http://mashable.com/2016/06/02/elon-musk-simulated-reality/#sdLXHm2_jsqB
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The Skeptical Zone
"I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken."
Remember my main objection? What’s the point?
To reiterate; the swampman thought experiment is trivial. If the substitution is identical, there is no discernable difference from entity A being rematerialised as entity A. Swampman is not a different entity, it is entity A. You either can’t discern and Kirk is Kirk or you can discern (but that would involve non-identicalness) and new Kirk is not old Kirk.
But why are we strolling down this pointless rabbit-trail?
keiths:
Bruce:
True, semantic-engine style meaning doesn’t exist; that is, original intentionality doesn’t exist.
However, sorta meaning does exist and is implemented by syntactic engines. The two-bitser’s state sorta-means “detected a quarter” and it also sorta-means “detected a quarter balboa”, and there is no fact of the matter about which is the real meaning. The two-bitser’s state does not sorta-mean “detected a US nickel”, however.
No. I haven’t claimed that there is no fact of the matter regarding Swampman’s ability to understand English. I think he does understand English, After all, we agree that non-Swampman understands English, and since Swampman is physically identically to non-Swampman, he has the same capabilities.
Who’s we? There is no difference in your scenario between swampman materialising as non-swampman or as swampman. There are no consequences.
Alan,
Swampman and non-Swampman are physically identical, but they have different histories. That’s the whole friggin’ point of the thought experiment.
If you had been able to follow the discussion, you would know that the point of contention between Bruce and me is whether the difference in history alone is enough to disqualify Swampman from “understanding English”.
Don’t mix Swampman up with your twin-Kirk scenario. The latter is problematic, for reasons we’ve already discussed.
As for Swampman and non-Swampman, you can distinguish between them if you have observed their histories. Their futures are identical, as are their present physical states; but their histories differ prior to a certain point.
The fact that you find this stuff difficult and are confused by it does not make it a “pointless rabbit-trail”. It just means that you are a confused guy who finds this stuff difficult.
Alan:
keiths:
Alan:
As in the previous comment, ditto here. The fact that you become confused by a thought experiment is not an indication that there’s anything wrong with it.
That’s why I asked:
Speaking of what philosophers do for a living, Michael Tye has a paper where he considers what would be the experience of Swampman sent to Inverted Earth.
I don’t seem to be getting my point across to you. To be able to say something like “they have different histories”, you have to have some means of distinguishing two entities. If you can, they are not identical. If they are identical, you cannot establish different histories. It’s not complicated.
My wife is en route collecting guest from the airport, hence my narrow window of opportunity for commenting. I have looked at the paper (I may have skimmed it a little 😉 ) but I can hear Dennett’s siren voice. As to the SEP article, you may know that I think the whole idea of qualia is a nonsense of zero explanatory power. As my wife would disagree, I’m open to persuasion otherwise. 🙂
Alan,
I understand your point, but I disagree with it.
They can be physically identical without having identical histories. If you’re standing there when a lightning bolt turns a dead tree into Swamp Nigel Farage, you’ve witnessed part of his history — his electrical ‘birth’. You then know he is not the same entity as non-Swamp Nigel Farage, even if the two are physically identical.
That’s for sure.
Only if I tag him somehow. Then the two Farages are not identical. Furthermore, identical to the last molecule would mean, as memory is embedded physically, they would both self-identify as the real Farage.
What point are you making, if there is one?
ETA: no rush, I have RL stuff to do.
ETA2: in the case where entity A disappears and entity B appears whether due to lightning or transporter beams, the same basic argument applies. You can’t have it both ways. Identical implies reincarnation. It’s the same Kirk (or is it!!!)
One last thing.
I think a thought experiment on the lines of what might happen if I could travel near the speed of light or what would falling into a black hole feel like, I can see real merit.
In a thought experiment like science fiction or other fantasy, suspending disbelief and altering the rules of reality to create imaginative and entertaining stories are fine. Big Game of Thrones fan, me!
Keiths is falling between the two stools of being useful and being entertaining. Just my twobobsworth.
Good grief, Alan.
You don’t have to physically tag him. You just have to track him.
If Swamp Nigel Farage is zapped into existence before you, and you manage to keep your eyes on him for the next ten seconds, then at the end of that ten seconds you know that the man you are looking at was zapped into existence ten seconds ago rather than being born the normal way.
As you say, it’s not complicated.
keiths,
Develop your point from there.
Alan,
Now that you’ve been corrected on a couple of crucial points, why not reread the relevant parts of the thread with the corrections in mind? Perhaps you’ll be able to follow the discussion this time around.
All my experience of the World would enable me to reject that out of hand. I’d think I’d been fooled in some way. So how otherwise am I to establish new Farage is not really the old Farage? All I’ve witnessed is an apparent discontinuity. I can’t distinguish your scenario from being fooled. Is identical Farage new Farage or old Farage. Necker cube, anyone?
Really must go!
ETA, water into wine 🙂
LOL
Alan,
That misses the point entirely. Whether you think you’re being fooled is irrelevant to the fact that the physically identical Nigel Farages have different histories.
It’s not that difficult a concept. Suppose you’re building two copies of a machine from identical sets of parts. In one case you assemble the base first and then the motor housing before joining the two together. The second time around you assemble the motor housing first, then the base. Different histories, same end result.
.
And the point you presumably wish to make is..?
Ah! When you say “physically identical” what you mean is “not quite identical”!
Nope. Similar result. Not identical. You’re being a bit imprecise in your language here.
ETA 36°C outside so gardening cancelled. Window has widened.
Dennett denies a version of qualia that are defined as ” intrinsic, nonphysical, ineffable properties” but few current philosophers would use that definition. Dennett does not deny first person experience per se.
There are many scientific studies of qualia: eg psychoacoustics, color naming. And of course food companies have specialists paid to determine how to adjust the taste of the product so as to generate the highest sales.
My objection to qualia is that they are not a thing. The concept is so fluid as not to help (me). I’m fine with the science of perception and attempts to give explanations for phenomena and how our perception of reality is not reality. (KNs maps and territories). Calling some aspect of perception a quale does nothing to improve understanding.
I pretty much agree with this.
BruceS mentioned some “scientific studies of qualia”. But I don’t see those topics that he mentioned as having anything to do with studying qualia.
Well, sure. Calling something X does not explain it. That does not mean it is not helpful to have a name and some attempt at a definition for the concept of what you are trying to explain. Note the “some attempt at”.
Is “jazz” a word without purpose if it is true that” if you have to ask what it is, you will never know?”
I tried to stick to the phrase “understanding a language”, not just the single word “understanding”.
Then I claimed that, although I and my twin understand a language, it is not the same language we understand, because the contexts and histories of our respective linguistic communities differ by a large enough degree.
Now recall that according to Putnam I and my twin are molecular duplicates. That fact does not change the conclusion.
Accepting my criteria for understanding a given language means that there can be no language which SM understands at the moment of its creation, even though it too is my molecular duplicate.
I am not sure what you don’t see and so I don’t know what point you are trying to make.
Hence, any further reply by me would no doubt miss that point.
This would all be fine if I could be convinced that “qualia” are a coherent group of phenomena.
Of course a nested set of descriptions, definitions, categories help us focus in and out of a field of study. Biologists study living organisms without needing to define “life”.
I’d put “qualia” with the so-called hard problem of consciousness as being arguably counter-productive in achieving progress in the study of cognition. I like Dennett’s sweeping side-step on qualia as I like Michael Graziano’s side step on consciousness.
From the physicalist’s point of view, postulating two identical (down to the last atom) duplicates, means in the case of swampmen, Captain Kirks and so on, identical sets of brain states, memories etc. Any divergence means differences in brain states, therefore we cannot claim identicalness.
Learn Laconian! 🙂
I will happily admit that my first Swampman example was imperfect: its problem was that it was underspecified. As Bruce noted, I didn’t say if it was on Earth or not. I also didn’t say how long it was around, which could affect answers to my queries about it.
I did not mix it up with anything (as you have). I did not leave out any characters, as you also suggested. It was perfectly fine for the questions I’ve asked you and you still haven’t answered. In sum, it has none of the problems you have confusedly suggested. But, yeah, it wasn’t great.
Now let’s talk about you. You are responsible for a significant portion of this 2000 post thread. More than a tenth of them. A fifth, maybe? Perhaps half of your posts have been confused, contained red herrings, or been intentionally non-responsive. And a bunch of them have now become obnoxious to boot.
Early on, when you asked for links, taking some time and trouble to do so, I pointed out a bunch of them on Noyau that I took to substitute repetitions of what was being questioned for answers to those questions. You ignored those complaints, of course. You have still admitted no errors or omissions on your own part. Honestly, I’m not sure you can. But I know you’ll get into all of this in your promised OP on the honesty one ought to display on the internet.
Such duplicates would necessarily have identical histories, at least to the extent that memory corresponds to history. Not only would outsiders be unable to tell them apart, they would not be able to tell themselves apart, not in the sense of knowing which has which history.
petrushka,
Exactly!
petrushka,
In the case of Swampman, memory doesn’t correspond to history at all for times prior to ‘birth’.
Swampman and non-Swampman have the same ‘memories’ for those times, but vastly different histories.
keiths,
So not identical, then.
What def do you like?
Ostensible memory does not, though–which is why keiths put “memories” in quotes above.
Certainly true for my memory! (I had to look up “ostensible”)
keiths:
Alan:
The one I proceeded to make in the very next sentence, obviously. Please try to set the childishness aside, Alan.
keiths:
Alan:
No, by “physically identical” I mean physically identical. Two physically identical objects may or may not be identical in other respects, such as “has history H” or “is being gazed upon lovingly by Irene”.
keiths:
Alan:
The funny thing is that when I wrote that, I asked myself, “Should I state the obvious, just so Alan can’t misconstrue this?” My answer was, “Nah, even Alan will get this.” Big mistake on my part.
Okay, here’s the child-proof version:
Not only are there two physically identical sets of parts, but the individual assembly operations are performed in a physically identical fashion. Thus, at the end of assembly, the two machines are physically identical. Yet the operations were performed in a different order for one machine versus the other. Thus they have different histories.
Physically identical machines, different histories.
keiths:
Alan:
As I keep explaining, they are physically identical, which is the entire point of the thought experiment.
Do you really not see that the word “physically” is actually playing a role in the phrase “physically identical”?
Do you really not see that the word “physically” is actually playing a role in the phrase “physically identical”?
It is intended to play a role, but I doubt you can actually define what you mean by it.
By qualifying “identical”, you negate it. Almost unique is not unique.
Ninja’d
Alan:
Are you actually serious?
Does “identical in shape, but not in composition” sound nonsensical to you?
Depends on context. I’d use “similar”. And no, I’m not taking you seriously. I’ve long since ceased to do that.
Alan,
If it depends on context, then what about the context we’ve been discussing?
keiths:
Do you really not get what “physically identical” means in that context?
walto,
I’m not talking about your twin city example. This is the mistake I’m talking about, as you know, and it came before you presented the twin city scenario:
That’s incorrect, for reasons I’ve already given.
Now, in desperation, you’re resorting to false accusations:
False. I responded to them in great detail.
My OP is about the psychology of (not) admitting mistakes, not about “the honesty one ought to display on the internet.” I’ve pointed this out at least four times, and still you persist with the misrepresentation.
To summarize:
1. You made a couple of silly mistakes.
2. You couldn’t bring yourself to admit them.
3. You still can’t bring yourself to admit them.
4. In desperation, you are making stuff up about the person who pointed them out.
If your goal is to make yourself appear ineffectual, immature, and dishonest, then carry on — you’re doing great.
Otherwise, you might want to pause and reconsider.
keiths,
Regarding context. Identity has a specific meaning regarding twins and is an important concept mathematically. You seem to want to claim you are being specific whilst effectively remaining vague. But carry on. Maybe your point will emerge in due course
Motes and beams.
PS the technique of unsettling your fellow commenter by gratuitously insulting them is rather obvious and is becoming less effective.
Alan,
It isn’t a “technique”, and there’s nothing gratuitous about it. When you or walto make false claims, I dispute them and cite the evidence.
Says Alan, whose own behavior at TSZ has been even more ineffectual, immature and dishonest than walto’s.
Alan,
Why not answer my question?
And of course thé Goebbels technique! 😉