TSZ commenter walto published a paper this year in the Journal of Philosophy entitled Epistemic Closure, Home Truths, and Easy Philosophy. Unfortunately, the paper isn’t free — if you want to read it, you’ll either need to pay for it yourself or get it via institutional access (if you’re fortunate enough to have that.)
Regarding his paper, walto made the following remark to commenter Kantian Naturalist:
I don’t know if it counts as “a refutation”–but I think keiths’ version of skepticism requires the closure of knowledge under (known) entailment [which walto refers to as ‘CLR’ in his paper.] And I think that that premise can be shown to be false.
It’s a long story and you’ll have to get my paper to see how, but the abstract is available for a nickel.
I think walto hesitated to use the word “refutation” because he couldn’t rule out the possibility of arguments for skepticism that don’t rely on CLR. Any such arguments would be unaffected by the conclusion of walto’s paper, and skepticism might therefore remain standing. But any argument that did depend on CLR would be refuted if the conclusion of walto’s paper is correct and CLR is false.
We can (and likely will) discuss many of the technical details in the comments below, but unless I’m missing something fundamental, it appears to me to be surprisingly easy to show why walto’s paper doesn’t work as a refutation of CLR-based arguments for Cartesian skepticism.
His statement of the argument requires the following premise:
(ii) A competent reasoner sometimes knows such things as that she is sitting on a green chair.
That premise effectively amounts to a denial of Cartesian skepticism. So in order to use his argument agains Cartesian skepticism, walto first has to assume the falsehood of Cartesian skepticism just to get the argument off the ground.
The reasoning therefore ends up being circular:
1) assume that Cartesian skepticism is false;
2) using that assumption, deploy the argument laid out in the paper and conclude that CLR is false;
3) use that conclusion — that CLR is false — to negate any argument that requires CLR to be true, including arguments for skepticism.
It looks hopelessly circular to me, but walto is unlikely to take this lying down. Stay tuned for a vigorous debate.
Note that in my summary of the circularity, the assumption — that Cartesian skepticism is false — is not precisely identical to the conclusion — that all CLR-based arguments for Cartesian skepticism are false. That’s OK. The circularity is still there because the assumption is stronger than (i.e. encompasses) the conclusion.
In other words, assuming that Cartesian skepticism is false amounts to assuming both that all CLR-based arguments for skepticism are false and that all non-CLR-based arguments for skepticism are false. The circularity is there by virtue ot the fact that this…
..;appears as both an assumption and a conclusion.
Two (I’m guessing largely coextensive) groups my paper is not addressed to:
1. people who make some argument for skepticism not relying on a principle of the closure of knowledge under known entailment; and
2. People whose concept of knowledge is so strong/restrictive that they don’t think that they (or anybody else) can ever know their own name, that they are now sitting, that they’re looking at a computer screen, etc. Not ever. Regardless of the conditions or environment.
They can all go their merry ways as far as my argument is concerned.
I note that you explicitly relied on closure many times in your own skeptical arguments, modus-tollensing your way to doubts about your own name. But I don’t know where you can be found on these issues now.
ETA: in case it’s not clear from what I wrote above, the claim in your OP that knowing you are sitting implies a denial of Cartesian skepticism requires CLR. You have to understand that to get what’s going on in the paper.
walto,
Then you’re just confirming the circularity. You’re saying that your argument works only for those who reject Cartesian skepticism. But that was already implicit in your premise (ii):
In other words, your argument against Cartesian skepticism boils down to this:
True, but not useful. And it certainly doesn’t work as an argument against Cartesian skepticism.
walto,
I accept epistemic closure. It’s intuitive, as you point out; it makes logical sense; and I haven’t seen any successful arguments against it.
Note that your own argument against CLR requires the assumption that Cartesian skepticism is false. You’ve simply assumed that. As I explained above, you haven’t demonstrated it.
No, you have not understood the paper because you do not understand how Cartesian skepticism works. It goes like this: we think we know that we’re sitting but…..we can’t because we might be dreaming or otherwise deceived.
Thh thing is, that inference requires CLR. That’s the point. The falsity of CLR does NOT follow from me knowing that I’m sitting, however. (If it did, there would be a circle, but thinking it does is the actual fallacy being committed here.)
You need to read the paper again. If you have the same thoughts about it, maybe try it again in a couple of years or something.
walto,
Right, which is why I’ve been saying that sort of thing literally for years in conversations with you and KN. I’m a Cartesian skeptic, so it shouldn’t be surprising at all that my views are in line with Cartesian skepticism.
Right, which is why I keep telling you that I accept CLR. Let me repeat:
walto:
In that case, it was gratuitous for you to include (ii) as a premise:
If your argument doesn’t depend on (ii), then why did you include it in the formal statement? Are you saying that including (ii) was a mistake, and that you would leave it out if you were rewriting the paper today?
That doesn’t make sense either, because the argument you present in the paper really does depend on (ii).
So if you’re correct, and (ii) is unnecessary, then you need a different argument against CLR than the one presented in the paper. You’ve invalidated the core argument of your paper. In that case, what’s left?
You sure you want to go there?
And if not, then you’re back in the circularity conundrum I described above. You have to assume that Cartesian skepticism is false in order to conclude, via your argument, that Cartesian skepticism is false, because your intervening argument depends on that assumption to justify the rejection of CLR and thus the rejection of any pro-skepticism arguments that depend on CLR.
walto,
Just to drive the point home, let me quote your summary of the core argument:
Note how (iii) follows from (ii), as indicated by the connective “Therefore”. That shows that (ii) is essential to your argument as presented.
So when you say this…
…you are incorrect, unless you are claiming that the argument you presented in the paper is wrong.
And if the argument in the paper is correct, then it does indeed depend on (ii), which means that any use of the argument to defeat Cartesian skepticism is circular.
So you’re left with an argument that can’t be used against Cartesian skepticism, lest you fall into the circularity trap; and you’re also left with an argument that fails against CLR, because you can’t justify the assumption you need — assumption (ii) — that Cartesian skepticism is false.
No. iii is a disjunction. My proof of the falsity of CLR requires other premises besides there being knowledge of “moorean truths.” Yes, it’s a premise that one can know that he’s sitting, but No, there’s no circle.
Anyhow, the confusion you are displaying here (quite gloriously) is discussed at some length in the paper. If you didn’t get it there, you won’t get it here.
So keiths was wrong. Has he admitted it yet?
Keiths is currently unable to respond to comments as his account is suspended.
Can I suggest we hold back on comments that expect a response from Keiths.
Walto now has something else in common with Plantinga and KN.
🙂 Good company!
As I feared, this discussion is sort of pointless without access to the article, but this list and commentary (from page 44 of the journal issue) may help interested observers (if there are any):
Hope that helps anybody who happens to care why I’m saying keiths’ circle accusation is incorrect and confused. We can (as I do) assume we know stuff like our name and that we are sitting; additional argument is nevertheless required to demonstrate the falsity of CLR. There’s no circle.
Personally, I see this as word games that philosophers play. So I don’t have a comment on the paper itself.
The clear issue, however, is that this paper has gone through a review process. So keiths is not merely criticizing the paper. He is implicitly criticizing the judgment of the reviewers.
This reminds me of an earlier time at TSZ, where walto used the “de re”/”de dicto” distinction. And keiths indicated that this was pretty much new to him. But keiths went on to assert that walto was getting it all wrong. Never mind that walto has been using this for years and has probably even taught it to undergrads at some time, while it was new to keiths.
I am currently subject to a censorship scheme like the one that was imposed on phoodoo, so it’s not clear when (or if) this and future comments will actually appear. However, I’ll go ahead and respond to this.
Neil:
Not necessarily. Reviewers will often approve papers they disagree with, if they think that the content has merit and is worth being heard. If any of the reviewers actually agree with walto’s conclusion, however, then I disagree with their judgment. Why should that be a problem?
No, I indicated that the terminology was new to me. The ideas were quite familiar, and I had thought about them at length.
I disagreed with walto’s arguments, and I backed up my disagreement with evidence and argument.
Again, it wasn’t new to me. Only the terminology was.
And what matters is obviously understanding, not the amount of time one has been dealing with a topic.
Bruce,
Having been disagreed with by keiths? True.
ETA: Mods — please approve my earlier reply to Neil.
walto,
You’re conflating two distinct issues. I am not saying that your argument against CLR is circular. I’m saying that your argument against Cartesian skepticism — which employs your argument against CLR — is circular.
And it is. If you remove premise (ii), then the argument against CLR fails, and if the argument against CLR fails, then it can’t be used against Cartesian skepticism.
So just to be absolutely clear, here is the circularity:
1. Assume that Cartesian skepticism is false.
2. Use that assumption to disprove CLR.
3. Use the disproof of CLR to argue that Cartesian skepticism is false.
The circularity couldn’t be more obvious.
There is also a separate, distinct issue: the fact that the argument against CLR fails, because it requires an assumption — assumption (ii) — that cannot be justified. That’s not a problem with circularity, however.
Mods, several comments of mine in this thread are awaiting approval.
walto,
As I explained in an earlier comment (still in moderation, for some reason), it’s not your argument for CLR that is circular. It’s your argument against Cartesian skepticism — which employs your argument against CLR — that is circular.
Once more:
That mirrors my concern. As I recall, understanding the de re/de dicto distinction arose with questioning of a Plantinga argument which used it and claimed Plantinga had made an obvious error in apply the concepts.
If I see people with no relevant qualifications arguing with the conclusion of professional biologists using arguments that almost no qualified biologist would make, then I think it is reasonable to conclude that the professionals are right and the person without formal training is wrong. I extend the same courtesy to philosophers.
In particular, if it seems to me there is an obvious flaw in some philosophical paper, I would conclude I don’t understand the paper. If the author was available for questioning and was open explaining both the paper and relevant philosophical background, I would start by trying to try to understand what I missed.
Of course, others may take a different view on how to engage with the paper.
I don’t have easy access to the paper, and I am not sure if Walt is interested in being a tutor on both the paper and relevant philosophical background, so I have not pursued trying to understand the ideas in the paper better.
As indicated above, keiths, we’re not using ‘Cartesian skepicism’ the same way. I’m using it to refer to a theory which (as you always seemed to) relies on CLR for it’s ‘I don’t know my own name’ conclusion. That is what I’m attempting to refute. And there is no circle.
Otoh, as I said in my first post above and will not again repeat after this, if one simply says that nobody can know their own name for some non-clr-reliant reason, the argument is not addressed to them. I think they must have some very weird concept of knowledge, but I don’t care. I absolutely DO use a premise inconsistent with THEIR beliefs. My argument is simply not intended to be responsive to skeptical claims not based on dreams, evil demons, bivs, etc.
Note to Neil and Bruce: the anonymous referee I dealt with–and who almost rejected my paper twice, was brilliant. Forced me to make the paper much better than it would have been if I’d been left to my own devices. Everybody should get editors like that!
Bruce,
I would put it more carefully than that. Lacking any other information, it makes sense to assume that those with formal training are more likely to be correct than those without. But to conclude that they must be right, simply because they’ve been trained, is a fallacious argument from authority.
Again, I am being more careful than that. I didn’t just glance through walto’s paper, summarily decide “he’s wrong”, and leave it at that. I read through it several times, thought things over, and published my OP only when I was convinced that my criticisms were valid.
That’s precisely what I did in starting this thread. See this sentence from my OP:
I’ve stated my case, and I am open to responses from walto or from anyone else who cares to weigh in on the topic, including you and Neil. I encourage you to respond, in fact.
Open discussion is what TSZ is supposed to be about! May the truth prevail.
Just as a heads-up to people in this thread and elsewhere, some of my comments are appearing, some of them are instantly vanishing, and some are being held in the moderation queue. If you ask me something and appear not to get a response, keep all of this in mind.
walto,
I keep agreeing with your definition of Cartesian skepticism, and I keep agreeing that it depends on CLR. If I keep agreeing, why do you keep insisting that I don’t agree?
Read this exchange again:
walto:
keiths:
walto:
keiths:
Well, I gave one. (Whether it’s successful or not I leave to others.) So far your objections to it have been really confused. If you have one that’s actually on point, you should post it. That you like CLR is really neither here nor there.
walto,
As I’ve said already, I agree with that. Let me proclaim it boldly and in bold: Walto’s argument is against CLR-reliant versions of Cartesian skepticism. It does not address non-CLR-reliant versions, if such even exist.
The circularity is in the argument you’re actually making, against CLR-reliant versions of Cartesian skepticism.
There’s no circle. I guess we’re done here.
keiths:
walto:
One of the two major points I am making in this thread is that your defense of CLR is unsuccessful, because it depends on an assumption you cannot justify — namely, premise (ii), which amounts to a rejection of Cartesian skepticism. You’ve acknowledged in the past that you can’t refute arguments for Cartesian skepticism, including the ones I’ve presented. Why assume it is false, then?
walto:
Here’s the circle:
1. Assume, via premise (ii), that Cartesian skepticism is false.
2. That means, by direct implication, that you are making two sub-assumptions:
a) that CLR-reliant versions of Cartesian skepticism are false; and
b) the non-CLR-reliant versions of Cartesian skepticism are false.
3. Use the assumption to prove that CLR is false.
4. Conclude that any CLR-reliant version of skepticism must be false.
So you have a conclusion…
…that relies on an assumption that includes the thing being concluded:
It’s a textbook case of circular reasoning.
A. I don’t defend clr
B. ii isn’t a rejection of Cartesian skepticism. Both ii and skepticism can be true if nothing follows about the existence of physical objects fromthe existence of chairs.
It’s seeming less and less likely to me that you actually read this paper.
keiths,
No. Read again in a couple of years.
walto,
You’re clearly eager to bring the conversation to an end, and you are free to leave, of course, but I intend to stay and to continue discussing this with anyone who is interested in the topic and is willing to do so.
Hopefully that includes you, but if not — OK.
I see the issue as trusting expertise, not as making an appeal to authority.
As an non-expert, if I cannot see the flaws in my concern with the paper, I think there is an issue in me, not in the arguments by the expert, especially when they have been vetted by other experts.
This exchange is turning into one of those meta-conversations which I tire of rapidly. So I won’t be posting further on the issue.
Me either.
walto,
I know! Your entire paper is an argument against CLR, not a defense of it! Here’s your conclusion, after all:
walto:
Sure it is. Here’s premise (ii):
Cartesian skepticism says the exact opposite: A competent reasoner cannot know that she is sitting on a green chair.
If you affirm (ii), then you are obviously rejecting Cartesian skepticism.
My A was a response to that remark.
I’ve already responded to the rest three times. You’re out!
walto:
Sorry! My mistake.
Here’s what I meant to write:
Looks like my comments (in this thread) are appearing when I first post them, but go into moderation if I edit them. Mods, please fish my comments out of the queue.
Here’s what I just tried to post:
walto:
Sorry! My mistake.
Here’s what I meant to write:
walto,
Hi
I am humbly appealing to your expertise as I have no formal training in philosophy but found an interest in this discourse. Just looking at Cartesian skepticism, could you call it a method of analyzing reality? If so would it not be a way to analyze something that is chosen by the person using it for a given situation?
colewd,
I wouldn’t call it that, no. Generally, it’s the belief that we can never trust our senses because sometimes we are deceived–say by dreams.
But do our dreams deceive us, and is it only our dreams while asleep that do so, or also our dreams while awake?
keiths:
Bruce:
You were making a fallacious appeal to authority:
It’s fallacious to conclude that the person without formal training is wrong.
All else equal, a person with formal training is more likely to be correct than a person without. If you had to bet, and you had no other information, it would be wise to bet on the trained person. But to conclude that the person with training must be correct, based on nothing more than the fact of the training itself, is clearly fallacious.
Again, I approached it much more carefully than that. I don’t assume that I’m automatically right if I disagree with an expert, but I also don’t assume that I’m automatically wrong. I look at the situation, the evidence, and the arguments.
In this case I carefully evaluated walto’s argument(s) and worked through them in my mind, thinking about how I would respond, trying to find flaws in both his positions and mine. When my positions seemed solid, I posted an OP, inviting walto (and anyone else with an interest) to respond.
Seems to me that’s exactly what should happen, instead of blindly assuming “Oh, he has a PhD in philosophy and I don’t, therefore I’m wrong.”
There’s plenty of substantive discussion going on, of walto’s paper itself. Why not get a copy, read it, and then join us? You’re obviously a philosophically-minded guy, and the issues at stake are quite interesting.
Does that fallacy have a name?
Descartes’ point was that if we were ever deceived, we might be at any time…like now!
walto,
Based on this is there a method to judge reality with our senses?
Mung:
It’s just the flip side of the argumentum ad verecundiam, or argument from authority.
Not according to Descartes.
colewd,
More precisely, it’s a method of analyzing what we can and cannot know about reality, given the the possibility that our senses are deceiving us.
The movie The Matrix is the classic modern example. How do we know — right now — that we aren’t suspended in pods in the Matrix, and that the reality we think we see around us is just an illusion?
The Cartesian skeptic says: We can’t know that.
Mung:
As walto says, we could be deceived at any time. Any time at all.
Try to think of a situation in which you are absolutely certain about your physical situation. I see a pair of scissors with orange handles on the desk next to my keyboard, but how can I possibly know that the scissors are actually there?
I don’t think it’s possible to actually know that, which is what makes me a Cartesian skeptic.
Now for practical purposes, I treat the scissors as if they’re really there. But there’s a huge difference between doing that versus claiming to know that they’re actually there.
Again, well done, Walto! Congratulations. I know you mentioned it earlier, but I’m glad I have the chance to congratulate you again.