Does quantum entanglement violate relativity?

Ever since the implications of quantum entanglement between particles became unavoidable for physicists and cosmologists, the doubt of the accuracy or completeness of Einstein’s general and special theory of relativity became real… Einstein himself called quantum entanglement “spooky action at a distance” because the possibility of faster than speed of light transfer of information between two entangled particles (no matter what distance between them) would violate relativity and the fundamentals of one of the most successful theories in science…

Recently, however, several experiments have confirmed that entanglement is not only real but it seems to violate relativity.

The results of the first experiment have provided the speed of entanglement, which was measured to be at least 10.000 times faster than the speed of light. here

In the second experiment scientists have been able to send data via quantum entanglement at 1200 km distance. Next OP will be on this theme…

Quantum entanglement is a phenomenon in quantum physics where 2 particles, like photons or electrons, become entangled, or their quantum state, or properties, became interdependent. Any change to the property of one entangled particle instantaneously (or faster than speed of light) affects the other. Einstein believed that the exchange of information at the speed faster than speed of light would create paradoxes, such as sending information to the past. That was one of the reasons Einstein and many other physicists have rejected quantum mechanics as either incomplete or false. And yet, up until today, no experiment has ever contradicted any of the predictions of QM.

As the experiments clearly show, the speed of entanglement is at least 10.000 faster than the speed of light and if that is the case, then entanglement violates relativity, as quantum information about the quantum state of one entangled particle instantaneously affects the other entangled particle…

So, if that is true, as it clearly appears to be, why didn’t we hear about it on the News?

What I would like to do with this OP is to get everyone involved to state their opinion or provide facts why these news have not been widely spread or accepted…

As most of you probably suspect, I have my own theory about it…Yes, just a theory…for now… 😉

BTW: I love quantum mechanics…
Just like Steven Weinberg once said: <strong><i>”Once you learn quantum mechanics you are really never the same again…”

501 thoughts on “Does quantum entanglement violate relativity?

  1. newton: Not sure what you mean by an essence , does one’s life experiences contribute to it or is it bequeathed from on high?

    You’d have to ask walto he is the one who brought it up as a reason to deny quantum immortality .

    Peace

  2. walto: Are we interested in………….. Those are all different things.

    I’m not particularly interested in any of those things they seem to me to be a rabbit trail. However several folks here seem to think that the issue of walto’s indistinguishably is relevant to this topic.

    I would simply say that if the MWI is correct there is no way to say which walto is the true walto.

    So by extension each and every walto is the true walto given materialism or none of them are.

    I recall a thought experiment in which a future women’s brain ( call her Alice) is comprehensively and perfectly downloaded into an advanced computer.

    Now you have two beings each claiming to be the real Alice how can a materialist choose between the two.

    That is the sort of thing I find interesting

    peace

  3. Kantian Naturalist: In other words, Albert’s objections to the Copenhagen Interpretation (which seem quite right to me) have also got to apply to the Many Worlds Interpretation.

    I would tend to agree. The problem is that once we eliminate Copenhagen and MWI the pickings start to get slim.

    peace

  4. walto: OK, then distinguish them. What property does one have that the other doesn’t? (Hint: If you understand this example, you’ll find you can’t.)

    for starters sphere one is appears to me to be in one spot and sphere two is in another (possibly to it’s left or right).

  5. fifthmonarchyman: I would tend to agree. The problem is that once we eliminate Copenhagen and MWI the pickings start to get slim.

    I find the basic idea of Bohmian mechanics quite interesting but I don’t know enough to be an advocate or critic of it. But since we don’t have any version of quantum mechanics that’s compatible with general relativity, I don’t get too caught up with any of these issues. And since we don’t even have a single unified comprehensive theory of fundamental physics, I don’t think the prospects are good for “reducing” biology to physics. Heck, we don’t even know how to “reduce” Mendelian genetics to molecular genetics, or psychology to neuroscience!

  6. fifthmonarchyman: I would simply say that if the MWI is correct there is no way to say which walto is the true walto.

    So by extension each and every walto is the true walto given materialism or none of them are.

    The most one could say is this: given the many worlds interpretation, there exist universes in which there are counterparts of us which differ by virtue of some quantum mechanical event. That’s not to say that a counterpart exists in every universe — there are universes in which my parents never met, or in which they never had children, or had a daughter instead of a son, etc.

    That aside, since I am mortal in this universe, then all of my counterparts are also mortal as well. No immortality to be found in the MWI.

  7. fifthmonarchyman: I’m not a fan of the many worlds interpretation except maybe as part of a tri-perspectiveal understanding of QM in conjunction with the Copenhagen and Relativistic perspectives.

    The reason I’m exploring it here is that I’m very intrigued by arguments for immortality that don’t involve the Christian God.

    This sort of exercise helps me to sharpen my own views and to understand where other folks are coming from.

    It’s the kind of interesting discussion I would like to see more of here.

    I would love to hear what folks with a classical materialist/naturalist understanding ofconsciousness and person-hood think of the idea that immortality is certain in their worldview if the MWI is the correct understanding of QM.

    peace

    I know where you’re coming from…
    If you’d like to sharpen your understanding of the possibility of immortality from QM prospective, I’d recommended Penrose/Hameroff quantum consciousness theory called Orch OR…
    Their 20 year predictions have recently been verified by experiments…
    I don’t think OOR proves immortality, at least not yet…
    However, the quantum information conservation law can validate their theory of the conservation of our experiences, memory etc. If they are proven to be quantum…

  8. fifthmonarchyman: I would simply say that if the MWI is correct there is no way to say which walto is the true walto.

    So by extension each and every walto is the true walto given materialism or none of them are.

    Is this the argument then? I’m asking because you won’t just tell us.

  9. fifthmonarchyman: You’d have to ask walto he is the one who brought it up as a reason to deny quantum immortality .

    Peace

    If you want to hypothesize immortality ,what is it that is immortal?

  10. fifthmonarchyman: I recall a thought experiment in which a future women’s brain ( call her Alice) is comprehensively and perfectly downloaded into an advanced computer Now you have two beings

    Computers are beings?

    each claiming to be the real Alicehow can a materialist choose between the two.

    Pick the original.

    How does a non materialist answer the question?

  11. fifthmonarchyman: You’d have to ask walto he is the one who brought it up as a reason to deny quantum immortality .

    Peace

    Essences are necessary properties, characteristics that make something the sort of thing it is. So, e.g. persons are sometimes held to be essentially sentient. Note that’s not true of human beings. Other species (including alien ones) might be said tto be persons if and only if they’re sentient, while some human beings (which, presumably, essentially have a certain sort of DNA) are not sentient, and so, not persons based on that definition. Iguanas may be essentially reptilian.

    An individual essence (or ‘haecceity’) is thought by some philosophers to be an essential property of an indivual item, a property that can be had by nothing but that individual and is had by that individual in every possible world in which it exists.

    I note again that most philosophers these days who think that no person could be anybody else (though many might have been seamstresses rather than a plumbers) nevertheless do not rely on haecceities.

    And I don’t think one needs them to deny that MMI entails immortality. Why Everett or anybody else thinks it might has still received no explanation or support on this thread, in spite of my repeated request for any argument to that effect,

  12. J-Mac: If they are proven to be quantum…

    How are you getting on with your replication of the “think to affect interference lines” experement?

  13. Nothing seems to stop you aging, so who wants to be an immortal pile of dust?

  14. So the answer seems to be “No”, that entanglement does not violate relativity.

    yawn.

  15. newton: If you want to hypothesize immortality ,what is it that is immortal?

    in this case walto

    peace

  16. OMagain: Nothing seems to stop you aging, so who wants to be an immortal pile of dust?

    no one I’d suppose.

    What you want and what you get are two different things

    peace

  17. newton: How does a non materialist answer the question?

    Alice is a person the computer is just a computer that pretends to be Alice

    peace

  18. walto: Is this the argument then? I’m asking because you won’t just tell us.

    Why does there always have to be an argument??

    I’m just fleshing out the implications of materialism given the MWI

    peace

  19. `

    fifthmonarchyman: why does the original have priority?

    peace

    Your claim of ‘an implication is a claim that immortality FOLLOWS from MWI. I would like to know how. Capisce?

    Since you can’t or won’t tell us, I’ll give it a whirl for you. (I get so little thanks for this kind of thing here {sniff} )

    Let walto be anyone born to aggie and sig in 1952.
    According to MWI, whenever walto dies in some world there’s at least one other world in which he doesn’t.
    Therefore, according to MWI at any time t subsequent to 1952, there is always some world in which there is a walto who is not dead.
    Therefore, walto is immortal.

    Is that the basic idea?

  20. fifthmonarchyman: in this case walto

    peace

    Only if some timeline / world created by a decision by W allows him to be immortal. If that is not a possible world, no immortality.

    I wonder ,when W turns left rather than right and creates a new world, would that create a new timeline for every person in the world in order to populate the new time line?

    In other words MWI allows one to create the Universe and everything that ever was by deciding on chocolate rather than vanilla.If one is a literal creationist we would create God Himself.

  21. fifthmonarchyman: why does the original have priority?

    peace

    It is the original. “something serving as a model or basis for imitations or copies.”

    You did not answer my question. Since your point seems to be demonstrate the deficiencies of materialism since you have mentioned materialism repeatedly, please provide the alternate view.

  22. fifthmonarchyman: Why does there always have to be an argument??

    I’m just fleshing out the implications of materialism given the MWI

    peace

    No you are fleshing out the implication of a version of MWI, you keep getting that wrong.

    W is asking why the version you choose makes sense otherwise you are fleshing implications of a strawman.

  23. walto: Therefore, according to MWI at any time t subsequent to 1952, there is always some world in which there is a walto who is not dead.

    Not to be morbid but by the year 2200 in every possible world, there may be no possible world in which a person born 1952 is still alive. We cannot know.

  24. newton: Not to be morbid but by the year 2200 in every possible world, there may be no possible world in which a person born 1952 is still alive. We cannot know.

    Yes. And there seem to me a number of other problems with it too. But perhaps that’s not the actual argument. We may never know. Certainly FMM isn’t going to tell us.

  25. walto: Certainly FMM isn’t going to tell us.

    Perhaps you should adopt the pose and await revelation?

  26. walto: Your claim of ‘an implication is a claim that immortality FOLLOWS from MWI. I would like to know how. Capisce?

    Since you can’t or won’t tell us, I’ll give it a whirl for you. (I get so little thanks for this kind of thing here {sniff} )

    Let walto be anyone born to aggie and sig in 1952.
    According to MWI, whenever walto dies in some world there’s at least one other world in which he doesn’t.
    Therefore, according to MWI at any time t subsequent to 1952, there is always some world in which there is a walto who is not dead.
    Therefore, walto is immortal.

    Is that the basic idea?

    The world will never know.

    For what it’s worth, the second premise is false. What the argument needs is some additional premise that takes us from,

    1. For any individual P1 existing in a universe U1, there exists at least one another universe U2 in which P2 exists.

    to

    2. For any universe Un, there exists an individual Pn.

    I don’t see how that argument is going to work without a quantifier-shift fallacy.

  27. It all looks like bullshit to me. In the absence of evidence, it’s all Harry Potter stuff.

  28. newton: Maybe but not enough to test it on himself and achieve quantum immortality.

    I’m striving for quantum immorality.

  29. Mung: I’m striving for quantum immorality.

    ha ha …very funny…I think…or I should think it should be funny coming from you…
    High five! Good job!

  30. J-Mac: Kantian Naturalist
    Exactly this. Once you know that state of one entangled particle, you know the state of the other entangled particle. There’s no transmission of Shannon information, because there’s no reduction of uncertainty. So quantum entanglement doesn’t violate general relativity.
    I’m really disappointed with this comment of yours… Neil’s is even worst because he didn’t even bother to check the details how the experiment was set up to go around the detection system “faster than light”
    Why don’t you both read up on Shannon’s dichotomy? It is obvious that his argument is flawed but it has been ignored…

    For those who are confused about my comment to Kan, here is a quote from Wiki regarding Shannons/Van Newman theories:

    “The von Neumann entropy is being extensively used in different forms (conditional entropies, relative entropies, etc.) in the framework of quantum information theory.[10] Entanglement measures are based upon some quantity directly related to the von Neumann entropy. However, there have appeared in the literature several papers dealing with the possible inadequacy of the Shannon information measure, and consequently of the von Neumann entropy as an appropriate quantum generalization of Shannon entropy.[citation needed] The main argument is that in classical measurement the Shannon information measure is a natural measure of our ignorance about the properties of a system, whose existence is independent of measurement.

    Conversely, quantum measurement cannot be claimed to reveal the properties of a system that existed before the measurement was made.[11] This controversy has encouraged some authors to introduce the non-additivity property of Tsallis entropy (a generalization of the standard Boltzmann–Gibbs entropy) as the main reason for recovering a true quantum information measure in the quantum context, claiming that non-local correlations ought to be described because of the particularity of Tsallis entropy.”

  31. walto: there is always some world in which there is a walto who is not dead.

    I would rephrase it like this

    “There is always some world in which walto does not die.”

    walto: Is that the basic idea?

    It’s in the neighborhood I suppose.

    peace

  32. newton: Only if some timeline / world created by a decision by W allows him to be immortal. If that is not a possible world, no immortality.

    I would say that it’s a very tall order to show that immortality is impossible in a particular world.

    Unlikely yes but impossible is something else entirely.

    I would expect there is a path that leads to immortality in almost every world it might not be a happy immortality but that is beside the point.

    newton: If one is a literal creationist we would create God Himself.

    I think this is an important point. In the MWI it seems that everyone is in a sense the creator of his own reality.

    peace

  33. fifthmonarchyman: I would rephrase it like this

    “There is always some world in which walto does not die.”

    It’s in the neighborhood I suppose.

    peace

    Finally something I can understand!
    So, is walto both dead and alive in other worlds just like the Schrodinger’s cat?

  34. here again is a syllogism that I’m playing with.

    premise one: something empirically equivalent to the many worlds interpretation is plausibly correct

    premise two: Given the many worlds interpretation at least one individual that is indistinguishable from walto will never die.

    conclusion: If the many worlds interpretation and a materialist understanding of
    consciousness/personhood is correct walto is immortal.

    peace

  35. Kantian Naturalist: Well, that premise certainly doesn’t follow from the MWI.

    again from here

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortality

    quote:

    Putting aside the philosophical problems associated with individual identity and its persistence, we may assert that, under the many-worlds interpretation, the experimenter continues to exist through all of their superpositions where the outcome of the experiment is that they live. In other words, we may say that the experimenter survives all iterations of the experiment, whichever its number. Since the superpositions where the experimenter lives occur by quantum necessity (again, under the many-worlds interpretation), it follows that their survival, after any realizable number of iterations, is physically necessary; hence, the notion of quantum immortality.

    end quote:

    peace

  36. J-Mac: So, is walto both dead and alive in other worlds just like the Schrodinger’s cat?

    Not exactly. In the MWI walto is both the cat and the scientist who looks in the box.

    Since a dead scientist can’t observe anything walto is necessarily always alive.

    get it??

    peace

  37. fifthmonarchyman: Not exactly. In the MWI walto is both the cat and the scientist who looks in the box.

    Since a dead scientist can’t observe anything walto is necessarily always alive.

    get it??

    peace

    fifth,
    I think you lost me…
    Your claim is not even QM.
    Do you have a theorem to support it? I’d love to read it…if it exists…

  38. fifthmonarchyman:
    here again is a syllogism that I’m playing with.

    premise one: something empirically equivalent to the many worlds interpretation is plausibly correct

    premise two: Given the many worlds interpretation at least one individual that is indistinguishable from walto will never die.

    conclusion: If the many worlds interpretation and a materialist understanding of
    consciousness/personhood is correct walto is immortal.

    peace

    The second premise is false, and it’s invalid to boot. The first premise is ok, tho you don’t need that ’empirically indisguishable’ bit. Otherwise, a total mess. But at least I get where you’re coming from now.

    Thanks.

  39. walto: The second premise is false, and it’s invalid to boot.

    I’m sorry but you need to elaborate here.

    That premise is pretty much just a summary of the quantum immortality idea that was advocated by Everett himself.

    If you think you understand the MWI better than the guy that formulated it then It behooves you to explain exactly where he erred.

    walto: But at least I get where you’re coming from now.

    I posted the syllogism at the very beginning of this conversation I’m not sure how you could have missed it.

    Like I said it’s very much a work in progress. I’d certainly like some help in cleaning it up

    peace

  40. J-Mac: Your claim is not even QM.
    Do you have a theorem to support it? I’d love to read it…if it exists…

    Of course it’s QM. I don’t have my own theorem I just encountered the idea a few months ago.

    here is a Wikipedia page with a summary

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortality

    Here is an overview from astrophysicist Ethan Siegel he is pretty entertaining.

    https://medium.com/starts-with-a-bang/quantum-immortality-5a74caaa0f64

    Check them out and if you have questions I will try and help you out if I can.

    peace

  41. fifthmonarchyman: I’m sorry but you need to elaborate here.

    That premise is pretty much just a summary of the quantum immortality idea that was advocated by Everett himself.

    If you think you understand the MWI better than the guy that formulated it then It behooves you to explain exactly where he erred.

    I don’t know much about MWI, but it’s pretty clear that Everett didn’t have even a faint idea what immortality means. And you need to do some work on what a valid syllogism looks like.

    You’ve got too many terms, for example: stuff turns up in the conclusion that’s not mentioned anywhere before it. But there’s a bunch of stuff prior that’s not there for any reason too, like, as I mentioned the “empirically equivalent” in 1. The problems with 2 are manifold. as Newton, Neil and I have explained a bunch of times already (and I note that you have made no responses). Furthermore, as KN added, since MWI is supposed to be a scientific theory, each world must be physically as well as metaphysically possible. So we need evidence that it’s physically possible for a human being to persist 200, 300, 500, etc. years. Say we agree that if any walto persists, I do (which is already ridiculous) so that I could be argued to persist because one version freezes himself: it needs to be physically (not just logically) possible that this counterpart walto can be thawed and be alive and conscious 500,000 years after being frozen. What’s the evidence for that? And our galaxy isn’t immortal itself, so even if any of those speculations made sense (which they don’t) how can some entity stuck inside it be summarily claimed to be? In a word, (2) is a pile of baloney.

    The introduction of the materialist biz in the conclusion blows up any possibility of validity. You’d need to introduce that in one or more premises. And materialism seems to me to be not particularly friendly to immortality because on its view, personhood seems to depend on brain meat which gets older and older.

    Like I said it’s very much a work in progress. I’d certainly like some help in cleaning it up

    Take it and do what you will with it.

  42. walto: So we need evidence that it’s physically possible for a human being to persist 200, 300, 500, etc. years.

    Have you investigated the whole singularity thingy. According to this idea you can download your consciousness into a computer and continue to exist that way. In the story the aliens resurrected the protagonist’s physical body.

    None of these things has to be remotely likely they just have to be physically possible.

    walto: The problems with 2 are manifold. as Newton, Neil and I have explained a bunch of times already (and I note that you have made no responses).

    I thought I made it clear that I share your philosophical reservations. The point is most folks who follow this sort of thing are simply not interested in philosophy.

    They think that science has no need of philosophy.

    I’m trying to view this from the garden variety materialist perspective that says that if something is physically identical to walto it is simply walto.

    walto: The introduction of the materialist biz in the conclusion blows up any possibility of validity.

    Again the reason for the “materialist” qualifier is to specify that we are looking from the perspective of a certain type of individual.

    The Folks here who frequently poo poo any talk of metaphysics

    walto: Take it and do what you will with it.

    I’ll do some minor tweaking and get back too you.

    thanks and peace

  43. fifthmonarchyman: I’ll do some minor tweaking and get back too you.

    tweaking

    Frantic and compuslive behaviour often associated with methamphetamine abuse (crank). People who regularly abuse crank may find themselves unable to stop a particular random activity like searching drawers, having sex, or putting things apart. This is called tweaking.

  44. fifthmonarchyman: Have you investigated the whole singularity thingy. According to this idea you can download your consciousness into a computer and continue to exist that way

    Do you take that functionalist perspective to be materialist?

    In any case, you can’t introduce that concept in the conclusion of a syllogism.

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