This post is long overdue.
One doesn’t have to look far to find examples of moral outrage aimed towards theists in general and Christians in particular here at The Skeptical Zone.
Judgmentalism, oddly enough, is prevalent. A pungent odor of opprobrium frequently wafts its way forth from the atheist trenches, and it stinks.
Are we all moral realists after all? Do we all now agree on the existence of objective moral values? If so, what are they and what makes them objective?
As for you moral relativists, are there any of you left? Why ought anyone (including especially Erik, Gregory, myself, fifth, William) be subject to the vagaries of what you moral relativists think others ought to be doing or ought not be doing?
Such opprobrium. Based on what, exactly?
If you are going to claim that we have some moral obligation towards you, you really ought to support that claim or retract it.
After all, that’s the intellectually honest thing to do.
Interesting. Never heard that reference before, Patrick. Although, in reading about the origin of the term, I think it is used mostly in reference to liberals, particularly those who use social media to vent their outrage over what they feel is some social injustice (like posting French flags on Facebook to show support for the victims of the terrorist attacks), rather than actually going out in the world and working to change the root cause of the social injustice.
But whatever…cool term. Thanks!
Precisely, William. That was my point – in that sense of the word “objective”, human morality is an objectively observable fact.
Yes, That is the point I am trying to make (or one of them).
I dispute that there is a problem at all. I think the charge that atheists don’t have an objective morality is a straw man.
I don’t think anybody here DOES think that morality isn’t objective, by the definition I’ve given. It’s the theists who keep arguing that we can’t possibly have an “objective morality” (by some definition) without belief in some sort of god.
It’s bullshit, frankly.
EL said:
It may be a straw man wrt some argument that you are making, but it’s hardly a straw man wrt the argument I and other theists make and wrt the counter-argument many non-theists/physicalists make.
My point was that your definition is utterly useless because it provides anything agreed to by multiple people the imprimatur of being “objective”, or “objectively discovered” or “objectively figured out”, etc. That is simply not the argument most people are having when they are debating “subjective” vs “objective”. By your definition, “vanilla is the best flavor of ice cream” becomes objective knowledge as long as two or more people agree to it.
When most people argue whether or not something is objective vs subjective, they are arguing if a thing has certain values or characteristics regardless of if anyone agrees to it or not, and regardless of how many people agree to it. In your argument, different people can have contradictory objective knowledge about whether or not a thing is moral.
Well, by any definition of the word “objective” that isn’t watered down into meaninglessness.
What’s bullshit is you trying to redefine the word “objective” just because you don’t like the idea of admitting that (1) your morality is subjective in nature, and (2) what that logically, necessarily means, and (3) that you cannot live according to the logical ramifications of that worldview.
It’s sorta like how you guys redefine “free will” because you don’t like the idea of being biological automatons, when that’s really all you can be without it.
Well, give me your definition of “objective” if you don’t like mine.
That’s what I asked for.
I agree completely. Which is partially why I don’t feel moral outrage.
newton said:
No, I mean they have no basis for moral outrage at all, because they do not logically have the capacity to judge the moral content of the behavior of others since, as a subjectivist, they hold morality to be a subjective commodity. I mean, they might feel logically justified moral outrage at their own immoral behavior, but they have no grounds to project their personal moral feelings onto others.
I think that many moral objectivists agree that they do have such access via the conscience.
William, you crack me up. From June of this year:
William, a few minutes ago:
Allan said:
Well, if you’re admitting your moral outrage is irrational, then no rational justification is necessary. However, aren’t you the guy that says a thing is rational as long as you can provide a reason for your behavior? If so, then “it’s an irrational emotional response” is all the rational justification you require.
There isn’t any. Which is, I would suppose, why I haven’t regained it after losing it under my atheism.
I addressed it earlier in this or the other thread. I don’t think moral outrage is rationally justifiable under either my own theistic views or under subjectivist views. I lost my moral outrage back when I was an atheist because I realized (at the time, under that worldview) that it was an irrational response to brute physico-chemical facts. What was the point of being outraged over something that was essentially a matter of biologically/culturally programmed preferences? I might as well be outraged at the shape of a maple leaf.
My perennial battle-cry? I don’t know that I’ve ever even addressed “moral outrage” much before this thread. Before this, I argued that subjectivists have no logical justification for moral interventions, whereas moral objectivists do. I’m not that familiar with all forms of theism to judge if they have a sound basis for “moral outrage”, but objective morality gives most of us not only a sound basis for intervening, but an existential obligation to do so.
William?
keiths,
Pointing out immoral behavior and hypocrisy is not the same thing as being outraged by it. This is why I can keep my cool and continue contributing here in a calm and collected manner no matter how often I’m ridiculed by OMagain or RichardHughes, or how often my contributions are quote-mined and mischaracterized by you.
I still feel things when confronted by immoral behavior, but for the most part I just feel hurt – not for myself per se, but for those that are behaving that way. It pains/disappoints me when people behave immorally.
It’s in your own words, William:
That’s an expression of moral outrage. Misplaced moral outrage, but outrage nonetheless.
Your self-image is badly distorted.
He’s just…disappointed, you know.
Actually, what would be most scary would be if his rants were truly done coolly. The only excuse (hardly adequate, but at least an excuse) for the wild accusations he’s often made, especially at UD, would be some ill-informed outrage.
Glen Davidson
keiths,
I’m content to let readers decide for themselves whether or not the tone of my posts here appear to reflect some “moral outrage” on my part. For myself, I know it to not be the case.
There are many posts on this site, IMO, on both sides of the debate that reflect what I consider to be “moral outrage”. Gregory and hotshoe, for an example on each side, post often in what is obviously a “moral outrage” tone.
Deliberately employed rhetoric to advance a cause or position is not the same thing as moral outrage.
Only following orders….
William, you said I had “watered down” the definition of “objective”.
Can you give the neat version?
William:
As am I.
Hence my remark about your distorted self-image.
Well, congratulations. But that’s kinda the point. For example, is faith healing moral? Immoral? Depends?
In the UK laws had to be passed to ensure that people were told that visits to psychics and similar are “for entertainment purposes only” and so on, as people were getting endlessly taken advantage of. I’m not sure it helped.
Is ‘pretend PSI for money’ moral? Immoral? Depends?
Is ‘donations gladly accepted faith healing’ moral? Immoral? Depends?
Is telling people in a that a faith healer “possibly” cured someone you know giving what is certainly false hope to others in similar situations moral?
Exactly so. Why invent things when reality is so much more interesting and imaginative then you could ever hope to be?
Elizabeth,
Objective = having certain qualities or characteristics regardless of any individual or interpersonal agreements about those qualities or characteristics to the contrary.
Objective fact is what it is, no matter if everyone in the world disagrees.
Objective morality = X is wrong no matter who or how many say otherwise, even if it is **everyone**.
Adding people who agree to a subjective view does not take the view any closer to being an objective view. It just increases the pool of those with that particular subjective view.
OK, so tell me how it could possibly be [objectively] determined that X is objectively wrong, given that it is theoretically possible, according to your definition, that everyone could agree that X is right.
Except that, as keiths has repeatedly pointed out, this doesn’t get you to objective morality. As you note, adding one more person who agrees to a subjective view doesn’t get you to objective morality even if the person is God. To get genuinely objective morality, by this criterion, would require moral facts of the sort to sustain moral realism. Divine command theory is clearly incompatible with moral realism, and natural law theory doesn’t fare much better, since natural law theory only purports to show that we have divinely instituted purposes; one would still need to show that those divinely instituted purposes are the right sort to ground moral facts.
Conversely, it’s an open question among moral realists whether moral facts are non-natural (as Shafer-Landau seems to think) or natural (as McDowell, Foot, and Casebeer think). Casebeer, in particular, argues (in Natural Ethical Facts) that we can explain moral facts as proper evolutionary functions of cognitive systems and can be modeled objectively using neuroscience. Foot runs a similar argument, though without invoking neuroscience, in her Natural Goodness.
In other words — taking this together with my previous post — naturalism is consistent with moral realism (if Foot and Casebeer are right), and even if non-natural moral realism were the right view, theism is neither necessary nor sufficient for non-natural moral realism.
KN said:
God isn’t a person. I know you know better than this, KN. Surely you do.
Well, I don’t know if it’s logically incompatible with moral realism, but it is definitely useless in any practical sense as a grounds for moral realism.
No, you don’t have to show it. You only have to premise it. It is only under that particular premise that one can have a sound and useful objective morality.
Unless you’re going to premise that natural forces generated humans for a purpose, there’s no such thing, under naturalism, as objective morality. If nature did generate humans for a purpose, I think “god” would be a suitable term for a purposeful nature.
Whether or not it can be determined is irrelevant. The question is not what can be determined, but rather what must be premised in order for our behavior to logically follow from our worldview. Then, if we must premise that thing in order to explain our behavior, we must follow the logic of what else the premise necessarily indicates.
If we premise that morality is subjective (including transpersonal to various groups), then X logically follows.
If we premise that morality is objective (meaning, it is what it is regardless of if everyone else disagrees), then Y logically follows.
We can demonstrate the problem by situating the naturalist/atheist in a community where X is considered proper moral behavior. The naturalist considers X outrageously immoral and wrong. Does the naturalist change their own view to be in accord with the group? Or does the naturalist disobey the group if they feel it necessary and attempt to change the moral view of the group?
One behavior is consistent with an intellectually realized, logically consistent view that morality is subjective and determined by groups (transpersonal agreements). If the naturalist does anything other than change their own views, they are acting contrary to what you, EL, have said is objective knowledge about morality.
But, that’s not how anyone acts, other than perhaps sociopaths. We will buck the system and put our own lives and comfort at risk for that which we feel is a moral obligation, regardless of if all of society disagrees with us. We act as if our conscience is tied to something objectively real which transcends the power of the group or society to say otherwise. We act as if certain moral truths are universal, binding, and absolute. We know certain moral facts for an absolute certainty, and feel they are so important they are worth dying for.
Exactly
check it out
quote:
“For who has understood the mind of the Lord so as to instruct him?” But we have the mind of Christ. (1Co 2:16)
end quote:
how cool is that
Exactly.
Now you are getting it. When we define things we do so derivatively. God’s opinion is the one that matters
Peace
So now you demand more than evidence you now want a detailed argument.
I expect that once you see an argument sufficiently detailed to satisfy you will simply demand something else.
The claim is quite simple
premise 1) Without God knowledge is impossible
premise 2) I know this.
conclusion: Therefore God exists.
how do you know this? How could you possibly know anything given your world view?
peace
no,
The incarnation is necessary for creation but it need not proceed creation temporally.
Think of the original Rocky movie
The Rocky movie would not exist with out the climactic bout between Rocky and Apollo Creed. However that in no way means that the bout has to be the first scene in the movie
Get it?
peace
Who exactly is the public?
peace
No God is the sovereign creator and sustainer of all things his opinions are objective simply because of that fact.
quote:
objective: not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.
end quote:
God’s definitional role is not influenced by personal feelings or opinions but facts.
Facts are simply the things that God believes
He is God you are not. Creation is his to do with as he pleases.
He speaks and therefore he objectively decides what words mean
Rebellion on the other hand is simply acting as if you have a right to do what you are not authorized to do.
peace
Working on it,
1. The Incarnation has always existed in the Mind of God, just like a perfect circle
2. The telos of creation is to make the existence of Incarnation flesh ,without the Incarnation there would be no creation.
Therefore creation is necessary to make the Incarnation flesh and since the Incarnation proceeded and is the point of creation ,the Incarnation is necessary for creation.
Close?
And we’re still waiting.
Yes. Like your own private definition of a code.
Why is the definition of words so important to you? Science is not apologetics.
It was not private Mung. That is the whole point. It was public and explicit.
The people you are trying to communicate with.
Well that is exactly what I am disputing. I’m saying that whether your putative “objective morality” (e.g. that “X is wrong” is objectively true) can be determined, objectively, is highly relevant, and it it cannot, then it is not only an oxymoron, but useless.
So how on earth can it be a necessary premise? How un earth can you base a sensible logical argument on a premise whose truth cannot be determined?
It would depend on the naturalist, the view, and the group, just as it would with anyone. Remember, that you have stipulated, as part of your definition of “objectively true” that whether “X is wrong” is objectively true cannot be determined [objectively, using my definition, at all, using yours]. So if, for instance, I were to become a member of a group that challenged some view that I had hithertoo held, I might change it, if I found it persuasive, or observed that the behaviour, which I had assumed would be harmful, was not. On the other hand, if I did not find it persuasive, and observed that the behaviour caused exactly the harm I thought it would, I’d hang on to my original view.
In neither case would the belief that either “X is right” or “X is wrong” was an “objective moral truth” help me decide which.was true, nor would it be necessary.
No, it is not. If you think it is, you have completely missed my point. I do not think that it makes any sense to say that there can be truth statements such as “X is wrong” that are both “objectively true” and “not possibly to determine”. I think it is a nonsense. I do think that it makes sense to say that it is “objectively true” that thumbscrews and hunger cause pain, and that it is objectively true that most people regard pain as something they wish to avoid, and that it is objectively true that most people regard other people’s welfare as a moral priority.
That is NOT the same thing as saying that what is objectively moral is what the majority think is objectively moral.
And I agree that the conscience is “objectively real”. We can objectively (my definition) observe that human beings put value on the welfare of others. We can even see why they should do so. Our human tendency (with, as you say, some exceptions) to behave as social beings in which the good of the group is often placed before individual self-benefit, is an objectively observable fact.
Most people don’t. They act as if the good of individuals need to be balanced against the good of the group, and that sometimes laws and taboos are necessary to constrain those who cheat.
And that kind of certainty is exactly leads to dangerous fanaticism. So it seems that belief in “objective morality” is actually worse than useless – it is actually dangerous. Give me a secular social pragmatist over a suicide bomber any day.
ETA fix typo
Mung,
Nineteen pages into the thread, and you still haven’t figured why subjective moralists care about what other people do? (And for William it’s actually been years.)
Let’s take a specific example. I think that cruelty to animals is a moral issue, because I think that the well-being of animals matters. Since I think the well-being of animals matters, things that threaten that well-being — like cruelty — are undesirable. It’s why I don’t think I should be cruel to animals, and it’s why I don’t think others should be cruel to them either.
Given that I care about animals, it would be totally irrational for me to treat them well myself but then shrug and say “It doesn’t matter if others treat animals well, because my morality is subjective.”
So the short answer to your question is that I care about what other people do because I am rational. I see the mistake you and William make over and over, and I think “That’s really stupid. I’m glad I’m not making that mistake.”
Lizzie,
Yes. That’s one of the reasons I keep stressing that absolute certainty is mythical.
False certainty is an excuse to stop questioning one’s beliefs. The world would be much better off without it.
Well, unfortunately people who are absolutely certain are not mythical!
But that’s why I like Oliver Cromwell’s plea:
“I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken.”
Which of course I regard being said by Cromwell to me as well as to everyone here, not as by me to everyone else.
fifthmonarchyman,
No, and if you kept context in your replies this would be clear. I asked you this:
You replied:
This isn’t objective, empirical evidence, but if it’s the best you’ve got I’ll try to work with it.
It is, however, an unsubstantiated claim. You’ve declined in the past to provide a full argument to support this claim, yet now you want to use it as evidence for the existence of your god.
You have more work to do. As it stands now this claim can be simply dismissed as baseless.
EL asks:
Whether true or not, it’s necessary to logically accommodate how I actually behave in the world wrt moral actions and what I actually experience.
Sensible, logical arguments are based on hypothetical premises all the time, EL, even premises nobody thinks are actually true – like, “If Santa existed …. ”
Also, I didn’t say that the truth of the premise cannot be known, I just said that knowing the premise is true is irrelevant to the argument. And it is, just like it is in any logical argument where one evaluates the logic following a given premise.
I wonder what it means, from your “transpersonal agreement” version of objective knowledge, to “determine the truth” of any proposition? As far as I can tell, it means to have others agree with you that the proposition is true. That is how you claim objective understanding is arrived at, correct – from your worldview?
Then, from your worldview concept of acquiring objective knowledge, as long as others agree with me that my premise is true (objective morality), it is true by your concept of how “truths” are acquired. Thus, I could be determining the truth of my premise the same way you would be determining the truth of your premises – transpersonal agreements. There are certainly more people that agree with my view that morality is objective in nature than agree with your perspective that it is ultimately a matter of transpersonal agreement. By your own worldview explanations, I win, simply because I have more people that agree with my premise than agree with yours.
But, that is exactly what my (and I assume, our) moral experience directly contradicts – that our moral knowledge depends upon the agreement of others. Our moral knowledge is what drives us to contradict others, even if everyone else says we are wrong, and even if we put our own safety and comfort and standing in the group at risk. So, we cannot be determining our moral knowledge from interpersonal agreement; rather, our interpersonal agreements (wrt moral views) are determined by a shared sense of morality.
Now, as to whether or not one has access to objective moral knowledge, I would say that yes, we do. We have access, but access is like a door we can open or shut. I think there is a part of all agents that is connected to the objective divine (which is absolute and objective as it gets), and that objective moral values can be directly known. I also think that other forms of objective information can be directly known, as well. When we can formulate propositions that accurately depict some aspect of this objective knowledge, we call them self-evident truths, or propositions that must be true or else absurdity necessarily follows.
For morality, a self-evidently true statement of direct, objective moral knowledge is: it is wrong to gratuitously torture people. I am absolutely certain that statement is true, whether or not everyone else would disagree with me.
1) creation is necessary for incarnation
2) incarnation is necessary for creation
It’s irreducible complexity all the way down 😉
This is to be expected because even God himself in his aseity is irreducibly complex. You know The Trinity and all that,
peace
EL said:
Good grief, EL, we’re arguing about the logic. A logically consistent naturalist who believes moral knowledge is nothing more than transpersonal agreements established by a group/society should, logically, change their own view and go along with the group. Right? They have no logical grounds for disobeying the group or trying to change the moral views of the group. Right?
No, EL. If by “determined” you mean “known to be true”, I didn’t stipulate that. I said it is irrelevant to my argument. I do think we have access to objective knowledge, because we are not just indivdiuated, subjective entities.
What do you mean, “if you found it persuasive”? You have said that the basis of objective moral knowledge is transpersonal agreement; logically, the persuasiveness of that knowledge lies entirely in the fact that it is transpersonally held, while your view (in that scenari) is not. Now, you are saying there is some commodity other than the fact of a view being transpersonally held that makes that commodity “objective knowledge”. It appears you are now saying that “whatever you personally find persuasive” is the standard by which “knowledge” should be ultimately judged, whether or not that knowledge is transpersonally agreed upon.
Wait … what difference does it make if it is harmful or not? It sounds to me like you are insisting that transpersonal moral agreements must conform to some other standard you personally hold or else you are not willing to change your views to that of the group. IOW, you are insisting that your personal idea of what morality is transcends/takes precedens over the objective knowledge of the group.
Why would you do that? Does “transpersonal agreement” only dictate objective knowledge when it agrees with your personal views? Or are you saying you insist on your own premise of “what morality is about” regardless of whether or not anyone else agrees with you? Can you prove that it is objectively true that morality is about not harming others?
Or, do you just know that morality is about not harming others, regardless of what everyone else says, and that any morality that will harm others (generally speaking) is an incorrect morality?
As I said, EL, you behave like a moral objectivist. You will not get rid of your inner knowledge of what morality is, you will not submit, you will not conform to the group “knowledge”, if you know it is wrong. No “transpersonal agreement” necessary.
I didn’t say it would help you make your decision. I argue that it is the only premise that logically justifies your decision.
Ok, God is personal.
There is interpersonal communication with God before anything exists. Creation itself is an act of communication. In fact the universe itself is nothing but a medium that the persons of the Godhead use to communicate their Glory.
God never ceases to communicate with himself and all his creation.
How utterly absurd for a few tiny insignificant specks of creation to unilaterally decide that they will define their own words with out reference to the creator who is talking to them at that very moment.
peace
keiths,
Huh? So it matters to you if others eat meat? Or wear leather?
EL said:
This is based on your erroneous interpretation. I never said that moral truths cannot be determined/known. I said, it’s irrelevant to the argument – just as you have shown that it is. Can you prove or demonstrate that morality is about “not harming others”? Of course not. Billions of humans transpersonally agree that you are wrong. Is it then a nonsensical argument to debate from the premise that morality is about “not harming others”, since you cannot demonstrate that this is what morality is about?
You refer to what “most people think” when it serves your inner moral compass, and ignore it when it does not. Just as I said. You only have two options to justify this:
1. Because I feel like it, because I can (logically consistent personal moral subjectivism). IOW, your personal, subjective feelings determine what morality is about and how it should be actioned, or
2. Your inner moral compass is presumed to refer to absolute (my objective def.) moral knowledge, which determines, for you, if any group’s morality is right or wrong, regardless of if anyone else agrees with you or not.
There is no third option because you will dismiss the group’s morality if it doesn’t meet up with your inner criteria.
But an argument based on a false premise will lead to a false conclusion. Observe:
Premise: it is objectively true that homosexual sex is wrong.
Conclusion: therefore it is right to do all we can to prevent homosexual sex.
It’s logical, but the conclusion is only as true as the premise, the truth of which cannot be ascertained, by your definition of “objective”.
Of course it’s relevant. It may not affect the logic but it sure as heck affects the truth of the conclusion.
A valid argument based on a false premise may or may not result in a true conclusion.
An invalid argument based on a true premise may or may not result in a true conclusion.
An invalid argument based on a false premise may or may not result in a true conclusion.
Only a valid argument based on a true premise will reliably lead to a true conclusin.
So if we cannot determine the truth of the premise, then any argument based on it is moot.
I don’t have a “transpersonal agreement” version of objective knowledge. I think we can know that something is probably true if independent observers can independently come to the conclusion that it is true. But that doesn’t guarantee truth, nor does it define it. Independent observers independently agreed that Newton’s laws of motion were true. But they turned out not to be. However, they hold well enough for most purposes. And they are a lot better (“truer”) than some other laws of motion). The arbiter, I would say, as to whether a statement is true, is whether it makes good predictions.
However, that doesn’t apply to “moral truth” because when we say that it is “X is wrong” is “true” we are making a quite different claim to saying that “F=MA” is true. So I think that moral truth claims are a different category of claim, and I wouldn’t even call them “knowledge”.
But what we can say is a verifiable truth (in the F=MA sense) are:
That human beings regard the welfare of others being comparable important to their own welfare (we can make predictive testable hypotheses about this).
And we can also, I suggest, take it as a self-evident premise (it’s virtually implicit in the etymology), that “welfare” means “what promotes continued healthy functioning”.
Given those two objectively (by my definition) verifiably approximate truths (because all verifiable truths are approximate I suggest) I’d say it was logical to say that actions that promote the welfare of the actor at the cost of others are the kinds of actions that human beings will tend to regard as immoral.
This conclusion does NOT depend “harming others is wrong” being objectively true by your definition, nor does it require the assumption that the statement is an “objectively true” statement. In fact, it starts exactly where your line of argument started, in the observation that most humans don’t think that their own welfare is the only welfare that matters.
Our “moral knowledge”, as humans, is simply our built-in tendency, to put a high value on the welfare of others.
You ascribe it to some theistic source. I ascribe it to evolution. Either way, we agree that that is what we (in general) do.
OK, well, the only difference between me and you is that I do not regard “gratuitously torturing people is wrong” as an “objective moral truth”. I simply regard as an aberrant undervaluation of welfare of others matters – aberrant, because it is not what a healthy human animal does. As you point out, the minority of people who torture not only other people, but, typically, animals, are often diagnosed as psychopaths, and they are diagnosed as psychopaths because the rest of us non-psychopaths not only do value the welfare of others, but recognise that as a corollary of that valuation, it is important to corral, and, if possible, correct, the psychopaths so that they do not undermine the welfare of others.
In other words secular morality is entirely logical:
Premise: valuing the welfare of others is an observable human trait
Conclusion: therefore humans set up legal and ethical rules systems such that those who undervalue the welfare of others are discouraged, and where possible prevented, from harming others.
“Morality” is the name we give to these systems of rules, and they are subject to adjustment in the light of evidence as to what constitutes harm and welfare.
Thus, whereas in some circumstances, torture of heretics was a moral imperative (to save their souls and the souls of others), we mostly now acknowledge that the evidence for harm in some afterlife from believing a heresy is at best slim, and that therefore there is no moral argument for torturing heretics.
Similarly, punishing homosexuals was and sadly still is a moral imperative for some, who believed that homosexual sex, even between consenting adults, was harmful. We know know that there is no evidence for this, and indeed, plenty of evidence that forcing gay people into hiding their homosexuality and into heterosexual partnerships can be deeply harmful. So mostly, not only do we no longer regard homosexual sex as morally wrong, we regard the punishing of people for homosexual sex as itself wrong.
This is not “subjective morality” – quite the reverse – it is evidence-based ethics, grounded in the objective fact that human society consists of animals who display the very species trait that enables them to live in successful societies, namely, the tendency to put a high value on the welfare of others.
Basically you have said that you want others to behave in a certain way because you want others to behave in a certain way.
Talk about a vicious circle.
It’s no different than saying that things that threaten your selfish happiness are undesirable. Well of course they are….. to you…… that goes with out saying.
Why should other people care?
peace
Fifth, can you think of anything seriously wrong with the preamble to the American constitution? Is there anything inherently wrong about getting together to make laws?
EL said:
I didn’t say “the majority”. I said what the transpersonal group agrees is objectively moral. If the transpersonal group agrees a thing is moral, by your own definition it has been objectively determined that the thing in question is moral. Are you walking back your definitionof what “objectively determined” means? Did I misunderstand you?
If only I had any idea what you mean by this. It’s probably not what I mean when I use the phrase.
Humans put value on all sorts of things; that doesn’t mean that such valuations are what morality should be about.
There are also lots of other observable facts about human behavior. Them being observable facts doesn’t mean that morality should be about those facts.
Even if what you have described above ;is true, it in no way contradicts what I said about people behaving as if morality is absolute & objective; in fact, it compliments what I said, because “what is good” is what people consider to be absolute. As you yourself have shown, if they do not consider what the group says is good “good”, they will defy it/try to change it. You’ve state that you will defy the group concept of “good” if it doesn’t conform to your own.
It is also what leads to the moral grounding and obligation to oppose, even to one’s own perial, dangerous fanaticism. You yourself have it – it is why you will oppose the group if you consider them morally wrong. You just aren’t comfortable calling it absolute certainty.
Are you absolutely certain it is immoral to torture people for your own gratification?
You mean, give you a eugenics supporter, or a nazi collaborator over a suicide bomber any day? You make the fundamental logical error of thinking that because some certainty is dangerous, all certainty is dangerous.
Calling your own moral certainty something else, and defining it as something else, doesn’t change the fact that about some things you are as morally certain as I or any suicide-bombing theist.