Last night I was talking with an old friend of mine, an atheist Jew, who is now in the best relationship of her life with a devout Roman Catholic. We talked about the fact that she was more surprised than he was about the fact that their connection transcends their difference in metaphysics. He sees himself as a devout Roman Catholic; she sees him as a good human being.
This conversation reminded me of an older thought that’s been swirling around in my head for a few weeks: the disunity of reason.
It is widely held by philosophers (that peculiar sub-species!) that reason is unified: that the ideally rational person is one for whom there are no fissures, breaks, ruptures, or discontinuities anywhere in the inferential relations between semantic contents that comprise his or her cognitive grasp of the world (including himself or herself as part of that world).
This is particularly true when it comes to the distinction between “theoretical reason” and “practical reason”. By “theoretical reason” I mean one’s ability to conceptualize the world-as-experienced as more-or-less systematic, and by “practical reason” I mean one’s ability to act in the world according to judgments that are justified by agent-relative and also agent-indifferent reasons (“prudence” and “morality”, respectively).
The whole philosophical tradition from Plato onward assumes that reason is unified, and especially, that theoretical and practical reason are unified — different exercises of the same basic faculty. Some philosophers think of them as closer together than others — for example, Aristotle distinguishes between episteme (knowledge of general principles in science, mathematics, and metaphysics) and phronesis (knowledge of particular situations in virtuous action). But even Aristotle does not doubt that episteme and phronesis are exercises of a single capacity, reason (nous).
However, as we learn more about how our cognitive system is actually structured, we should consider the possibility that reason is not unified at all. If Horst’s Cognitive Pluralism is right, then we should expect that our minds are more like patchworks of domain-specific modules that can reason quite well within those domains but not so well across them.
To Horst’s model I’d add the further conjecture: that we have pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “theoretical reason” (abstract thinking and long-term planning) with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and also pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “practical reason” (self-control and virtuous conduct) with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (and especially in its dense interconnections with the limbic system).
But if that conjecture is on the right track, then we would expect to find consistency between theoretical reason and practical reason only to the extent that there are reciprocal interconnections between these regions of prefrontal cortex. And of course there are reciprocal interconnections — but (and this is the important point!) to the extent that these regions are also functionally distinct, then to that same extent reason is disunified.
And as a consequence, metaphysics and ethics may have somewhat less to do with each other than previous philosophers have supposed.
Hey…I’m just going with the rather general definition of claim here. I’m sure, however, there are all sorts of clauses and conditions one to could consider in terms of what claim includes and excludes by definition for the purposes of this discussion.
For example, In common usage, to make a statement of occurrence (e.g., this event happened) is to claim said event happened. This is particularly notable in journalism.
But, to be fair, Merriam-Webster narrows the conditions by noting, “to assert in the face of possible contradiction“), in which case the example I gave would not actually qualify. However, since you were in dispute with Mung over making claims in the first place, so of course you must have expected that anything and everything you type in this thread would be ‘in dispute.’
Then, there’s the legal definition, which has to do with ownership and is only tangentally (but quite specifically) associated with actual statements by people.
See where this kind of nonsense goes?
I’m with you Patrick. Personally, I don’t think of statements relating events (such as, “Hey! My wife and I went to this place for Taco Tuesday! I recommend trying it!“), that no one feels compelled to dispute as a claim. Nor, might I add, do I think statements of evidence to dispute claims are claims themselves. But, since Mung doesn’t seem to care much about the intent of the site and lives to get himself wrapped around the axle, particularly in situations he can turn into potential GOTCHA moments, why continue down the rabbit hole?
I backed up my claim as you requested. You don’t have to enjoy the outcome. Do you still honestly think that you haven’t been making claims throughout this thread?
By the way, I’m providing objective empirical evidence and you’re ignoring it. Doesn’t bode well for your demands that fifth provide you with “objective empirical evidence” for his claims.
Reasonable people usually apply logic: if atheists exist, then your premises are wrong. If your premises are wrong, then you can’t deduce from them that knowledge is impossible if atheists exist.
Obviously atheists exist, but don’t let facts get in the way of your beliefs
Well, you got snookered. Patrick managed to get you to focus on his report of a personal experience and ignore yet another obvious claim he made just prior to his “report” that was not a claim.
But he probably really does not think he was actually making any claims. I call that the Lizzie defense.
and
and
Yeah…nothing about wanting a relationship or anything…nothing about loving, or sitting down to supper, and welcoming folks in, or betrothing, or heirs, or…
For something that has no interest in relationships, that deity book uses a lot of odd words…
Well, there is more to the bible than Acts…
The two are not mutually exclusive.
For example, Patrick might be inclined to say the same thing. But I would argue that embedded in his questions and demands there are in fact actual claims. If not explicit at least implicit.
For example, he makes a claim about what kind of evidence is appropriate for settling the matter when he demands “objective empirical evidence.” A claim he’s never supported with any actual objective empirical evidence himself, I note.
Hahaha.
I was trying, but we got interrupted. Perhaps we can get back to it.
For example, I was asking whether “I’m hungry” was intended to describe a sensation and whether sensation is the same as or different from perception, and whether one can be said to have knowledge of a sensation.
Sensations are not beliefs, and knowledge has to do with belief.
Yeah…that god there…he’s a rock and an island. Makes you wonder why went through the trouble of creating humans and why, if he doesn’t need anything, how disobedience is even possible…
Could be. Or perhaps there’s a few implications of biblical dogma you’ve not considered with those presuppositional blinders on.
No worries. After all, that’s all just recounting your personal experiences. We’ll not hold you to any of it. Heck, you may not even be in Spain without any books!
‘Fraid it cannot be an axiom by definiton. Not even have the planet accepts the concept.
That you hold it as the foundation of your knowledge and hold it as an axiom of Christian faith, does not then extend to the general population. You’re in even worse odds in this particular domain…
So…yeah…’fraid it’s a claim, by definition.
Same as above.
Already dealt with.
I get the feeling you don’t see a lot of things…
If you really don’t get it (and it’s apparent you don’t, even after the elaborations I’ve given), I would suggest you see if KN can break it down for you. He has at least noted some of the issues and appears to get it quite well. He’s also much better than I am at articulating philosophical concepts.
ETA: He’s also got significantly more patience…
Is there any reason why you chose “I’m hungry” and not “I’m impatient” for your foundation of knowledge?
I would say that “I’m hungry” is an report of a bodily feeling. It seems a bit odd to say that “I’m hungry” is a bit of knowledge.
A: “I’m hungry!”
B: “how do you know that?”
A: ” . . . . I dunno, I just do.”
Whereas the following makes more sense:
A: “you’re hungry!”
B: “how do you know that?”
A: “you’re short-tempered, disoriented, and having trouble making decisions.”
Notice, however, that in the latter case, A’s knowledge is an inference based on evidence. In the former case, A is not making an inference. This is non-inferential knowledge. Compare
A: “I’m hungry!”
B: “how do you know that?”
A: “because I know how to use the English word ‘hungry’.”
This is not an inference. What A knows is how to use words, when they are appropriate, and how to make herself understood to others who speak the same language.
Her non-inferential knowledge is a response to sensations (a rumbling tummy, low blood sugar), but not reducible to or analyzable in terms of sensations. Nor are sensations premises in an argument; one cannot infer anything from a sensation.
The role of language in producing “I’m hungry”, and the know-how necessary to generate that sentence, shows that non-inferential knowledge is not presuppositionless. A great deal of empirical knowledge is non-inferential — I do not infer that leaves are green or that skies are blue. I see them as such. But I am able to do so because I am a competent language-user with normally functioning sensory capacities — and I both know myself to be such and am recognized as such by others.
In that sense empirical knowledge, although it is in some sense the court of appeals for all “theoretical” knowledge, itself rests on the complicated relations between language and embodiment.
Robin, is this the postion you’re trying to convey?
Are you asking for evidence that the Coyote is a better fictional deity or for evidence that one particular version of the Christian God is a fictional deity?
Explain how you get “hungry” from “short-tempered, disoriented, and having trouble making decisions”. Show how the inference is rational or how there is a causal connection, so that “short-tempered, disoriented, and having trouble making decisions” would serve as evidence for “hungry”.
If I have understood right, you teach at a university. So you actually lecture these things to a younger generation?
1) how do you know what reasonable people do given your worldview?
2) How do you know logic is valid given your worldview?
Yes, but since no one has been able to provide a consistent cogent justification for knowledge sans the Christian God then I can only conclude tentatively that all knowledge is impossible if the Christian God (the one who reveals himself to everyone) does not exist.
That would obviously include the knowledge that atheists exist
peace
Those scriptures are addressed to God’s people not to everyone. It’s a shame you never learned exegesis. When you were constructing the strawman god that you rejected.
He created humans for his own Glory just as he created everything else.
You need to remember that God is a Trinity and being in essence a relational being it’s in his nature to give the gift of himself to others of his choosing. Not everyone mind you just those who are his Children.
The rest of humanity were created to show his wrath and power to his vessels of mercy (Romans 9:22-23)
Perhaps you missed that part when you were misinterpreting those other passages.
peace
This story crossed my desk just this morning. Talk about amazing providence it’s even more proof that God exists.
If you want to understand the issues being discussed you need to understand this article
https://www.quantamagazine.org/20160421-the-evolutionary-argument-against-reality/
Quote:
says Donald D. Hoffman, a professor of cognitive science at the University of California, Irvine. Hoffman has spent the past three decades studying perception, artificial intelligence, evolutionary game theory and the brain, and his conclusion is a dramatic one: The world presented to us by our perceptions is nothing like reality. What’s more, he says, we have evolution itself to thank for this magnificent illusion, as it maximizes evolutionary fitness by driving truth to extinction.
end quote:
peace
Fifth:
Click…whirrr….ticka ticka ticka ticka…*spoink*:
“1) how do you know what reasonable people do given your worldview?
2) How do you know logic is valid given your worldview?”
Reciprocating Bill,
You make my day Bill 😉
peace
Yes, I understand it. That is to say, I understand that it is nonsense.
Wow, it is bad, woo to the hilt. According to him, what we “see” hides a complex reality–except that in actuality we have discovered a complex reality that seems altogether difficult to fake (not that appearances, or constructs built on those, are “true,” they’re just our interpretations of what is open to observation).
On the other hand, there does appear to be an evolutionary tendency for primates to fall for social constructs rather than getting the best “map” of reality via appearances and testing of those. Hence Plantinga, and FMM (“how do you know that?”). But that’s more a matter of social issues (social evolution if you will) getting in the way of a better map of the knowledge of our world, not a problem with perception per se.
Glen Davidson
Yes. A textbook case of decent science ruined by bad philosophy.
Quantum sauce applied to cognitive science like ketchup to caviar.
I use the term “state”, but “sensation” works. I’m not sure that one can really conceptualize “sensation” when first experiencing some awareness, but it works.
I agree. It’s not.
I would describe it as:
A: “I’m hungry”
B: “how do you know”
A: “I don’t. But I’m labeling this state as “I’m hungry”.
The exercise of “I’m hungry” doesn’t get to this stage. It’s only concerned with the individual’s perspective and subjective assessment.
All the latter I agree with. The “I’m hungry” exercise isn’t about knowing one is hungry; that comes later as a product of definitional state change.
Think of the “I’m hungry” exercise this way: what do babies (particularly baby mammals) “know” vs how do they react to “sensations”? Do kittens require the existence of some deity in order to recognize some “desire” and find their way to their mother’s milk? Do they further require the existence of some deity in order to stop drinking and sleep? Lastly, do they require the external (objective) assessment of some state and behavior to confirm their hunger?
Sure, because I’m not the object in the exercise. Technically you are, so maybe I should have gone with, “I’m cranky”…
No.
Yeah…that’s why it says “any man”…
I come from a family of biblical scholars and researchers. You’re not in any position to tell me what I have and have not learned. And in point of fact, your claims really don’t show much understanding.
As for the strawman god, I hate to tell you, but you’re black too Mr. Pot.
So, this god then…it doesn’t “need” glory, but it creates humans for its own Glory. Ooookaay…
Maybe you need a different bible…or a whole different religion…
Uhh…you might try actually reading that passage:
Strikes me that Paul is setting up a hypothetical. As in, “who could argue with God if He did this?
He goes on too:
So…who are the righteous? Not necessarily the “chosen people”. But even the “Gentiles” who did not follow after righteous, have attained righteous.
And the “beloved who were not beloved” and “Ye are not my people; there shall they be called the children of the living God.”
Have you actually sat down and read the bible, Fifth?
‘fraid I’m not the one misinterpreting anything. The words are pretty plain.
I thought there was an echo in here.
So in your understanding God does not require worship? Would it be improper not feel worship?
It is not the human side of the equation that I don’t understand, people worship many things.
Chasing the high ,fifth? I prefer understanding to worship and I certainly admire a good craftman’s work
peace
I find this area of theoretical conceptualization fascinating:
http://www.businessinsider.com/neil-degrasse-tyson-thinks-the-universe-might-be-a-simulation-2016-4
Is your view utterly novel, or can you link to a philosophy resource on the web that discusses it? I tried and seem to have failed in that regard.
It has occurred to me that given that you cannot articulate your views it’s rather unkind of you to complain that fifth has not addressed them.
p.s. Why does your view apply to kittens but not to a bacterium?
I doubt the concept is novel, but I don’t think it’s been formally laid out the way I have it in the “I’m hungry” exercise. I got the idea from an exchange I read on a Yahoo message board some time ago, but sadly that’s long gone. I can’t even find a cache of it. Could be there’s something on ‘sensation’ or ‘state’ epistemic grounding, but I’ve not seen anything specifically. Maybe KN can shed some light.
I will say that the “I’m hungry” exercise is not based on Descartes or on Aristotle.
Well, I feel that I have articulated the “I’m hungry” concept quite well. From my perspective, the issue is that FMM has not engaged in what I wrote. I suggested that KN could elaborate on the concept because I do feel he has the ability to articulate these types of concepts better than I, but that doesn’t change the fact that FMM has not actually addressed what I wrote and has merely repeated his assertion regarding the need for some deity.
But to try to make this more clear: it’s an exercise, not an explanation; “I’m hungry” illustrates presuppositionalism’s lack of validity through engagement, not through definition or assertion.
Bacteria would likely work in the exercise, though few people are as familiar with bacteria as they are with kittens.
But hey…I’m game. Do you have a specific bacteria in mind? Mutans streptococci perhaps? Helicobacter pylori? Escherichia coli?
I think that this the beginning of a helpful turn away from the cul-de-sacs of traditional epistemology. It requires an explicitly anti-foundational method: we can stake out some provisional epistemological position, but that position gets revised as we learn things we didn’t know previously about how animals learn or about how brains process information. Epistemology does (in some sense) clarify the basis of empirical disciplines such as cognitive psychology or neuroscience, but what we learn in the course of inquiry can lead to revisions in epistemology.
That said, I quite agree that we can get a nice handle on knowledge by considering what animals know — how a kitten knows how to respond to his mother, or how a beaver knows how to build a dam. We can understand our distinct kind of knowledge as a type of animal knowledge, where we know how to do things that other animals don’t know how to do — such as how to weigh arguments for and against a law, test a hypothesis, prove a mathematical theorem, or evaluate arguments for validity.
Bingo! Really nicely put.
Pick the one that has a language.
The exercise is not limited by language or lack of language. If you feel there are limits on knowledge without language, then likely you will only get so far in the exercise using bacteria to illustrate state assessment. I’m pretty sure it will still work as an exercise.
That said, it would be pointless for me to do the exercise for someone. Like the Matrix, no one can be told what “I’m hungry” is; you have to experience it for yourself.
Keep in mind though, the “I’m hungry” exercise is specifically a response to presuppositional apologetics, so without starting with that perspective, the exercise doesn’t do anything.
That could explain alot. 🙂
Presuppositional apologetics
Yeah…
I personally find a number of flaws in presuppositional apologetics. The number one issue noted by most critics, even folks like William Lane Craig, is that it’s starting presupposition begs the question (as I noted earlier). But that’s small potatoes compared to what I think is it’s fatal flaw: presuppositional apologetics invalidates itself.
The basis of apologetics is the rational defense of faith against misguided, non-christian, and anti-christian arguments and perspectives by offering a way to present rational arguments about Christianity that make other perspectives on reality look weak by comparison.
Presuppostional apologetics puts itself in an odd bind however. On the one hand, it’s supposed to provide a way of arguing the defense of Christianity by presupposing that God is the basis of all knowledge. However, there are two problems. One, the perspective that generally leads (and supports) presuppositional apologetics is Calvinism, which notes that those who are not granted the Grace of God cannot possibly understand not only God’s proclamations (they come across as absurd to non-believers…seem familiar?), but any argument about God, which would include presuppositional apologetics. Two, if the basis of knowledge is God and one is not granted the Grace of God, then one can’t know anything, including any argument from presuppositional apologetics.
So, given that in general apologetics isn’t presented for other believers (I mean…in theory, believers who buy into Christian apologetics already accept it anyway), what’s the point?
Apparently, there really is nothing new under the sun:
I really should just go back and repost a bunch of the threads and save everyone some time in terms of rewriting all their old comments over and over.
Or…perhaps we really are all in hell…
You just noticed?
Worst shit I read in a long time. Evolution can only function if it properly informs you of the world you actually live in. To claim that there isn’t a connection between survival chance and at least an approximation of understanding of the world the evolving entity lives in, really does qualify as nonsense.
If evolution made some particular species think lions that wanted to eat it, instead were pink ice-cream selling unicorns, then than organism would simply find itself extinct in short order.
How can a professor of cognitive science go so amazingly awry?
So you base your worldview on an argument from ignorance? That’s awesome. BTW, we have provided a cogent justification for knowledge. It’s called reason, and it’s axiomatic. So
Reason -> Knowledge.
Al you are doing is the old trick of adding an extra entity that doesn’t help in the slightest, and makes your argument circular: God, as axiomatic
God -> Reason -> Knowledge
But you need reason to postulate god, are you denying that? So you are stuck in the Reason -> God -> Reason -> God -> Reason -> God -> Reason -> God -> Reason… trap… and that means your approach can never reach knowledge. For someone like me who appreciates the power of evidence to acquire knowledge, it’s very telling that all the evidence supports the conclusion: no knowledge is ever acquired through theology
Still evaluating the evidence, but it is becoming a more compelling hypothesis…
Well, I’m not a fan of Calvinism, so I’m not wedded to any Calvinistic position. But leaving aside God’s proclamations and argument’s about God, what about the evidence for God that doesn’t rely on proclamations or arguments?
From what I can tell, his argument turns on the following:
1. He wrote a computer program in which simulated conscious agents play the same computational role as a simulated world;
2. This looks a little bit like the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The real error in his reasoning, however, is that he neglects the possibility that perceptual systems are “tuned” to organism-relevant information and neglect organism-irrelevant information. That doesn’t mean that the organism “constructs” or “creates” the organism-relevant information that matters to achieving its goals, including reproduction. Instead, different kinds of organisms have different ways of selecting the information relevant to their goals and ignoring the rest.
What I find most striking about this article is that here we seem to have a professor of cognitive science who doesn’t pay any attention to how brains work or how animals behave. It’s all done in mathematics!
I would also stress that the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM remains (from what I understand) controversial among physicists. It’s not “settled science” and I believe it’s inappropriate for a cognitive scientist to be treating it as such.
If you’re coming at this from a Calvinistic (or Reformed Christianity if you prefer) perspective, there is no “what about”. Reformed Theology holds that God actually creates certain humans for the sheer purpose of damnation. They cannot, by God’s own Will and Purpose, EVER accept any evidence for God (why then would any Calvinist need apologetics? You got me there…inquiring minds want to know.)
Keep in mind, in Reformed Christianity, salvation and understanding is granted through the Grace of God. So there is NOTHING any human can do about his or her position/belief vis a vis sin, salvation, knowledge, righteousness, and so forth. Honestly, I can’t quite fathom way those who subscribe to Calvinistic teachings either A) don’t just commit suicide from the get go (it’s not like any action they take can change their “Elected” status and their real rewards await in heaven anyway) or b) don’t climb up in a bell tower with some high-powered rifle and start taking out all those predestined to sin. Seems to me that would at least be merciful. But then, I don’t have the mindset for Reformed Christianity, so what do I know…
See Predestination, Unconditional Election, Total Depravity, and Irresistible Grace if you don’t accept what I’ve posted and you want to learn more about Your Future in Robotics from a Calvinist standpoint. Seriously Mung, I can’t make this stuff up! 🙂
OTOH, if you’re question comes from some other perspective, you’ll have to be more specific.