Last night I was talking with an old friend of mine, an atheist Jew, who is now in the best relationship of her life with a devout Roman Catholic. We talked about the fact that she was more surprised than he was about the fact that their connection transcends their difference in metaphysics. He sees himself as a devout Roman Catholic; she sees him as a good human being.
This conversation reminded me of an older thought that’s been swirling around in my head for a few weeks: the disunity of reason.
It is widely held by philosophers (that peculiar sub-species!) that reason is unified: that the ideally rational person is one for whom there are no fissures, breaks, ruptures, or discontinuities anywhere in the inferential relations between semantic contents that comprise his or her cognitive grasp of the world (including himself or herself as part of that world).
This is particularly true when it comes to the distinction between “theoretical reason” and “practical reason”. By “theoretical reason” I mean one’s ability to conceptualize the world-as-experienced as more-or-less systematic, and by “practical reason” I mean one’s ability to act in the world according to judgments that are justified by agent-relative and also agent-indifferent reasons (“prudence” and “morality”, respectively).
The whole philosophical tradition from Plato onward assumes that reason is unified, and especially, that theoretical and practical reason are unified — different exercises of the same basic faculty. Some philosophers think of them as closer together than others — for example, Aristotle distinguishes between episteme (knowledge of general principles in science, mathematics, and metaphysics) and phronesis (knowledge of particular situations in virtuous action). But even Aristotle does not doubt that episteme and phronesis are exercises of a single capacity, reason (nous).
However, as we learn more about how our cognitive system is actually structured, we should consider the possibility that reason is not unified at all. If Horst’s Cognitive Pluralism is right, then we should expect that our minds are more like patchworks of domain-specific modules that can reason quite well within those domains but not so well across them.
To Horst’s model I’d add the further conjecture: that we have pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “theoretical reason” (abstract thinking and long-term planning) with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and also pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “practical reason” (self-control and virtuous conduct) with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (and especially in its dense interconnections with the limbic system).
But if that conjecture is on the right track, then we would expect to find consistency between theoretical reason and practical reason only to the extent that there are reciprocal interconnections between these regions of prefrontal cortex. And of course there are reciprocal interconnections — but (and this is the important point!) to the extent that these regions are also functionally distinct, then to that same extent reason is disunified.
And as a consequence, metaphysics and ethics may have somewhat less to do with each other than previous philosophers have supposed.
This appears to be the source of part of your confusion. You’re positing a false dichotomy: assume a god exists or assume a god doesn’t exist. The skeptical position is: require evidence before provisionally accepting that an entity exists.
It’s a continuum. There are no gaps.
Who says Calvinists lack a sense of humor?
No. For then it would not be revelation.
That’s a different question. See above.
Bravo!
This should be an OP that we can just link to in response to any of fifthmonarchyman’s comments.
Patrick, you list a number of potential authorities on what a person believes and assert that you have examined all known mechanisms of authoritative knowledge about what a person believes, and yet you conclude that none of these mechanisms are in fact authoritative, but then conclude that therefore you have no reason to consider God as a possible mechanism for authority about what someone believes.
And you don’t see a problem with this line of reasoning?
You appear to be looking for something entirely fictional. Something that does not in fact exist. So on what principle do you exclude God?
Mung:
Mung, is it possible for you to take something as revelation, when it wasn’t?
Do you use reason to decide what beliefs are self-evident truths?
That’s gibberish to me, and irrelevant to the topic at hand. The thing is that, if we must rely on our “unreliable” nature to interpret “revelation”, then revelation is an unreliable source of knowledge for us, and can’t justify OUR KNOWLEDGE as FMM purports to prove here.
He said:
“If we know anything it is the result of revelation”
But if revelation is an unreliable source of knowledge then it follows that we don’t know anything
QED
If knowledge comes from revelation, and only revelation, and revelation is unmistakably true (god reveals in a way that you KNOW it’s true), then our understanding of knowledge must be perfectly reliable at all times.
Unfortunately the argument started with the premise that our understanding is unreliable, so logic comes back to bite you in the ass everytime
Or, it might be that all true episodes of divine revelation are completely true descriptions of absolute reality but that one is never justified in believing that one has in fact received a true revelation.
Yeah, well, I guess it depends on their definitions. According to Mung one can’t be mistaken about revelation by definition. If that means that true revelation is unmistakable there’s still the possibility that every purported revelation event is not really so as you pointed out, but a product of our unreliable reason, but then one can never be sure if something is true (if it was revealed) and revelation is an unreliable source of knowledge.
If OTOH they double down and claim that we always know when something counts as divine revelation and when it doesn’t, then we always know with a 100% certainty if something is true or false and our understanding can’t be unreliable. Either way the argument fails
No, I look at all alternatives that are known to exist and come to the conclusion that we are each the authority on our own beliefs.
There is no objective, empirical evidence for psychics, mind reading machines, or gods, so there is no reason to consider them.
Patrick,
More precisely, we are each authoritative about what we believe. That’s different from whether what we believe is true, well-reasoned, justified, supported by logic and/or by evidence, and so on.
Absolutely not, like revelation it depends on knowing without reason. Reason exempt justification
I don’t agree that we are absolutely ‘authoritative’ about what we believe. Sometimes we’re wrong about that too. I didn’t really understand what Patrick was saying about that, but I think sometimes the therapist is right and the patient is wrong, i.e. never comes to realize what’s actually going on. That’s fairly common, I think. Can’t be proved, of course, but there is other evidence around besides the believer’s ‘intuitiions.’
Excellent clarification, thanks.
Depends what he meant by ‘authoritative.’
when did I admit that??????
In my worldview It’s all God. If it’s revelation it’s not filtered by my reason.
If it is filtered by my reason it’s not revelation
peace
It’s part of the definition
peace
It’s a good thing we don’t have to do that.
peace
You seem to be again confusing knowledge with my certainty in a given instance.
One could be uncertain that God has revealed anything at all but certain God can reveal something.
In such a case you would be justified in believing knowledge was possible. That is what is at issue.
repeat after me
God can reveal so knowledge is possible
It’s not about me it’s about God. God existence gives the justification that knowledge is possible.
again
It’s not about me.
hopefully that will do it
peace
So when you say that an individual is the only authority on that individuals belief what you really mean is that
Given your individual materialistic assumptions about evidence you are ignorant of any other authorities on that individual’s beliefs.
That does not seem to be much of a claim
peace
As I’ve mentioned before, this is a variety of an ontological argument. It starts from a premise involving some proposition being possible. I wonder what your basis is for the claim that there COULD be what you call revelation. It could just as easily be claimed that that sort of information reception is NOT possible.
No the issue here is whether knowledge (in general) is justified given a particular worldview. Clearly it is if the Christian God exists. that is because the Christian God can reveal stuff.
When it comes to individual instances of knowledge certainty is not a requirement at all. I could know individual stuff even if I’m not rationally justified in believing that God has revealed that stuff to me.
as Walto has so often pointed out.
I can know something
1) when I don’t know how I know it.
2) when I don’t know that I know it.
All that is necessary for me to be justified in believing X is
1) X is true
2) I believe X is true
3) I am justified in believing X is true.
peace
It’s not an argument it’s an explanation of my worldview
It’s not a claim
It’s part of the definition of omnipotence.
Are you claiming that an omnipotent being could not reveal stuff to me?
In that case a being would be omnipotent and not omnipotent at the same time and in the same respect. You would be arguing (among other things) that the law of noncontridiction is invalid
If this was the case all knowledge would be impossible and absurdity would reign.
Is that the road you want to go down.
peace
I’m not ‘claiming that an omnipotent being could not blah blah’. I’m claiming that it’s possible that it might be impossible for there to be anything that has all the characteristics you attribute to ‘omnipotent beings’. (I know you think you know this is possible because it’s been revealed to you by a–wait for it–omnipotent being!).
Hashtag circular reasoning
It’s a good thing it doesn’t exist
Apparently everything going on in your brain is revelation, if you know what I mean
Btw, fmm, as i’ve explained before, it IS an argument in spite of your denials. The fact that it’s unsound doesn’t change that.
Interesting.
How would you know this?……..or anything.
from my perspective if it were impossible for an omnipotent being to exist then all knowledge would be impossible including the knowledge that it was possible that it was impossible for an omnipotent to exist.
Get it?
I know you think the reasoning is circular but since you grant that you don’t have a noncircular alternative that will justify knowledge in your words “Justify the Justifiers” why would your opinion matter? It’s just your opinion? You have no reason to believe that it is a true? Right?
peace
And as Ive explained before it is not an argument it’s a presupposition. The reason you think it’s an argument is because you don’t accept the foundational premise of my worldview.
If you denied that logic was valid my explaining that logic was necessary to reason would seem like an argument.
But it would not be. It would just be me explaining the way things were.
Do you understand?
peace
Your lasttwo posts consist of nothing but arguments (and little kickers which can be thought of as expletives). I get that you’d prefer they not be considered arguments, but that’s what they are.
The questions about whether one ought to accept anything I say if I don’t justify my justifiers is a repetition of a confusion of yours I’ve responded to numerous times, including on this very thread.
They are bad arguments, but they are arguments. That one needs presuppositions to know things is the conclusion of an argument (and one I happen to agree with). That those presuppositions have anything at all to do with God (unless ‘God’ means ‘truth’, which it doesn’t) is also the conclusion of an argument, but this time a very confused one. However as you apparently enjoy repeating yourself and I don’t, I’ll stop here (until the 10th thread or so after this one in which you repeat these arguments that you are so terribly and hopelessly attached to.
Peace.
Fifth:
Click…whirrr…ticka ticka ticka ticka…*spoink*:
“How would you know this?……..or anything.”
This is an announcement to anyone who might be interested.
I just received a revelation notificating me that, apparently, I defined the christian god into non-existence in the above post.
While some other god is taught all there is to know, Santa has been appointed as an interim ruler of the universe.
The ten commandments are provisionally suspended and for now this one single commandment applies: “Thou shall sit on mah lap”
Sorry everyone for the trouble.
Yours truly,
dazz (soon to be known as sixthmonarchyman)
I don’t enjoy repeating myself but it is sometimes a necessary though unpleasant exercise .
I won’t repeat the questions (not arguments) until and unless someone acts as if they have justification for knowledge sans God. Then reluctantly the bot will reboot to see if their implicit claim has any merit.
It’s not fun but it is necessary from time to time.
peace
PS Right now I’m going to get back to doing some work Ive been neglecting
Wrong again. Please remember that this subthread of the discussion is about your claim that I am assuming the non-existence of your god. That is simply incorrect.
I base my argument on mechanisms and entities that are known to exist. That is, those for which there is objective, empirical evidence. There are an infinite number of mechanisms and entities for which there is no such evidence. Your god is in that set.
There is quite literally no reason to consider mechanisms and entities for which there is no evidential support. That is not an assumption that such things do not exist, it is simply the reasonable position of dismissing them until some evidence of their existence is provided.
I think I agree. I do think that there are something like what Kant thought there was. Kant thought there were transcendental arguments for the necessary conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Those conditions were the answer to “how is knowledge possible?”
I think there is something much more like material constraints on the real conditions of the actuality of knowledge: specific material processes need to be up-and-running in reality in order for any being to actually have knowledge.
That is, the question “how does a being actually know what it knows?” is, I think, a perfectly good question.
But I don’t think that it knows anything by presupposing something. Knowledge can’t begin with axioms or premises, because one needs to know how to articulate an axiom to begin with. And most of our knowledge is “knowing-how,” rather than “knowing-that”.
There is no mechanism [no mechanism exists] for being an authority on what someone else believes. So again I say, you are not basing your argument on only things that are known to exist. So again I ask, by what principle do you exclude God?
Patrick, your philosophy is lousy. By your reckoning we could never come to possess any new knowledge.
Perhaps this is the problem with trying to begin with epistemology.
It certainly is the problem with any attempt to understand all knowledge as such as if it were a formal system. I think that is the very core of Descartes’ error that leads into all the rest of his mistakes and conflations. Specific scientific theories can be axiomatized but knowledge as a whole can’t be.
I would also say that one should not begin with epistemology to the exclusion of metaphysics (or semantics) but rather all three need to be understood as interdependent from the very beginning of theoretical philosophy, just as ethics, aesthetics, and politics are interdependent in practical philosophy.
The utter lack of objective, empirical evidence that any such thing exists.
That does not follow from anything I’ve written.
God does not “exist.” He IS Existence Itself…
– Alexander R. Sich
KN, I was wondering if you’d care to comment on this. I note that Dewey, who I understand to be one of your guys, famously wrote,
That certainly sounds very pretty, and it’s the kind of thing we’ve gotten to used to hearing from intellectually sophisticated theologians. But can you actually explain what this means in your own words?
walto,
I see your point, of course. One might also add to that Deweyan theme a minor Brandomian one — that meaning is inferentially articulated in social spaces, so what we mean by our words is never exclusively up to us. And the therapist can, indeed, know things about us that we don’t know about ourselves.
I was only stressing the innocuous idea that to be a subject is to have privileged epistemic access to one’s occurrent mental states. Insofar as beliefs are not occurrent mental states, first-person authority doesn’t apply. And in fact beliefs are quite complicated, being “mongrel” occurrent-dispositional states, as Ryle was among the first to understand.
“A neurosis is a secret that you don’t know you are keeping.”
– Kenneth Tynan
He is just being funny when resorting to the tenets of classical theism. Classical theism is unknown to ID theorists. Yet another dispute between Feser and Craig is proving this as we speak. Craig was among early proponents of Dembski.