In another thread, WJM writes:
Also, when I say I must accept such a prioris in order to even hope to deliberately establish a rational worldview, that means that without such premises, reason (logic) itself breaks down into nonsense.
WJM is laying out the case for rationalism. Typically, rationalism is described as assuming innate knowledge. However, some instead assume a priori knowledge. Thanks to WJM, I now have an inkling on what might be intended by “a priori knowledge.”
The opposing philosophical position is that of empiricism, that knowledge comes through the senses. Most of those posting here (self included) seem to be empiricists, while WJM is clearly standing for some version of rationalism.
This is intended as a stub topic, to allow comments specifically addressing the rationalism vs. empiricism debate.
My argument isn’t about discerning various things; my argument is about how one discerns true statements about various things. I can make statements all the time whether they make sense or not, whether they happen to be valid or erroneous, true or delusional.
That I happen to make a true statement is not the same as deliberately discerning a true statement. I cannot discern that my statement is true without a sytem of establishing what “true” means and how to validate it as a true statement under those qualifications and parameters.
Zachriel,
Like I said. Next thing Mr. Murray will be telling us is that numbers exist as concrete entities and that there exist such things as Euclidean triangles.
Natural language (take English as an example) is riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions. Yet we use it every day for meaningful communication and to express true statements about the world.
FOPC (First Order Predicate Calculus), as used my mathematicians and logicians, is free from inconsistencies and contradictions as far as we know. Yet, when it comes to expressing truths about the world, FOPC is sterile and devoid of meaning. People who use FOPC often accompany their FOPC expression with natural language expression, so that they can borrow the ability of natural language to convey meaning.
In short, your statements about the role of logic are nonsense.
I doubt that Newton’s laws are required. It does require the ability to track the motion of the baseball, and to predict its future path with some accuracy. Our science would use Newton’s laws for that tracking, but there can be other ways of tracking that do not require internalization of Newton’s laws. Presumably we do it in a more atheoretical manner.
My above statement is inaccurate. A statement can, of course, be true by chance. As my larger argument indicates, my point is about the deliberate discerning of true statements. Such discernment requires logic.
That we take a week of 7 days is an a priori commitment. The names of the days are also a priori. But, in both cases, these are arbitrary. If we had use a week of 8 days, and if we had numbered the days instead of giving them their current names, that would have worked just as well. The particular a priori commitments that we have made are not necessary. That we make some sort of a priori commitments is necessary.
A rhetorical rebuttal can often suffice, when what is being rebutted is itself no more than rhetoric.
Perhaps, but it’s clear that his claims about “true statements” are vacuous. In a world that allows no shades, everything is either black or white.
I am amused by WJM’s habitual response to the many posts in which people demolish his silly arguments by hoisting him on his own petard. A truly sane and rational person would think, “Okay, he’s shown that my premises ain’t shit, looks like I lose to reductio ad absurdum“… but our boy WJM, why, he makes noise about “you’re stealing my concept!!!!”
Our boy WJM is FAIL.
I wonder one determines what a “truly” sane and rational person would do in the context of a belief system where true statements cannot be discerned via rational processes.
One last try before I give up. Mr Murray, is the following syllogism true or false?
All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Socrates is mortal.
Remember, you must use the rules of logic to determine if the syllogism is true. (We already know that it’s valid).
I wonder how long it will take WJM to realize that his weapons-grade ludicrosity — I mean, really, watch me use the fallacy of Appeal to Consequences to prove that it’s rational to assume God exists, and now whaddayamean, ‘reductio ad absurdum’ isn’t Latin for ‘you stole my concept’!? — has reduced him to the intellectual status of a chewtoy?
Who knows – or cares? Empirical science is a rational process which is able to discern the extent to which statements about reality are true and it does very nicely thank you.
But I thought you were just talking about logic which, of course, is a part of that rational process but not the whole of it.
We could construct a logical argument for the claim that there must be flocks of all-white penguins at the South Pole but the only way to find out is to go and look.
It’s also perfectly possible to construct valid arguments concluding that God exists. Theologians have made a good living out of doing that or something similar for hundreds of years. But the only way to discover which, if any, are true and to what extent is by empirical research.
You nailed it! I was struggling to compose a reply with the ‘naked ratio’ as my starting point and that led straight to the paradigm of GIGO. ‘Nuff said about WJM.
The problem is that they miss an essential of man’s most valuable assets; curiosity, without which ratio becomes a gigo machine.
I absolutely agree with this btw.
Catching up here (thanks to Rolf for bumping the thread!):
William, I’m not understanding this, though I’m no philosopher so that’s probably not surprising. But how can logic discern true statements from false if logic itself depends on the truth of the statements that are premised?
Curiosity is hugely under-rated IMO.
Logic doesn’t depend on the truth of the statements that are premised. You’re mistaking a logically true statement with a factual claim about the world. Logic can begin with the premise, “IF santa clause existed, and IF there existed 2 billion independent locations on earth with “good” children .. ” etc., and deliver a true statement given the premises.
Yes, but where does that get you?
It provides one the mechanism by which to meaningfully evaluate the logical inferences that necessarily extend from various ideological premises(whether or not they are true) to determine if those fundamental premises provide sufficient warrant for the beliefs and views one holds, or if it requires them to ignore the logical ramifications of their premises and hypocritically act and think as if other premises are true, even while denying they are.
How else would one determine if their belief system was rationally coherent and consistent with how they actually think, argue, and behave in the world?
For instance, it’s one thing to believe that no objective (universally applicable to humans) source of “what is good” exists; it’s another thing entirely to rationally justify one’s functional moral views and practical application thereof with that founding premise.
It’s what makes Dawkins a hypocrite, whether or not his premises are actually true. He has no rational reason that can be derived from his fundamental premises to attack theists, because under his premise, theistic beliefs are no different in essence than Dawkins’ beliefs; they are the successful evolutionary traits of certain human lineages established only by accumulations of deterministic cause and effect physics. Dawkins might as well be ridiculing and belittling them for their skin color; it’s exactly the same thing. They are traits determined by physics (under Dawkins’ view), not beliefs vetted and accepted by free will individuals that can choose something other than what the causal, underlying physics commands.
Well, I can see that logic helps us ascertain whether our beliefs are internally consistent, but I don’t see that it helps us ascertain whether what we believe is true. So I’m still not seeing how logic/reason enables us to “discern true statements from false”, which I thought you were claiming.
Well, I’m not knocking reason for doing that job. I agree that logic can tell us whether a belief system is “rationally coherent” etc. It’s the truth part I’m querying 🙂
Ah. Light is beginning to dawn. Thank you.
So you are saying that moral principles and moral behaviours are coherent if based on the premise that “what is good” exists, but don’t if they don’t?
If, so, I think I get it.
That’s helpful, William. I think I understand what you are saying.
More shortly (need a bike ride to think).
I’m saying there are necessary inferences from premises. For example, a poster here named “Robin” demonstrated a rationally consistent moral view that stems from the premise that “what is good” is a subjective commodity: it means that “let’s kill the jews” is every bit as moral a statement as “let’s save the jews from being gassed”, given the conditions that give rise to such views. Since there would be no objective standard by which to assess them, neither is intrinsically more moral than the other.
If one holds that “the good” is an essentially subjective commodity (like “what tastes good” or “what feels bad”), but holds (for all intents and practical purposes) that “lets kill the jews” is an objectively (meaning, applicable to all humans regardless of subjective views or conditions) immoral statement, then one has a moral view that cannot be justified via their premise, and is actually contradicted by their functional, practical behavior.
If one is going to be able to rationally defend their beliefs, and they insist that gassing the jews is wrong regardless of subjective context (justifying their “moral outrage” over people like Craig defending biblical genocide), then they’re going to have to find a premise that warrants their view that morality describes a universal good.
Many posters here on the one hand cliam that morality describes an entirely subjective good; but on the other, react to Craig and other theists as if their moral views warrant outrage. If morality describes a subjective good, there’s no call to be outraged over anything anyone calls moral or immoral.
Leaving aside your last post, William, with which I disagree for rather different reasons (I think it confuses morality with ethics – the idea that there is a right thing to do with what that right thing is) here is my more considered response to your previous one:
It seems to me that you are saying that if we start from the premise that there is an “objective moral standard” it is logically coherent to say “therefore we must try to discern what is right”, even if it doesn’t give us any clue about what is right.
But that if we start from the premise that there is no “objective moral standard”, it is not logically coherent to claim that “we must try to discern what is right”, and so it is hypocritical to claim any given action is wrong.
I have three issues (at least!) with this.
The first is that as neither scenario gives us any clue as to what is right, merely whether it matters, the end result is the same – people who do think it matters, whether “rationally” or not, will try to figure out what is right, and those (rare) individuals who don’t think it does, won’t bother. And of those who do try to figure out what is right (again, whether “rationally”) or not, those who think there is an “absolute moral standard” will have no advantage over those who don’t in getting to an answer. To give an analogy: take two people trying to guess the result of a coin flip. One thinks that the coin is already flipped, the other thinks it hasn’t been flipped yet. In the first case, the person believes there is an “objective reality” that she has to try to discern, even though she has no clue as to how to discern it. In the second, the person believes there is no “objective reality” (at least at the time of guessing. And yet both people will have an equal probability (whatever the “reality” of the case) of getting the answer right (50%). So it’s a difference that makes no difference, unless you can demonstrate that believing that an “objective morality” exists gives you a heads up as to what is right and what is wrong.
The second objection I have is that even you are not claiming (as I understand it) that the “objective morality” that is the premise for your logic is actually verifiable, or for that matter, falsifiable (correct me if I’m misunderstanding you on this). You seem, rather, to be saying: if we assume that there is an absolute (I prefer that word to “objective” btw, which has another, rather different, meaning, and was one of the reasons I at first misunderstood you) morality, “out there” in reality somewhere, then it makes sense to try to figure out, and do, what is right and what is wrong, whereas if we don’t, it makes no sense. And there’s nothing wrong with basing your actions on the basis of an assumption, even if you don’t know whether the assumption is warranted. For example, we live our lives (mostly) on the assumption that we will be alive for the foreseeable future, even though there may, already, unknownst to us, be an aneurysm about to burst lethally in our brains, or a sharpshooter training his sights on us right now. So I see nothing wrong (or hypocritical) about making the assumption that doing the right thing matters, even if we have no way of knowing, whether, on some cosmic scale, it does. So there is nothing irrational (and certainly not “hypocritical”) in an atheist saying: I will live my life on the assumption that doing the right thing matters, therefore I will try to figure out what the right thing to do is.
Lastly, and most importantly, and this is a point I’ve made before, but I’ll make it again: ethics is, essentially, about what we ought to do, as opposed to what we’d do if we didn’t ought to do something else! In other words, it’s about considering the wider ramifications of our actions than the immediately rewarding effects on ourselves. It can be to do with long term benefits to ourselves and/or benefits to beings other than ourselves. And the reason we even have the auxiliary verb “ought”, I suggest, is because, unlike, or at least to a far greater extant than, other animals, we are capable of “mental time travel” – of placing ourselves imaginatively at a different place, a different time, in a different mind, and are thus enabled to way up the consequences of our actions not merely to ourselves, now, but to ourselves and others at other places and times.
In other words ethics is built into our brains. We do not need to postulate an “absolute morality” to make the assumption that doing the right thing – doing what we ought to do – matters. It’s hard-wired. What we do need to do is to figure what that right thing is, under different (often difficult) conditions.
And the assumption of an “absolute morality” is, as far as I can see, of no use at all in figuring that out.
No, that’s not what I said, nor is it what I meant. The rest of your post extends from this erroneous characterization. We are under no obligation to discern what is right, nor have I tendered an argument in this thread about how discerns behavioral oughts.
IF morality and/or ethics is “built into our brains”,and IF it is “built into my brain” that I should steal, cheat, lie and brutalize others for my own gain, then that is by definition what is ethical and moral for me. Correct?
OK, I will re-read your posts.
No, I don’t think your last paragraph is correct 🙂
This is what I’m talking about when it comes to examining the consequences of one’s premises whether or not they are factually true. If one premises that ethics is only what is hard-wired in one’s brain, then if it is hard-wired in my brain that cheating, lying, stealing and coercion are ethical, then those things are by definition ethical. There’s no way around it.
If one premises that ethics are what is hard-wired into the majority’s brain, then if the majority is hard-wired as above, that behavior is by definition ethical. Again, there is no way around it.
It may be factually true that ethics and morality are wiring outputs, or that they represent the consensus wiring output of a group, but then one must accept the consequences of those premises. If one is unwilling to accept the consequences of those premises, then they must provide a premise that warrants their view.
Also, the only reason it “makes sense” to figure out any true moral or ethical statements is if there are necessary consequences to such behavior. If there are no necessary consequences, then the idea that some behavior is “right” and other behavior is “wrong” is just a social convention. If that is the case, then one needn’t try to figure out what is right and wrong, but rather only what society allows and disallows, and how one wishes to operate within that system based on their own proclivities and desires.
I didn’t say “ethics” were hard-wired – I said the capacity for “mental time travel” i.e. for placing ourselves imaginatively at a different place, a different time, in a different mind, and for weighing up the consequences of our actions not merely to ourselves, now, but to ourselves and others at other places and times, is “hard wired”.
This, I suggest means that morality is hard-wired – by which I mean, the notion that some things are right and some things are wrong.
What is right and what is wrong, i.e. ethics – is a different issue.
And as I understand you, you agree – your premise is, as I understand it, simply that there IS such a thing as right and wrong. I don’t think you are claiming any method of figuring out which is which, are you? If you are, please explain!
OK, that does seem to be a separate point.
I would agree that ethical questions only arise when there are consequences to our actions. But you seem to be saying that they only arise when there are necessary consequences for the actor – do you mean in the sense of reward or punishment?
If so, is it a key aspect of your premise that our actions are rewarded/punished in an afterlife?
How can one have a sense of “right and wrong” that is separate from “what is right and wrong”? If you sense “right”, it isn’t in an experiential vacuum; you sense some act is right, and you sense some acts are wrong. What you’ve described “ethics” as, apparently, is simply categorizing what one’s hard-wired brain senses as “right and wrong” into specific, coordinated lists.
Is that what you mean? That morality is hard-wired into sensing that some acts are right and others wrong, and that ethics is process of categorizing and coordinating those sensations?
Right and wrong only formally exist in relationship to purpose. You claim morality, or a sense of “right and wrong” are hardwired in the brain. If so, what purpose does this organization of “right” and “wrong” serve? If they serve no purpose, then how can one say that any action is right or wrong?
Perhaps you are equating “right and wrong” with empathy; perhaps what you mean to say is that the brain is hard-wired to feel bad empathetically in relation to some acts, and feel good empathetically in relationship to others; not that the actions are “right” or “wrong” in any formal sense of those terms.
Is this what you mean when you say our brains are hardwired to sense “right” and “wrong” – good and bad empathetic feelings? And that ethics is simply formally categorizing and coordinating those feelings into a behavioral system?
My system of right and wrong is predicated on their being universal purpose that humans are created to serve, thus “right” and “wrong” have formal meaning, so some things are right and wrong regardless of how one feels empathetically about them.
The means by which one discerns right from wrong is by starting the same place we start with any descriptive theory: begin with self-evidently true statements, from those, establish necessary premises and use logic to discern necessarily true statements, conditionally true statements, and generally true statements.
OK, let me ask you some questions, because clearly I’m misunderstanding your position.
When you talk about “objective” morality, do you mean there is a system of ethics (rules about what is right and what is wrong) that is “out there” and that we can discern?
If yes, how do we discern it?
If no, what do you mean by “objective morality”?
ETA:
For some reason my screen cut off the bottom of your post.
Ignore the above, and I’ll respond later.
I mean in the sense that there are necessary consequences to the actions one takes in their relationship with gravity; their are consequences to the actions one takes in their relationship to morality. Gravity is a theoretical description of what is presumed to be an objectively existent commodity. In my argument, morality is a theoretical description, in terms of “oughts”, of an objectively existent commodity – the purpose of human existence.
One ought not jump off a cliff; one ought not torture infants for pleasure. The consequences are inescapable and are not forms of “reward” or “punishment” in any formal sense; they are just the necessary consequences. Necessary does not mean arbitrary.
The consequences are: moral behavior refines and purifies us; immoral behavior degrades us. By “us”, I mean the quality, ratio, or mix of spirit (soul, god-aspect) to matter (not-spirit, absence of god). These terms are used metaphorically, not formally. In the same sense that dark is a measure of lack of light, and cold is a measure of lack of heat, evil is a measure of lack of god, or lack of good. Immoral behavior makes us colder, darker, more material; moral behavior makes us lighter, warmer, more spiritual, more godly. They are movements in directions.
Since god is the fundamental essence of existence itself, the other end of the spectrum – not-God – means non-existence. The eventual consequence of immoral behavior is non-existence, not because god commands such a state of affairs, but because that is what God is, and so that is what existence must be.
Whether it is one lifetime or many, or one afterlife or many, or different iterations and levels thereof – it doesn’t really matter to my theory. There are experiential benefits to refining one’s spiritual nature, and experiential detriments to degrading it, even if one never reaches either extreme consequence.
But, back to the point: unless there are necessary consequences to moral behavior, there is no reason to worry about it. What one should rather worry about are the personal and social ramifications of their actions in regards to their personal goals and views. Calling it “morality” is just an unnecessary convention. If it serves you best to turn in Jews and cheer their gassing, then unless there are necessary consequences against doing such a thing, go ahead and do it. Why not?
OK, thanks 🙂
That makes some sort of sense to me!
This is what I mean:
“The good” is the objective commodity; human purpose – what purpose we are created to fulfill, that which is common (universal) to all of us, and held as true regardless of if others subjectively agree or not.
Morality is a subjectively determined set of behavioral “oughts” which are (in my worldview) assumed to be describing – as best we can – an objectively (universally applicable to all humans) existent purpose (also known as “the good”).
Some oughts (that serve this objective good) are self-evidently true (one ought not torture infants for pleasure). We know (in the self-evidently true sense) that torturing infants for pleasure acts against our purpose as human beings. It is formally wrong, not just wrong in the “feels bad empathetically” sense, because we hold it to be wrong even if a sociopath enjoys doing it. It’s still wrong to do even if you have no empathetic barrier against it.
From such self-evidently true, formal statements of right and wrong, we can discern, via logic, necessary premises, necessarily true statements (about right and wrong behavior), conditionally true statements, and generally true statements.
One of the necessarily true statements is that there must be necessary consequences (not arbitrary ones) to moral/immoral behavior, or there is no reason to concern ourselves over it; yet, another self-evidently true moral statement is that it is important that we concern ourselves with how we ought to behave. We know (in a self-evidently true way) that we should concern ourselves with our oughts, even though we are not compulsed to.
Furthermore, we know we are harmed in some way if we engage in truly immoral behavior (not just claimed immoral behavior), whether we believe in any god or spiritual existence or not – which is why people are (rightfully) outraged at those who defend behavior that is self-evidently immoral.
It sickens us, saddens our heart, makes us furious … because it is a violation of something formally real and important and not just a subjective expression of preferring key lime pie over coconut creme – which is all it would be under subjectivist perspective.
When puzzled, I often try to translate things into E Prime. Here goes:
William describes the objective commodity he calls “the good” as “human purpose”, which he defines as the purpose the agent that created us intended us to fulfill, and which [somebody, maybe the agent that created us?] holds as true whether or not others agree or not.
So your definition appears to presuppose a creative agent with the capacity for intentional behaviour. Which is fine. The last part is less clear – is the actor that “holds [the purpose] as true” the agent that created us? If so, what is does it mean to hold one’s own purpose “as true” – to believe one has it?
Ah, I was calling that “ethics”. Good to know. That’s fine.
If these oughts are “self-evidently true”, why would it be “hypocritical” for an atheist to express them? Or are they only “self-evidently true” if you also hold that an agent created us for the purpose of “good”? If so, how do you know that the “good” for which it was the intention of the agent that created us that we should serve includes not torturing babies?
In other words, can you give the formalism by which you know that torturing babies is self-evidently wrong?
I’ll stop there and wait for your response 🙂
Cheers
Lizzie
Elizabeth,
Let’s go at this from another direction.
Is torturing babies for one’s personal pleasure wrong in all cases, in all cultures, regardless of any claim by feeling, consensus, authority, supposed divine edict or “hard-wired brains” to the contrary?
Well, I would say yes, and so would you. But then we both share the conviction that prioritising our own pleasure at the expense of other people’s is wrong.
Where we appear to differ is in how we derive that conviction.
Why don’t you just answer Elizabeth’s very clear and simple questions instead of responding in a way that gives the impression that you are attempting to evade them?
No, the difference is more profound than that; you believe the conviction is derived. I do not believe the conviction is derived.
Since your conviction is derived, please tell me what it is derived from.
Well, I’ve done that a few times! But to repeat: from our capacity for mental time travel.
Which, using my terminology, makes it more objective, not less, because it can be derived independently by different people (which is another way of saying that it is “self-evident” to people endowed with that very human capacity.
So tell me where you get your conviction from – or, if it is a better question, why you think it is “self-evident”.
That doesn’t even respond to the question. If I happen to enjoy torturing infants for pleasure, and I “mentally time travel” to the future and imagine the fun I could have torturing, how can I derive from that imagined scenario that torturing infants is wrong?
Are you saying that sociopaths cannot or do not employ mental time travel? Are you saying people that perform blatantly immoral acts do not use mental time travel? Hitler and all the SS Nazis – all incapable of mental time travel?
Of course they use mental time travel. Many sociopaths plan out their behavior very carefully. If “what is moral” is derived from “the ability to mentally time travel”, then anything can be moral simply by the process of planning it out in advance, and so “torturing infants for pleasure” can be a moral activity, in contradiction to your earlier agreement.
Are you sure that your moral views about torturing babies isn’t derived from something other than just the ability to mentally time travel? Because by itself, mental time travel would authorize anything as moral.
Self-evident truths are not derived from anything. There is no reason “why” a self-evident truth is self-evidently true; it just is. If there was a reason why, they would be derived from that reason, and not self-evident. That’s what the “self-evident” part of “self-evidently true” means.
Because her questions (which essentially refer to ground already covered) indicate she’s having trouble understanding my explanations and descriptions of my views as I intend them. For example, she asks what I derive a self-evidently true statement from; this indicates that we have a fundamental disconnect about what “self-evident” means.
I noticed this pattern at UD where several posters have become frusrated towards Elizabeth and began accusing her of intellectual dishonesty. From my observation (and participation up until I started avoiding those interactions), a contributor at UD would make a post, and what Elizabeth would paraphrase back or respond to was a complete mischaracterization of the original messages (I don’t believe it was purposeful, although several other posters there did, and said so).
I’ve experienced this myself several times, where her response was so far off the base of what I said, it wasn’t even wrong – it was something else entirely. It would have been a full-time occupation just trying to correct her ongoing misunderstandings of points and arguments being made. Note: I’m not saying she is wrong about any facts under debate here, only that it is apparent that there is a chasm between what I and UD posters write, and what Elizabeth interprets from those words, that makes debate more problematic than usual.
IMO, there is a fundamental disconnection between how Elizabeth thinks and organizes thoughts and makes arguments, and how I and other posters at UD do. So I thought perhaps a different tactic would be more successful here; instead of arguing from my position, which Elizabeth apparently has great difficulty in understanding as I intend it, we can instead try this debate from the point of view of Elizabeth defending her moral views.
Certainly she understands her own moral views and can present a rational argument and justification for them, and it will be easier for her to articulate and defend them. In the process, hopefully, she can more easily understand my (hopefully) rational criticism of her moral system and ultimately any moral system that doesn’t include a theistic premise.
William, the reason I ask these questions is for clarification. To imply that it is anything to do with “intellectual dishonesty” is, hmmph, well, let’s say, rather annoying (ETA: and I appreciate that you are not doing so here, but it’s one of the reasons I’m taking a substantial break from UD).
I’ve said repeatedly what I’m trying to do here – to understand your position. My questions were addressed to you so that you could clarify for me what you are saying.
I’d be really grateful if you would answer them, or at least comment on that post, point by point.
A further comment, William:
Here’s my view of what I think is the same phenomenon:
I do try to paraphrase what people are saying, i.e. rephrase it in my own words, precisely because I want to check whether I’m understanding. Far from “intellectual dishonesty”, it arises from an intense desire to get thing right.
However, what repeatedly happens is that my paraphrase is rejected, sometimes indignantly. Now, there are two (at least, don’t want to exclude a middle here) possible reasons for this.
One is that I have indeed misunderstood (and I’m sure that is sometimes the case).
The second is that my paraphrase reveals a latent inconsistency, or even absurdity, in the original claim or proposition
And my sense is that the latter is sometimes the case. But the only way to find out is if the original author of the claim or proposition addresses my “paraphrase” seriously and points out how it differs from what they are saying, and clarifies what they are saying.
That’s why I “translated” your words into “E-Prime”. I was fairly rigorous, and the only parts I added were the lacunae resulting from your use of the passive voice. Those are real lacunae, and I want to know what you have in mind as their occupants. Passively used verbs have an implicit subject, and I want to know what those subjects are.
And the reason I bang on about the passive voice is exactly the same as the reason I try to get my students to avoid the passive voice (and why many journals these days ask for it to be minimised) is that it is very easy to miss a hole in one’s argument if one thinks too passively. I think this is a real problem in ID thinking.
And it’s not just use of the passive – it’s also reluctance to provide operational definitions for key terms. I don’t think it’s dishonesty, but I do think it betrays unchallenged assumptions, sometimes, CSI being a case in point.
As I’ve said, I make no claim to being a philosopher, but my one strength, I’d say, is that I have absolutely no diffidence about asking simple (even stupid) questions. If I don’t understand something, I ask. If I still don’t understand it, I try to express a candidate meaning as simply as possible, and ask whether this is correct. For some reason, at UD, this is regarded as dishonesty. Which is kinda weird 🙂
So, as I said, I’d appreciate a point by point response to my post above.
That’s not a description. It’s two ways of referring to the same thing. So is “final cause”.
The purpose is created by god. I hold this purpose to be universally applicable to all humans regardless of culture or any other condition. Some statements that refer to the good are self-evidently true, and are true regardless of circumstance, culture, feelings, etc. Others are necessary derivations of those self-evidently trues statements; others are only conditionally true.
This means that some aspects of how the purpose is supposed to be fulfilled is universal (not torturing infants for pleasure), while other aspects are conditional in terms of the state of affairs one finds themselves in. Some are clear and obvious; some are not.
No, it doesn’t presuppose a god. The existence of a god of some sort is logically required if we accept that formal (referring to right and wrong and not good and bad empathetic feelings), self-evidently true moral statements exist.
I hold the purpose of human existence to be universal because if moral statements refer to what is right and wrong, and a moral statement is universally true (torturing infants), then regardless of any other consideration it is wrong to torture infants.
But, what does “wrong” mean? What does it refer to? “Right” and “wrong” in the formal sense only refer to a purpose or goal. It cannot refer to anything else. This necessarily means that regardless of other circumstances, all humans must have a common (universal) purpose, whether they know it or not, whether they accept it or not.
You cannot have something that is universally, prescriptively, unconditionally wrong, without there being a purpose that the action in question violates.
Already answered in another post; the atheist has no warrant for accepting that self-evidently true moral statements exist.
Answered. Self-evident means self-evident. The truth of the statement is evident in itself. It is not derived or reasoned.
Now if you would answer my questions above?
Cool.
Right, so you mean “purpose” as in the intention that whoever made us had for us, rather than any purposes we ourselves might have for our lives, yes? (Excuse the paraphrase, I’m just checking!)
OK.
In that case I don’t understand you. You talked about the “purpose we are created to fulfill” – which presupposes that some entity capable of intentional action created us for that entity’s [edited to fix grammar] own ends. Moreover, just above, you said that “the purpose is created by god”. So it seems to me that by positing that we were created to fulfil a purpose, you are intrinsically (and, in fact, explicitly, above) positing a creator with a purpose for his/her/its creation. I guess we could call it something other than “God” but that seems to me as good a definition of a god – certainly of a monotheistic god – as I can imagine – an entity that creates human beings for his/her/its own purpose. What am I missing?
But again, I have to insist, that if human existence has a purpose that is external to the purposes we ourselves devise for ourselves, as intentional beings, that purpose must itself be the purpose of an intentional being. So it seems to me you don’t need your “because” clause. If humans have a purpose, by virtue of having been created by an intentional being who had some purpose he/she/it created us to fulfil, and if we define “good” as synonymous with that purpose, than good will be universal anyway. I don’t see what the torturing infants has to do with anything, although I would agree that it’s universally wrong! I’m just not seeing your logic. Clearly if something is universally wrong, it will be, well, universally wrong.
Or are you saying that because torturing infants is self-evidently and universally wrong, therefore there must be a universal good, therefore there must be an intentional being for whom that good was his/her/its purpose in creating us? If so, that makes some kind of sense to me.
OK, so “right” and “wrong” refer to the intended results of some action. Which is the same as saying that “right” and “wrong” are to do with action selection – choice, decision-making. But not all decision-making has “right” and “wrong” alternatives. Many actions are morally neutral. So we’d have to say that “right” and “wrong” refer to goals that have effects that will benefit or harm some other person (or conceivably oneself at a later date). Say if you disagree.
So why do you say that “This necessarily means that regardless of other circumstances, all humans must have a common (universal) purpose”. How have you derived this corollary?
Well, leaving aside the question as to how you decide that something is universally, prescriptively, unconditionally wrong, how about simply saying that the purpose that is violated by torturing babies is the purpose that humans widely derive for themselves, which is to treat others as they would be treated. Why attribute that purpose to anything or anyone other than the human beings who regard torturing babies as “self-evidently wrong”? Or is your argument that: human beings have a conscience, therefore they must have been created to do good, which we can identify by examining what is universally regarded as being contra-conscience?
OK, but I have not seen any post in which I find an answer to this that makes sense to me. If something is “self-evidently” true, why can an atheist not accept it? That’s why I asked my question above: are you arguing that the fact that humans find that torturing babies is self-evidently wrong is evidence that we were created by an intentional being whose purpose was that we should inter alia not torture babies, and that to deny this is to deny the evidence of the existence of conscience? That would make some sort of sense to me.
Well, again I ask: if the truth of a statement is evident without recourse to reason, why should an atheist not find it as self-evident as a theist does? Please don’t refer me to some other answer, William, because I am just not seeing this, unless, as I said, your argument boils down to:
Human beings find it self-evident that torturing babies [ETA: for our own pleasure] is wrong.
Therefore human beings are endowed with a universal moral sense.
That sense could only have been endowed by an intentional creator who installed the module.
Therefore denying that we were created by an intentional creator is tantamount to denying that the wrongness of torturing babies is self-evident.
If so, I propose this:
Human beings find it self-evident that torturing babies for our own pleasure is wrong.
Therefore human beings are endowed with a universal moral sense.
That sense probably evolved as an aspect of our capacity for Theory of Mind, empathy, and social living.
This explains why we universally identify as “wrong” those actions that bring us pleasure at the expense of the suffering of others.
Right.
Technically, it’s not a presupposition in this line of reasoning, because – as you later argue – just because one recognizes a self-evidently true moral statement, that understanding at that time doesn’t indicate any particular premise to warrant that finding. It is not until one logically examines the possible competing premises, necessary conclusions and how they affect the status of one’s self-evidently true statement that one realizes that there is only one logically satisfactory premise.
If one begins with recognizing that a self-evidently true “ought” exists, and if one reasons that such an ought cannot be rationally or sufficiently warranted by any other premise than the premise of sentient creator, then they then conclude that premise as the necessary one. So, technically, it would not be a presupposed premise.
But, that is the argument at hand. Since you have already admitted that self-evidently true moral statements exist (as more completely characterized in a prior post – meaning, regardless of subjective beliefs, views, society, might, feelings, and any other conditions), the the question is if any premise other than a theistic one can sufficiently warrant the existence of such a self-evidently true moral statement.
The reason I have asked you to defend your moral view is to show that no non-theistic premise can sufficiently warrant the existence of a self-evidently true moral statement.
I don’t know if I understand your objection here. Let’s posit that not all human beings consider torturing infants for pleasure wrong (we could substitute some other obviously wrong behavior that some humans have not believed to be wrong). If “what is right” is right so because of the intentions (purposes, goals) of humans, then for those humans who think torturing infants is good, it is by definition good, because it is the right behavior to achieve their goal. If, however, humans were created for an objective purpose by god, and that purpose was necessary (not arbitrary), then all human oughts exist in relation to that purpose, and not the individual, particular purposes each human has.
Right behavior would be right behavior regardless of what any particular human thought was right, and regardless of any particular human goal. Torturing babies might be the right behavior if a sadistic human wants to amuse himself, but unless there is an objective standard of oughts to judge his personal ought by, one cannot rationally argue that his “right” is actually a “wrong”.
But the experiential fact is that it is not considered universally wrong by all humans; so it is not warranted as “universally wrong” by fact, it must be warranted universally wrong by premise. For one to claim that something is universally wrong for all humans whether they agree it is wrong or not, they must warrant that claim via a sound, sufficient premise. What makes it wrong for all humans, whether they agree or not? The warrant for such a claim must refer to a standard that is beyond individual or consensus view, because it is held (by us) as superceding individual and consensus view.
As far as I can interpret, that’s the short gist of it.
It depends both on what you mean here, and how it is contextualized. I think “the good” goes beyond what are normally considered to be choices that affect others, and pretty much reaches into all behavior. Harming others is just the most easily recognized and egregious offense against the good. Also, if the above is contextualized as falling under the god-created premse fine. If you believe the above can exist independent of that premise, then one would have to justify it (as per how a universal wrong can exist without a god and without it factually being universal).
Because they have universal oughts (or, we agree that humans do), they must refer to a universal purpose in order for them to be logically coherent. If our proposed universal ought refers to anything other than an objective, necessary, universal purpose, then it is not a universal ought. It might be an almost-universal consensus ought, but we agree that even if everyone else agrees that torturing babies is right, it is still wrong. We must accept (by elimination of other premises that attempt to give sufficient warrant to a self-evidently true and universal ought) that our ought formally refers to an actual, universal purpose that supercedes all subjective, individual purposes, ideas, feelings, consensus, etc., or else we must dispense with the idea that there are self-evidently true universal oughts.
And then we digress into moral relativism, where anything can be moral.
Because we have already agreed (have we not?) that we hold our self-evidently true moral statement as true regardless of consensus, and regardless of any justifications otherwise. I mean, you can certainly say that the reason it’s wrong is because most humans feel that way (however they derive that conclusion), but then you must also agree that if most humans derive that it is okay to torture infants for fun, then it is by definition moral. Furthermore, you would then have to explain (if you wanted to defend your moral view as rational) how, if the definition/warrant for “how humans ought to behave) is determined by consensus – how does one go about challenging that consensus, or acting in contradiction to it? By definition, it would be immoral to contradict it. By definition, the genocide of the Canaanites would be moral and anyone attempting to stop it would by definition be immoral.
That’s the problem with any other premise; it leads to a rational breakdown, inconsistency, hypocrisy, and incoherency in moral views unless one is willing to agree – as Robin did – that protecting those babies is not intrinsically more moral than torturing them, depending on whatever subjective source of justification one uses – consensus, might, feeling, etc.
To achieve a rationally warranted, coherent and consistent worldview. If moral purpose can be attributed to whatever a group of human beings decides or feels, then gassing the jews is a moral behavior by definition (at least, for the nazis that gassed them).
No. I don’t think any of my arguments have even included the term “conscience”.
They can, and often do. They just cannot rationally justify it.
My argument is that if you agree that there are self-evidently true and universally binding moral statements that describe a “right” or a “wrong” that you hold as being true regardless of if anyone else agrees or disagrees, regardless of the consensus, might, feelings, or any other such conditions, that such a view cannot be rationally justified (warranted) by any premise other than a theistic one.
An atheist can certainly hold that it is always immoral to torture babies for fun, and they are under no existential obligation to rationally justify their belief via a sound premise; nor are they under any obligation to explain how such a view can be justified via their other existential premises and views. IMO, most people live their entire lives – successfully, and with great enjoyment and satisfaction – holding inconsistent, incoherent and unjustifiable beliefs.
They should, and usually do. The question at hand is if they can rationally justify it via their existential premises.
Not all do.
Only, it’s not universal. You are conflating “universal” with “consensus”, and you’ve already agreed that what is right is right whether it is a consensus view or not. Therefore, either your proposal here is invalid, or you must agree that under your proposal, consensus determines what is moral, since there is no universal agreement about what is moral.
If you are positing that your moral statement is true regardless of whether or not it is actually universally held, you must refer to a justification why it should be held as true whether or not it is actually universally held. If it is not actually universally held, but it you hold it as universally valid, then you must explain why it is true even for those who disagree; you cannot answer them, “because it is a universally held true statement”, because that is factually incorrect. You can either tell them that it is valid because most humans agree, or that it is valid regardless of whether or not most humans agree because …..”
That is where you’d have to fill in the blank with sufficient warrant. MY sufficient warrant is “… because humans have an actual, objective, necessary purpose whether they know it or not, whether they agree or not, given to them by their creator. It is valid regardless of consensus, might, culture majority, or even if every single human being disagrees. Its existence justifies one’s right to challenge any moral view regardless of consensus, might, authority, or culture, and empowers one to act in contradiction to any moral consesus or authority. Furthermore, one ought act in accordance with this purpose because there are necessary consequences involved.”
That’s to answer the following question such a person might ask, “Okay, even if I agree that universal oughts exist, why should I pay them any mind?”
There’s no rationally coherent, justifiable reason why one should pay them any mind unless there are necessary consequences. There cannot be any necessary consequences to immoral behavior unless the purpose of human existence is a necessary, objective, universal commodity that matters. Without necessary consequences, the consequences of immoral behavior are arbitrary and hardly a system worth arguing about.
Mr. Murray:
The succession of argumentation in these three paragraphs reveals the big gaps in your argument:
You (as a particular human) claim that a particular moral statement (or a particular set of moral statements) is “self-evidently” true. You deduce from this “self-evidence” as a premise that a god must exist which endowed humans with this sense of “self-evidence” to compel them towards a universal goal set by this god. Then you use this premise (a god exists who wants us to do x) as a “sound, sufficient” grounding for your claim that a particular moral statement is universally true.
Problem # 1: This argument is obviously circular. You cannot deduce your premise (a god exists) from your initial claim (moral statement x is self-evidently true) and then use that same premise to justify your original claim.
Problem # 2: If “the experiential fact is that [certain self-evidently wrong moral statements are] not considered universally wrong by all humans”, then your argument leads to absurd logical conclusions: If the sense for “self-evidence” is the result of an endowment by a god for the purpose to compel all humans towards a particular goal, then the persons not considering “self-evidently” wrong statements as wrong are obviously lacking the endowment of a necessary sense for “self-evidence” by god, and can in this sense not be considered human. Thus, the statements can indeed be warranted as “universally wrong” by fact, counting all those persons who can be considered human.
Even if WJM is correct, it’s not at all clear what actual, practical difference it makes. Under subjective morality, people won’t treat X as moral unless they agree that X is moral; under WJM’s putatively ‘objective’ morality, people won’t treat X as moral unless they agree that ‘X is moral’ is a self-evidently true statement. Why bother spot-welding WJM’s seemingly-gratuitous ‘self-evidently true’ schtick onto it — what’s the point of that act of philosophical spot-welding?
Under subjective morality, there’s no guarantee that you can use sweet reason to persuade someone that X is moral if they didn’t already agree in the first place; under WJM’s putatively ‘objective’ morality, there’s again no guarantee that you can use sweet reason to persuade someone that X is moral if they didn’t already agree in the first place. Quelle difference?
Under subjective morality, there may or may not be any rational warrant for supposing any particular X to be moral; under WJM’s putatively ‘objective’ morality, the alleged ‘warrant’ for supposing some particular X to be moral is It just is moral, that’s why — which doesn’t strike me as much of an improvement, somehow. I mean, one way, it’s moral because you feel it’s moral; the other way, it’s moral because you… declared it to be… self-evidently true..? Again, quelle difference?