Why the NDE/ID Debate Is Really (For Most) A Proxy Fight

To define:

NDE (Neo-Darwinian Evolution) = OOL & evolution without prescriptive goals, both being nothing more in essence than functions of material forces & interactions.

ID (Intelligent Design) = Deliberate OOL & evolution with prescriptive goals

(I included OOL because if OOL contains purposefully written code that provides guidelines for evolutionary processes towards goals, then evolutionary processes are not neo-Darwinian as they utilize oracle information).

I’m not an evolutionary biologist, nor am I a mathematician. Therefore, when I argue about NDE and ID, the only cases I attempt to make are logical ones based on principles involved because – frankly – I lack the educational, application & research expertise to legitimately parse, understand and criticize most papers published in those fields. I suggest that most people who engage in NDE/ID arguments (on either side) similarly lack the necessary expertise to evaluate (or conduct) such research on their own.

Further, even if they had some related expertise that makes them qualified, to some degree, to successfully parse such papers, as has been brought up in this forum repeatedly is the lack of confidence in the peer-review process as a safeguard against bad science or bad math, or even fraudulent and sloppy science. A brief search on google or bing for scientific fraud and peer review process will find all sorts of studies about a growing epidemic of bad citations – citations that reference recalled, recanted, fraudulent or disproven research.

So, for the majority of us who are not conducting active research in evolutionary biology, nor are mathematicians or information theorists, what are we really saying if we assert that “evolution has been proven by countless papers”, or “ID is necessary to the formation of DNA”? When one of us claims that Dembski’s work has been “disproven”, or that Douglas Axe has proven something about functional protein probabilities, what does it mean when we (those whom I am referring to in this post) have no personal capacity to legitimately reach that conclusion via our own personal understanding of the math or the research fields/data involved?

All we can be doing is rhetorical characterizing and cheerleading. We argue as if we understand the research or the math, but in fact (for many of us) we don’t, and even if we did, unless we are doing that research, we cannot have that much confidence in the peer-review process. All we can do (outside of arguments using logic and principle) is quote abstracts and conclusions or other people we believe to be qualified (and honest) experts about data and research we don’t really understand and which may or may not be valid.  This is really nothing more than just cherry-picking convenient abstracts and conclusions and assuming the peer-review process worked for that particular paper.

Therefore, the NDE/ID argument for most people has nothing to do with (and, in fact, cannot have anything to do with) valid and informed interpretations of biological data or an understanding of the math involved in information theory as it is applied to evolutionary processes – even if they believe that to be the case. Logically, if we admit we are not really personally capable of qualitatively examining and reaching valid conclusions of research that we would somehow vet as valid research, we must admit all we are really doing is choosing to believe something, and then erecting post hoc arguments in an attempt to characterize our choice of belief as something derived from a legitimate, sound understanding of the facts (biological & mathematical) involved.

This means that for most of us, the NDE/ID argument is really a proxy argument that belies the real argument, or the reason we have chosen NDE or ID to believe in the first place. IMO, that “reason” is a disagreement of ontological worldviews, and I think that the two general worldviews that are in conflict which are fighting a proxy battle through the NDE/ID debate are:

1) Humans are deliberately generated entities that exist for a purpose;

2) Humans are not deliberately generated entities that exist for a purpose.

Now, I don’t claim those general worldviews cover every foundational motive or position in the NDE/ID debate. But, I think it is logically clear that most of us must be presenting what can only be rhetorical cheerleading in an attempt to construct post hoc rationalizations for our choice of belief (combined with attempts to make the other “side” feel bad about their position via various character smearing, motive-mongering, name-calling, belittling their referenced papers and experts, and other such invective, and so we must have chosen our belief for some other reason, and IMO the two categories above represent the two basic (and pretty much necessary) consequences of NDE/ID beliefs.

So, to simplify: for whatever psychological reasons, people either want or need to believe that humans are deliberately generated beings that exist for a purpose, or they wish or need to believe the contrary, which leads them to an emotional/intuitive acceptance of ID or NDE, which they then attempt to rationalize post hoc by offering statements structured to make it appear (1) as if they have a valid, legitimate understanding of things they really do not; (2) that they have real science on their side; (3) that experts agree with them (when, really, they are just cheerleading convenient experts), and (4) that it is stupid, ignorant, or wicked to not accept their side as true.

523 thoughts on “Why the NDE/ID Debate Is Really (For Most) A Proxy Fight

  1. William J. Murray: So why should anybody else care?
    Who said anyone else should care?

    Good!

    Then you agree that this thread is pointless?

    Or maybe it is all about you, and that is why you wanted it so badly?

  2. William J. Murray:
    Flint,

    I wanted to believe in ID, so I did so.I wanted to believe in libertarian free will, god, etc. So, I did so. It’s not random; it’s what I wanted to believe. I prefer having those beliefs to not having them.

    So, emotional preference. Hopefully, you understand that others evaluate ID using different yardsticks.

  3. William J. Murray: Who said anyone else should care?

    Well, you sort of implied that using logic you could arrive at an objective morality, to which, I rather assumed, you would like us all to have access.

    I’m very surprised at the turn this discussion has taken! I cannot connect what you have been saying recently with your earlier statements.

  4. William J. Murray:
    Flint,

    I wanted to believe in ID, so I did so.I wanted to believe in libertarian free will, god, etc. So, I did so. It’s not random; it’s what I wanted to believe. I prefer having those beliefs to not having them.

    Cool. My objection to ID is to the ID claim that we can infer an ID from the evidence; specifically from the observations of patterns that indicate Intelligent Design.

    I don’t think we can – as I’ve said, I find that claim fallacious. It sounds as though, for different reasons, you do too, which is interesting.

  5. I am not particularly surprised at the turn. When someone is more interested in logical deduction than in the validity of axioms, you can anticipate some eccentric premices.

    I will be surprised if I continue paying attention to WJ.

  6. Elizabeth: Cool.My objection to ID is to the ID claim that we can infer an ID from the evidence; specifically from the observations of patterns that indicate Intelligent Design.

    I don’t think we can – as I’ve said, I find that claim fallacious.It sounds as though, for different reasons, you do too, which is interesting.

    ID claims that if we observe a pattern we should at least be able to check into what caused it. And if it is demonstrated that matter, energy, necessity and chance can explain it, then cool, at least we know.

    But if it can’t then we should be able to at least consider the design inference and its ramifications.

  7. William J Murray,

    Why even put together an argument if you have already decided on a conclusion beforehand?

    I

  8. petrushka:
    I am not particularly surprised at the turn. When someone is more interested in logical deduction than in the validity of axioms, you can anticipate some eccentric premices.

    I will be surprised if I continue paying attention to WJ.

    What a strange comment! My experience (and my reading of WJM) is that theological axioms are of absolutely critical interest. In ID discussions generally, I think, the theological foundation of these critical axioms must necessarily be de-emphasized or even evaded, often creatively, so that ID can be misrepresented as scientific. And that strategy often takes the form of waving and trumpeting logical deduction to divert attention away from the theological nature of the axioms.

    But hey, the whole point of ID, it’s raison d’etre, is exactly that – to blur the line between empirical knowledge (“just another worldview”) and supernatural knowledge (“just as scientific as physics”). And so we keep reading that biology is religion, but on the other hand creationism is science!

    (And I have doubts about the extent to which people really can “choose” theological views and beliefs. I think there is some scope for choice there, but the scope is generally narrower than the “chooser” is comfortable recognizing.)

  9. Elizabeth: Well, no.Not according to the UD FAQ, anyway, or to Dembski.The claim made there is that if a pattern is more improbable under some ill-specified null than “500 bits” (or sometimes a different threshold), that we must reject non-design.

    This approach verges on exasperating, know what I mean? Dembski very clearly starts out assuming goddidit, and that assumption never budges. NOW, how can he show that goddidit? For Joe G, this is easy – simply deny that normal physics and chemistry, along with adaptive feedback processes, are capable of doing what they do. If we simply DENY that all demonstrations of this demonstrate anything, then bingo, problem solved, goddidit.

    Dembski is one step more sophisticated – he attempts to quantify (albeit generally too vaguely) that goddidit by gaming his assumptions accordingly. But surely you would’t expect Dembski to look at all your AVIDA runs, all your Matlab results, and say “By golly, you’re right, god DIDN’T do it!” That level of honesty from a hardcore creationist is about the only thing that would be miraculous enough to cause me to start wondering about gods.

    But behind all of the custom terminology and scientistical-looking math, Dembski REALLY IS saying the same thing as Joe G – that goddidit, therefore evolution didn’t, therefore observations showing evolution does do it are wrong and empirical approaches are purely subjective and magic is science and whatever else might ratify (and even draw converts to) foregone conclusions.

  10. Flint,

    Well, I think that Dembski considers that the evidence independently points to his theological position. Or rather that the math does.

    But his theological position would hold perfectly well, even if his math failed (as indeed it does). So I do think the two things are independent. What doesn’t seem to be independent are the reluctance to re-examine the math and the conviction that non-IDists are theologically unsound.

  11. Elizabeth:
    Flint,

    Well, I think that Dembski considers that the evidence independently points to his theological position.Or rather that the math does.

    I agree. Few creationists are, like Kurt Wise, honest enough to admit that evidence against them may be overwhelming, but so what? And hopefully, you agree that Dembski very very carefully positions both his evidence and his math to support his assumptions.

    But his theological position would hold perfectly well, even if his math failed (as indeed it does).

    What do you mean by “hold”? I agree with Dawkins that there is no sensible limit to what the human mind is capable of believing, against any amount of contradictory evidence. But his math fails for theological reasons.

    So I do think the two things are independent.What doesn’t seem to be independent are the reluctance to re-examine the math and the conviction that non-IDists are theologically unsound.

    How do you propose that the math be re-examined? OK, it was supposed to render his theological convictions unassailable and it didn’t. Presumably his “solution” would be to rejigger his math rather than question his theology.

    As I see it, non-IDists ARE theological unsound according to Dembski’s theology. His particular mental coin has two sides, his and wrong, theologically speaking. But as I said on your communication thread, those of a scientific orientation are no more likely to accept poofism as an “explanation” for anything, than theists are likely to set aside their gods as imaginary and irrelevant. People like Dembski have such a virulent case of religion that even ordinary mundane physical processes cannot be permitted to happen without his god’s active intervention.

    I think people like Joe G understand this instinctively.

  12. Elizabeth: I don’t think we can – as I’ve said, I find that claim fallacious. It sounds as though, for different reasons, you do too, which is interesting.

    No, I don’t. Because I choose to believe something doesn’t mean it cannot be supported by evidence and/or argument.

  13. Well, you sort of implied that using logic you could arrive at an objective morality, to which, I rather assumed, you would like us all to have access.

    That may be what you inferred, but what I actually implied is apparently outside of the scope of your capacity to see. Like gravity, we all have access to the objective good, and if we have free will, the capacity to act on it, whether we recognize it for what it is or not. My argument about morality was strictly a logical exercise about what our assumption must logically mean.

    Even though the proposition “it is always wrong to torture infants for personal pleasure”, if accepted, necessarily leads to certain conclusions about what premises must exist in order for that statement to be sound and valid, you are unable to accept this. Subjective good, subjective right and wrong necessarily means that a thing is not always good or right or wrong. If we hold that the statement is always true in every situation, then good (in the moral sense) cannot be held as a subjective commodity, and one cannot rationally believe that both the statement is true and good is subjective.

    It demonstrates the hole in your sight, the a priori (and unconscious) desire to have your cake and eat it too in matters of morality, which I find interesting.

    I’m very surprised at the turn this discussion has taken! I cannot connect what you have been saying recently with your earlier statements.

    Because I inhabit a “middle’ that is “excluded” from your vantage point, as I say things you attempt to organize them according to your a priori categories. Since what I say cannot be properly organized that way, some of it seems to fall one way, and some of it falls in apparent contradiction, and still other things seem utterly unrelated.

    It’s nothing new to me.

  14. William J Murray: “No, I don’t. Because I choose to believe something doesn’t mean it cannot be supported by evidence and/or argument.”

    But there’s no need to now in the eyes of others.

    You’ve proved that you can accept a conclusion without requiring the use of logic or reason.

    Why should they get there with logic when you didn’t have to?

  15. Why should they get there with logic when you didn’t have to?

    I didn’t say they should. Whether or not they want to defend their views is entirely up to them. I’ll defend my beliefs as best I can when challenged. Most of what I believe is sound and valid from a logical perspective, but that isn’t why I adopted those beliefs.

  16. Even though the proposition “it is always wrong to torture infants for personal pleasure”, if accepted, necessarily leads to certain conclusions about what premises must exist in order for that statement to be sound and valid, you are unable to accept this.

    Perhaps because this position is not presented very well?

    Subjective good, subjective right and wrong necessarily means that a thing is not always good or right or wrong.

    No, it doesn’t mean that at all. It means that whether something is right or wrong is subjective. Even if all people agree under all circumstances, it is still subjective.

    If we hold that the statement is always true in every situation, then good (in the moral sense) cannot be held as a subjective commodity

    Wait, you have suddenly substituted “true” for “right”, and these are very different concepts. One is a matter of reality, the other is a matter of protocol. “Good” in a moral sense means that everyone accepts the same protocol. But universal acceptance of a moral value doesn’t make that value “true”, it makes it RIGHT, within the scope of that acceptance.

    and one cannot rationally believe that both the statement is true and good is subjective.

    UNLESS one thinks about what one is saying, that is. Universal agreement is a wonderful thing, it greases the process of social intercourse, facilitates a gregarious lifestyle, reduces the incidence of disagreement and other frictions. And if these are regarded as desirable goals, than agreements on them are Good Things. But no less subjective.

    Moral behavior within a pack of dogs is very different from moral behavior for an isolated cat. And either behavior would be IMmoral in the other’s context. So both are subjective, EVEN THOUGH every individual animal follows them instinctively and without variation.

    It’s nothing new to me.

    If you equate moral agreement with Absolute Truth, it’s no wonder you run into these problems a lot. But the blind spot is not in the eyes of anyone else.

    And I might suggest that the delusion of Absolute Moral Right is insidious, because it’s easy to use as a rationalization for imposing personal preference or ideology onto others. Near-universal agreement is a worthy goal, but it should be clear that the path to agreement isn’t the same as the path to “Objective Right” – something invariably possessed by those self-convinced they have it.

  17. William J. Murray: No.

    You were asked why you believed in ID. You responded that you chose to because you WANTED to. You explicitly denied that it was for any external, empirical or scientific reason. It was because you WANTED to, and because you FEEL COMFORTABLE with such a belief.

    This is emotional preference, as bald as it gets. Now you deny it. Odd.

  18. William J. Murray: Elizabeth: I don’t think we can – as I’ve said, I find that claim fallacious. It sounds as though, for different reasons, you do too, which is interesting.
    No, I don’t. Because I choose to believe something doesn’t mean it cannot be supported by evidence and/or argument.

    But then, according to your rules, we can CHOOSE to reject all your “evidence” and “arguments,” and you would have no legitimate right to complain if we do. Therefore there is no point to any discussion or to any presentation of evidence. So who are you attempting to convince?

    This appears to be another instance of the “freshman philosopher syndrome” in which young college-aged students start blowing their own minds when encountering existentialist ideas for the first time.

    Their “intellectual” contortions degenerate into an infinite regress of giggling over the profundity of their own giggles.

    No doubt there is a little pot involved as well.

    Most people who care about communicating ideas to others have something like a “built-in empathy” that identifies with the person receiving the ideas.

    In that regard, such a person attempts to place a very high value on conveying ideas as accurately as possible with the minimum of words and obfuscation. For such a person, communicating with clarity is considered a virtue.

    On the other hand, there are pontificators who seem to want to appear to be mysterious Zen masters who look down their noses and the “ants” before them while speaking in koans. Kids first discovering ambiguities in words sometimes like to do this.

    Most kids soon realize that getting on with life requires communication.

    Your entire approach, however, appears to be to generate as many words devoid of meaning as possible.

  19. William J Murray: “That may be what you inferred, but what I actually implied is apparently outside of the scope of your capacity to see. ”

    So we’re too dumb to understand reasoning we don’t need to begin with?

    Do you think BarryA and StephenB also don’t need the Rules Of Right Reason for their position on ID?

  20. William J. Murray:

    If you mean that I have the moral authority to attempt to contravene their will if I can in appropriate situations [presumably situations that WJM believes to have self-evident moral answers, but either way it is clearly WJM deciding what an appropriate situation is], then yes, I have moral authority “over” them.

    Of course that’s what I mean, what else would I mean?

    Definition of authority:
    – power or right to give orders, make decisions, and enforce obedience.
    – right to act in a specified way, delegated from one person or organization to another.
    – power or right to direct or control someone or something.

    Clearly, the moral authority you claim is not compatible with this statement:

    When people fundamentally disagree about anything, nothing is going to “solve” the problem.

    …. because you just suggested that you will solve the problem by trying to enforce your view.

  21. William J. Murray: Like gravity, we all have access to the objective good, and if we have free will, the capacity to act on it, whether we recognize it for what it is or not.

    Is this a claim that you would care to back up with evidence, or did you just forget to put *according to my assumptions / beliefs…* in front of that sentence?

  22. … we’ve been over this before, but it bears repeating that the moral authority you claim is also incompatible with your recognition that your judgement of what is morally right and wrong may be faulty.

  23. William J. Murray: Most of what I believe is sound and valid from a logical perspective, but that isn’t why I adopted those beliefs.

    Yeah, well, I disagree, as you know. But of course what matters to you is that you *believe* that your beliefs are logically sound and valid. So, pop the champagne!

  24. I’m not really sure what I’ve learned here. Is ID a proxy fight? Perhaps for William, but his views are so esoteric that I doubt ID would want to claim them. William clearly has his own very special lens, but can’t anchor it to anything concrete or usable (for me). I’m not really able to share in where he’s coming from, because it doesn’t seem very shareable. Gripes with materialism surface in venues like these from time to time. Maybe there is something more – but I doubt we have epistemic access. I wonder if the ‘more to existence than materialism’ guys ever try to teleport or work or levitate their cornflakes. That would seem a coherent endeavour for them. “I’ve chosen to be this way and it works for me” isn’t really a common language. Good faith prohibits us from doubting William’s intentions but honest request for specifics have been given drive-by non-clarifications. William, honestly, what are you trying to achieve?

  25. Even though the proposition “it is always wrong to torture infants for personal pleasure”, if accepted, necessarily leads to certain conclusions about what premises must exist in order for that statement to be sound and valid, you are unable to accept this.

    It seems somehow odd to derive premises from conclusions. Maybe it’s just me.

  26. No, it doesn’t mean that at all. It means that whether something is right or wrong is subjective. Even if all people agree under all circumstances, it is still subjective.

    You apparently don’t understand the proposition. The proposition accepted by Elizabeth and I is that it is wrong even for the person that considers it right. If we accept that it is wrong even for the person who considers it right, then what we are necessarily describing is an objective wrong – and thus, and objective good.

    Universal agreement is a wonderful thing

    If you had followed the argument in context you would realize we were not talking about universal agreement, and I wouldn’t be here submitting another round of “no, that’s not what I said” or “no, you misunderstand” or “no, you’re taking it out of context”.

  27. Clearly, the moral authority you claim is not compatible with this statement:

    The problem I was referring to was the fact that two people disagree on what is good, not the problem of the person torturing the child.

  28. It seems somehow odd to derive premises from conclusions. Maybe it’s just me.

    When you being with an agreed proposition, that agree proposition is not necessarily a fundamental principle. By reasoning forwards and backwards from the proposition one can reach both necessary conclusions from and premises for the proposition in question.

  29. Mike:

    It may be pointless from your perspective. If so, I suggest you stop contributing.

  30. But the blind spot is not in the eyes of anyone else.

    Now that was priceless.

  31. But then, according to your rules, we can CHOOSE to reject all your “evidence” and “arguments,” and you would have no legitimate right to complain if we do.

    Once again, if you read my arguments here through I make it very plain that people are certainly free to believe whatever they wish regardless of it is logically supportable or not. I don’t think I’ve “complained” in any sense of the word here; I’ve presented what are calm, respectful arguments and debate.

    Therefore there is no point to any discussion or to any presentation of evidence. So who are you attempting to convince?

    I’m not trying to convince anyone of anything, as I’ve already said. In my arguments, I generally challenge whether or not their beliefs hold up to logical scrutiny; if they don’t care if their beliefs hold up to logical scrutiny, they are certainly free to say so or simply not participate in the challenge.

    The rest of your post is just a personal attack.

  32. Is this a claim that you would care to back up with evidence, or did you just forget to put *according to my assumptions / beliefs…* in front of that sentence?

    As I’ve told you before, I don’t make evidential arguments, I make logical ones. And now, perhaps the reason for that has clarified somewhat; I consider logic one of the few objective commodities that is universal to all experiential channels.

  33. William J. Murray: As I’ve told you before, I don’t make evidential arguments, I make logical ones.And now, perhaps the reason for that has clarified somewhat; I consider logic one of the few objective commodities that is universal to all experiential channels.

    But if the premises are not, then how does the universality of the logic help?

  34. Elizabeth: But if the premises are not, then how does the universality of the logic help?

    In any logical argument, you either agree with a premise (at least for the sake of the argument), or you do not.

  35. William J. Murray: In any logical argument, you either agree with a premise (at least for the sake of the argument), or you do not.

    Sure. But the key clause here is: “for the sake of the argument”. Your argument, if valid, remains contingent on your premises being true.

  36. Elizabeth: Sure. But the key clause here is: “for the sake of the argument”. Your argument, if valid, remains contingent on your premises being true.

    If you and I accept the premise as true, which we did in the case in question, what point are you trying to make?

  37. I don’t quite see how logic helps one to a useful worldview if the premises used to construct the logic are not supported by evidence.
    What use is a logical argument that begins with the premise”All cats have three tails”?

    I can’t help feeling, William, that whilst I sympathise with you in that your work seems to have a number of slow periods to be filled, that you’re just mucking about.

  38. I can’t help feeling, William, that whilst I sympathise with you in that your work seems to have a number of slow periods to be filled, that you’re just mucking about.

    Or, you could make a post that doesn’t carry with it an apparently obligatory negative personal characterization..

  39. I don’t quite see how logic helps one to a useful worldview if the premises used to construct the logic are not supported by evidence.

    Please directe me to the evidence that everything I (or you, or anyone) experiences is not a very detaled, solipsistic delusion.

  40. William J. Murray,

    I can’t help feeling, William, that whilst I sympathise with you in that your work seems to have a number of slow periods to be filled, that you’re just mucking about.

    Or, you could make a post that doesn’t carry with it an apparently obligatory negative personal characterization..

    Oh I have nothing against mucking about per se.

  41. William J. Murray:

    Please directe me to the evidence that everything I (or you, or anyone) experiences is not a very detaled, solipsistic delusion.

    Well, I can’t of course. But then I have no need of, or indeed time for, the proposition. I have briefly thought about it in the past, and concluded that living life as if it were reality is immensely satisfying and interesting.

  42. William J Murray: “Please directe me to the evidence that everything I (or you, or anyone) experiences is not a very detaled, solipsistic delusion.”

    1) If I was a brain in a vat, someone would have to maintain the tank, meaning while my existence might be a dream, the guy who cleans my tank must be real.

    2) If someone was a brain in a vat, the god he dreamed would not really exist, but if the god he imagined really did exist, then this would not be a dream and he would not be a brain in a vat.

  43. damitall said: “I don’t quite see how logic helps one to a useful worldview if the premises used to construct the logic are not supported by evidence.”

    I said: “Please direct me to the evidence that everything I (or you, or anyone) experiences is not a very detaled, solipsistic delusion.”

    damitall replied: “Well, I can’t of course. But then I have no need of, or indeed time for, the proposition. I have briefly thought about it in the past, and concluded that living life as if it were reality is immensely satisfying and interesting.”

    So a premise that is intrinsically immune to evidence (that we are living in a real, exterior world and not a solipsistic delusion) is useful to you in that it aids you in the experience of satisfaction and interest that extends from adopting that premise.

    Perhaps now you can “quite” see it.

  44. As Descartes pointed out, consciousness is real..

    Physics (currently) tells us our entire reality is equivalent to a hologram on the surface of some mathematical construct, but that doesn’t change reality. It doesn’t change our perception.

    My reality is that my foot hurts when I kick a large rock. Empiricism doesn’t tell us the TRVTH, but it tells us what is real. It makes neat things possible, like digital watches and vaccinations.

    As others have pointed out, the “Oh Wow” school of philosophy is fascinating in freshman dormitory, but gets old pretty fast. At least for some of us.

    It does sell books, though. I see them by the ton at garage sale, usually selling for 39 cents.

  45. So a premise that is intrinsically immune to evidence (that we are living in a real, exterior world and not a solipsistic delusion) is useful to you in that it aids you in the experience of satisfaction and interest that extends from adopting that premise.

    I don’t require any such premise about the reality of such a view. In fact my working premise about reality is that it could be seen as a static tapestry from some point of view. It makes no difference to how I feel or behave. It’s just an amusing diversion.

  46. No William. My premise about the reality in which I live is not” immune from evidence”. At this moment, and for decades past, the evidence I have supports the premise. I might in future be confronted by evidence against that premise – I genuinely strive to keep a reasonably open mind – but until that day comes, I have a worldview that is supported by the minute, hour and day, in my daily interactions with those things and people appearing to exist in the same reality.
    Except the sodding stock market, of course. (For the avoidance of doubt, that is an attempt at humour)
    I find it all satisfactory. If you find your ways of seeing things satisfactory, then good luck to you. I find it empty, hollow, vacuous.

  47. I said: “Please direct me to the evidence that everything I (or you, or anyone) experiences is not a very detaled, solipsistic delusion.”

    damitall said: “Well, I can’t of course. ”

    Then, damitall said: “At this moment, and for decades past, the evidence I have supports the premise.”

    So tell me, what is your evidence that what you have experienced all this time is not a detailed, solipsistic delusion?

  48. I don’t require any such premise about the reality of such a view.

    I agree. No view requires any consistent and coherent premises whatsoever, unless one is attempting to logically defend their worldview.

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