In another thread, WJM writes:
Also, when I say I must accept such a prioris in order to even hope to deliberately establish a rational worldview, that means that without such premises, reason (logic) itself breaks down into nonsense.
WJM is laying out the case for rationalism. Typically, rationalism is described as assuming innate knowledge. However, some instead assume a priori knowledge. Thanks to WJM, I now have an inkling on what might be intended by “a priori knowledge.”
The opposing philosophical position is that of empiricism, that knowledge comes through the senses. Most of those posting here (self included) seem to be empiricists, while WJM is clearly standing for some version of rationalism.
This is intended as a stub topic, to allow comments specifically addressing the rationalism vs. empiricism debate.
madbat089,
Entirely wrong. I don’t deduce the claim that self-evidently true moral statements exist from the premise of a god; I deduce that the theistic premise is the only category of premise that can warrant the existence of self-evidently true moral statements by comparing various premises.
You either agree that self-evidently true moral statement exist and are universally applicable (it is always wrong to torture infants for pleasure), or you do not. If you do not agree with that, we don’t have an argument. That self-evidently true moral statements exist is the axiomatic premise of the debate.
Except I never claimed that god endowed humans with an equal or universal capacity for sensing self-evidently true moral statements. That’s a straw man.
You’re looking at it from the behavioral justification end and assuming the validity of the non-theistic premise. If my argument is valid and what it concludes is true, then we’re not talking about “spot welding”, but rather the entire foundation of one’s existence with inescapable necessary consequences for one’s intentions and behavior.
If the subjectivist view is true, then there’s really no reason to even argue about morality other than rhetoric and manipulation for to get others to behave the way you want them to. If my view is true, there is a significant and important reason to argue and debate about morality, since moral behavior has inescapable consequences. One of those reasons is actual concern for those who engage in immoral behavior – which isn’t a reason available to the subjectivist.
Mr. Murray:
Of course that’s wrong, because that’s not what I said. Please read what I actually said. You deduce the premise of a god from your claim that self-evident moral statements exist. That’s exactly the opposite of what you claim I said. Then, in saying this: “For one to claim that something is universally wrong for all humans whether they agree it is wrong or not, they must warrant that claim via a sound, sufficient premise.” you use that same premise you just deduced from your claim as justification for that same claim, i.e. that a particular statement is self-evidently true. That is a classic example of a circular argument.
Ok, maybe you could explain then what you meant by this statement:
“If, however, humans were created for an objective purpose by god, and that purpose was necessary (not arbitrary), then all human oughts exist in relation to that purpose, and not the individual, particular purposes each human has.”
…and where the capacity for recognizing self-evident moral statements comes from, since this capacity seems necessary to discern the relation of human oughts to the objective purpose?
No, because what I’m trying to deduce from the premise (that self-evidently true moral statements exist) is which justification sufficiently warrants that premise in the first place; I’m not trying to prove -using logic – that self-evidently true statements exist. That is the given, so there is no circular argument attempting to prove or support it.
Ultimately, all things either come directly or indirectly from god. That doesn’t mean god imbues all humans with equal capacity for discerning self-evidently true moral statements, just as the premise that god is the source of good doesn’t prevent evil from existing, or just because god is the source of logic doesn’t prevent irrationality from existing.
Humans with free will are also free to simply deny that such statements exist.
Of course you are attempting to support your axiomatic claim by your premise when you say this: “For one to claim that something is universally wrong for all humans whether they agree it is wrong or not, they must warrant that claim via a sound, sufficient premise.” And that is making a classic circular argument! You claim that your claim (self-evident moral statements exist) is justified by a sound sufficient premise (there must be a god). But you have DERIVED this premise from the axiomatic claim in the first place! Thus, it CANNOT be used to justify your claim – it adds exactly nothing in explanatory power or justification to your original claim BECAUSE it is derived from that claim. There is nothing logically wrong with using axiomatic claims and deriving logical premises from them. But there is something very logically wrong if one then claims that the premise can in turn justify the axiomatic claim: That is an invalid logical operation, commonly called a logical fallacy. Your derived premise (there must be a god) does not add one iota of justification to your original claim, because it is simply logically derived from it.
Ah. So the capacity for recognizing self-evident moral statements comes from god after all. But god gives some humans a really good capacity, some not so good a capacity, and some evidently practically no capacity at all. Apart from this really being a bummer for those on the practically-no-capacity end of things, how do we figure out which one of us is which?
Madbat,
You are under apparently under the mistaken assumption that I am attempting to prove or support a claim of fact. I am not trying to support a claim of fact that humans **can** identify self-evidently true moral statements; nor am I trying to describe how humans can or cannot make such identifications, or where such capacity comes from. All of that is entirely irrelevant to the logical debate betwee Elizabeth and I.
IF we assume (and Elizabeth and I have agreed to this assumption) that self-evidently true moral statements exist, then what worldview – atheism or theism – would (if true, not as support that it is true, thus no circular reasoning) best support or justify it?
It’s exploring what is essentially a hypothetical situation – where if X is true, what conditions must exist for X to be true? It is my argment that if self-evidently true moral statements exist (whether or not all humans can equally identify them), then the necessary condition for that situation is that a god would have to exist.
Not that a god “actually” exists, or that self-evidently true moral statements “actually” exist, but rather IF self-evidently true moral statements exist, THEN (pursuant to the logical argument) a god must also exist.
IF Elizabeth is going to claim that self-evidently true moral statements exist, AND that there is no god, then she is challenged to describe how an atheistic system can produce a self-evidently true moral statement.
Not ignoring you guys 🙂
Back shortly.
Mr. Murray,
Ok. You claim that self-evident moral statements exist. You don’t support or justify this claim, because it is just a claim for the purpose of playing out a hypothetical scenario, not a claim that is supposed to have any factual weight and meaning. So far so good. You now take this hypothetical claim and deduce an equally hypothetical premise from it.
So you have a hypothetical fact that entails a hypothetical premise, whereas Elizabeth just has a hypothetical fact (in fact, from reading what she wrote, I have reason to believe that Elizabeth means something very different when she uses the term “self-evident” than what you mean, and thus has something very different and much more substantial than a hypothetical fact as her starting point, but that is a different point). However, adding a hypothetical entailment to a hypothetical fact gets you exactly as far as just the hypothetical fact by itself (which is nowhere) when trying to argue that something IS indeed “universally wrong for all humans whether they agree it is wrong or not“. If you say “behavior x is moral”, and I ask you why, your answer is: “I just assume that it is.” Adding to it: “I just assume that it is, and I consequently assume that there is a god that wants it to be.” adds exactly nothing in explanatory power, it’s the same non-answer. If person B says “behavior x is immoral”, you have absolutely nothing to justify that your position should be preferred over person B’s position.
Well, trying to describe how humans can or cannot identify self-evident moral statements, and where this capacity comes from may be irrelevant to the specific debate you are having with Elizabeth, but it is obviously pivotal to trying to actually APPLY your moral system in the real world. Unless you don’t try to apply this system to the real world, and this is really just a hypothetical mind game?
If you call determining whether or not one’s beliefs are rationally justified, consistent, and coherent a “game”, then yes.
The hypothetical premises (theistic or atheistic worldview) we are using to try and justify our hypothetical fact with are actually held (one by Elizabeth, the other by me), while we both agree that the hypothetical fact is actually valid. Thus, our debate has meaning in the context of examining the coherency of our belief systems.
If one worldview premise justifies and supports the agreed hypothetical fact, and the other contradicts or disallows it, then only one of us can rationally support holding the hypothetical fact in our belief system.
I agree that Elizabeth’s view of a self-evidently true moral statement is probably different from mine, but then that is part of the exercise here – to see if her view of that hypothetical fact has any significant value, or is an irrational contradiction to her worldview premise. I contend that atheists cannot hold, in any rationally justifiable way, that some moral statements are self-evidently true and universally applicable for all humans in all times in all situations whether they agree or not.
To be clear, I would never claim that it is a demonstrable fact that some moral statements are self-evidently true.
I asked: “Unless you don’t try to apply this system to the real world, and this is really just a hypothetical mind game?”
You answered:
Ah, ok. That explains a lot. In that case, I leave you to it and hope you have fun in your further discussion with Elizabeth. I am not really interested in discussing moral systems and belief systems for a hypothetical world. I prefer moral systems that can be applied in the world I live in. I have a feeling though that Elizabeth might agree with me here. I don’t think she is really discussing a hypothetical moral system on her side either, but one that is derived from, and applicable to the real world. As I said earlier, and you agreed with, Elizabeth’s view of a self-evident moral statement differs substantially from yours, and I think this includes its status as a hypothetical fact.
But I’ll keep watching and let Elizabeth speak for herself.