is on a debate tour of Britain. Apparently Polly Toynbee pulled out of debating him. I heard on Uncommon Descent that a replacement had been found. (I’d emailed WLC to volunteer myself! – but I guess it has to be Somebody.)
I’m starting this thread to house any comments about the tour and the debate.
Okay.
And yet again, WJM avoids addressing the question of what to do when John Doe doesn’t accept a notion that Richard Roe believes to be a “self-eviden\tly true moral statement” Given that WJM’s stated objections to ‘subjective’ morality is that disagreements about ‘subjective’ morality can only be resolved by brute force & fallacious sophistry rather than valid philosophical cogitation, one might expect WJM to leap at the chance to explain how ‘objective’ morality allows for resolving such disagreements by means of valid philosophical cogitation. Thus far, however, the closest he’s come to such an explanation is a dismissive there’s something wrong with those guys in the general direction of people who don’t agree that whatever assertion actually is a “self-evidently true moral statement”. Perhaps a concrete example may stir WJM to explain himself…
How can one use the presupposition of objective morality to resolve this conflict? WJM instructs us that there’s just something wrong with anybody who disagrees with a “self-evidently true moral statement”… but which of the above pair, John Doe or Richard Roe, is the one whose moral statement genuinely is “self-evidently true”, and which is the one who’s got a screw loose somewhere?
Murray on homosexual anal sex:
It’s certainly not self-evidently immoral. I doubt one could make a rational case that, in and of itself, it’s even conditionally immoral.
How did you make the determination that it is “certainly not self-evidently immoral,” in light of your assertion that torture of infants for pleasure is self-evidently immoral? Please provide your objective method for determining what is self-evident so we can all apply that method to future moral issues, such as abortion and capital punishment.
You don’t make “determinations” of self-evidently true – that’s what the term means. They are self evidently true.
In any event, without them (and the assumption of an objective good) we are left with moral subjectivism and the tyranny of might makes right when it comes to morality. If most people think it is moral to own slaves or burn witches, then it is by the definition of subjectivists.
You attempt to resolve the issue by finding self-evidently true moral statements that can be agreed upon, then working logically from there via inference to see if the statement in question can be resolved that way.
You act as if I claimed that via a morality based on the assumption of an objective good that all disagreements can be resolved; I never made that claim. What it provides – at least – is a framework for a reasonable attempt at a rational solution to disagreements based on the premise that an objective standard exists independent of all institutions and cultures and is available for any reasonable person to sort out.
So, here’s a few question for the moral relativists:
If most people feel it is a good thing to burn suspected witches at the stake, own slaves and gas jews, then are those things by definition moral? Also, if I find it egregiously disgusting and reprehensible that a homosexual couple live near me, and I feel strongly that it is good that such people should be eradicated, is it moral for me to go and kill them?
If morality is based on subjective feelings, then shouldn’t I do what my feelings command? If not, why not?
Yet again, WJM avoids the meat of the issue. If the presumption of an objective morality does indeed “provide a framework for a reasonable attempt at a rational solution to disagreements”, how would such a thing work? It’s one thing to assert that a ‘framework’ exists; it’s another matter entirely to pony up the details of how that ‘framework’ would operate, not to mention how that ‘framework’ would avoid the flaws than WJM claims exist in the notion of subjective morality.
If WJM could only show us poor, benighted moral-subjectivists how to determine which of two conflicting “self-evidently true” moral statements genuinely is true. Thus far, he’s informed us that if someone doesn’t agree with a moral statement that one holds to be “self-evidently true”, one is justified in declaring that there’s something very wrong with the disagreeing person; alas, this does nothing to help anybody figure out which (if any) of the conflicting “self-evidently true” moral statements is true. Will WJM ever get around to explaining how the presupposition of objective morality helps people avoid the “tyranny of might makes right”for which he excoriates subjective morality? Given his record thus far, it seems unlikely…
Murray:
If most people think it is moral to own slaves or burn witches, then it is by the definition of subjectivists.
Not if they find it self-evident, as many have through history.
Murray’s objectivity is indistinguishable from subjectivity.
I’ve already “ponied up” the details several times. I doubt doing so again would matter much to your insistence that I have not.
It seems that the fundamental argument here is being lost by the subjectivists.
Assuming that “the good” is an objective commodity doesn’t prevent disagreements, even about what are “self-evidently true” statements. Because there might be people that disagree that “what goes up must come down” or “descent with modification” or “natural selection” or “the surface of the ocean curves at the horizon because we see ships come up over the horizon” doesn’t mean we dismiss such statements about experience as entirely subjective in nature; scientist have disagreed about what is true about phenomena far more easily examined than “the good” for hundreds of years. Because well-meaning seekers of true statements disagree about fundamental statements is entirely irrelevant to the point that we must live and debate as if our statements about subjectively experienced phenomena refer to objective commodities.
There’s no way to make a rational (logical) argument about anything unless we posit that the thing in question is an objective commodity, or at least has objectively discernible characteristics that can be rationally argued/compared according to a standard. Otherwise, all we can do is make statements about personal taste and attempt to sway others to our personal taste via rhetoric and appeals to feeling and emotion.
Unless we assume an objective standard exists by which to judge, the goose is cooked along with the gander. No rational argument can in principle be tendered against any moral position whatsoever – whether condemning Craig, the burning of witches, gassing Jews, or committing genocide.
It isn’t that adopting the premise of an objective good magically erases all disagreements, nor does it magically erase the capacity for error. It doesn’t magically erase the essential subjective nature of all experience. Neither does the premise of the scientific method. No premise has these effects, nor can any premise have these effects; that’s not the purpose of accepting the premise.
The reason one must accept the premise of an objective good, and the starting point of self-evidently true moral statements, whether or not they agree with any particular description of such a morality, is because without those assumptions – if one instead believes that morality is entirely subjective and refers entirely to subjective good – then they have no rational argument to make, have no basis by which to justify their condemnation of anyone’s morality (since they are all equally subjective under subjectivism). Subjectivist morality authorizes any behavior, and can rationally condemn nothing. The only “argument” that subjectivist morality can make against any other moral position is rhetoric – appealing to emotion, or utilizing other logical fallacies to move others to their position.
Subjectivist morality is necessarily self-defeating in any argument that condemns anyone’s moral view. It is exactly like saying “you are free to enjoy any fruit you wish” and then arguing that eating an orange is wrong. Craig cannot be wrong, nor can the Israelites be wrong, nor can the God of the Old Testament be considered wrong under subjectivism. The argument destroys itself.
Another reason one must adopt the premise (whether true or not) of an objective good, is that only under an objective good system are there any necessary consequences to immoral behavior. Without necessary consequences to immoral behavior, then arguments about morality becomes nothing more than rhetorical sophistry. Who cares about arguing about a concept that has no necessary consequences to consider whatsoever? We might as well be debating whether or not Santa Clause’ employment of elves technically violates international law.
If your entire argument about morality is to make someone else “feel bad” about some aspect of their moral argument (like Craig’s defense of Biblical genocide) … then you don’t have an argument: you only have rhetorical appeals to emotion that are entirely hypocritical given the subjectivist “anything goes, with no necessary consequences” perspective of morality.
From what I’ve seen so far, your description of the immorality of some acts as “self-evident” is indistinguishable from an admission that your judgement of their immorality is based on nothing whatsoever. I was giving you the benefit of the doubt by guessing that ordinary human empathy was the basis of your judgements of the immorality of certain acts. By disavowing such a connection, you reinforce the less charitable interpretation. The lack of any discernible basis for your judgements is all the more disturbing given the way you attribute your ability to reach conclusions to a so-called “libertarian free will”: If I take seriously your dismissal of the importance of human empathy, then I cannot identify anything that stops you from changing your opinions daily about what is or is not “self-evident” about morality.
Thus, there’s a wonderful irony in your worry about the possible instability of an empathy-based subjective morality. It’s hilarious that you speak of simply “desensitizing oneself”, as if that can be done simply. It’s not like there is a switch on the side of your head marked “empathy”, that you can simply reach up and turn off. It doesn’t work that way.
I wouldn’t know how to “desensitize myself”. I doubt you know either, unless … well, I don’t think I can finish that sentence within the rules of this site.
As for the rest of your post, what a whopper of a straw man.
If morality is subjective, why should I base it on empathy at all?
It’s morally wrong to cheat on a test even if nobody else knows, it harms no one else, and nobody ever finds out.
Can you expand on that example, William? What sort of test would fulfill those requirements?
This is not just nickety picketing – details matter!
Let me respond here instead of on the other thread.
It is you who has lost the point of the argument. What you are unable to see is that your ‘self evident moral truth’, you ‘objective good’, is entirely subjective itself. It is nothing but what William Murray considers to be true. You are so desperate to try and straight-jacket discussions about morality in a rational framework that you totally overlook the simple fact that you start yourself with mere assumptions. Personal convictions. You even say so right here in this post!
Just declaring something to be objective does not make it so. The test if something is objective or not is if it exists independently from the mind. The concepts of good and bad are non-existing outside the human mind. They can never be anything but subjective. Slapping the label ‘self evident truth’ on them is a subjective choice in itself. Others will apply the label differently from you, and where is your standard to judge them by but in your own mind?
I hate to burst your bubble, but you are in exactly the same position as the rest of us – you have to work out all by yourself what is right and wrong. We all do. We resort to our conscience, and draw on our environment, on our parents, friends and peers, on education, study and reflection, on life’s rich experiences.
You are worried that admitting this takes away all grounding for deciding what is moral or not, so you come up with this idea that there is this self evident moral good. You dismiss subjective morality because it will turn into might makes right.
Tell me, William Murray, if you encounter someone who does not consider your self evident moral good to be a self evident moral good, and therefore commits acts that you have rationally deducted to be immoral – what then do you do? How will you persuade this person of your self evident moral truth? If he doesn’t listen to your reason, what else do you have to stop him from doing their immoral deed? Surely, it would not be might, would it? Might, justified by your subjective declaration of what the objective good is?
You need to understand that your are trying to make a distinction where none exists.
fG
How can I be “unable to see” this, when you go on to say:
You then go on (with the apparently prerequisite ad hominem):
I not only do not overlook the fact that I begin with assumptions, I’ve reiterated that point many times on this site, and I’ve argued about what assumptions are necessary and which are not in order to be able to develop rationally coherent world-views based on those assumptions/premises. Of course I begin with assumptions – everyone begins with assumptions; the question is whether or not those foundational premises provide sufficient warrant for the particular aspects of a worldview/belief system, and if those aspects are logically consistent and coherent.
And this is where you demonstrate that you have failed to comprehend both the basis of my argument, and the meaning of it:
I’ve consistent reiterated on this and other threads here that all premises and experience and evidence and facts and interpretations thereof are subjectively posited, assumed, gathered, observed, and concluded. This is a trival statement. All things that humans think about themselves and the world is rooted in subjective experience.
I have also reiterated several times that I am not asserting or declaring or attempting to prove that something is objectively existent, but only that in order to have a rationally consistent/coherent worldview that doesn’t collapse into solipsism, incoherency, self-contradiction or blatant hypocrisy, one must begin with certain assumptions. That doesn’t mean such assumptions are factually true; it just means that without them we cannot mount a significant logical defense of our views.
Try to keep this in mind going forward.
First, this assumes that phenomena which do not exist independently of the mind are not objectively existent. You are claiming by fiat that the “realm of mind” houses no objectively existent phenomena, which is basically assuming a materialist perspective. You don’t get to assume the very conclusion that is under debate – that “the good”, which must be a purpose held in a mind – is an objectively existent commodity.
Second, there’s no way to tell if something exists independently of the mind because all experiential sensations are processed and interpreted via the mind. There is no test that determines if something exists independently of the mind. What we do is use the mind as best we can to determine if we ought to consider/believe that the phenomena/commodity in question exists independently of our mind.
I’d like to see you support this assertion without attempting to shift the burden.
The consequence of this is that if I decide torturing infants for my personal pleasure is a good thing, then because “good” is purely and unequivocally subjective, it is a good thing simply because I consider it so. That makes anything moral – including genocide – as long as those committing it consider it good. Right?
All standards exist in one’s mind; the question is whether or not we should, or must, consider that commodity to be objective. That doesn’t make it objective; it just means we must (or should) consider it to be so. I wonder if you’d like to live in a world where everyone believed “what is good” to be an entirely subjective commodity, including those who passed laws and enforced them?
The only bubble you’re potentially bursting is your internal mischaracterization of my view which is held in direct contradiction to things I’ve directly stated multiple times on this site. I would suggest that the difference between you and I is that I not only draw from the things you list, but I arbit all of the above via logic driven by necessary premises, because if I left it to your method, I would be capable of considering as “good” and “moral” the gassing of Jews, throwing newborns off cliffs, drowning infant girls, burning witches, torturing heretics, owning slaves and treating women and children like chattel depending upon my time period and culture.
To avoid being a hypocrite (since I consider those things wrong regardless of the time and culture), I must believe that “what is good” is not merely and completely a subjective consideration. You are, of course, free to believe whatever you wish, whether it is rationally justifiable or not.
It depends on the act being committed. There are some things I feel I have an immediate moral obligation to attempt to stop, such as when someone in certain situations is being harmed. You cannot “persuade” people that a self-evident moral truth is a self-evident moral truth; they either recognize it, or they do not. Of course might – of one sort or another, intellectual, physical, cunning, logical whatever – is one’s only tool when attempting to stop the immoral act of another who doesn’t see their act as immoral.
However, that I can apply might doesn’t mean might makes my action right, any more than the might of the Nazis makes gassing Jews right. That’s the difference between morality based on an objective good, and morality based on a subjective good; with an objective good, what is right is right regardless of whether or not might is used for or against it; with a subjective good, might (of some sort) is fundamentally what actually defines what is good.
IOW, with one it is assumed that humans are discerning an objective commodity, and are thus committed to changing themselves and their behavior to conform to an objective good; with the other, it’s just a might (of some sort) free-for-all based on what is assumed to be nothing more than personal taste; why bother trying to conform to someone else’s personal taste? Since there are no necessary consequences to any definition of immorality, why even bother with a “moral system” in the first place?
You need to understand that you are missing the distinction that matters. We agree that all of these things are assumed, experienced, processed, and concluded subjectively; the difference is whether or not one assumes/believes that what is being subjectively processed represents an objectively existent commodity.
One cannot rationally argue that Craig’s defense of genocide is outrageously immoral if “what is good” is entirely subjective. They can assert it, and the can fling emotional feces at Craig for asserting it, and browbeat and denigrate anyone even appearing to take Craig’s side; but none of that is a rational rebuttal. If “what is good” is entirely subjective, no rational rebuttal is possible. It would be like Craig saying “I like apples” and because everyone here dislikes apples, they are aghast that Craig has said he likes them.
I have a question that is pertinent to this debate. Is logic entirely in the mind? How about mathematics? Are those things entirely subjective because they do not reside in the physical world? If I say that 2+2=100, is that as “right” as any other answer, because math only resides in the mind? If I say that X can be both X and not-X in the same time and place, is that as correct a statement as any other, because logic exists only in my mind, and so is entirely subjective?
This is really a bizarre discussion. You appeal to an objective good but freely admit that the determination of what this objective good is, can only be a subjective choice on your (and therefore anyone’s) part.
This is fatal for your argument. Anyone can assume and claim that their subjective definition of moral good and bad is objective, but the moment when different people have conflicting views all we have to choose between them is… you guessed it, another subjective judgment!
Folks, there is no objectivity here anywhere in sight.
When we say that killing babies is bad, we mean that it is bad in our personal subjective moral system. It doesn’t matter at all if there is an underlying objective truth to this when the only way to decide on that is a subjective call. The way in which moral disputes get settled is exactly the same when morality is based on subjective standards as when it is based on claimed objective standards that nobody has access to without making a subjective judgment in the first place. Introducing an invisible concept of objective morality behind these identical sets of subjective judgments adds precisely nothing. It is astonishing that you don’t see this.
I’m done. This debate is utterly pointless from any practical point of view.
fG
Indeed. We have gone round and round, but with nothing achieved.
Well, okay, perhaps it isn’t quite nothing. The pointlessness of the discussion very well illustrates the emptiness of the argument from morality that theists often use.
William J Murray,
faded_Glory,
Absolutely true.
For WJM to argue we have to act “as if” there was an objective good doesn’t help anyone when you actually have to put it to use.
People will come up with their own version of the “objective good”, which they can ony arrive at with their own “subjectivity”.
Our “experiences” of life are purely subjective.
We don’t have **any** objective inputs.
It would be like coming up with an algorithm and just before we use the result, we multply by 0.
It would be like coming up with an algorithm and just before we use the result, we multiply by 1.
What I am trying to say is that claiming objectivity, does nothing.
Yes, I think there is, and I think this is really where we are coming unstuck here.
One way we can determine whether something is likely to exist “independently of the mind” is by testing whether independent observers can come to the same conclusion.
At its silliest: if I see a pink elephant on my lawn, and no-one else does, there isn’t much evidence in favour or the hypothesis that there really is a pink elephant.
On the other hand if five independent observers all report seeing a pink elephant on my lawn, then that is strong evidence that there really is a pink elephant.
We can’t be sure, of course, and all models are subject to revision, but we can at least conclude, in the latter case, that “there really is a pink elephant” fits the data better than “Lizzie has drunk too much gin”, and vice versa in the former case.
Ditto with morality: if independent thinkers in many different cultures can conclude that there are things we “ought” to do, and that the reason we think we “ought” to do them is because they are in conflict with what we “want” to do, then what we “ought” to do has something to do with wider consequences than that of our own immediate personal gain.
So “treat others as you would be treated” is a fairly obvious “ought” maxim. So is “take thought for the future”.
Put those together, and some things become “self-evidently” what we ought not to do. Others remain tricky, but at least we have a moral compass to guide us.
From which point we may decide that this moral compass has a divine origin, and that therefore God is good, or even that what is good is of God.
What seems unsupportable to me is the proposition that we decide a priori (on what I’d call highly subjective grounds) that a particular set of ancient writings are the Word of God, that God by definition is good (again, a highly subjective and unevidenced premise) and that therefore no matter how morally abhorrent an action, if we believe it to be ordered by God it must be good.
Also extremely dangerous.
Not saying you are doing that, but you do seem to be clinging to the idea that somehow theism is a prerequiste for morality. Or am I not following you?
Actualy, it probably does add something – a nice warm fuzzy feeling inside the person who thinks he’s figured it all out. The reality that not everybody else see the same things in the same way (a prerequisite for something to be objective) is of no bother, and is entirely the fault of those others.
fG
What we are objectively observing here though is photons being bounced of something that only a pink elephant could scatter.
This is a completely different category though than WJM’s argument which is that something that does not register on any of our senses can somehow be thought of as existing objectively.
The laws of physics allow us to see your pink elephant but there is no sensory way of verifying the conclusion, “an objective good exists” and, “all humans with free will have the same purpose”.
Elizabeth said:
Unless they are coming to the same conclusion without use of their minds, you have not only not excised “mind” from being a commodity necessary to the thing, you have only further substantiated that it is necessary to the thing in question.
“Objective” anything cannot be shown to be “independent of mind”, because only a mind can come to the conclusion that a thing might be best considered an objectively existent phenomena (whether independent of mind or not).
I would caution against using definitional fiat that if something exists only “in the mind” that it is by definition not an objectively existent phenomena.
I notice you elected not to answer the questions that are spot-on for this aspect of the debate. Let me paste them here again:
Is logic entirely in the mind? How about mathematics? Are those things entirely subjective because they do not reside in the physical world? If I say that 2+2=100, is that as “right” as any other answer, because math only resides in the mind? If I say that X can be both X and not-X in the same time and place, is that as correct a statement as any other, because logic exists only in my mind, and so is entirely subjective?
And universal agreement that a thing **actually** exists doesn’t mean it actually exists. So? The question – as I’ve pointed out repeatedly – isn’t if the thing **actually** exists, but rather if we must act, think and argue as if it actually exists, or else fall to hypocrisy and incoherency.
Oughts derived from principles are not “self-evident”; they are derived from principles. Principles are derived from self-evident truths, not vice-versa. Self-evident truths are not voted in by consensus, nor does the authority of historical philosophers define “what is good”. Either what is good is good regardless of what authority and subjective compassion and weight of historical consensus claims, or it is subjective in nature.
I agree, but then, I’m not making that claim or argument.
Are you clinging to the idea that it doesn’t?
Theism is a necessary premise for a meaningful morality that is rationally coherent and consistent with how we must live and how we must argue about morality. Without a god as creator of humans and human purpose (final cause, purpose being in the mind of a sentient entity), then “what is good” is ultimately a subjective commodity.
IOW, if one is going to argue that genocide is immoral – an implication that it is an objectively true moral statement – then “the good” it refers to as an “ought” (we ought not commit genocide) must be universal to all humans.
Why is it universal (not meaning “consensus”, but valid regardless of consensus)? We cannot leave these questions begged in our worldview philosophy. It is not an objective good because authorities or historical consensus or a book tell us so; it is good, and those authorities and consensus and writers of the books have discerned it to be true.
If our commitment to universally, objectively true moral statements stands, then our worldview (to be coherent) must account for our expectation that such a thing can exist.
Just as physicists discern true statements about phenomena, and are not making something true just because they agree or say so, we discern that genocide is immoral. It is not made immoral because we say so, it is immoral, and a because it is, we say it is.
But, that doesn’t answer the question of how and why genocide is wrong. Not by our say-so; not by authority or consensus; not by feeling or appeal to compassion and not by might, because none of those things provide the necessary warrant for an objectively true moral statement.
So, what makes genocide objectively wrong? Why ought we not eradicate whole groups of people? The golden rule doesn’t make genocide objectively wrong; it attempts to report the putative fact (in a general way) that genocide is objectively wrong. “Do unto others…” is a generalized ought, it doesn’t explain why any universal oughts exist in the first place.
This is a completely different category though than WJM’s argument which is that something that does not register on any of our senses can somehow be thought of as existing objectively.
Exactly. Is mathematics subjective? Logic? If so, then we are lost. We must assume that some things that apparently only exist “in the mind” are objective commodities, or else we are all de facto solipsists and our arguments are really nothing more than rhetoric.
And, in that case, mathematics would be nothing more than mind-control programming by religious zealots trying to make us conform to their particular subjective view of “good math”.
No, mathematics and logic do not exist objectively.
They are simply processes we use to help us describe something.
For instance, if math was objective, we should be able to come up with a value of pi that would allow us to definitively say how big around a circle is, but we can’t.
The reason is that the math we came up with was the result of our limited knowledge, i.e., it is subjective.
Math evolves and keeps getting better at what it describes, but that is the result of the people who work at it, extending its ability to give us better descriptions of what we see.
If it is objective, it is an “objective component of the universe”, that is flawed, so I would say it is definitely subjective.
No, of course not. There can be no observer without a mind. But where independent observers report the same observations, we can be more confident that what is observed reflects some underlying regularity in the universe than when one person observes it, and others contradict it. I chose an extreme example, but the principle is at the foundation of scientific methodology – you report your findings in a manner in which they can be replicated by independent researchers. You also report your findings in a manner in which the methodology can be scrutinised for possible observer bias, and you also take pains to minimise observer bias in your methods. It’s what most statistical methodology is all about, and why we use techniques like blind-rating and conduct inter-rater reliability indices.
Sure. I’m not disputing that. I’m saying that if an observation is only available to a single “subject” it is more “subjective” than if several “subjects” independently come to the same conclusions in comparable conditions. We cannot then attribute it to some idiosyncrasy of an individual mind, but a regard it as a replicable phenomenon that can be observed by anyone, regardless of the mindset they bring.
Not sure what that means, but I don’t think it sounds like something I am tempted to do 🙂
Ahem. I “elected” to do no such thing. I’m still catching up. So thank you for reiterating your questions.
Well, my answer would be that logic and mathematics are tools, used by the mind, that enables us to model the world effectively and make causal inferences and good probabilistic predictions. Also simply have fun with. They are also real cultural artefacts, like language, and abstractions like governance systems and justice systems, and bodies of knowledge. So yes, they have objective existence as cultural artefacts, and they also have objective existence as mental processes we use to model the world.
Sure. But we can put the probability that something “actually” exists much higher if we have good objective evidence in the form of independent observations. But here I will climb on my usual hobby horse and say that even our observations are a kind of model. We don’t have direct access to reality, all we have are models. But the more effectively our models predict our observations, the more confident we can be that they are a good model of reality.
So how would you establish a “self-evident truth”? And does it take the form of “X is right, Y is wrong” or does it take the form of “does action X fulfil criterion Y?”
Good 🙂
Well, I don’t think so, except in the sense that I don’t see why it should be. I’m just not following the counter-argument.
Why does theism make it not “ultimately a subjective commodity”? I think I’m not understanding what you mean by “objective” morality, or, at least, on any possible reading I can make of it, it seems a rather useless sort of objectivity, as there seems no non-subjective (using your terminology) of finding out what it is. To take a parallel, I guess I think there is probably some “objective” reality that corresponds to the model we call “matter” but as all we have are models, that doesn’t really help. What does help, hugely, is that those models make reliable predictions. In that sense I would call them “objective” models, even though they are only models, because anyone using those models (e.g. Maxwell’s equations) will make the same predictions and receive supporting data. Whereas the prediction that a pink elephant is about to do somersaults on my lawn is useless, even if I assure you that yes, indeed, there is, just as I predicted, a pink elephant doing somersaults on my lawn.
What seems to be a maxim found in all cultures is: “treat others as you would be treated”, and it seems to me pretty intrinsic to the very concept of morality. And by that maxim, genocide seems pretty hard to justify.
Well, it clearly isn’t universal. Some people seem able to convince themselves that “others” excludes certain groups, and that those groups present a threat to those included within the circle of “others”. So a Nazi may sacrifice his life to further the goal of Aryan purity, because the “others” he regards himself as treating as he would be treated himself only include his fellow Aryans. But the principle that morality is about deprioritising the self in relation to “others” does seem pretty universally agreed. What is not, unfortunately, agreed, is who those “others” are – where our responsibility to “others” stops. At our own family? Tribe? Species? Generation?
I guess I could get behind that. I still don’t see where theism comes in, though.
Well, I think there are reasonable explanations as to why “Do unto others….” is a generalized ought, and I’d start, myself, with the fact that we are social animals with Theory of Mind capacity. But I would readily concede that that general maxim is does not address the question “who is my neighbour?” I find it interesting that we, a species, are so motivated to keep asking the question, and to draw the boundaries ever wider. Religious leaders have played a role here, but then they have also conspicously played a role the other way. Secularists are also guilty of xenophobia, but also of the opposite. There are impressive secular organisations and individuals dedicated to the Brotherhood of Man (Or the Siblinghood of People, but it doesn’t sound so good). Only last week I read a moving letter, written by Bertrand Russell, expressing horror at the H bomb tests (it’s on display in the Wren Library in Trinity College, Cambridge).
And here is Einstein:
By “universal” I don’t mean “everyone agrees”; by universal I mean it is immoral regardless of culture, might, empathy, feeling, etc.
You’re using an ought (Do unto others ….) to explain other oughts, which begs the question, and you are trying to use an “is” (“we are social animals with a theory of mind”) to to get to an “ought”; a social animal with a theory of mind can (and has) come up with “Let’s gas the jews” and “Lets make slaves of those people” and “let’s throw imperfect newborns off a cliff” as well as “do unto others”.
That we are social animals with a theory of mind doesn’t explain why (or how) “do unto others as you would have done unto you” should be followed instead of “let’s take advantage of whomever we can”. You are begging the question of why we should adopt one moral rule over another.
Why should we adopt “do unto others’ over “Let’s gas the jews”?
Well, let me answer your question with another: what does the proposition that there is an objective moral standard tell you about whether it is moral to commit genocide?
The proposition that there is “an” objective moral standard (the good) tells you nothing about it, which is why one must also agree that self-evidently true moral statements can be made, and from those one can reason out other true statements.
However, unless one assumes that an objective good exists, there is no warrant for the belief that self-evidently true moral statements can be made, and that they are universally true (not universally agreed upon) regardless of culture or time-frame – that genocide is wrong regardless of time, culture, authority, or consensus.
Now, please just directly answer my question: Why (from your worldview) should we adopt “do unto others’ over “Let’s gas the jews” as a moral maxim?
Ah, thanks.
In response to your question, because it seems to me that what we “ought” to do is fundamental to the concept of morality, and, by definition, what we “ought” to do is other than what we are immediately inclined to do. So we use the word when we are considering wider consequences of our actions that may go against our immediate desires, and outweigh them.
There are two principles that might inform an “ought” therefore: what benefits someone other than myself, or what benefits me in the long term.
From the first, we can derive “treat others as you would be treated” – in other words, put other people’s welfare no higher than your own (i.e do not set it as a lower priority in your decision-making). From the second, we can derive the principle that future wellbeing may outweigh transient pleasure. From this we can derive the principle that sobriety and hard work are of value.
Together those principles seem to me to mandate “do unto others as you would be done to” or whatever formulation you prefer (I like Jesus’s best, myself, but not because it is Jesus’s! – the reverse is the case) as opposed to “let’s gas the Jews”. In fact the first proscribes the second.
ETA: it’s not bombproof of course, but it seems reasonable, and evidence that other people find it so is found in the fact that human laws tend to enshrine the principle.
This cannot be true, because there is nothing preventing “what we are immediately inclined to do” from being what we ought to do. Also, if we are immediately inclined against stealing, but then decide it is best for our long-term financial well-being, changing one’s intention from one’s immediate inclination (not to steal) to a different inclination (to steal) is (excluding extenuating circumstances) is certainly what they ought to do in order to benefit their financial situation, but it is still not what they ought to do.
If you mean “ought” in the purely subjective sense, then I ought to do X to get rid of the Jews, or I ought to do Y to make my children afraid of me are valid “oughts” in our moral discussion. But to avoid this, you once again beg the question:
Why should I consider what benefits others, and why should i consider what benefits me “in the long term”? Just stating that this is what I should do doesn’t tell me why I should.
Yes, we can, but you haven’t explained why I should consider the effects of my actions on others in the first place, and secondly, I can derive all sorts of principles by considering the effects on my acts on others – such as might makes right, do unto others before they do unto you, make sure that others are unaware of my selfish actions; you have provided no reason why, “do unto others” should be the proper derivation of “considering the consequences of our actions on others”, you only say it “might” be.
I can consider the consequences of my theft and manipulation and deceit on others, and decide it would be in my best interest in the long term to collect a gang of loyal people to make sure we put fear into the hearts and minds of the people we’re collecting protection money from and using to build our little gang empire. That certainly meets the requirements you’ve laid out for establishing a moral system.
No,they do not. Not even close. They beg the question and just flatly assume that others will agree with your derivations when countless other derivations are logically possible and fully meet your criteria for establishing a moral system.
The concept you necessarily steal from theists and apparently unconsciously hide by begging the question is that without an objective standard (what we know to be good without any explanation or logic required because it is self-evident), there is simply no way to discern which is right – your “do unto others” system of oughts, or my “collect a gang and enforce my will on others” system of oughts, because they are both derived by altering immediate inclinations towards a future goal to benefit myself in light of considering the effects of my actions on others.
IOW, “do unto others” is a possible principle extracted from your maxims (which you have not said why I should adopt those maxims in the first place other than “it seems to me that what we “ought” to do…”), but it is not the necessary or only valid extractable principle, and many extractable principles are obviously immoral. Also, you offer no reason to extract those particular principles from those question-begged maxims, other than: “There are two principles that might inform an “ought” therefore: what benefits someone other than myself, or what benefits me in the long term.”
Yes, one might choose those principles to inform an ought; and one might not. One might extract principles (from your question-begged maxims) that are obviously immoral; but if it is extracting principles one might from from maxims that seem to the individual to be which ones the should, one can end up validating virtually anything as moral.
Which is why it is necessary to assume an objective standard exists, and that self-evidently true moral statements are available.
This is what is rather troublesome about the argument you present; IMO you provide yourself cover with “it’s not bombproof, of course” and vague terms that don’t really mean anything (other than covering rhetoric) like “it seems reasonable” and then employ appeals to popularity and authority for additional insulation.
It’s not whether or not your argument/worldview is “bombproof”; it’s whether or not you can rationally justify your position. If you cannot, then you hold it by faith, and possibly irrational faith. The disclaimer “it’s not bombproof” doesn’t indemnify you against looking at the problems your argument/views have and honestly attempting to rectify them or, if you cannot, at least admitting that your position isn’t rationally justifiable.
Stalin, Hitler, Dahmer, Torquemada and Pol Pot probably didn’t have “bombproof” arguments for their beliefs either. So? You either follow the logic or you don’t. I can point to many laws that have existed, and currently exist, which are not favorable to your conclusion – but I won’t, simply because a reference to laws and consensus doesn’t help whatsoever in this argument, it only serves to provide comforting cover when one is unable to logically support their views and show how they are logically consistent and coherent.
Once again: why should I adopt the maxim “do unto others”? Why should I care about others in the first place? Why should I are about my “long term” benefit? Why should I not override my natural inclination to “be kind” because I think it is in my best long-term interests to intimidate and alpha-male my way to dominance in my social group? Why should I override my and my friends and family’s obvious long-term interests by hiding Jews in my attic when the Nazis are looking for them?
IMO, you do not answer these questions; you avoid them because your worldview can provide no answer. You cannot tell me why I should not commit genocide without, in some more convoluted way, just reiterating “you should not commit genocide”. You refer to “principles” which are just restated oughts with the same begged question, and cover with appeals to consensus and authority, neither of which add one whit of logical support to your argument.
Your “basis” for your principles can be interpreted in any number of ways, which could end up with principles and morals (by definition of your methodology) that we know are in fact immoral, but you rely on the fact that we know some things are immoral in order for people to avoid concluding with those immoral principles. But, historically, they have not. Hitler, Stalin, Torquemada, etc – all could have used the very methodology you describe and have ended up with their same historical factual, lawful at the time, authority-promoted genocidal and torturous programs.
That’s what is called “insufficient warrant”; your stated premises and method are insufficient to warrant your moral view that some things are self-evidently true moral statements and to preclude the possible, obviously immoral conclusions.
Unless we accept that there is actually an objectively existent good we can use as a standard by which to judge any supposed moral principles and conclusions thereof, your premise basis and system of inference cannot discern moral principles and conclusions from obviously immoral principles and conclusions. If the “objectively existent good” is “derived from principle”, then it begs the question of why we should adopt that principle in the first place; your explanation of “why” equally authorizes obviously immoral principles.
Your only warrant offered for using those problematic maxims in the first place is “it seems to me”, and the only reason for extracting the particular principles you extracted from those maxims is that one “might” come up with them. The basis for your entire argument and justification for your moral system is “it seems to me ..” and “one might use thse principles” …l
So, by the basis of your system, if it seems to me that “dominate everyone else” is the ought I should use (begging the question the same way you did), and I “might” extract from that the principle of “might makes right”, then I have described a perfectly valid moral system by the very definition and system of warrant you have provided.
“It seems” and “one might” can be used to justify anything.
If you take “should” to be meaningful only in reference to “objective” morality, then obviously no answer is possible.
You observed elsewhere, if I recall correctly, that people typically treat moral statements as objective. I agree with that, but I see that habit as merely a useful convention, rather than an indicator of true objectivity.
Humans care about stuff. Among the things we care about, we care about the content of what people (including ourselves) care about. This observation leads directly into a thick jungle of self-referentiality, which we navigate by means of the language of morality. When I speak of morality being subjective, I do not mean that morality is straightforwardly defined in terms of the speaker’s preferences. (Among other problems, such an interpretation would confuse “subjective” with “indexical” – making the truth value of a moral claim dependent on who is making the claim, just as the truth value of any statement that makes use of the pronoun “I” is in general dependent on who is speaking.) Rather, I mean that morality is ultimately grounded in human cares, and that any allegedly external (e.g. divine) grounding for morality is superfluous.
Let’s take a scenario (admittedly contrived) in which I’m forced to choose between action A and action B, and the choice has to be made within a certain period of time, and after using up most of that time in analyzing the probable consequences, I conclude that the only consequential difference between A and B is that if I do A, then one of my children will probably be badly hurt, while if I do B instead, there is no such danger.
Obviously I choose B. Indeed, any sane observer (if they agree with the analysis of the likely consequences) would agree that I ought (in some sense) to choose B. In practical terms, the analysis of consequences serves as the justification, since nothing else needs to be said. “But no!” you say. “The analysis of consequences was entirely descriptive, and you can’t get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. Justified you may be, but the meat of the justification lies elsewhere.”
OK then. But where? In an “objective” system of morality? Not at all: For if someone presented to me an argument concluding that I “ought” (objectively) to do A, then that argument, urging me to contribute wilfully to the harming of my own child (with no resulting benefit for anyone!), would merit nothing but a flip of my middle finger. Among sane people, metaphysical systems are rejected for no stronger grounds than this. So, to be consistent, an argument saying that I “ought” (objectively) to do B would have to be considered entirely superfluous.
Where, then, is the missing ingredient in the justification? It’s in what we all take for granted: the human context. No one seriously proposes to divorce all discourse from the simple fact that discourse consists, in practice, of humans (with human concerns) talking to humans (with human concerns). That is always there in the background. (We can get away with pretending such a divorce only in the contexts in which the question needn’t even come up, such as in pure mathematics. But I digress.)
So can “it is self-evident that…”.
IF we posit that subjective feelings exist, then the actual existence of subjective feelings, when used as the basis of morality, can be used to justify anything because they are posited as subjective.
If we posit that self-evidently true moral statements actually exist (because of an objectively existent good), then the actual existence of self-evidently true moral statements cannot be used to justify “anything”; they can only be used to justify that which comports with the objective good.
You are taking the assumed subjective nature of the first premise and attempting to apply it to a premise that is not presumed to be subjective.
I didn’t say that the mere existence of self-evidently true moral statements can be used to justify anything. I said that moral claims of the form “it is self-evident that…” can be used to justify anything. There’s a big difference between saying that elephants exist and saying “see that thing over there? it’s an elephant”.
Regardless of what we might posit about the existence of objective moral truths, any specific claim about a given moral proposition being self-evidently true can only be based on subjective feelings. What other mode of input is available?
Something is only evident if it is evident to someone, hence evidence (including “self-evidence”) is always subjective. Moreover, “it seems to me that X” differs from “self-evidently X” only in that the former admits the possibility of room for improvement, while the latter represents pure bravado, poisoning the well against any disagreement. The latter is not rendered more likely than the former, merely by its difference in form, to coincide to some real objective moral truth (should any such thing exist).
The gap between objective moral truths (should they exist) and human moral assertions cannot be bridged merely by uttering an incantation with the term “self-evident” in it.
I didn’t say it could, and this point is trivial and has no bearing on my argument.
William J Murray,
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The point is not trivial as the construction of your world-view depends on “self-evidently” true statements being regarded as “non-subjective”.
That is impossible.
You could replace “self-evidently true” with “obvious to anyone who actually thinks about it”, with no change to the rest of your argument.
There is no way any human being can make an objective statement.
We can try and come to a consenus with our common subjectively held beliefs, but that’s as close as we can get.
It is quite possible to regard “self-evidently true statements” as being “non-subjective”; it’s intrinsic to the meaning of a “self-evidently true” statement.
That might be true if my argument was what you think it is; it is not, as I have explained many times.
Is that a statement you and I should regard as objective? Looks like it to me.
Is that an statement you and I should regard as objective? Looks like it to me. You’re not making claims of objective truth, are you?
I never claimed humans can make objective statements; I only claimed that there are statements we must and/or should regard as objective statements – in the exact same way that you are regarding the above statements to reflect objectively true meaning.
Without regarding some moral statements as self-evidently true and reflecting an objective good, we cannot construct or validate a logically consistent and coherent moral system without authorizing genocide as a perfectly moral act under various subjective views.
Once again: this is not an argument of fact and evidence; it is a logical argument derived from premises.
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Only if you have somehow determined I am **not** a human being.
If I am **not** a human being, then there is a possibility I might be able to make an objective statement.
I believe I am human, but by believing I am human, I am bound by my previous statement acknowledging that **any** opinion I hold, is necessarily subjective.
So……
1) I believe I am human.
2) I believe humans are doomed to subjectivity.
3) By believing I am human, I might be wrong.
After all this, do you believe, that I “believe” I am making an objective statement?
Hi all, I have been following this discussion with interest, and would like to jump in with a comment…
Toronto said: “We can try and come to a consenus with our common subjectively held beliefs, but that’s as close as we can get.”
I completely agree with Toronto here.
William Murray answered: “I never claimed humans can make objective statements; I only claimed that there are statements we must and/or should regard as objective statements – in the exact same way that you are regarding the above statements to reflect objectively true meaning.
Without regarding some moral statements as self-evidently true and reflecting an objective good, we cannot construct or validate a logically consistent and coherent moral system without authorizing genocide as a perfectly moral act under various subjective views.”
So, you actually agree with Toronto that observing and expressing a consensus of subjectively held beliefs is as close as we can get to discovering and expressing objective facts. In our common language use, that is exactly what most people mean when they make “objective” statements about facts. But then, almost in the same breath, you claim that we must pretend otherwise – we must pretend that we can discern some facts, which we label label as objective facts because of a relatively broad consensus among subjectively held beliefs, as independent-from-the-observer-true. You call these facts “self-evident”.
1) How could pretending that you know something about the real world that you agree you cannot know help you in constructing a logically consistent and coherent system that is expected to function in the real world?
2) How do you pick among facts, which we label label as objective facts because of a relatively broad consensus among subjectively held beliefs, those ones you pretend to be independent-from-the observer-true?
But since we don’t have the viewpoint to “make” an objective statement, how can that same limiting viewpoint allow us to “recognize” one?
If we can’t actually recognize “objective statements”, but need to assume some, why don’t you assume mine instead of yours?
That’s not a flippant coment as I believe it shows the weakness of your position.
Neither of us outrank the other in determining objectivity.
Then perhaps you can see why your objection to my earlier (one line) comment was also off base.
No, I do not.
“What most people mean” has no bearing on my ongoing argument, which now runs through many threads here, where “objective” is implicitly defined only as being that which exists independently of any particular person’s perspective, and whether or not consensus or authority agrees or disagrees. IOW, whether or not we know what it is, or agree what it is, and whether or not any authority agrees, an objective commodity is what it is regardless of how accurate our descriptions of it are.
And, in order to tender rational arguments about the commodity in question, we must assume (not pretend) that we can discern fundamental, self-evidently true statements about the commodity in question to base our debate about it on. Otherwise, we have nowhere to even begin. IF it is “self-evidently true” to you that whatever “good” morality refers to is entirely subjective, THEN no rational debate can ensue in regards to a moral system because it would be like debating what flavor of pie we ought always eat with no necessary consequences. It’s not a rational debate, it’s a show of hands, and a show of hands in a moral debate can authorize anything, as history demonstrates, as “moral”.
If you’re okay with that (as Robin, another poster here, is), then we have nothing further to debate.
That never came from any breath of mine. This is an entirely erroneous characterization of my position based – apparently – on a complete ignorance of weeks of previous argument on the subject in various threads here.
I said nothing about “pretending” that we can discern “facts”, nor have I said anything about “broad consensus” other than to disqualify it as a significant indicator of true moral statements (unless you’d like to call “It’s good to gas Jews” a true moral statement). The questions that follow stem from these erroneous inferences and thus have no bearing on my actual position and argument.
Because we realize we are subjective, mistake-prone entities, we do the best we can. Since we must live and argue in a manner that identifies and assumes that some of the commodities we experience are objectively existent (whether or not our view of them is accurate), we make statements about them; some of those statements are statements we hold as being self-evidently true. That doesn’t mean they **are** true statements, it just means that we must or should regard them as self-evidently true (especially when, if we do not, our worldview or an aspect of it collapses into incoherency, hypocrisy,or self-contradiction).
We can certainly assume yours and see where logic leads us from there.
Is that an objectively true statement?
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Why would you fall back to statements of these type?
This is very childish behaviour.
Read below my response to you yesterday, on this same topic.
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If for some reason you don’t want me to interact with you, I’ll stop commenting on the things you say here.
What I want from you is simply a conversation with an adult.
If you do this again, I’ll take it as a hint that we should stop, and I’m okay with that.
Is this statement supposed to imply an objective fact?
Okay.
Mr Murray:
I said: “So, you actually agree with Toronto that observing and expressing a consensus of subjectively held beliefs is as close as we can get to discovering and expressing objective facts.”
You said: “No, I do not.”
Hm, okay, maybe I am misunderstanding most of what you are saying. This is what you said in response to Toronto earlier: “I never claimed humans can make objective statements; I only claimed that there are statements we must and/or should regard as objective statements – in the exact same way that you are regarding the above statements to reflect objectively true meaning.” [the above statement being: We can try and come to a consensus with our common subjectively held beliefs, but that’s as close as we can get.]
So, you agree with Toronto and myself that humans cannot make objective statements. Then you say that we should regard certain statements (that are, logically following the preceding statement, all subjective) as objective nonetheless. The criteria that Toronto used to describe the closest state we can come to objectivity is: a consensus of subjectively held beliefs. You then say that we should, according to your belief, regard statements as objective in the exact same way that Toronto uses it. But Toronto does not regard his statements as objective. He said so clearly. So the only thing you can mean here is the criteria he used to describe the closest state we can come to it. Which is: a consensus of subjectively held beliefs!
So it does not seem to me that my assessment was an erroneous characterization of your position.
Either way – if you do agree that humans cannot make or discover objective statements (since the best we can do, according to you, is assume that some statements are objective), and you reject the criteria of consensus, which criteria do you propose for picking those statements you want to be regarded as objective?
You further say: “objective” is implicitly defined only as being that which exists independently of any particular person’s perspective, and whether or not consensus or authority agrees or disagrees. IOW, whether or not we know what it is, or agree what it is, and whether or not any authority agrees, an objective commodity is what it is regardless of how accurate our descriptions of it are. And, in order to tender rational arguments about the commodity in question, we must assume (not pretend) that we can discern fundamental, self-evidently true statements about the commodity in question to base our debate about it on. Otherwise, we have nowhere to even begin. IF it is “self-evidently true” to you that whatever “good” morality refers to is entirely subjective, THEN no rational debate can ensue in regards to a moral system because it would be like debating what flavor of pie we ought always eat with no necessary consequences. It’s not a rational debate, it’s a show of hands, and a show of hands in a moral debate can authorize anything, as history demonstrates, as “moral”.”
First of all, assuming that I can know something (an objective statement) that I have already concluded I cannot know is the text book definition of pretending.
“whether or not we know what it is, or agree what it is, and whether or not any authority agrees, an objective commodity is what it is regardless of how accurate our descriptions of it are.”
Possibly. But as subjective observers we can only make subjective observations and describe, analyze and understand it according to those subjective observations.
“And, in order to tender rational arguments about the commodity in question, we must assume (not pretend) that we can discern fundamental, self-evidently true statements about the commodity in question to base our debate about it on.”
No. Since we can’t make objective statements or observations, we cannot assume that we can discern objectively true statements. Quite the opposite, which is already encompassed in the observation that we cannot make objective observations. But we can base our debate on the commodity in question upon the shared observation, analysis and understanding among a group of observers.
”IF it is “self-evidently true” to you that whatever “good” morality refers to is entirely subjective”
No. It is not “self-evidently true” to me. It is a subjective observation of mine that what “good” morality refers to is subjective. It is further a subjective observation, which I share with a great many other subjective human observers, that what “good” morality refers to shares core components among the overwhelming majority of human individuals and communities.
“a show of hands in a moral debate can authorize anything, as history demonstrates, as “moral”.”
Sure it can. Which is why we try in many modern societies to not just use any arbitrary set of hands, but a consensus as broad as possible. It’s called a democracy.
It is still completely unclear from your argumentation how you choose among your set of subjectively acquired observations about a commodity those you call “self-evident”, and how you then determine whose “self-evident” statements we shall assume to be “truly objective”, if disagreement arises?