In a recent post, keiths criticizes Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will theodicy, which (very briefly) goes as follows:
…[S]ome of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this is the source of moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts neither against God’s omnipotence nor against his goodness: for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good.
(Plantinga, Alvin (1967). God and Other Minds. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Pages 166-167.)
Keiths responds:
Suppose God creates each person with free will, so that everything he or she does during life is freely chosen. If God is omniscient, he knows what all of those choices will be before the person is even created. If God simply chooses not to create the people who will go on to commit rape (or even experience the desire to commit rape), then he has prevented those things from happening without depriving anyone of their free will.
There are several things wrong with this reply.
What traditional Christians believe about human souls
First, according to traditional Christian theology, God doesn’t create each person. Rather, God creates each person’s soul, which is spiritual and immortal, and which animates that person’s body. The only human persons created by God were those whose bodies were formed by God – i.e. Adam and Eve, according to the Biblical account.
Second, there are no inherent differences between individual human souls, as such. To say otherwise is tantamount to saying that there are different types of souls – which is what racists and sexists implicitly assume when they declare that people come in different types, and that some types are superior to others. The soul that God infused into me at my conception was in no way distinct from the one He infused into keiths, at his conception. Had there been any inherent differences between our souls at conception, then we would no longer be the same kind of being – namely, a human being. Individuals sharing the same kind of form are only distinguishable because they are composed of different matter. Hence the differences between human individuals are only made possible by the fact that they have distinct bodies. That doesn’t mean that the only differences between us are physical differences; rather, what it means is that human souls, per se, are not distinct from one another.
Third, souls do not pre-exist the bodies they animate; for if they did, then they could not be the forms of those bodies: at best, their mode of union with the body would be merely an external one, as in Cartesian dualism, which envisages the human soul as moving the body, whenever someone performs a voluntary movement, in a manner similar to the way in which a pilot moves the controls of an airplane. In fact, given that the soul is the form of the human body, we cannot speak of it being even logically (let alone temporally) prior to the body it animates. Even to speak of a soul as being “infused” into a body is a little misleading, as it conjures up the image of God inserting a soul which He has already made into a body which is waiting for it. The human soul is created by God simultaneously with the generation of the human body.
Thus it makes no sense to imagine that soul X, which God is about to create and “infuse” into Tom’s body at his conception, would choose to commit evil acts (such as acts of rape) under certain circumstances, whereas soul Y, which God is about to create and “infuse” into Sam’s body, would never choose to harm anyone. At conception, there is nothing to distinguish soul X from soul Y, apart from the fact that they inform different bodies.
Real me and possible me
Additionally, Keiths’s thought experiment assumes that it is meaningful to speak of God knowing what choices an uncreated person would make. Certainly, there have indeed been some theologians (notably, the Molinists in the sixteenth century) who would have agreed with keiths on this point. On the Molinist account, God’s knowledge of my free choices is not only temporally, but logically prior to my existence as a human being, and hence, logically prior to God’s act of creating my soul. To which I reply: it makes no sense to speak of what I would do in a given situation (e.g. what I would do if I were presented with an opportunity to steal), unless I actually exist in the first place. There is no “possible me,” waiting to be created; there is just “real me.”
Perhaps keiths might respond as follows. On the traditional Christian view, God made the first human beings: not just their souls but their bodies, as well. (This could still be the case even if their bodies were formed via an evolutionary process, provided that this evolution was God-guided: this would suffice to make God responsible for the formation of their bodies.) Now, let’s consider the first two human beings, Adam and Eve. (It makes no difference, for the purposes of this illustration, whether there were only two human beings in the beginning, as traditionally supposed, or more than 1,000, as human geneticists currently maintain.) Then if God is omniscient, presumably He must know everything that Adam and Eve will do – including which future sperm cells of Adam’s will fertilize which future ova of Eve’s. Since each human’s individuality is grounded in his/her body’s having been generated from this sperm cell and that ovum, then God, in creating Adam and Eve, automatically knows who their descendants will be. Moreover, He must know what each of these descendants will choose to do. All of this knowledge is available to God, simply by virtue of His deciding to create Adam and Eve. Thus it seems that God’s knowledge of my choices is logically prior to His act of creating my soul, after all.
Keiths might also urge that if God’s knowledge of my free choices is logically prior to His act of creating my soul, then there is no good reason why His knowledge of Adam and Eve’s free choices could not be logically prior to His decision to create them. That being the case, God could then compare different possible scenarios: He knows that if He creates Adam and Eve, then some of their descendants would turn out to be rapists; whereas if He creates possible individuals Albert and Elizabeth instead, then none of their descendants will be rapists. Thus God is perfectly able to prevent rape (or any other kind of sin), without violating human freedom, simply by choosing to create the right people in the first place.
The flaw in the above argument is that it assumes that God’s knowledge of our choices (and of Adam and Eve’s choices) is logically prior to those choices. I see absolutely no reason why a believer in Divine omniscience should make this assumption. On the Boethian view of Divine foreknowledge, for instance, God is like a watcher on a high hill: He timelessly knows everything that we choose to do, but His knowledge is logically subsequent to the choices we make. In other words, God is timelessly informed by His human creatures, because He freely and timelessly chooses to rely on His creatures for His knowledge of what they do. On this account, God’s knowledge of my choices is not automatically available to Him, simply by virtue of His deciding to create Adam and Eve; rather, it is derived from my choices themselves – choices which God knows about only because I make them.
What’s wrong with Molinism
Keiths may respond that I have not discredited Molinism; all I have shown is that it may not hold, as there is a rival account of Divine foreknowledge (the Boethian account) which preserves libertarian free will (which predestinationism does not). However, I would argue that if Molinism is true, people are no freer than they would be under Universal Predestination. For if (as Molinism maintains) it is true that for any choice that I actually make in a given situation, that was the choice I would have made in that situation, then there is no meaningful sense in which I could have chosen otherwise in that situation. The Molinist may reply that God does not cause my choice; but I would argue that in fact, by knowingly choosing to create a world, whose built-in specifications include the fact that I will make that choice, then He does in fact cause my choice. And if God, in choosing which possible world He should actualize, selects one in which He knows certain individuals will be damned because of decisions that they would make (including acts of rape), then God has already ensured the damnation of those individuals, simply by deciding to create that world. Consequently, if these people are damned for their bad choices in this world, then it seems to me that they are no more responsible for their own damnation than they would be if Universal Predestination were true.
Back to Boethius
What I am suggesting, then, is that if all (or most) human beings have libertarian free will, then God’s foreknowledge of their past, present and future choices must be logically subsequent to their making those choices. That means we must embrace either a Boethian account, in which God is timelessly made aware of our choices, or an omnitemporal account, in which God is not outside time but present at all points in space and time, and is thereby able to keep tabs on everything that happens in the cosmos.
And that brings me to my final criticism of keiths’s thought experiment: I would argue that it ascribes an exaggerated (and I would say, logically absurd) form of omniscience to God. There is no good theological reason why we should ascribe to God a knowledge not only of all of the choices that every actual individual would make, but also all of the choices that every possible individual would make. And there is no good reason why God’s knowledge of our choices should be logically prior to those choices.
I wrote a little essay exploring the difficulties associated with the rival explanations of Divine foreknowledge and human free will, back in 2008. Readers may view it here. In my essay, I discuss (and answer) several objections to the Boethian view.
Postscript
Before I conclude this post, I’d just like to make a few quick observations.
First, it turns out (oddly enough) that Plantinga himself is a Molinist. If I am right, then he is inconsistent in adopting this view of Divine foreknowledge: he should be a Boethian, instead. Had keiths chosen to attack him on this point, his criticism would have been a very telling one.
Second, many Christians believe that at least some human individuals are genuinely free to choose between various goods, but are infallibly prevented by God’s grace from choosing moral evil, or at least, from choosing to damn themselves. Thus Catholics believe that by God’s grace, the Virgin Mary was preserved from sin; and some Protestants believe that the individuals who are “born again” are infallibly elected by God. If they are right, then the question arises: why didn’t God make all of us like that? My reply is that this objection assumes that God’s act of predestining someone to eternal salvation does not in any way determine who that person is. If God’s act of specially electing a saint to glory also determines that individual’s personal identity, then I cannot wish myself to have been elected like that, without wishing myself to have been someone else, which is metaphysically incoherent. My personal identity as a human being is the result of my having had the parents I had; but for Jesus’ mother Mary, it is different. Being the daughter of Joachim and Anne is not what constitutes her personal identity; on a Catholic view, what makes her who she is is the fact of her being the Mother of God. That is who she is. God planned it that way. God did not plan me that way, but I have no right to complain. I am who I am, and I am glad to be alive.
Third, I would like to conclude by noting that on the Judeo-Christian view, each and every human person is a being of infinite and irreplaceable value. Thus it would be enough for a defender of Divine goodness, when asked why God tolerates evil acts (such as acts of rape) to point out that there are some human individuals who would never have come into existence, were it not for these evil acts having been performed. Of course, God is under no obligation to create these individuals (or rather, their souls); but equally, He is under no obligation to create some other individuals, instead of them. The mere fact that allowing evil acts to happen enables certain persons to come into existence who would not exist otherwise seems (to my mind) to be a sufficient justification for God’s allowing those acts. Or is it?
What do readers think?
If someone with appropriate authorization wants to edit my post and insert a “Continue Reading” link after the sentence, “There are several things wrong with this reply,” then I’d be much obliged. My sincere apologies for taking up so much space on the main page.
By the way, I’m not sure how to edit my post, now that it’s up. I can’t seem to get back into edit mode, to insert a “More” link (if that’s the one I need to insert).
Why do you say that follows? Those claims certainly don’t seem to me to be tantamount at all. To say that I am essentially different from you means that I couldn’t have issued from your parents and you couldn’t have issued from mine. Nothing about anybody being better than anybody else–either essentially or contingently–follows from that.
I think you’re right that both “logical determinism” and “epistemic determinism” are fallacious. But I’m not clear what you think follows from that.
The OP seems to make a good case for there being no justification for holding my eternal soul responsible for what happens while it is in my body.
If life really is that much of a puppet show, then the puppet master holds most, if not all of the responsibility for how the show turns out.
Not sure why I don’t have an Edit button but the second quote I wanted to make above was this:
Hi walto,
Thank you for your post. The fact that I couldn’t have come from your parents just you couldn’t have come from mine makes us different, but not essentially so. After all, all of our parents are human.
What I had in mind in my remark about racism and sexism was the view that persons come in different essential types, and that what might be good for one type of person might not be good for another. For instance, some types of people might be born to rule, while others are natural born slaves. This was a common view, just a few centuries ago. What I’m saying is that there are no fundamental differences between the soul of a man and that of a woman, or between that of a slave and that of a free person, that would warrant this kind of discrimination. That was all.
Hi Fair Witness,
That’s an interesting perspective. Why do you think my OP implies that your soul is not responsible for what happens while it’s inside your body? Just curious.
Ah, I take it you don’t believe in haecceities (individual essences).
But in any case, when I say that I am essentially different from you, all I mean is that I am not you in any possible world. ETA: And, from such a position, nothing seems to me to follow about racism, or types, etc.
Hi walto,
I see where you’re coming from now. I’d certainly agree that I’m not you in any possible world. However, I see no need to invoke haecceities to explain this fact.
I hesitate to ask (my abilities in philosophy are demonstrably abysmal as many here will testify) but I find the problem with all the logical arguments that prove God is simply – which God? OK, for the sake of argument, let’s assume Plantinga’s logic is sound. What attributes does Plantinga’s God have and how are they arrived at? There seems a leap of faith from the basic logic to the God of Abraham.
This is *not* a maximally great God.
So, we agree that haecceities are not necessary for you to be essentially different from me. Do you still think that what you infer about racism, etc. in that paragraph actually follow?
The point of the presuppositionalists is that basic logic properly understood presupposes exactly the Christian God.
You might want to check it out
peace
I wouldn’t characterize it as a leap; more a slog through BS.
I would once again point out that Alvin Plantinga is explicit and insistent that he is not offering a theodicy. He makes this very clear from the outset.
What Plantinga did was offer a logical defeater to the problem of evil.
He is making no claims that it have anything to do with the actual nature of things in the real world.
You can object to his freewill defense on all kinds of grounds. For instance as a Calvinist I object to the whole concept to libertarian free will.
However the only grounds that are relevant to his defense are logical ones.
If you grant that it is at least logically possible that God had sufficient reasons for allowing evil then Plantinga’s defense is successful.
peace
I would think you would need to interact with the arguments before you could make such a claim
peace
The constitution and contents of the argument tells you which God. If you cannot tell it from the argument, I guess you will just have to work harder on your ability to read meaningfully. It’s hard, but worth it.
You are right about one thing. There indeed is a noticeable gap or even precipice between God of the philosophical arguments and God as revealed in scriptures. Philosophical arguments are always about some aspect of God-of-the-philosophers, even when the argument has been tweaked to approximate God-of-the-scriptures. The problem with (or feature of) God of philosophical arguments is that it’s common to all major religions, not specifically Abrahamic or what-have-you.
Maybe, but my question was, assuming you agree with Plantinga’s logic, from whence do you get God’s attributes? Revelation, I guess.
Could we agree on non-sequitur?
The only foundation for logic and reason is an “Absolute personal” being with precisely the attributes of the Christian God.
Pick an attribute and I’ll explain why it’s necessary if you need me too.
peace
I’m certainly missing that from the Plantinga argument that Vincent links to. Looking at his Wikipedia biography entry, he sounds like he accepts scientific explanations such as evolution and suggests a guiding hand through “natural” causes, a type of deism?
Oh good, you agree. The justification for the attributes of God is the hard problem of religiousness!
I get to pick? OK – the immaculate conception!
check it out
https://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/an_evolutionary_argument_against_naturalism.pdf
peace
the immaculate conception is not an attribute it is an event.
You mentioned attributes
Now I can explain if you like why the immaculate conception was necessary for Christ’s noetic work but that is not about logic proper it’s about our relationship to it.
peace
“First, it turns out (oddly enough) that Plantinga himself is a Molinist. If I am right, then he is inconsistent in adopting this view of Divine foreknowledge: he should be a Boethian, instead.”
Actually, being a professional philosopher, I suspect Plantinga can outline (and does) arguments for different occasions from any random presuppositions, not strictly adhering to his own personal views. Philosophers and logicians do it for exercise.
One of my own objections to keiths argument is as follows.
keiths: If God is omniscient, he knows what all of those choices will be before the person is even created. If God simply chooses not to create the people who will go on to commit rape…
The “simply” there is logically absurd. If God, before creating the person, foreknows what (bad choices) the person would make, and then God does not create the person, then it turns out that God foreknew wrong. God foreknew what the person would do, but the person was not created and thus ended up not doing anything he was supposed to do according to foreknowledge. We are being asked to accept a logical impossibility.
#11, FMM. #11.
I take it this god of yours is such that the whole notion of counterfactual conditionals is beyond him? Send him down, I’ll give him a class. Hey, maybe you should join him!
You are confusing native autonomous understanding with revelation. No one has the former we all have the later. 😉
the former is about our limitations the later is about God’s abilities.
peace
Exactly, Plantinga may be a Molinist or he may be a Supralapsarian.
It really is irrelevant to his argument
peace
It’s keiths’ God. His intellectual property.
Keiths is aiming to refute omniscient God, but to do that he created a self-refuting non-omniscient God. Maybe it’s a minor problem and you can fix it.
Gender. Explain why god is a “He”
Well I was talking about this mess, which I believe YOU wrote:
It seems like you think god can’t know what would have happened if he did something he decided not to do. As even I can understand counterfactuals, I’d hope that you professional philosophers and your gods could do the same. But, alas….
Hahaha. It’s omni!
Pick a attribute from what list?
Could we have a list of attributes?
Explain why only a Triune God can be the foundation for logic and reason.
Why can’t a deity with a singular nature ground logic and reason? Or one with six natures? Or forty two natures?
Also this…
Hi Alan,
I think Plantinga himself would agree that you can’t get from the God of philosophy to the God of Abraham. If God’s decision to reveal Himself to us is a free decision, then presumably it’s one He might not have taken. Humans could be living in a world in which God is silent.
Plantinga would probably point out, though, that even a silent God would not be God unless He were maximally great. Philosophy can take us to a God Who is something like the God of classical theism. I say “something like” because while Plantinga agrees that God is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent, He denies that God is simple.
Here are a bunch of them.
OK, so now we’ve established that God is fattening.
That should cause atheist numbers to skyrocket.
Glen Davidson
Triabetes is coming. Repent before it’s too late
1) Gender is not an attribute it is a subclass within a grammatical class
2) God is not a “he” a se (of himself) as far as I know.
3) At least one of the persons of the Godhead (The Spirit) has been reveled as neuter in the Greek or feminine in the Hebrew.
peace
God thanks you for your opinion.
And your first post in this thread consists of snark and contributes to the discussion how?
Very glad to see vjtorley here, especially after his departure from UD.
Any how, I want to point out that when I raised Molinism in the conversation about theistic evolution, I am not necessarily committing to it as the only correct solution to purposefulness in evolution. It is just one of many, and I’m still puzzling over how this is the one that was picked up so intently by everyone.
I totally agree with you here Alan. I, personally, do not find these arguments terribly compelling for this reason. Of course, one might show that the idea of God is “logically possible”, but as keiths might say, it doesn’t show that it is “probable” or “likely.”
I have identified as a Christian here, but I do not find this settling point based on logical arguments for God. I just don’t think they get you there.
For me, it is really the historical Resurrection that crosses the bridge for me. That is the real evidential basis of my faith, and (I feel) the best argument for God’s existence.
It took balls to create men.
Logic (logos) is nothing but the perfect image of the character of God
in the Trinity you have
The first person (the fount of Logic)
The second person (the image of God/logic)
The third person (the love eternally and dynamically expressed between the fount and it’s perfect image)
Communication requires a sender a message and a receiver.
Exactly three components are necessary more than three are redundant and superfluous.
peace
From the list of the Christian God’s attributes
Sure, you will find it here
https://www.blueletterbible.org/
peace
I think everyone would agree with that observation.
The point is that the God of Abraham is the God of philosophy properly understood.
The mistake of the philosophers is to begin with themselves and try and construct a God based on their own autonomous reason.
What should happen instead is to begin with the Sovereign God of reason who illuminates everything including ourselves.
peace
Do you think that the resurrection can be established scientifically/empirically?
peace
This should win some kind of TSZ Guff Award.
Only in your opinion are four or more components ‘redundant and superfluous’. What you haven’t done is shown why a God with four or more components is incapable of grounding logic.
Anyone else see the pattern here?
Pack it up folks…there’s only one person here who properly understands basic logic and the God of the philosophers.
fifth:
Woodbine:
It’s a perfect spitwad of deepities.