join them perfectly to Himself. This is why it is misleading (however soothing it may be) to say that the drama of fall and redemption will make the final state of things more glorious than it might otherwise have been. No less metaphysically incoherent – though immeasurably more vile – is the suggestion that God requires suffering and death to reveal certain of his attributes (capricious cruelty, perhaps? morbid indifference? a twisted sense of humor?). It is precisely sin, suffering, and death that blind us to God’s true nature…

I do not believe we Christians are obliged – or even allowed – to look upon the devastation visited upon the coasts of the Indian Ocean and to console ourselves with vacuous cant about the mysterious course taken by God’s goodness in this world, or to assure others that some ultimate meaning or purpose resides in so much misery.

But as KeithS has pointed out, there are problems with Hart’s own resolution of the problem of evil:

So in Hart’s bizarre world, we have a God who supposedly hates evil and suffering, yet chooses to permit them — and somehow this is all okay because it’s only temporary. Good will triumph in the end.

KeithS suggested that the problem of evil would be soluble if Christians simply acknowledged that God isn’t omnipotent or perfectly benevolent, but noted that Christians continue to “cling to a view of God that has long since been falsified.”

So I’d like to make a proposal of my own. In the first place, I’d like to propose that God is benevolent only in relation to the persons whom He decides to create. “Prior to” His act of creation, God is not benevolent at all. Thus when deciding what kind of world to create, God makes no attempt to choose the best one, or even a perfect one (i.e. one free from evil). Only after having chosen a particular world (for reasons best known to Himself) can we speak of God as being benevolent to His creatures.

In the second place, I’d like to propose that God’s benevolence to His sentient and sapient creatures is not unrestricted. After all, He allows His own creatures to be tortured to death, on occasion. Nevertheless, God is perfectly capable of setting limits to the amount of pain we have to put up with (thankfully, none of us has to suffer one million years of torture), of healing whatever wounds (physical and psychic) His tortured creatures have endured, and of bestowing the gift of immortality upon His sentient and sapient creatures (provided that they do not spurn it). Thus according to the picture I am sketching, God is ultimately benevolent, but not omnibenevolent. On this side of eternity, God’s benevolence is quite modest – but we can at least console ourselves with the thought that life could be much, much more painful than it is.

Finally, I’d like to point out that Christians have never referred to God in their prayers as omnibenevolent, but rather as all-loving. God loves each and every one of us with a steadfast, unshakable love which is greater than any of us can possibly imagine. The only kind of love we can compare to God’s love, in its steadfastness, is parental love. And most importantly, what God loves is we ourselves, and not our feelings. Thus God has no interest in maximizing the level of euphoria in the world – whether it be the aggregate level or the average level – because God’s parental commitment is to us, and not our states of mind. Being a loving Father, God naturally wants what is ultimately best for us, but He does not necessarily want us to enjoy a pain-free journey to our ultimate destination.

These proposals of mine have significant implications for the problem of evil. On the Judeo-Christian view, each and every human person is a being of infinite and irreplaceable value, loved by God. Two infinities cannot be meaningfully added to yield a greater infinity; hence a world with more people would not be a “better” world. What’s more, even wicked people are beings of infinite and irreplaceable value; hence a world with kinder people would not be a “better” world, but merely a world where people existed in a better state. Thus I would suggest that one reason why God tolerates evil acts (such as acts of rape or murder) is that there are some individuals in our world who would never have come into existence, were it not for these evil acts having been performed. The same logic can be applied to natural disasters: think of a man and a woman, living in neighboring towns, who both lose their families in a terrible earthquake, but are brought together in the aftermath of the quake, and who decide to get married, settle down and raise a family of their own. Such occurrences are by no means uncommon. Since the creation of any human being is good in an unqualified sense, God may decide to tolerate natural or moral evils, if doing so enables individuals to come into existence who would not have done so otherwise. Please note that I’m not saying He must, but merely that He may.

Fair enough; nevertheless, the skeptic might urge, the world is still a pretty awful place, and arguably much worse than it needs to be. Most natural and moral evils don’t result in the creation of new sentient or sapient beings, after all. There seems to be a lot of gratuitous evil in the world. Why is this so?

The Fall – and why it is needed to explain the mess we’re in

Traditionally, Christians have appealed to the doctrine of the Fall of our first parents at the dawn of human history, in order to explain why God allows these senseless evils to continue. John Henry Newman eloquently argued for this doctrine in his Apologia pro Vita Sua (Longmans, Green & Co., London, revised edition, 1865, chapter 5, pp. 242-243):

I can only answer, that either there is no Creator, or this living society of men is in a true sense discarded from His presence. Did I see a boy of good make and mind, with the tokens on him of a refined nature, cast upon the world without provision, unable to say whence he came, his birthplace or his family connexions, I should conclude that there was some mystery connected with his history, and that he was one, of whom, from one cause or other, his parents were ashamed. Thus only should I be able to account for the contrast between the promise and the condition of his being. And so I argue about the world;— if there be a God, since there is a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity. It is out of joint with the purposes of its Creator. This is a fact, a fact as true as the fact of its existence; and thus the doctrine of what is theologically called original sin becomes to me almost as certain as that the world exists, and as the existence of God.

In their recent book, Adam and the Genome, geneticist Dennis Venema and New Testament scholar Scott McKnight have marshaled an impressive array of converging scientific evidence, indicating that the human population has probably never fallen below 10,000 individuals. That certain puts paid to literalistic interpretations of the Fall, but as Denis Alexander has described in his book, Creation or Evolution: Do We Have to Choose?, one can still defend some notion of a Fall at the dawn of human history. Here’s how he outlines one possible approach to the Fall (although it’s not his favorite):

In the first type of approach (which has many variants), some people in Africa, following the emergence of anatomically modern humanity, became aware of God’s existence, power and calling upon their lives and responded to their new-found knowledge of him in love and obedience, in authentic relationship with God. However, they subsequently turned their back on the light that they had received and went their own way, leading to human autonomy and a broken relationship with God (“sin”). The emphasis in this type of speculation is on historical process – relationships built and broken over many generations.

My own belief is that God bestowed upon our first parents the responsibility for deciding the scope of Divine providence in ordinary human affairs. In their pride, our first parents chose personal autonomy, knowing that it would entail death and suffering for the entire human race: basically, they told God to butt out of everyday human affairs, leaving Him free to intervene only for very special reasons. To skeptics who would object that God should never have given such enormous responsibilities to our first parents in the first place, I would suggest that it is simply impossible for God to make intelligent beings without offering them an allotted sphere or domain in which they can legitimately exercise their freedom: that is what makes them who they are. As the first parents of the human race, our first parents had to have the responsibility for deciding whether they wanted the human race to be protected by God’s Providence or whether to reject God and go it alone.

As a Christian, I believe that God is just and merciful. I do not believe that it was unjust of God to test the human race at the beginning of human history; but I will acknowledge that in order to make sense of the terrible consequences of that fateful test, we need to maintain a view of history which sounds very strange to modern ears – instead of a gradual ascent to human self-awareness, as we might suppose, there was a First Contact between human creatures and their Creator. We need to envisage this as a cosmic, Miltonian drama, with our first parents as larger-than-life characters who enjoyed an intimacy and familiarity with God which we can only dream of, and who were given the enormous responsibility of custodianship over the lives of their future descendants. It may seem incomprehensible to us that they would give up their relationship with a God Who could satisfy all their needs, in favor of a death-and-violence ridden world like ours, but what they gained (in their own eyes) was the freedom to live as they chose. This, then, is why we’re in the mess we’re in. How long it will continue, I have no idea.

For those readers who would like a theological explanation of animal suffering, I would recommend Jon Garvey’s excellent online book, God’s Good Earth.

The problem of evil: A summary

We have seen that in order to make sense of the evil in the world, we need to abandon the notion of an omniscient God Who knows all counterfactuals and all possibilities, and Who knows what we do without needing to be informed by us. Rather, we should simply say that God (timelessly) knows everything we do, by constantly watching us. We also need to abandon the notion of an omnipotent God Who can do anything that’s logically possible. It turns out that there are a number of constraints which God is subject to, which prevent Him from creating any old world that we can imagine, and that prevent Him from having created us in a perfect world where no-one ever sinned. Furthermore, we need to abandon the notion that God is omnibenevolent. Christians have never worshiped an omnibenevolent Deity. Rather, the God they worship is a Parent Who loves us personally, and Who will never stop loving us. Such a God may however be willing to allow His creatures to be subjected to a great degree of suffering in the short term. He can only be called “benevolent” from a long-term perspective, insofar as He has prepared us for eternity with Him.

Finally, the sheer pervasiveness of the suffering in this world points to what Newman referred to as “some terrible aboriginal calamity” at the dawn of humanity, in which the entire human race paid the price for the proud decision made by our first parents to isolate themselves from God’s benevolent protection, for the sake of pursuing what they perceived as independence and freedom. God did not know that they would make that choice, but He gave them the power to decide the fate of the human race, and to “turn off the lights” in our world until God started turning them back on again, culminating in His Revelation of Himself to us 2,000 years ago in a manger in Bethlehem.

To sum up: the Christian view of history is capable of being cogently defended, provided Christians are willing to remove the theological barnacles that have attached themselves to its system of belief, and abandon the “three omnis,” in favor of a more intimate but less extravagant notion of God.

1,030 thoughts on “The Christian God and the Problem of Evil

  1. Mung:

    I have not seen you directly answer those questions or directly address the argument underlying them. You’ve either got to admit that your god isn’t omnibenevolent or you’ve got to come up with a better explanation for these kinds of horrific events than you have so far.

    First, I directly answered his question. I’ll find the link for you later.

    Thanks. As I said, I skimmed a lot of comments. I could have missed it.

    Fourth, I tried and tried to get him to post the underlying argument. If you have a link to where he posted it please share it. I’m sure Vincent would like to see it and that keiths would like to see him address it.

    Because I don’t find “Is there really not a single Christian out there who can explain why your God allowed that dog to eat the head of a living baby?” or “Is there really not a single Christian out there who can explain why an uncle who allowed a dog to eat his baby niece’s head would be condemned, but a supposed God who does the same thing is praised?” to be arguments.

    It looks pretty straightforward to me. The Christian god is claimed to be omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. We observe horrific things that such a being could prevent if it wanted to. We conclude that no being having those characteristics exists. Therefore Christianity is false.

    It was spelled out for you by at least two people.

  2. Patrick: It seems to me that you’re arguing against the position you wish keiths had taken rather than what he actually said.

    The response is simple and effective. I repeatedly asked for his underlying argument and never got it. So since he claimed it was the evidential argument from evil I started reading up on the evidential argument from evil.

    Now if his argument is different, I think it’s incumbent on him to say so, and say what his argument is, instead of leaving others guessing and then claiming they have no answer to it (whatever it is).

    Now if you have a link to his underlying argument, please post it.

  3. Patrick, to Mung:

    It seems to me that you’re arguing against the position you wish keiths had taken rather than what he actually said.

    It’s easier for Mung to dissemble than to defend.

  4. Mung,

    Fourth, I tried and tried to get him to post the underlying argument. If you have a link to where he posted it please share it. I’m sure Vincent would like to see it and that keiths would like to see him address it.

    Vincent doesn’t need to be spoon-fed, Mung. He is not Mung stupid.

    He already understands my argument — didn’t you read the OP, doofus? — and he agrees with me that the omniGod concept is untenable.

  5. keiths: It’s easier for Mung to dissemble than to defend.

    And it would save people a lot of bother if you would post your underlying argument, because even Patrick can see that asking a couple questions about some act you think is evil leaves a bit to be desired. Why would you allow him to search that whole thread to look for something you never wrote? That seems positively evil to me. 🙂

  6. Patrick: It looks pretty straightforward to me. The Christian god is claimed to be omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. We observe horrific things that such a being could prevent if it wanted to. We conclude that no being having those characteristics exists. Therefore Christianity is false.

    And keiths said that’s not his argument. He said he wasn’t employing the logical argument. His argument is supposed to be inductive, not deductive.

  7. Mung,

    Vincent understood my argument without being spoon fed. You clearly aren’t that bright, and it frustrates you.

    Take it up with the supposedly omnibenevolent God who under-endowed you.

  8. keiths: He was looking for your “direct answer”, Mung.

    My direct answer to the question was “I don’t know.” You should try it some time. When I asked what your explanation was, you appealed to an entity that didn’t exist. I prefer my explanation to that one. Then you doubled down later in the thread and appealed to doors to rabbit cages that also didn’t exist.

  9. keiths: Vincent understood my argument without being spoon fed. You clearly aren’t that bright, and it frustrates you.

    It would appear that Vincent understands your argument better than you do. If Vincent understands your argument then perhaps he can recite it.

    What do you say Vincent, can you set out the argument that keiths is making? His version of the evidential argument from evil, that is.

  10. Mung:

    When I asked what your explanation was, you appealed to an entity that didn’t exist. I prefer my explanation to that one. Then you doubled down later in the thread and appealed to doors to rabbit cages that also didn’t exist.

    In case anyone wonders what Mung is babbling about, I used the example of a rabbit cage without a door:

    How did the rabbit manage to escape the cage? There was no door to stop it.

    How did the dog manage to eat the baby’s head? There was no loving God to stop it.

    This, apparently, is beyond Mung’s powers of comprehension.

    To borrow fifth’s phrase: Are you really this dense, Mung?

  11. fifthmonarchyman: He doesn’t. The logical problem of evil is no problem for the Christian and the evidential problem is only a problem if you don’t trust Jesus to do what is right.

    Silly me. I always blamed Hitler and the Natzis for killing all those Jews. I should have realized that it was the fault of those non-Jesus believing Jews.

  12. Frankie: And what do you think was the pseudo-explanation for the Fall?

    What fall? Your position has no evidence. Your position is not testable. Your position has no mechanism to explain the fall from Paradise to New Jersey.

  13. Acartia: Silly me. I always blamed Hitler and the Natzis for killing all those Jews. I should have realized that it was the fault of those non-Jesus believing Jews.

    I thought he was blaming Jesus, not that He did anything wrong

  14. Alan Fox: Expanding on that, what I mean is, for someone who believes in an afterlife, that this life is a mere precursor to ultimate reality and everlasting bliss, death can’t come too soon. It’s merely a gateway.

    And then he puts that nasty little caveat that if we use suicude to end the suffering that He turns a blind eye to, we can’t get into heaven.

  15. And then he puts that nasty little caveat that if we use suicude to end the suffering that He turns a blind eye to, we can’t get into heaven.

    Thus demonstrating that he isn’t perfectly loving.

  16. Alan Fox: Reductio ad absurdum would suggest kill those fertilized eggs and avoid the interim altogether. Straight to heaven cutting out the middle man.

    So, instead of abortion being a holocaust, it is actually a salvation? Can i be around when you suggest that to KairosFocus? I wouldn’t want to miss the response.

  17. Patrick,

    There are many concepts that vjtorley missed:

    There is a difference between God allowing evil and causing evil…
    I’m referring to the Job’s case.

    There is also an issue with free will. Should God be responsible for evil done because humans and some animals-like-humans have free will to do whatever they want, including evil?

    BTW: What gives you the right to judge the One who, while patient for a reason, has the ability to undo the damage in due time? There is suffering involved but not eternal…

    Is anyone here familiar with the amazing properties of quantum mechanics and what it can do and more so how it can be used by the Creator for restoration?

    Unless someone here can take the ownership of a re-designer of quantum mechanics, I’ll leave all the glory to the Unsearchable One…

  18. keiths: If defeating the evidential problem of evil were as easy as saying “Look, they’re saying we must ignore the evidence for God’s existence!”, then don’t you think it would have occurred to, say, Plantinga, or van Inwagen, to make that objection?

    Whether or not defeating the evidential problem of evil is easy or not is rather beside the point. The point is that Plantinga (among others) makes that exact objection. The argument fails to take into account “the total body of evidence.”

    Now if you want to back off your claim that you’re employing the evidential argument don’t let me stop you. But that is in fact one of it’s defects, as I said and as you denied. So you were wrong. Will you admit it?

    So the atheologian must show that G is improbable with respect to the total body of evidence, whatever exactly that is. To do this he would be obliged to consider all the sorts of reasons natural theologians have invoked in favor of theistic belief… This would be a substantial and difficult project – one no atheologian has undertaken so far.

  19. J-Mac,

    There is a difference between God allowing evil and causing evil…

    Would you be comfortable praising the uncle in my story above? After all, he didn’t eat the baby’s head. He just sat back and allowed the dog to do it.

    Uncle of the Year, right?

  20. William Lane Craig:

    When we consider the probabilistic problem of evil, however, things are not so easy….

    The objector claims to prove that God’s existence is improbable. But with respect to what? To the evil in the world? If that is all the background information one considers, then it is hardly surprising if God’s existence should appear improbable relative to that alone. Indeed, it would be a major philosophical achievement if theists could demonstrate that relative to the evil in the world alone, God’s existence is not improbable. But the Christian theist need not be committed to such an arduous task. He will insist that we consider, not just the evil in the world, but all the evidence relevant to God’s existence, including the cosmological argument for a Creator of the universe, the teleological argument for an intelligent Designer of the cosmos, the axiological argument for an ultimate, personally‑embodied Good, the ontological argument for a maximally great being, as well as evidence concerning the person of Christ, the historicity of the resurrection, the existence of miracles, and, in addition, existential and religious experience. When we take into account the full scope of the evidence, the Christian theist might maintain, then the existence of God becomes quite probable. Hence, the theist could actually admit that the problem of evil, taken in isolation, does make God’s existence improbable. But he will insist that when the total scope of the evidence is considered, then the scales are at least evenly balanced or tip in favor of theism.

    keiths still has no answer. How could this theist response be available if the evidential argument from evil already takes into account the totality of the evidence for the existence of God?

    The answer is obvious. It doesn’t.

  21. I repeat:

    What evidence do you have to offer in favor of the Christian omniGod that outweighs the enormous negative evidence highlighted by the problem of evil?

  22. keiths: Don’t worry, Mung. I’ll connect the dots for you this time, since you can’t seem to do it on your own.

    Empty promises keiths. You never connected the dots.

  23. Here it is:

    Don’t worry, Mung. I’ll connect the dots for you this time, since you can’t seem to do it on your own.

    I did so in that same thread:

    I’m arguing against Christianity in this very thread, via the problem of evil. If Mung really wanted to engage me over the truth of Christianity, he would respond to my argument instead of pretending that I haven’t presented one.

    I think he’d prefer not to engage, given how that usually turns out for him.

    You remember — the problem of evil, of which you eventually said:

    I have no problem agreeing, for instance, that the problem of evil is the most (only?) serious objection that can be offered against the existence of God.

    …thus demonstrating that you are now lying when you say:

    I see mocking of Christianity, what I don’t see are arguments that Christianity is false.

    Christianity claims that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. The evidence undercuts that claim and shows that Christianity is therefore false.

    Will you actually confront the problem of evil this time, Mung, instead of fleeing from the discussion?

  24. And for Vincent: Would you describe that uncle as “loving”, much less credit him with “a steadfast, unshakable love which is greater than any of us can possibly imagine”?

  25. keiths: Christianity claims that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. The evidence undercuts that claim and shows that Christianity is therefore false.

    Me: What evidence?
    keiths: The evidence from evil.
    Me: So because you see the word evidence you think you’re making the evidential argument from evil?
    keiths: Isn’t it obvious? Doofus?
    Me: No, not really. It’s my understanding that the EA is an inductive argument, a probabilistic argument. Your argument does not look like that.
    keiths: Well, it is.
    Me: So you calculated probabilties?
    keiths: – crickets –
    Me: Is it Bayesian?
    keiths: – crickets –
    Me: Did you know the evidential argument ask us to set aside any other reason we might have to believe in God?
    kieths: does not
    Me: So you didn’t know?
    keiths: Idiot.
    Me: Look, I can quote all these sites and authors in support of my claim.
    keiths: They’re wrong.
    Me: Maybe we could settle this if you just presented your inductive/probabilistic argument in terms that didn’t sounds so doggone certain, as if you really are making a deductive argument.
    keiths: VJT! HELP!
    Me: Just connect the dots for me.
    keiths: But I did that already!
    Me: sigh

  26. This question seems to have spooked you, Mung:

    What evidence do you have to offer in favor of the Christian omniGod that outweighs the enormous negative evidence highlighted by the problem of evil?

    And what do you think about that uncle? Great guy, isn’t he?

    ETA: Meanwhile you’re off constructing imaginary dialogues, since you can’t defend your faith against my actual words.

  27. keiths: Regarding that attack, I wrote:

    Now I think it’s important to look at this, and let VJT see it. This is the dog ate baby head argument.

    keiths writes:

    You can tie yourself in knots trying to make excuses for God, or you can accept the obvious conclusion: your omniGod doesn’t exist. If there is a God, he isn’t the omniGod. And more likely still, there is no God at all.

    Now is it just me, or does that look like a deductive argument? Later, of course, after it was pointed out to him that the logical argument has failed, he claims that his argument is not the logical argument, but the evidential argument.

    The EA doesn’t deal in certainty. It’s inductive and probabilistic. He says that “more likely still, there is no God at all.” But that doesn’t follow at all, not even inductively. For as I pointed out to keiths, he’s only looking at the evidence from evil and not the totality of the evidence.

    So here we have an actual example of the very thing I claimed is true of the evidential argument from keiths himself.

  28. keiths:
    What do you say, Mung?Uncle of the Year?

    Symptoms of battered person syndrome….

    1) The abused thinks that the violence was his or her fault.

    2) The abused has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere.

    3) The abused fears for her/his life, and/or, the lives of loved ones whom the abuser might or has threatened to harm (e.g., children-in-common, close relatives or friends).

    4) The abused has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient.

    The resemblance to Christianity is uncanny.

  29. J-Mac:

    There is a difference between God allowing evil and causing evil.

    Not if the god in question is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. Are you saying that your god didn’t know that the universe it supposedly created would contain both moral and natural evil?

  30. keiths: What do you say, Mung? Uncle of the Year?

    Why don’t we hit the reset button. Why do you think that your questions are actual arguments?

    see here

    That’s a question, not an argument. Do you have an argument? You know, premises -> conclusion. Therefore Christianity is false.

    You’re at least as bad as the bot. Anyone can ask questions. Can you make an argument. That’s the question.

  31. keiths: What evidence do you have to offer in favor of the Christian omniGod that outweighs the enormous negative evidence highlighted by the problem of evil?

    What evidence do you have that the problem of evil is negative evidence for the Christian omniGod? You don’t know the plan and you don’t know the rules. Your entire “argument” is based on what you don’t know nor understand.

  32. Mung,

    Why don’t we hit the reset button.

    What’s the point of a reset? You’ve had chance after chance to defend your faith. You failed each time.

    Now it’s time to see if smarter Christians can do what you cannot.

  33. keiths: You claim that the Christian God exists, but the massive evidence of evil and suffering in the world — and dogs eating babies’ heads is just a tiny part of that evidence — shows otherwise.

    Here again we have keiths appealing only to the evidence for evil and suffering. It’s the EA in action. The evidence for the existence of God is nowhere to be found in the inductive/probabilistic analysis. He does the very thing that he denies his argument does. How does he explain that?

  34. keiths, all that we need is for you to post your actual argument. Show the probabilities you calculated. Tell us whether you are using Bayes’ Theorem. Tell us how you make your inductive leap. Assuming you’re even employing the evidential argument.

  35. And still the question hangs in the air, unanswered:

    What evidence do you have to offer in favor of the Christian omniGod that outweighs the enormous negative evidence highlighted by the problem of evil?

  36. Patrick: The problem is that you then post stuff like this where you go well off track and don’t even try to address the argument.

    I beg your indulgence. As you know, this thread had it’s origin because of another thread, which had it’s origin … erm -skip-skip- …

    keiths made claims in that thread which are factually false. Moreover, he made claims about me personally. I tried to provide a summary. But how does it not address the argument?

    P1: Christianity claims that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.

    True, I do not address that Premise. VJT addressed that premise in his OP.

    P2: The evidence undercuts that claim.

    Here, on the other hand, I do challenge the claim. I ask what evidence. The response is the evidence from evil. My response is, what about all the other evidence for the existence of God, how does that factor into your inductive/probabilistic reasoning?

    The fact is, that it doesn’t. And many philosophers have pointed out this flaw. The response from keiths is that they are wrong. Why should I believe him?

    So I think I have addressed the argument, though perhaps in an unconventional manner in that particular post, but it’s nothing that I didn’t bring up in the prior thread.

    There’s nothing new here, just stuff that keiths hasn’t dealt with. If his conclusion is that God probably doesn’t exist, or that Christianity is probably false, he can say so, and show his reasoning.

  37. Thank you. But keiths doesn’t seem to think so.

    That entire exchange — as simple as it was — went right over Mung’s head.

  38. keiths: It’s ridiculous and irrational to believe in the Christian God — omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly loving — when the evidence points in the opposite direction.

    Me: what evidence
    keiths: the evidence from evil
    Me: what about the other evidence for God’s existence?
    keiths: oh. that.
    Me: did you factor that in?
    keiths: nope. but you can. here’s where to plug it in in my argument!
    Me: so I can plug things in to your argument and change the probabilities you calculated? Why didn’t you do that?
    keiths: Idiot!

  39. Meanwhile, I don’t think anything I’ve written on this topic goes over the head of keiths. He knows perfectly well what is needed to defend his argument but just can’t seem to pull the trigger.

  40. Where did keiths respond to my answer to his argument?

    Mung: Let’s try to look at this rationally. Why can’t I argue that if something bad failed to occur, then it must be that God prevented it? And why can’t I argue that if something good happens that it was because of God?

    So I have on my side everything good that takes place, and everything bad that does not take place, and you have on your side only bad things that do take place.

    Why does my evidence not outweigh yours? Why are your events evidence that God does not exist while my events and non-events are not evidence that God does exist? Why, if you can appeal to a non-event (God did not intervene) is it illegitimate for me to appeal to a non-event (nothing bad happened)?

    I think if we total things up I win. There’s more evidence for the existence of God. Therefore there’s no compelling reason to think Christianity is false.

    Let’s not proceed under the mistaken assumption that I had not response to his argument. Let look at the facts.

    keiths did respond, lol!

    keiths: Mung,
    I just followed your link. Holy crap, that’s a bad argument.
    More later when I have time to properly dismantle it.

    Well that settles it then! Even keiths admits I responded with an argument.

    He dismantled it, I’m sure, but I can’t seem to find the post.

  41. J-Mac: There is a difference between God allowing evil and causing evil…
    I’m referring to the Job’s case.

    Bad example, the God of Job consorts with evil.

  42. keiths:

    Mung: Are we allowed to include evidence that supports the existence of God or not?

    Of course, doofus. A rational person will consider all of the available evidence when evaluating an evidential question.

    And the evidence that keiths actually considered all of the available evidence that supports the existence of God is?


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