Since objective morality is The Topic That Won’t Die here at TSZ, I think we need Yet Another Thread to Discuss It.
A Sam Harris quote to get things rolling (h/t walto):
There are two mistakes I see moral subjectivists making. The first mistake is believing in the fact-value dichotomy. The second mistake is conflating moral philosophy and psychology, suggesting that our psychology ought to be the sole determinant of our beliefs.
I’ll only address the fact-value dichotomy mistake here. Subjectivists typically exaggerate the gap between facts and values. While there is a useful distinction to be made between facts and values, it’s usually taken too far.
Let me explain. Facts in science are held in high epistemic regard by non-religious people, including me. But scientific facts are theory-laden. And theory choice in science is value-laden. What values inform choices of scientific theory? Verifiability, falsifiability, explanatory value, predictive value, consistency (logical, observational, mathematical), parsimony, and elegance. Do these values, each taken alone, necessarily make or prove a scientific theory choice correct? No. But collectively, they increase the probability that a theory is the most correct or useful. So, as the philosopher Hilary Putnam has put it, facts and values are “entangled.” Scientific facts obtain their veracity through the epistemic values listed above. If I reject those epistemic values (as many religious people do), and claim instead that a holy book holds more epistemic value for me, does that mean science is subjective?
I maintain the same is true of morality. Moral facts, such as “X is right or good,” are at least value-laden, and sometimes also theory-laden, just like scientific facts. What values inform choices of moral belief and action? Justice, fairness, empathy, flourishing of conscious creatures, and integrity (i.e. consistency of attitudes, beliefs, and behavior between each other and over time). Do these values, each taken alone, necessarily make or prove a moral choice correct? No. But collectively, they increase the probability that a moral choice is the most correct or useful. So again, as the philosopher Hilary Putnam has put it, facts and values are “entangled.” Moral facts obtain their veracity through the values listed above (and maybe through other values as well; the list above is not necessarily complete).
Now, the subjectivist can claim that the moral values are subjective themselves, but that is no different than the religious person claiming scientific values are subjective. The truth is that we have no foundation for any knowledge whatsoever, scientific or moral. All we have to support scientific or moral knowledge is a web of entangled facts and values, with values in science and morality being at the core of our web. Our values are also the least changeable, for if we modify them, we cause the most disruption to our entire web. It’s much easier to modify the factual periphery of our web.
If we reject objectivity in morality, we must give up objectivity in science as well, and claim that all knowledge is subjective, since all knowledge is ultimately based in values. I reject this view, and claim that the scientific and moral values listed above provide veracity to the scientific and moral claims I make. Religious people disagree with me on the scientific values providing veracity, and moral subjectivists disagree with me on the moral values providing veracity. But disagreement doesn’t mean there is no truth to the matter.
walto,
No, certainty isn’t necessary.
The problem is that you can’t even establish that your conscience is likely to be correct as an indicator of objective morality.
You don’t have recourse to the kinds of cross-checks that are available to someone who wants to know whether the monitor they think they see is actually in front of them:
Likely? You mean like with a probability of over. 5? I’m pretty sure you’ve said you don’t think we get that with our perceptual judgments either.
False. Illusion or not, the lines exist, only their respective lengths are subject to the illusion. Similarly in your stoning of adulterers, you personally would be abhorred of stoning while ignoring adultery, while actually they are morally about the same weight, give or take some further circumstances. A moral person is competent in judging the circumstances just like someone experienced in optical illusions is likely not be deceived by them.
You may disagree all you want, but expertise matters. You cannot argue conscience away into non-existence. Morality manifests as sense of justice and for moral realist it’s a real sense like vision or hearing, through which objects are perceived. Therefore objective.
walto,
If you bring Cartesian skepticism into this, then of course all bets are off, as I’ve explained many times. But most people don’t, and I am not pressing that point here.
I’m saying that even if you set aside the possibility that we are being systematically fooled, you can’t calibrate the reliability of your conscience as an indicator of objective morality.
You can do that in the case of your vision and the monitor in front of you.
Erik,
Good grief, Erik. That isn’t the only kind of optical illusion. Haven’t you ever seen this type?
How does he know that the way he goes about deciding this is the proper way to make such a determination with things like the Müller-Lyer illusion?
How does he know that what he presumes works with things like the Müller-Lyer illusion works in the apparently very different realm of morality?
peace
Like I said a long time ago at the beginning of this thread.
We are all presuppositionalists now
peace
I get it. You’re all over the place. You need to be sure–or have some unspecified degree of likelihood–except when you don’t.
That you don’t care about consistency or what ‘objectivity’ or ‘subjectivity’ mean are my main takeaways.
Erik,
We already know that in Erik’s subjective morality, stoning and adultery have roughly the same weight (which is pretty fucked up, by the way — subjectively speaking, of course.) What you haven’t given us is any reason whatsoever to think that adultery is objectively immoral by your criteria:
Erik:
I don’t. Consciences obviously exist. The question is whether they are indicators of objective morality.
It can’t be calibrated the way they can. If you and walto disagree, you’re welcome to explain how it can be done.
Sans revelation
walto,
I’ve explained this to you again and again.
I don’t bring Cartesian skepticism into every conversation. If someone asks me if I know where the keys are, I don’t hesitate to say something like “Yes — they’re on the kitchen counter.”
Do I really know that? Of course not. But I understand why my interlocutor is asking the question, and so I answer accordingly instead of saying “no” and launching into a disquisition on Cartesian skepticism.
Same thing here. Yes, all bets are off if you bring Cartesian skepticism into this. But most moral objectivists are not Cartesian skeptics, so I’ve set CS aside for this discussion.
I do the same for most discussions. Is it really that hard to understand why?
Now, if you think you can calibrate the reliability of your conscience as an indicator of objective morality, then by all means show us how that is done.
If you can’t, then why do you trust your conscience as such an indicator?
So, given all that blatherous rigamarole, what do you take ‘objective ‘ and ‘subjective’ to mean? Do you have to ‘be sure’ you’re right or don’t you? And, as erik has asked, do you have evidence of moral truths or don’t you?
Put another way, do you have any idea precisely what it is you’re claiming when you say that morality is subjective, or don’t you?
walto,
How many times must I repeat this?
If you disagree, then show us how you would establish one as objective. Pick one and walk us through your process. Be prepared to defend the validity of your approach.
So, a moral truth has to be an ‘actual state of affairs’? I suppose G.E. Moore held something like that view. Not too many others, though. OK, you disagree with Moore. Your reason–that you can’t be sure–wouldn’t convince him, though. Nor should it convince anyone–it’s just a verifiability rehash, which almost nobody buys even with respect to claims involving the objectivity of ‘actual states of affairs.’
So, what you’ve got here is a bad argument against a position almost nobody has ever held. Bravo. Maybe you should link to it again!
walto,
Or at least derivable from such. Otherwise it isn’t objective.
Erik thinks stoning and adultery have roughly equal weight morally. I don’t. We can’t both be objectively right.
How would you resolve the disagreement? What is the objective truth here, and how do you know?
Why does a moral claim have to be or be derivable from a non-moral claim (or a bunch of them) to be objective? I take it that Kant is a famous example of a moral objectivist. What non-moral claim(s) does he believe his categorical imperative derives from? Or take your buddy Harris or your buddy’s buddy Rand. Do you think they share your take on ‘objective’?
I’m not sure what ‘objectively’ adds there, but if you say P and he says Not-P you can’t both be right. However one of you can be, no? I’d think that if only one of you is right (and you’ve said you think are and he isn’t), then something must be objective in the vicinity.
Anyhow, if you mean by ‘objective’ what you’ve said you mean above, few people will dispute that morality is not objective. It’s a weird view, and though your argument against it is bad, I don’t hold it and I’m guessing Erik doesn’t either. But we can ask him.
Erik–do you think that moral claims are identical to or derivable from non-moral claims?
That’s right. And note that he’s not even saying non-P (not properly anyway). He’s only saying he wants to be sure about P, even after encountering evidence for P.
And his only counterevidence is a flawed understanding, as if moral perception weren’t analogical to all other perception. From the moral realist point of view, a moral skeptic is straightforwardly analogous to half-blind. To the half-blind, plenty of objects appear different than to one with clear vision. This doesn’t mean that those with clear vision must align themselves in accordance with the half-blind. In fact it would be immoral to do so.
By the way, if keiths is arguing in the name of truth, he’d do well to know that truth is a moral value among others. He is trapped in an objective moral system and is doing nothing to challenge it even though he is under the illusion that he’s doing something.
Has anybody given a reason to think so? For me, morality is embedded in ontology. “The harmony of all things” is not just an esthetical ideal. It also has its ethical aspect.
walto,
That’s not what I said. I said it had to be, or be derivable from, an actual state of affairs. Otherwise it would have no entailments and no direct or indirect causal impact. If you could demonstrate that something was objectively moral or immoral, that itself would be an “actual state of affairs” that could serve as a basis for further moral reasoning.
That said, I think the whole project is forlorn because of Hume’s is/ought distinction. The only way to get objective morality is to assume it. It can’t be demonstrated.
keiths:
walto:
It’s crucial, because under subjective morality he can be right under his own moral system while I am right under mine.
Yes, if morality is objective.
If objective morality exists, then sure — it’s possible that one of us is right. The question is, does objective morality exist?
You’re being sloppy, walto. Here’s what I actually said:
walto:
You do — or at least did — hold it, so it’s odd to see you throwing yourself under the bus. Don’t you remember?
Also, don’t forget to answer my follow-up question:
Erik,
How do you objectively determine who is morally “half-blind” and who has clear moral vision?
Why didn’t it occur to you to ask yourself this question?
Half-blind people see objects distortedly or don’t see some at all. That’s how. If this is unclear, then you must be half-blind. A half-blind person doesn’t get to assert too much about objects. He must consult someone with better vision. Failure to acknowledge his own limitations means we are dealing with a pretty sick puppy here.
Anyway, you already acknowledged that there is evidence to confirm your moral intuitions. You only want to be “sure”. It’s your job to analyze the evidence thoroughly and figure out clearly what it is you are still unsure of.
I have of course answered it for myself, but you get to know about this only now when it occurs to you to ask it.
Erik,
Or they see things that aren’t there.
Face it, Erik. You have no objective way of deciding who has clear moral vision and who doesn’t.
That’s embarrassing for someone who claims, himself, to have access to objective morality.
Erik,
No. I have already pointed this out to you:
And this:
You’re misrepresenting me with abandon. Is lying not objectively immoral in your opinion, Erik?
These assertions acquire relevance as soon as you have an argument to support them.
You see, given (physical, empirical) vision, objects and sense of vision self-evidently follow. They must be presupposed and they must co-exist in order for your illusion analogy to have any validity. Similarly, rational human beings can feel their conscience and in order for this conscience to be explicable, (objective) morality must be posited. If not, we are not dealing with a rational human being. For an irrational being, anything goes and no argument is sufficient, because that’s what it means to be irrational. Should rational people align themselves according to irrational people’s demands?
So now you are saying that these are not your words? “All of that is evidence in favor of my intuition, but I want to be sure.”
Yes, lying is immoral. As is wilful blindness, denialism.
Of course it can be triangulated objectively. When you mentioned stoning adulterers, you were implicitly emphasizing stoning while ignoring adultery. When I pointed this out to you, I was actually pointing out the way to triangulate it objectively.
Erik,
You’ve demonstrated that you have
a) no way of determining whether something is objectively immoral, and
b) no way of deciding who has “clear moral vision” and who is “half-blind”.
In desperation, you’ve also resorted to dishonesty.
I’m happy to leave things there.
Come back if you ever manage to find workable ways of achieving (a) and (b).
Workable for blind/immoral people? Best for them is to demonstrate to them the error of their ways, but this is a rather delicate and mostly unrewarding task.
You come back when you find actually something to object to about morality. Finding a coherent analogy or argument for your position would be a good start, supposing that you have a position to begin with. Maintaining both “I see no evidence…” and “There is evidence, but I want to be sure…” at the same time is not a coherent position.
A presuppositionalist who denies revelation is just a sad nihilist with no epistemology and no system of ethics.
No man is an island and being with out revelation is like being with out oxygen.
On the other hand claiming to be with out revelation is like denying the existence of oxygen while taking a deep breath
peace
On this we agree.
The opposite of demonstrated is revealed
Just because a thing can’t be demonstrated does not mean it’s not true objective and obvious to all.
Objective morality is all of those things. If we could demonstrate it it would be none of those things.
peace
“Getting to” an external physical world also requires presuppositions. Keith seems to vaguely recognize this sometimes, but conveniently forget it at others. He wants the physical world to be “objective,” and makes moral claims “subjective” because they are not “actual states of affairs” (which almost nobody has ever said they were). Worse, his “argument” that moral propositions are not “actual states of affairs” is that he might be wrong about them–just as he believes he might be wrong about every completely stateable physical claim. It’s a big mess wrapped in rotten salami.
We’ve seen now, at any rate, that nobody here disagrees with Keiths that moral propositions are not “actual states of affairs” that he can be “sure” about. And everyone is fine with the claim that they can’t be “demonstrated.”
So, as I suspected at the outset, this “dispute” is officially resolved. Everybody can be right since nobody has been using terms the same way! Yay! Argument over! On to the next bruhaha!
Demonstration can be done when there is a rational standard for sufficient demonstration.
On the one hand, keiths believes his eyes even when there are others who disagree. On the other, keiths doesn’t believe his conscience because there are others who disagree. He vacillates between “There is no evidence” and “There is evidence, but I want to be sure.” So keiths has no consistent standard for accepting the demonstration on offer. Sad story, but it’s his personal problem.
Yes, “demonstration” is also a term that we may be using differently. I’ll add it to the list.
And when it’s ready please paste the list as a separate OP with definitions and examples of usage. Might be educative. Thanks.
walto,
Again, I’m surprised to see you throwing yourself under the bus.
You yourself hold — or at least used to hold — that objective moral truths are derivable from actual states of affairs. Now you dismiss your view as weird, ridiculous, on the fringe.
Why the complete reversal?
Erik,
No. Why misrepresent what I’ve said? What’s the point?
Also untrue, as I’ve explained above.
You seem to realize that your position is too weak to be defended effectively without resorting to dishonesty. True enough — but isn’t that a good reason to change your position?
fifth:
(Imaginary) revelation is your security blanket. Time to let go of it.
Seems like a good time to repost these questions:
I take “demonstration” to mean prove via deductive reasoning from premise or evidence.
I think It makes objective morality dependent on something either logically or temporally prior to itself for it’s grounding.
on the other hand
quote:
Praise the LORD! Oh give thanks to the LORD, for he is good, for his steadfast love endures forever!
(Psa 106:1)
end quote:
peace
How can you possibly know that given your stated worldview?
It sound like you are commenting on the way things aught to be
Is it just your unsupported subjective opinion on the lines of “I like ice cream you should too”? If that is the case why should I care?
peace
fifth,
He pretends that God revealed it to him. That should do the trick, eh, fifth?
That depends
How does he know that pretending that God revealed it to him is the way to make such a determination?
peace
fifth:
That sounds a lot like walto’s dismissal of subjective morality:
William J. Murray makes a similar goofy argument.
I expect that sort of thing from you and William, but walto should know better, especially considering the number of times it’s been rebutted. For instance:
Just wondering. If Fifth is happy in his belief, why worry? What do you care?
Alan,
I could explain it to you yet again, but would it do any good? The entire concept of a Skeptical Zone is baffling to you.
Derivable from “actual states of affairs”? Nope. That’s your view, I guess. Also you have to be able to be sure of them for them to be (whatever it is you mean by) “objective.” I don’t hold that either.
I saw your post above that for something to be moral it has to be “strong” and that your distaste for this or that food isn’t strong enough. That’s hilarious. Do you really want to add that to the list of silly things you are saying about this stuff? (Before you answer–add some maggots to the broccoli and see if it’s now strong enough to compare with some subtle moral judgment about telling Jeff what Sue said.)
As I said, nobody disagrees with you about morality not being objective if you mean the cuckoo stuff you apparently mean by those words. The pathetic point here is that you hate it that nobody disagrees with you. I mean if you can’t fight with somebody what the hell will you do with yourself?
Only to a presuppositionist who requires revelation in order not to be a sad nihilist with no epistemology and no system of ethics.
Certainly having an omniscient buddy telling you stuff is a comfort, though it also causes some people to do heinous things to their fellow man.
it is not claiming to be without revelation, it is just not presupposing it.
+1
Nice.
He cares because he has a sense that there is a way that persons ought to think and behave and that this is more than just his own subjective opinion
That is the point, folks who claim that there is no objective morality can’t live consistently according to that belief.
Van Till would say he is stealing from my worldview.
peace
I fine with this nuance as long as you don’t act as if you know stuff or that your moral opinions should matter to others
You need to be consistent. If your presupposition(s) are incapable of grounding objective truth and morality you should not act as if you have that grounding.
That is worldview theft and it’s objectively wrong 😉
The Apostle Paul would call it idolatry (Romans 1:25)
peace