This Strawson piece just appeared in the NY Times.
It’s a position that I found attractive long ago. FWIW, I preferred Strawson’s father as a philosopher but I give the son some credit for consistently pushing this position for years. (IIRC, correctly, he also has no sympathy for compatibalism, and is an old-fashioned hard determinist.
What do y’all think?
An excerpt:
Every day, it seems, some verifiably intelligent person tells us that we don’t know what consciousness is. The nature of consciousness, they say, is an awesome mystery. It’s the ultimate hard problem. The current Wikipedia entry is typical: Consciousness “is the most mysterious aspect of our lives”; philosophers “have struggled to comprehend the nature of consciousness.”
I find this odd because we know exactly what consciousness is — where by “consciousness” I mean what most people mean in this debate: experience of any kind whatever. It’s the most familiar thing there is, whether it’s experience of emotion, pain, understanding what someone is saying, seeing, hearing, touching, tasting or feeling. It is in fact the only thing in the universe whose ultimate intrinsic nature we can claim to know. It is utterly unmysterious.
(Edited by Neil Rickert, to avoid possible copyright problems).
I expect you won’t be surprised to hear that I disagree with Shallit on this.
No you’re not. You’ve already admitted that you recognize that there are dead and living people. Those are the bodies.
There are lots of physical differences: respiration, Kreb’s cycle, vascular contraction, neurotransmitter response to stimuli, blinking, sodium/potassium ion exchange across mylan, etc, etc, etc. Literally thousands of physical “things” occur within a living body that do not when the body is dead.
See above. Where’s your issue?
Count me in on this.
The closest we’ve come conceptually to modelling a brain is Thompson’s Tone Discriminator. I probably sonud a bit cranky on this, but I’d be happy to defend it.l
Something I’d like to understand (and Petrushka’s comment concerning taking care of a family member made me think of this) is how people who believe in things like souls (or anything beyond brain activity establishing consciousness) explain or conceptualize something like Alzheimer’s Disease. Is it thought of as a situation like a cloud-storage situation wherein there’s a “complete consciousness” out there (somewhere), but the receiver/operation device is broken or is the soul deteriorating and thus one’s memories come into the body spotty? Or is this just not something anyone holding such beliefs even considers?
Shallit’s playing the false dilemma there. Epstein says, rather ridiculously:
Of course we’re born with some information, data, rules (under a broader definition), and memories, and we could argue endlessly and pointlessly over a whole lot of the rest. So what? That some versions of at least some of that list do exist in the neonate’s brain doesn’t make the brain a computer. I can imagine that one could make the definition of “computer” broad enough to include brains, for that matter (the first “computers” were indeed humans who did many computations as their jobs, after all), but that would hardly make the human brain more than only remotely similar to human-designed computers.
To call the brain a computer–unless you’re using a meaninglessly broad definition for “computer”–is to do something similar to what the IDists do. The latter find some similarity between a designed object and something in life (DNA and software, for instance), then conclude that because there is some similarity that both must have been designed, since we know that one of them was. The human-brain-is-a-computer folk find some similarities between the brain and the computer, then conclude that because there are some similarities that both are computers, because one of them is. It’s extremely sloppy thinking when IDists do it, and also when anyone calling the brain a computer does it.
Don’t do that.
Glen Davidson
I’ve seen this argument. Sometimes someone wakes from a coma and claims to have seen and heard everything while unable to communicate.
We can test for consciousness now.
In the case of my uncle, he was quite communicative and rational. He also formed memories during the day and could understand the concept of having been sick and having lost memories. But the next day he would have to start over.
I’m serious when I say I would like Erik and Charlie to experience this first hand. they really need to have their faces rubbed in reality. Their comments are extraordinarily hurtful.
Yep. Argument by Spurious Similarity (a form of Bad Analogy). The IDist’s stock and trade.
Yeah, my father-in-law has Alzheimer’s. It’s a horrible thing to watch.
I will say I’m fascinated by some oddities/unexpected issues about it though. For instance, for some reason he remembers me (and things we’ve done together) in some amazing detail for good chunks of the time, though I’ve only been a part of the family briefly, and haven’t even been around that much (we live a good distance apart.) Yet much of his knowledge of his immediate family – some who he is with daily – is gone. I believe that indicates something about how we store memories, but I can’t come up with what it indicates.
The other thing about the condition that puzzles me is how he can “be here” (that is, seem completely in the here and now and fully aware of who he is, what’s going on, and who’s around him) for some period of time and then in the next moment have very little awareness of the now at all. But then he will suddenly “be here” again some time later. Is the brain trying to repair connections or make new ones? I’ve no idea, but I’d like to understand that.
The similarity is real, but a problem arises when you try to argue that some feature of computers and computation necessarily constrains what brains can do.
there is also a problem if you are trying to design an artificial intelligence application by modelling human language behavior and human modes of reasoning.
I’m pretty sure that self driving cars and other successful applications of AI are at least partially evolved, rather than programmed. Yes, the substrate is designed and programmed, but the specific skills are learned.
BruceS,
Thank you for that response by Shallit. (Here’s the Aeon article by Epstein that Shallit is responding to.)
Unsurprisingly, I think that Shallit and Epstein are both right (and wrong). Epstein is right to stress that the computational theory of mind (CTM) runs into serious problems when we use it to explain skillful navigation of an environment. Dreyfus’s old critique of AI is not entirely irrelevant, and Rodney Brooks’s adage, “the world is its own best model” is still a good guide for robotics. The right place to begin in building a theory of cognition is perception and action, not how humans do mathematics. In those key respects Epstein is closer to the truth than Shallit.
However, I think Epstein overstates his case quite badly. For one thing, he overlooks criticisms of Anthony Chemero to the effect that no cognitive system can display flexible, adaptive responses to the world without having action-guided representations. Michael Wheeler in particular has pressed this argument, and I find it wholly convincing. And Andy Clark, like Jakob Hohwy, has developed a predictive brain hypothesis that shows how powerful neurocomputationalism can be when we use computational theory to explain how organisms can skilfully navigate their environments.
In short, the embodied mind approach and the computational approach are not at odds. Instead we can think in terms of embodiment and embeddedness when it comes to characterizing cognitive processes, and then use computationalism to explain those processes. This is basically the strategy developed by Michael Wheeler, Andy Clark, and Mark Rowlands — in contrast both to hardcore antirepresentationalism like Chemero’s and Epstein’s and to hardcore computationalism like Fodor’s and Shallit’s.
CharlieM,
Yes, I’m well-aware of Talbott’s work. I’ve been in correspondence with him for a few years. He makes a strong case for emergentism, which conflicts slightly with my distinct preference for a purely immanent ontology a la Spinoza. There’s nothing at all in his bio-philosophy which points towards the Neoplatonic emanationist biology of Goethe and Steiner. (Which is to say, if Talbott is an emanationist, I’ve been completely misreading him for years!) Nor does emergentism offer any aid and comfort to the thesis that we should posit the existence of “immaterial entities” to explain cellular function.
Piccinini agrees overall with this assessment of computation and the brain, although I am not sure what he thinks about embodiment. He provides a different perspective; one from the standpoint of what physical computation is compared to abstract computation, and what neuroscience tells us about what computation could be occurring in the brain.
He also has some things to say about CTM (that it is the wrong way to think about computation), about information processing (that it depends on which definition of information you are using), about whether the brain does digital or analog computation (he thinks neither: neural processing is sui generis computation according a recent paper at his site).
I am not surprised. Maybe he will notice the post and contribute. Then you two can show us how mathematicians have a completely reason-based, civilized fight.
Earlier in the thread, you mentioned that you thought Thermodynamics was incompatible with QM and GR. I was wondering why you thought this.
I understand that GR and QM are time-symmetric and so we have to posit a low-entropy state for the big bang to explain the fact that entropy increases only for increasing time. Is that what you were thinking of? I don’t know if I would call that an incompatibility as much as something currently not fully explained.
Or did you have something else in mind?
I’m not aware that there is an explanatory theory for thermodynamics.
It’s just a formalized observation.
If I am allowed to add my version of a suppressed premise to your post, I think it is fair to say that is the second example of the masked-man fallacy in this thread.
(See Walto on Descartes’s doubts for the first).
I had in mind different theories of time. GR seems to imply a “block universe”: past, present, and future are equally real because the universe is a four-dimensional object. Thermodynamics seems to imply a “growing block universe” in which the future does not, in any sense, exist — though past and present due.
I’ll just slink back to the Enquirer, my usual reading. 🙂
Nothing personal in my post of course; I never let (my) bad philosophy stand in the way of my bad jokes..
OK. But maybe if we anchor all the paths at both ends, with low entropy at one end a given, it still works. Something very roughly similar here:
To Understand Your Past, Look to Your Future
It talks about that GR picture you mention and how the Langragian formulation of physics fits it better than the Newtonian formulation. However, it does so in the service of QM, not thermodynamics.
k
Mostly it’s the last one – people rarely think these things through with consistency. This applies both to theists and atheists.
The problem in question is the mind-body interaction problem. The way I would explain it, the connection between the mind and body is that which makes the body alive, but there is no necessary, direct, and complete connection. The connection is always indirect* and when it’s also incomplete, then various mental maladies manifest – inattention, misperception, hallucinations.
* Indirect connection between mind and body enables self-reflection, i.e. enables a human being to be properly human, different from an animal. When one identifies oneself with the body and with instincts grounded in the body, one is closer to an animal than to a human.
Incidentally, I have taken care myself of a family member with Alzheimer’s, so if my views come across as ignorant insults to you, then rest assured – you come across precisely the same way.
Looks like your patient was able to form memories and grow in rationality during the day, but had to start from square one next day, i.e. the mental growth was lost during night. In the case of my patient, the personality got stuck to a specific event decades ago and everything around the person was viewed from that limited perspective. The specific event involved staying at a spa with some other guests and a nurse, no family. Consequently, the one who was in closest contact, feeding and washing the patient every day, was assigned the label “nurse” while most others were viewed as “guests”. There was no recognition of family members. Occasionally there were too many “guests” which made the patient uncomfortable and occasionally there was brief realization of the real situation, comprehension of one’s own far-advanced senility, which was traumatic both to the patient and to the observers.
To me it’s ludicrous to suggest that this is merely to do with degeneration of the brain. If it were, then the illness should be easy to fix by splashing some hormone on the brain or by sticking electrodes in it. Rather, the phenomenon is similar in nature to what often occurs during night – forget who one was and identify oneself with other situations and bodies in dreams. Dreaming and daydreaming is not pathological per se. It gets pathological when you get stuck in it, when you lose the ability to snap out of it, to switch perspective as the social situation demands.
The change of perspective, retention of memory, detachment and attachment to emotions, etc. is done by one’s own will and consciousness, not by sticking pinchers in the brain. Admittedly you can achieve some similar effects by electrodes and chemicals in the brain, but when you do that, that’s pathological on another level. And when you do that, you cannot claim absolute control of the person’s mind. If you think you can, feel free to experiment, become the puppet master of a person’s mind and see if she will have no recognition of being puppeteered. If she has this recognition, then how do you explain it? My explanation is that even when you control the brain completely, you still don’t control the mind completely, because these two are distinct. I guess your answer to this is “We don’t know enough to be sure right now, but soon it will be proven that it’s physical all the way down.” Just like a true believer.
Of course not, chemistry is a physical science, and so concerns the physical side of things. But there is more to life than chemistry. Take for instance your breathing. You can go about your everyday business without even thinking about it, it need not enter your consciousness. On the other hand you can consciously take control of and regulate your breathing. The chemistry between the respirotory gases and your circulatory system is the same in both cases but the activity of your will is not.
If you can invent a radio that will continue to function indefinitely without human intervention then you will be a very rich person. Physical forces alone can explain why the materials that makes up the radio will return to their natural state. For example ferrous components will oxidise. But it takes more than physical forces, it takes intelligence, to ensure that a radio will remain as a functional unit.
I would not wish to have any association whatever with scientology.
We are both aiming at an explanation of life which satisfies us. There are two poles, matter and consciousness. You have faith in matter being primal and I have faith in consciousness being primal. We disagree, but I respect that you have reasons for your belief and I am happy to listen to any argument against my position so long as they are presented in a civil manner. Just because people hold different views they need not bear any animosity towards each other. In fact I’m sure we can learn from each other.
You no virually nothing about me and yet you feel that you can judge me.
We can all be educated by those who society deems as less normal than the majority (whatever normality is).
We can all be educated by those who society deems as less normal than the majority (whatever normality is).
Can you let me know which of my comments you find offensive. I can assure you that its not my intention to hurt anyone. All I can suggest is that you ignore my posts in future.
It doesn’t really bother me whether Talbott is labelled an emergentist, an emanationist or whatever. It is the arguments he puts forth in his writings that I am interested in.
And I’m happy with the fact that cellular function can be explained in material terms. But I do not agree that this encompasses the whole story of living substance. I regard thoughts as immaterial and my example of breathing in a recent post demonstrates a difference not accounted for by purely material forces
Mostly I find your posts boring.
I do not attribute to you any intention to offend.
I am offended by the radio brain paradigm. It sounds all theoretical or philosophical until you have someone close to you suffer brain damage. Then it gets real personal.
You at least need to be aware that saying uninformed things about handicapped people can be taken personally.
No, it doesn’t demonstrate anything, other than your omnipresent question begging. We already knew we can breathe consciously. You equate consciousness with immaterial. All you are doing is assuming your conclusion
It was OMagain who brought up the comparison of a brain and a radio, and the next comment about radios was by you. I was just giving my thought on your question. If you did not want a response why ask the question?
I see nothing but the flimsiest connection when comparing human brains and radios.
You brought the subject of handicapped people. What uninformed things do you think I have said about them? As far as I can recall I have said nothing about handicapped people.
So what would you say the difference, if any, is between breathing as a conscious process and everyday breathing?
Degree of cortical control, versus control originating in the brainstem.
So what instigates the conscious cortical control?
And what instigates what instigates the conscious cortical control? Turtles all the way down of course. You’re obsessed with entities because you think the “soul” is the entity behind consciousness, don’t you?. Why not study the processes involved in brain activity instead of giving up entirely by positing the ultimate non-explanation?
Perceptions, usually.
Glen Davidson
I would like to ask Charlie if cats and dogs are conscious.
You first 🙂
And what if you decide to control your breath just for the fun of it? Where are the perceptions in that case?
The voluntary component of breathing is no different than any other voluntary behavior. Indeed, it is less voluntary than most other voluntary behaviors (try refraining from breathing for five minutes. It’s not really up to you, after all).
If you believe a detachable ghost is required for voluntary behavior generally, then you’re going to insist on one for the voluntary component of breathing.
Unfortunately, detachable ghosts don’t really explain anything.
Of course they are. Pullf a cat’s tail if you want to test its consciousness.
Where are your perceptions when you skip qualifiers and set up a strawman?
Glen Davidson
I agree that detachable ghosts don’t explain anything. Likewise chemical activity in the brain doesn’t really explain the difference between conscious and automatic breathing.
The fact that we can only control our breathing within certain limits only tells us that we are limited beings But who would argue with that?
It was your qualifier that evaded the question. If you decide to control your breathing without any perceptions prompting you to do so, what do you think is it that has actually instigated the process?
The “andys” in Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep can hold their breath until they die, because they don’t have vagus nerves.
I gave you a good answer that quite demonstrably covers a lot of situations, you gave me nothing that explained anything at all and asked that I explain more, as if explaining everything is my task and tiresome questions and no explanations are your task.
You provide something for once, other than your incredulity. It gets old.
Glen Davidson
What do you think does?
Why do you ask when the answer is in the very post you quoted? It’s turtles all the way down!
The answer is quite simple. Its not a trick question. Your I, your ego, your rational thinking self is the source of your conscious breathing.
So what? The question is if that “ego”, “consciousness” or “rational thinking” is a physical process. We know of tons of connections between those things and physical aspects of our bodies. What is “immaterial” anyway?
Do they have immaterial consciousness? Seriously.
I ask because there seems to be wide differences of opinion as to whether non-human animals have souls, or whatever it is that isn’t material.