Since objective morality is The Topic That Won’t Die here at TSZ, I think we need Yet Another Thread to Discuss It.
A Sam Harris quote to get things rolling (h/t walto):
There are two mistakes I see moral subjectivists making. The first mistake is believing in the fact-value dichotomy. The second mistake is conflating moral philosophy and psychology, suggesting that our psychology ought to be the sole determinant of our beliefs.
I’ll only address the fact-value dichotomy mistake here. Subjectivists typically exaggerate the gap between facts and values. While there is a useful distinction to be made between facts and values, it’s usually taken too far.
Let me explain. Facts in science are held in high epistemic regard by non-religious people, including me. But scientific facts are theory-laden. And theory choice in science is value-laden. What values inform choices of scientific theory? Verifiability, falsifiability, explanatory value, predictive value, consistency (logical, observational, mathematical), parsimony, and elegance. Do these values, each taken alone, necessarily make or prove a scientific theory choice correct? No. But collectively, they increase the probability that a theory is the most correct or useful. So, as the philosopher Hilary Putnam has put it, facts and values are “entangled.” Scientific facts obtain their veracity through the epistemic values listed above. If I reject those epistemic values (as many religious people do), and claim instead that a holy book holds more epistemic value for me, does that mean science is subjective?
I maintain the same is true of morality. Moral facts, such as “X is right or good,” are at least value-laden, and sometimes also theory-laden, just like scientific facts. What values inform choices of moral belief and action? Justice, fairness, empathy, flourishing of conscious creatures, and integrity (i.e. consistency of attitudes, beliefs, and behavior between each other and over time). Do these values, each taken alone, necessarily make or prove a moral choice correct? No. But collectively, they increase the probability that a moral choice is the most correct or useful. So again, as the philosopher Hilary Putnam has put it, facts and values are “entangled.” Moral facts obtain their veracity through the values listed above (and maybe through other values as well; the list above is not necessarily complete).
Now, the subjectivist can claim that the moral values are subjective themselves, but that is no different than the religious person claiming scientific values are subjective. The truth is that we have no foundation for any knowledge whatsoever, scientific or moral. All we have to support scientific or moral knowledge is a web of entangled facts and values, with values in science and morality being at the core of our web. Our values are also the least changeable, for if we modify them, we cause the most disruption to our entire web. It’s much easier to modify the factual periphery of our web.
If we reject objectivity in morality, we must give up objectivity in science as well, and claim that all knowledge is subjective, since all knowledge is ultimately based in values. I reject this view, and claim that the scientific and moral values listed above provide veracity to the scientific and moral claims I make. Religious people disagree with me on the scientific values providing veracity, and moral subjectivists disagree with me on the moral values providing veracity. But disagreement doesn’t mean there is no truth to the matter.
Hahaha “sure.”
newton,
The point of my quote was to remind you that “seems like a practical solution” is not an viable indicator of truth
I would have guessed that you would agree with that appraisal. Am I right?
peace
It is exactly and only about how you define your god concept. That’s the only thing that can be reasonably discussed because your concept, as poorly defined and mercurial as it is, at least exists. There is no evidence that any gods do.
You may have deluded yourself into thinking your definitions correspond to reality, but you have never demonstrated that to be the case. The root cause of most of your disagreements here is your inability to recognize that.
More repetition of unsupported claims. Are you never going to learn that you need to support your positions, not just continuously spew them out?
Do you understand the difference between a claim and a presupposition?
Because you don’t act as if you do
peace
Indeed I do. A “presupposition” is what someone calls a claim when they lack the intellectual honesty and integrity to support it.
Pretty clear from that response that you have no idea whatever. Maybe you’d do better with ‘axiom’. Any idea what THOSE are?
fifth,
Whichever word you use, your reasoning is circular. (And that’s not praise, by the way.)
Not very impressive.
fifth, then:
fifth, now:
What a difference a day makes. You’re a hoot, fifth.
My main objection to “objective morality” or “objective values” is that it encourages the temptation to treat moral values as things, maybe as “abstract entities”, that are just sitting out there waiting around for us to discover them.
I think that’s rightly rejected as absurd.
But that doesn’t mean that the very idea of objective morality is absurd. Just that specific way of thinking about it.
I suspect that the concepts of “objective” and “subjective” here mean too many things — they are too elastic — for them to be really helpful in clarifying what’s at stake.
Instead, I want to think about these issues in terms of how norms constrain conduct. I think it’s the idea of constraint that’s really important here.
It is sometimes thought that norms cannot be intersubjective, since intersubjectivity is just the adding up of subjective desires, and so we don’t get the way that norms constrain desires by locating them in intersubjective terms. And it sometimes though that unless norms were themselves grounded in the very structure of reality, they couldn’t play a constraining role.
I think that both of those thoughts are profoundly and completely mistaken.
On the contrary, I think that the constraining function of norms — how norms constrain desires — can be completely explained in terms of intersubjective approval and sanction. (Tomasello, following Searle, calls this “shared intentionality”. Brandom’s communal intentionality comes from Sellars’s analysis of morality as “we-intentions”.)
If there were any such things as “presuppositions,” then they would be claims that do not need support and indeed cannot really be supported — after all, to lend support to a claim is precisely not to presuppose it!
But I don’t think that there are any such things as presuppositions — at any rate not in the sense that would be required in order for FMM’s views to have any plausibility.
I know that FMM insists that everyone has their own presuppositions, and that just differ about them. That might be true to some extent — after all, empiricists and rationalists are both foundationalists. But non-foundationalism is a genuine philosophical option, whether its found in Nagarjuna, Hegel, or Sellars.
I know the real definition. I was simply defining the term as fifthmonarchyman seems to use it.
This is why I don’t often reply to you — I end up with more books to read.
Certainly everyone (aside from those you mention) has presuppositions, e.g. an external reality exists. I find that fifthmonarchyman stretches the definition to the breaking point by simply “presupposing” that every aspect of his childhood indoctrination is true. There’s a point where presuppositionalism becomes simply assuming one’s conclusions.
Ha! I’m sorry/not sorry.
But honestly, the only reason I name-drop is that folks here won’t ascribe any originality to what I say. I’m a competent thinker, but I’m just a tinkerer compared with philosophers of genuine brilliance.
I’m not crazy about the word “external” there, but surely it’s true that the very idea that there is a world that we discover and do not create is implicit in the structure of our experience of that world. It is, to be Kantian for a moment, a ‘transcendental’ condition. But it’s not functioning as a ungrounded premise in an argument, rather more like a description of the world as we experience it (and experience ourselves as experiencing it).
My main objection to FMM is that he’s unwilling or unable to distinguish between doing phenomenology and quoting Scripture. That’s the main reason why I’ve put him on “ignore”, and I’m happier for it.
KN:
Reification isn’t really the problem here. After all, “norm” is an abstract noun just as “morality” and “value” are.
In any case, a believer in objective morality can vitiate the reification charge by simply rephrasing. Instead of speaking of “objective morality” as a thing, they can talk instead about whether it’s objectively moral or immoral to do certain things.
You can hardly avoid the concept of “objective” when discussing “objective morality”!
A tribe in New Guinea collectively decides that it’s immoral to eat snails. That’s an intersubjective norm, and it constrains the conduct of the tribespeople.
Would you argue on that basis that it’s objectively immoral when one of them sneaks out at night to eat snails?
Hunh, so as you understand FMM, he’s using “presupposition” to mean
That’s an odd suggestion, since he’s a self-professed presuppositionalist. Maybe someone should ask him if he’s ever used to term to mean anything like that.
My sense is that the truth is that either (1) you didn’t (and perhaps still don’t) know what the word means; or (2) you were just violating the rules you’re supposed to be enforcing.
I’m not sure which of those is right, though.
One doesn’t exclude the other.
There is no difference at all so perhaps it’s the straw-man who is a hoot
😉
peace
I’m truly sorry that you have me on ignore but I’d like to point out that there is nothing about doing phenomenology that requires one refrain from quoting scripture.
If you are going to quote Peirce and James I see no reason I can’t quote Paul and James.
That is the same reason I quote scripture
😉
peace
He didn’t say you shouldn’t quote from Scripture. He said that what bothered him was that you seemed not to be able to distinguish between the two activities.
Why must quoting from scripture be segregated from intellectual pursuits as if it was somehow beneath them?
I would venture to say that the greatest thinkers of the last couple millennia quoted scripture liberally often in the middle of their most important philosophical works
peace
I simply presuppose that the Christian God of scripture exists.
That is only one single presupposition it’s certainly not every aspect of my “childhood indoctrination”. What ever that is supposed to mean.
The reason I presuppose this one thing is because I’m simply unaware of any other presupposition(s) that is capable of serving as a foundation for things like knowledge or morality.
I’m open to any alternative suggestions that are offered and in fact I often specifically ask for them.
That is what I am doing when I ask you “How do you know?”
peace
fifthmonarchyman,
Again, what he said was you couldn’t distinguish the two activities.
What makes you think that there are two separate activities going on that need to be distinguished?
From my perspective what I’m doing is just bringing scripture to bear in the process of doing phenomenology. Why is this approach illegitimate? It’s the same thing he is doing when he “name drops”.
What makes his sources more admissible than mine?
peace
You’ve had a pretty rough thread, haven’t you, fifth?
Best thread so far, as far as I can tell.
1) Keiths is fighting an imaginary proponent of Fideism
2) Patrick thinks presupositons are claims
3) Glen Davidson is mumbling profanities
and
4) KN is ignoring me because he thinks there is too much Bible being quoted
I could not ask for a better demonstration of the atheist worldview
😉
peace
If you can distinguish them, KN is mistaken. If you can’t, he’s not. Your three posts on the matter have been mostly non-responsive, contradictory, or just all over the place. You can either distinguish them or you can’t. You either think they’re distinguishable or you don’t. He should care about this matter or he shouldn’t. You seem to be confusing all those in each post. And in this last one you’re whining to me–as if this were my complaint.
This isn’t my issue, I’ve just repeated KN’s remark a couple times, because you keep responding with red herrings. But I have to say, I’m beginning to see what he means.
OK, I apologize. I assumed you thought his complaint has some merit. One more comment and I’ll let it lie.
I can distinguish between “doing” and “quoting” if that is all he means.
however
I think he means that you can’t “do” phenomenology and at the same time “quote” if and only if the thing you are quoting is the Bible.
You haven’t given me any reason to think that is not what he means.
peace
keiths:
fifth:
Do you think you’re fooling anyone, much less your supposedly omniscient God, with that bit of bravado?
The nice thing about Christianity, if it were true, is that you can be forgiven for even the most brazen of misrepresentations. Might as well go for it, eh, fifth?
No deception is untended. I call um like I see um
Apparently an accurate summary sounds like false bravado to your biased ears.
I guess we should expect as much. You did mistake presuppositionalism for fideism and stuck with your error even when it was pointed out to you..
That sort of track record makes your blind faith in your mental faculties to ground your knowledge seem pretty foolish. 😉
peace
fifth:
Well, you certainly tend yours quite carefully.
fifth,
Since by your own suspect account this thread is going swimmingly for you, you’ll be eager to tackle the next question — the one that you’ve finally acknowledged as an “obvious followup question” after dodging it for months:
How do you reliably distinguish between genuine revelations and imaginary ones?
You might also want to send the URL of this thread to your minister and fellow congregants, so they can witness and share in the joy of your great triumphs here on behalf of Jesus.
LMAO
In an earlier comment, I explained why the conscience can’t be put on an equal footing with senses like vision or hearing. There is another problem for those who argue that our consciences give us access to objective morality: how does that work, exactly?
Some obvious questions are:
1) What is the nature of our consciences?
2) What is the nature of objective morality?
3) How does the conscience operate so as to gain access to objective morality?
4) How does objective morality causally affect the conscience, and through it, one’s bodily actions?
5) Why do consciences go so badly wrong, as in the example I gave earlier?
From a guy like fifth, the answers will most likely boil down to “it’s all magic, and when the conscience doesn’t work that’s due to broken magic.” That isn’t very interesting, so I’m hoping to hear from brighter theists.
I’d also like to hear from atheists such as walto who accept the existence of objective morality and believe that our consciences have access to it.
How do the senses operate so as to gain access to objects?
Objective morality (in theism, in scholastic tradition and in plain common sense – which are not the same thing, but reason similarly in this case) is analogous to any objective reality: Sometimes you see stuff, sometimes you don’t, but it doesn’t follow the stuff is not there.
Anyway, this is yet another thread that is hopelessly fifthed.
Erik,
Did you read this comment? It explains the difference.
It doesn’t. It amounts to nothing but “Sometimes we don’t know stuff, therefore we don’t know stuff – at all.” Doesn’t follow.
Erik,
No, it shows why we can’t detect “moral illusions” in the same way we can detect an optical illusion.
If you disagree, then tell us how you’d go about determining that my moral intuition (that it’s wrong to egg my neighbor’s house for fun) is not a moral illusion.
keiths,
In your own example, you describe how you go about determining that Müller-Lyer illusion is an illusion. Similarly, I will show that this particular moral intuition of yours (an abuse of the word “intuition” by the way) is not illusory as soon as you show that it is illusory. In other words, what I’m saying is that you are abusing the term “illusion”.
Erik,
Is it objectively immoral for me to egg my neighbor’s house for fun? How do you make that determination?
Erik,
But it hasn’t been Munged yet!
You haven’t shown that it is illusory. But your abuse of the term “illusion” consists in the following.
In the illusion you describe that the two different lines appear to be of different lengths. Then you say there’s a way to go about to verify the lengths. So far so good. However, you ignore that, illusion or not, the lines are there either way. Similarly, you may have the “moral intuition” that it’s immoral to egg your neighbor’s house while some other people (occasionally) feel they should egg their neighbors’ houses and they do it. The rightness or wrongness of it can be independently verified – if you have conscience. If you don’t, then it’s like a blind person verifying the lengths of the lines in the illusion you provided.
In fact, the blind person would not see the illusion in the first place, so the problem never enters the verification phase. I treat you the same way – proof of objective morality is irrelevant to people who deny that conscience is a real sense like the other senses are. First you have to get over your assertion that morality is illusory. But of course you know that as soon as you concede this, you have lost your entire argument, so feel free to stay as you are.
Alternatively, *demonstrate* that morality is illusory so that I would have something real to argue against. Until then it’s just a kiddies’ nonsense game.
Erik,
How?
What happens when consciences disagree? How do you adjudicate the following example?
Who is objectively right about this, and how did you make that determination?
Erik,
You’re not getting it.
I’m assuming for the sake of argument that objective morality does exist. Under that assumption, it really is either objectively moral, or objectively immoral, to stone adulterers to death.
If it’s objectively moral, then the people whose consciences tell them that it’s immoral have fallen prey to a moral illusion. Likewise, if it’s objectively immoral, then those whose consciences tell them that it’s moral have fallen prey to a moral illusion.
They can’t all be right, so under the assumption that objective morality exists, the existence of moral illusions follows.
Adultery is a crime.(1) Different cultures deal with the crime differently. In the Western civilization, we effectively have ceased to deal with it, even though you still “feel outrage” when your spouse does it. To deal with it is necessary precisely in order to not “feel outrage”.
Anyway, you have too many conflations to address there. “Feel outrage” does not necessarily mean the outrage is morally justified. Socially, the outrage needs to be moderated regardless if it’s morally justified, but when the topic is objective morality, then only morally justified is what matters. To understand this distinction, it takes conscience, which is not a feeling. These are some hopeless conflations you have there.
(1) Immoral as per natural law. Natural law as in scholasticism.
Erik,
Is it objectively moral, or objectively immoral, to stone adulterers to death? How did you make that determination?
Take your time. I’m off to bed.
False due to the conflations that I pointed out. First – if adultery is immoral (and a significant crime) then it must be punished. From there, your dichotomy crumbles down.
The burden of proof can be met as soon as you have met your share. I would say “Take your time” if I knew you ever would do your share, but I know you won’t so I won’t say it.
It’s things like this that lead to the impression that threads are being “fifthed”
I already answered the question and provided practical examples of what the process would look like and even provided links that describe the method in greater detail. Yet apparently you missed it all.
in the interest of brevity Instead of rehashing all of that again how about I provide a link to an actual manual of how it might work ?
from the introduction
quote:
Knowing is a gift. Epiphany comes as a surprising encounter,
equal parts knowing and being known. It could never have been achieved in a systematic or linear fashion. It transforms knower and known. Deep insight hints of exciting future prospects, confirming that we have made contact with reality. Pilgrimage modulates into an ongoing dance of communion. Reality proves to be deeply dynamic and welcomes us in. Knowing ushers in shalom.
End quote
Shalom (ie peace)
petrushka,
You didn’t answer my question as to why the Roman Empire collapsed …
Just because it was taken over by another power and continued in a different form as a world power doesn’t explain the reason for the fall…
“…if the nation is the body, then the family is the cell…”
The decline in moral values in the Roman Empire that had united the families for many generation led to the gradual decay of the families, which in turn led to the gradual decay of the fundamental strength of the Roman Empire…
Obviously, there were other reasons too but looking back a the history of many strong societies that declined the same story repeats itself: Strong moral values sustain strong families, which make up strong societies…
Our society is on decline too… the same issue is repeating itself. ..”For an atheist “No God” world simply means “no accountability to a divine authority”,as well as “no objective values which he/she are obligated to respect”,so writes law professor Phillip Johnson. Morality then becomes relative,with each person deciding his/her own standards,if he/she chooses to have any such…”
So basically it was the HOMOS.