This post is long overdue.
One doesn’t have to look far to find examples of moral outrage aimed towards theists in general and Christians in particular here at The Skeptical Zone.
Judgmentalism, oddly enough, is prevalent. A pungent odor of opprobrium frequently wafts its way forth from the atheist trenches, and it stinks.
Are we all moral realists after all? Do we all now agree on the existence of objective moral values? If so, what are they and what makes them objective?
As for you moral relativists, are there any of you left? Why ought anyone (including especially Erik, Gregory, myself, fifth, William) be subject to the vagaries of what you moral relativists think others ought to be doing or ought not be doing?
Such opprobrium. Based on what, exactly?
If you are going to claim that we have some moral obligation towards you, you really ought to support that claim or retract it.
After all, that’s the intellectually honest thing to do.
And is there anything wrong with happiness?
William J. Murray,
Don’t put words in my mouth. I don’t consider ‘emotional response’ and ‘irrational’ to be synonyms. Nonetheless, ‘You guys’ are the ones claiming that moral outrage (an emotional response) has to be logically justified, not me.
You have just equated ‘emotional response’ with ‘irrational’. So is ‘irrational emotional response’ tautologous, or do you think there are rational emotional responses they could be contrasted with? I certainly do. ‘Rational’ isn’t simply about ‘reasons’; I may admit to having expressed that poorly. “The chickens made me do it” is a reason, but not (necessarily) rational. See also: God made me do it.
I am obliged to take you at your word, though you appeared pretty pissed at me for (as you seemed to think) promoting a worldview that justifies ISIS.
I realise people can sound outraged without being so. You are very rare on the theistic side. OK, as an outside observer of those human beings who do experience moral outrage, do you find that theists are more rational than atheists on this matter? That is certainly the sense I get from your weighing in on their side, and they appear to feel that you are endorsing their position with regard to it.
One can decide whether one finds a particular emotional response counter-productive or not. One is not merely an emotional automaton.
Moral sensations are ‘real’, in the sense that I experience them and others concur that they do too. They are not merely negative – there is a positive warmth from acts of kindness, both those observed and those performed. One might consider one would get a better life by desensitising oneself to this particular world of experience, or maybe just a part of it. I think one would be mistaken. Responding to and promoting ‘virtue’, and steering clear of excessive ’harm’, have had a positive effect on my life. And so I pass these on to my kids, dear little physico-chemical automata that they are. My 3-year-old daughter knew: “What makes you say that, sweetie?” “My brain!”.
It’s not just this thing (moral outrage) that you think they have no justification for. And yet, as with outrage, you claim not to bother intervening either. So, regardless of your attempt to dodge this one, any challenge that atheists ‘should’ justify X becomes rather weak if it is something that you yourself do not even bother with. I certainly don’t see you telling theists that they have no rational basis for outrage or intervention. Just ‘materialists’. Because …
And what is that justification? I justify intervention because I do not wish to see harm. It’s perfectly ‘logical’. A theist justifies intervention because (typically) they believe their particular Friend and Saviour does not wish to see harm. I don’t find invocation of invisible entities to be particularly superior on the ‘logic’ front, but there you go.
Still, what’s the fundamental difference – what logic is added to their preferences by the insertion of a ‘premised’ inaccessible 3rd party?
And yet (you have said) you neither intervene nor feel outrage. It’s very much a paper exercise.
Actually it is more like pouring the foundation after the carpet is installed on the foundation
EL said:
It is subjective because it is what you personally, subjectively think morality is about – constructing successful societies – especially when the majority of humanity disagrees; they consider morality to be about serving god’s will.
Apparently, you think that moving the subjective nature of your morality back one step to the definitional level, then conveniently redefining morality as “constructing successful societies”, saves you from the subjective “because I say so, because I can” conclusion. It does not; it only serves to hide you from your because I say so definitional fiat.
Apparently, yes. Can you quote exactly where you read whatever it was I wrote that you interpreted in this way?
I didn’t say “it should be”. My claim is that it is. Which is, I suggest, not intrinsically different from your observation that “gratuitous torture is wrong” is something that you, personally, feel (and that all except psychopaths feel).
I’m just putting the more general case – that what I “feel”, in common with all non-psychopaths) is that the welfare of others has value.
Of course. But I think there is an important distinction, which has been made before in this thread, but which is in danger of being lost here, and which is sometimes expressed as the difference between “ethics” and “morality”. Human beings (with the exception of psychopaths, which you agree) tend to put a high value on the welfare of others as well as their own. GIVEN that trait, there can be arguments about what constitutes “welfare” (“this is for your own good in the end…”) and how to resolve competing claims (“send the trolley to kill one person rather than the six it is currently heading for”), but virtually no argument THAT the domain of ethics is about competing welfare claims.
So for me I do not claim to be “absolutely certain” that it is right to value the welfare of others. I simply observe that humans, of which I am one, do, and that that trait is one of the traits that facilitate successful in societies, to the extent that those societies construct ethical and legal systems in order to protect their members from the minority who do not. Nor do I claim to be “absolutely certain” that punishing people for homosexual sex is wrong (though I’m pretty damn sure). It’s an evidence-based conclusion based on the evidence of harms caused by homosexual sex between consenting adults (none that I am aware of) and the evidence of harms caused by punishing people for homosexual sex (vast).
And the only reason I’m not “absolutely certain” of the latter is that it’s straightforward evidence-based knowledge, that is always contingent on new evidence. But I’m as certain of it as I am certain that the earth is round, and on the same basis.
fifthmonarchyman,
Is that a rhetorical question? It appears that you know the mind of the Lord well enough to instruct him on the correct view of both the Species Problem and human-bounding.
Not even slightly.
You respond with approval to a Poe …
Do you have a source for your majority claim?
Objective( in the absolute sense) known to subjective minds , otherwise those moral truths are subject to exactly the same criticisms .
No, it is based on the objective (my definition) observation (which you agree on) that human beings, with the exception of psychopaths) value the welfare of others (as exemplified in your example of gratuitous torture).
It’s no more “definitional fiat” than your “gratuitous torture is wrong” fiat. And I’d argue they come from the same source: putting a value on the welfare of others.
Note that I am NOT saying: it is right to value the welfare of others because that is what builds successful societies, and I will define “right” as “what builds successful societies”. I am saying that humans, by virtue of being social animals, tend to value the welfare of others, and therefore tend to construct ethical and justices systems systems that protect the members of their societies from those who do not so value the welfare of others.
Far from being a definition, it is an observation that that is what human societies base their morality on – balancing the individual against the common good. They don’t always derive the same set of ethical precepts, and some even end up trying to eradicate the trait. But then I’m not the one claiming that there is some “objective” moral truth! I’m observing the basis on which human ethical systems are constructed, namely, the value they (in general) put on the welfare of others, and the resulting need to resolve competing claims.
Actually there is potential harm from consensual sex.
http://www.bbc.com/news/health-34995811
William J. Murray,
Neither social cohesion nor ‘god’s will’ lie at the heart of morality. One can observe children aquiring morality before they have a sufficient conception either of society or of God. Later, when the rational faculties develop, we can provide some extra layers. But one can learn to ‘play nice’ without resorting to religious carrots and sticks.
It is my position that rational, individual agents have aspects to their mind available that are not subjective.
What do you mean by this?
I think he means the wishes and desires of theists take precedence.
A common theme of these discussions appears to me that theists wrap the causal account of morality up with the ‘obligation’ side, and assume that atheists are doing so too.
The theist’s causal account is that the source of morality is external to humans, and we are mere ‘lightning rods’ for the preferences of this ‘thing’. Moral sensations are vibrations in this moral sensor. The obligation side is a little less clear – does one have an obligation to not incur the displeasure of this ‘thing’, or maybe to get special favours from it? Not sure, but regardless, cause and obligation are co-located in some way.
For the atheist, however, the causal account relates to certain genetic predispositions overlain by culture – culture itself acting through a predisposition, the ability and desire to learn cultural norms and a tendency to endorse them. It’s tied up with the linguistic capacity – we learn what ‘good’. ‘bad’, ‘nice’, ‘dishonest’ etc mean, and which attract approval/disapproval, which leads to linguistic/moral agreements. When one says they think it ‘morally good’ to torture babies, they evidently have a ‘private definition’ of ‘morally good’.
But this creates no strong ‘obligation’ – one is certainly not obliged to follow one’s genes, and not fundamentally obliged to culture either. Yet whenever one discusses the causal account, the theist leaps to the ‘obligation’ side.
“You believe the moral sense was subject to Natural Selection – why shouldn’t I rape/eat you/conduct some other activity that I imagine Natural Selection means?”.
“You believe there is typically a consensus? Might makes right!”.
“You think people act on mere moral sensation? Ice creeeeeam!”.
Allan said:
I never said one had to have a conception of god in order to behave morally, nor have I said any religious carrot or stick is necessary to behave morally.
El said:
Humans also value having power over other humans and value possessing lots of stuff and property. That doesn’t mean morality should be about acquiring as much power over others and as much property as possible.
Yes, it is, because you are claiming that “good” means X simply because you are defining that good means X. We are both in agreement that gratuitous torture is immoral; I suspect most of the world’s population throughout history would agree. I personally don’t think that morality has anything to do with “constructing a successful society”, nor do I think most people do. Religious theists by and large do not.
Therefore, you are establishing “what is moral” by definitional fiat because you have nothing – ultimately – upon which to rest the definition other than your own personal idea of which qualities of human behavior should be considered the basis of morality. I can pick other qualities of human behavior and – by definitional fiat – call those behaviors or facts the basis of morality, and it would be jusified by the same principle as yours; my alternate morality would be based on objective facts concerning human behavior – they would just be different facts because I want to justify a different morality.
I could justify just about any moral system the same way by choosing which facts about human behavior I want to ground my moral system in, and thus it would be a moral system grounded in objective fact.
The problem, EL, lies in what we mean by “good” and “welfare”. You seem to think it’s all about avoiding physical pain and discomfort and acquiring happiness and satisfaction. I do not.
Is that position based on personal feelings that reason can determine the objective? I ask because I feel the same way.
Allan:
I never said one had to have a conception of god in order to behave morally, nor have I said anyreligious carrot or stick is necessary to behave morally.
El:
Humans also value having power over other humans and value possessing lots of stuff and property.That doesn’t mean morality should be about acquiring as much power over others and as much property as possible.
Claiming that “good” means X simply because you are defining that good means X is definitional fiat.
We are both in agreement that gratuitous torture is immoral; I suspect most of the world’s population throughout history would agree. I personally don’t think that morality has anything to do with “constructing a successful society”, nor do I think most people do. Religious theists by and large do not.
Therefore, you are establishing “what is moral” by definitional fiat because you have nothing – ultimately – upon which to rest the definition other than your own personal idea of which qualities of human behavior should be considered the basis of morality.
I can pick other qualities of human behavior and – by definitional fiat – call those behaviors or facts the basis of morality, and it would be justified by the same principle as yours; my alternate morality would be based on objective facts concerning human behavior – they would just be different facts because I want to justify a different morality that has nothing to do with humans being a social animal.
That humans are a social animal is just one fact out of many; why should that particular fact be the basis of morality? Because you want to ground a morality that is about how we treat each other from a society-building perspective? Do you not see the circuitous nature of that argument? Sure, if you already think morality should be about society building, it makes sense to pick that particular fact about humans to ground your morality in. But, what if you don’t think that morality should be about society-building?
I could justify just about any moral system the same way by choosing which facts about human behavior I want to ground my moral system in, and thus it would be a moral system grounded in objective fact.
The problem, EL, lies in what we mean by “good” and “welfare”. You seem to think it’s all about avoiding physical pain and discomfort and acquiring happiness and satisfaction and building a successful society. I do not.
I’m not crazy about every aspect of this characterization, because you tend to use “objective” to mean not only that but also eternal, absolute, unchanging, etc. — which is to say, you tend to characterize the objective as mathematicians (and more precisely, as mathematical Platonists do) rather than as empirical scientists do. For scientists, the fact that our knowledge of the world is constantly being revised does not make that knowledge any less objective.
I shall mention, but only to set aside, the more profound difference between our approaches here: for you, objectivity is a mere premise or assumption, whereas I actually think that we can have objective knowledge of both facts and also of values.
A more specific point worth raising here: it’s wholly unclear why “purpose” is the only concept that can satisfy the demand for an objective criterion of evaluation for moral judgments. Why can’t facts about human ecology and neuroscience play the same role? Earlier I suggested a different conception of moral facts:
Whether or not moral realism is compatible with naturalism remains hotly contested, which is why there are lively debates among naturalistic anti-realists and non-cognitivists, naturalistic moral realists, and non-naturalistic moral realists.
All I’m trying to do here is point out that there are rather intelligent people who have thoughts about these issues for much longer than you or I have, and you might not want to be so assured that you’ve figured out all the answers.
ROTF! I laughed for a good three minutes over this!
In the immortal words in Inigo Montoya, “I do not think this word means what you think it means…”
LOL!
Two problems:
1) not everyone agrees with this assertion
2) not every who does agree with the above assertion agree on which god is personal.
Ergo, not only is the assertion not a fact, it is questionable at best and utterly worthless for determining anything about interpersonal communication.
Per Fifth, revelation makes an assertion a fact. How does he know this? Revelation
petrushka,
What’s so funny ’bout peace, love, and understanding?
Those are indeed the ethical issues over which human beings differ, William, I agree. In fact, I specifically pointed out that people can differ over WHAT constitutes “good” or “welfare”, including people who think that it is worth suffering pain here in the interests of bliss in the life hereafter.
I also explicitly said this:
I like this post.
Elizabeth, I value laws and regulations not just for the welfare of others, but also as a calculated benefit to myself. I am safer and happier in a regulated society.
As for the welfare of others, I put my immediate family first.
And for the calculated benefit of my family and my descendants, I value the safety and well being of everyone, and also equal opportunity for everyone. I have ho way of knowing whether I will have descendants in a hundred or two hundred years, but if I do, the network of kinship could be vast. Hence, I do not wish my descendants to live in a society that is authoritarian or brutal. I have no way of knowing whether they will be high or low on the economic and power scale, so I value education and opportunity for all classes.
I realize that not everyone thinks like this, but most of the people I know express these sentiments, even if not explicitly.
I rather doubt that William or Mung or phoodoo or Gregory will respond to this, but I wish they would.
EL said:
Which amounts to nothing more than “because I pick this particular fact of human nature, and interpret it thusly, then what is moral is from that point forward is objectively X.
For example, I can say that humans, by virtue of being social animals, tend to value the usefulness of others (which is true) so … (followed by objective X facts about increasing the usefulness of others). Or, they tend to value their own position and power in a social system so … (followed by objective X facts about increasing my social position and power). Or, I could start somewhere else entirely – like: humans, by virtue of being predators ….
And there’s no reason I should not, because “shoulds”, under that paradigm, are generated objectively forward from one’s choice of (1) objective human facts (2) how those facts are interpreted into a moral system.
So you have simply begged the subjectivist question back to definitional fiat, where any other definition is necessarily, logically as valid, because morality doesn’t extend backwards from the point of definition to say which definition we should use.
What is there to respond to?You’ve stated what kind of society you prefer to live in. So? What does that have to do with moral outrage or the argument about objective vs subjective morality?
KN asks:
Because facts do not tell you which facts to use or how to use them. There are all sorts of facts present in your kitchen. Without a purpose you do not know which facts are pertinent nor how they should be used. If you want to make a peanut butter sandwich, then you know which facts are pertinent, and how they should be used, to fulfill that purpose.
Whether or not it is hotly contested, naturalism (as per a definition meaning cause and effect physicalism/materialism without libertarian free will or objective purpose) is incompatible with the idea of an objective morality.
The capacity of intelligent people to deny what is true via convoluted semantics and ideological bias doesn’t reduce my capacity to understand what is true one bit.
William,
Correct me if I’m wrong about this, but if I’m reading your posts correctly, you hold that “morality”, the term, applies to something specific outside human existence. In other words, to you, morality is a specific thing that exists independent of any human interpretation of that thing. So for instance, your criticism of EL’s and KN’s descriptions of morality is that their descriptions are based on arbitrary characteristics (why do they arbitrarily pick facts related to how people relate to one another and call ensuing behavior “moral interaction” vs…say…using facts about flight or the movement of water?) and their very definitions of “morality” are arbitrary interpretations of what they “feel” morality is rather than what it actually is and what it is for?
Is that an accurate assessment of your perspective?
I don’t have moral outrage, but I do have outrage at some things people do.
Morality is something that people invent. Claiming you have a pipeline to
God is just an annoying delusion. It carries no political weight and does not impress me.
Robin said:
It resides in the fabric of reality. It is both within and outside of ourselves.
Yes.
Generally speaking, but I would say that while it may be a good argument that one would premise that some human characteristic should serve as the basis for human morality (how humans should behave), it’s arbitrary as to what characteristic you pick, which facts about that characteristic you use, and how you translate those characteristics into oughts.
Ok. Got it. Thanks!
No at all. it presupposes absolute morality in the form of “justice”.
People making laws has been the cause of all kinds of bad things from holocaust to the designated hitter rule.
peace
No it like planning the foundation with the eventual floor covering in mind from the start.
peace
unanimity of opinion is not a requirement for truth.
peace
If the person making the assertion is God then yes it is a fact.
It is a fact if God believes it and God does not lie so we can believe what he says.
peace
الله أكبر
Is God a person?
Except that the facts I have in mind here are facts about functions. We disagree on whether there are objective purposes — I don’t think there are — but I do think there are objective functions, and we can find out what they are. I treat the objective ground of morality as something to inquire into and learn more about, not as something I simply presuppose as a blanket assertion.
I think there’s a bit of shifting of the goal-posts here. First you seemed to contend that moral realism requires theism. Then I offered a version of naturalistic moral realism according to which there are facts about human ecological and biological functions — functions resulting from past evolutionary history and which can be modeled by neuroscience and other empirical sciences — serve as an objective ground for morality. They do so because we can inquire into whether a moral judgment (or more precisely, a family of moral judgments) tends to promote or hinder those biological functions. And that too is an empirical question.
Now you say that that’s not enough, because moral realism require more than just an objective basis for morality, but also that the objective basis must take the form of purposes rather than functions, and also that libertarian freedom must also be presupposed. Both of these moves seem utterly question-begging to me.
No he is not.
According to the Koran (S. 5:46-47) Christians are supposed to judge Muhammad’s message by the Bible and the Bible says that Allah is not greater
quote:
“I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery. “You shall have no other gods before me.
(Exo 20:2-3)
end quote:
That settles it
peace
God is tri-personal.
One God three persons and all that
peace
But how do you know if it’s God saying it?
KN said:
Okay then, let’s follow this up some. How do you go about determining which biological/neurological fact is “improper” or biologically-generated behavior is “immoral”?
I’m glad someone finally asked.
Before I answer tell me if you think it is possible for an omnipotent God to say something in such a way that I can know that the message is from him?
I don’t mean suspect it’s from him I mean know it’s from him.
Once you answer that one simple question we can explore how he might choose to do it in a particular case
peace
fifthmonarchyman,
Why can’t you just answer?
Allan said:
Then what criteria determines if your reasons provide a rational basis for your actions? In my book, it’s logic – if your reasons are logically sound, then you are behaving rationally. If your reasons are not logically sound, then you are not behaving rationally.
I really don’t get this. Do I type in all caps? Call you names? Make aspersions? Attempt to ridicule you? What do I say that makes it seem to you that I am pissed at you?
I do the same thing – I figure out what works in my life and I do those things. I figure out what doesn’t work and I steer clear of those things. I would imagine that most people would consider “excessive” harm to be always immoral. I mean, why apply more harm than is necessary for the purpose intended?
I’m not that familiar with how major religions explain “moral outrage”, but on first blush no, most theists in the major religions don’t appear to have a rational grounding for their moral outrage. After all, at the end of things in those religions, it’s not like god can lose or god’s plan can be ultimately thwarted. I can see doing your moral duty, but I can’t really see where “outrage” is warranted. Perhaps in some religion moral outrage is called for by their god. I’m just not that familiar with or educated about any of the major religions.
5MM or Mung seem particularly outraged.
Please remember, I’m not saying moral outrage is wrong; I’m saying, it doesn’t appear to be rationally appropriate given either the materialist or most theistic premises.
I don’t think I’ve ever said that I don’t bother intervening. I would certainly intervene, and have intervened, in those situations which call for my moral intervention. However, I also as much as possible wish to respect the individual rights and free will of those who wish to do immoral things because I think it is immoral for me to intervene in the sense of physically stopping them unless it is a situation where such intervention is necessary to my own moral well-being.
What difference does it make if I bother with it or not? My arguments are not rooted in the idea of “I do this, so you should too.” Rather, they are rooted in the idea of “If you claim your view is rationally justifiable, then defend the logic.”
There could be a rational basis for moral outrage under certain forms of theism; there can be no rational basis for moral outrage under any form of atheism/physicalism. Moral outrage would just be a physical fact that the body produces in certain situations. It would be physically caused, not rationally justifiable.
You mean someone asked for the thousand and one times?
To the casual observer ,you are the person making the assertion, how can we know when it is fifth and when you are channeling another person?
Is belief in that God required for that knowledge?