What would Darwin do?

At Evolution News and Views, David Klinghoffer presents a challenge:

Man needs meaning. We crave it, especially when faced with adversity. I challenge any Darwinist readers to write some comments down that would be suitable, not laughable, in the context of speaking to people who have lived through an event like Monday’s bombing. By all means, let me know what you come up with.

Leaving aside Klinghoffer’s conflation of “Darwinism” with atheism, and reading it as a challenge for those of us who do not believe in a supernatural deity or an afterlife (which would include me), and despite lacking the eloquence of the speakers Klinghoffer refers to, let me offer some thoughts, not on Monday’s bombing, specifically, but on violent death in general, which probably touches us all, at some time.  Too many lives end far too soon:

We have one life, and it is precious, and the lives of those we love are more precious to us than our own.  Even timely death leaves a void in the lives of those left, but the gap left by violent death is ragged, the raw end of hopes and plans and dreams and possibilities.  Death is the end of options, and violent death is the smashing of those options;  Death itself has no meaning. But our lives and actions have meaning.  We mean things, we do things, we act with intention, and our acts ripple onwards, changing the courses of other lives, as our lives are changed in return.  And more powerful than the ripples of evil acts are acts of love, kindness, generosity, and imagination. Like the butterfly in Peking that can cause a hurricane in New York, a child’s smile can outlive us all. Good acts are not undone by death, even violent death. We have one life, and it is precious, and no act of violence can destroy its worth.

823 thoughts on “What would Darwin do?

  1. Ok, then your definition of God acts should be ” altruistic acts that do not harm”. Then I could present the case of the police that kill the muslim suicide bomber, and you tell me that he is hurting one people to avoid more people to be harm. And your definition of Good acts should be refined in “altruistic acts that do not harm or make the less harm”. But then again the suicide bombing thinks that they are trying to reduce the harm imposed to their people. And we can going on in that way, because your definition of Good acts is relative. Is relative because of the interpretatin of the terms and because at the end is “your” definition of Good acts, muslim suicide bombers are refining their definition of Good acts in order to fit their behavior to the definition.
    Do you agree that the definition of Good acts is relative?

  2. Blas:
    Ok, then your definition of God acts should be ” altruistic acts that do not harm”. Then I could present the case of the police that kill the muslim suicide bomber, and you tell me that he is hurting one people to avoid more people to be harm. And your definition of Good acts should be refined in “altruistic acts that do not harm or make the less harm”.But then again the suicide bombing thinks that they are trying to reduce the harm imposed to their people. And we can going on in that way, because your definition of Good acts is relative. Is relative because of the interpretatin of the terms and because at the end is “your” definition of Good acts, muslim suicide bombers are refining their definition of Good acts in order to fit their behavior to the definition.
    Do you agree that the definition of Good acts is relative?

    Let me try to be clearer:

    I am suggesting that actions motivated by a desire to benefit others (when we act altruistically) are, by definition, moral actions, and “morality” is the concept that we should act morally.

    I am distinguishing morality from ethics. Given the acceptance of morality (that we should act altruistically), the problem then arises as to what actions are most beneficial to others.

    I suggest that there is widespread agreement, throughout the world, and throughout history, on that definition of morality. Where there is disagreement is over ethics – what, precisely, constitutes an altruistic act – what constitutes “benefit” to others, and who counts as “others”, and how these things should be weighed up.

    Whether a suicide bomber is acting morally or not would, I suggest, depend on the extent to which s/he was motivated by the thought of personal reward (72 virgins or whatever), as opposed to a sense that the net benefit to others was worth the sacrifice of his/her life and the life of innocents.

    Whether it is ethical or not, would, I suggest, depend on how each of us perceives benefit.

    For example, I do not believe in heaven, or hell, and I think attempts to “cure” homosexuality are deeply misguided, no matter how “moral” because I think it harms people for no ultimate benefit.

    Others, who think it is worth having a miserable sex life, or none, for the sake of greater reward after death, may consider it ethical to attempt to cure homosexuality.

    We can argue about the ethics, but I suggest we agree that, whatever factors, or information inform our ethics (and science, for example, should), we pretty well all agree that we should do the best we can for others, and thus agree that moral behaviour is behavior that maximises benefit to others, and minimises harm.

    Perhaps the Boston Bombers thought they were minimising harm.

    But we can all agree that whether some greater good was, or was not served, they caused harm.

    Yes?

    I think it’s an important distinction, because theists often accuse atheists (as Klinghoffer in effect does) of having “no basis for morality”. I consider morality, as I have defined it, as self evident – we act morally when we are motivated by concern for others, rather than ourselves. Nobody attempts to say that it is “moral” to act selfishly, although a few may argue that acting selfishly is not wrong. I’d call that amorality, myself.

    So if we can get past that – and agree that there is really no widespread disagreement on what constitutes “morality” – then we can get on and have an informed discussion ethics. And I suggest that science is a better guide to ethics than scripture.

  3. Patrick:
    I finally disagree with Lizzie on a substantive issue!

    I see nothing particularly morally good about altruism per se.My simple definition of good acts is summed up in the Wiccan Rede:An it harm none do what ye will.

    (No, I do not self identify as Wiccan.)

    Cool 🙂

    But I’m not sure that counts as substantive disagreement.

    “First, do no harm” is a good start. I sometimes more harm is done by those who seek to benefit others than those who don’t (trying to “cure” homosexuality, for example).

    But altruism is still embedded in your principle – to whom is the “harm none” to be done, if not to others?

  4. For my own definition of good I choose: any action and intent that does not place one’s self as more morally or ethically important or above others.

    It’s actually pretty simple to me. “Evil” or wrong doing is always an act of selfishness, even when the actor truly believes he or she is doing the act for some greater good. Simply deciding that something is a greater good is a subjective opinion, and thus is a selfish concept. And there are few (if any) folks I’ve come across with the wisdom to truly determine the consequences of all actions and know that their act is the most selfless.

    “Goodness”, to me, is the recognition that one has no inherent authority or control over someone else based on one’s own person concept of right and wrong. In other words, “goodness” is acknowledging that we have no authority to be morally responsible for anyone else and can only be morally and ethically responsible for ourselves. It is the foundational message of Genesis in fact; the underlying concept of why the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil was so perilous, for most people do not have the wisdom or foresight to accurately judge right and wrong for others. In fact, I like the way Tolkien put it best:

    Many that live deserve death. And some that die deserve life. Can you give it to them? Then do not be too eager to deal out death in judgement. For even the very wise cannot see all ends.

    So “goodness” to me is any action that does not attempt to morally control another person. As such, I don’t tie “goodness” to altruism automatically. Certainly, altruistic actions are good, but other non-altruistic actions – such engaging in honest business practices – are also good to me.

    What the brothers did in Boston was evil to me for the simple reason that they placed their personal belief of right and wrong above those of the people of Boston.

    Now, I’m sure there are those who will wish to split hairs with my definition and ask if I think whether a mother who places her belief of safety over a child who wishes to play in the road is being evil. The answer is no and the reason covers why I do not find the police who placed their beliefs of right and wrong above the bombers’ were evil: those who demonstrate that they do not have the capacity to empathize with others or who do not have the capacity to understand the consequences of their own actions give up the right to freely express their desires in a society.

  5. I agree with the concept of an unselfish act. We are social animals and are very skilled at delayed reciprocity. I think that is the core of a civilised society. We are prepared to help others because we hope that one day, when we need help, someone will be there for us. It’s also a very practical and successful way for families and larger social groups to live. Is it possible to be utterly unselfish?

  6. Lizzie,

    “But we can all agree that whether some greater good was, or was not served, they caused harm.

    Yes?”

    Yes they caused harm, but the police killing the bomber also caused harm, so again it is a matter of “how much” harm you cause? Evaluated by whom?

    ” Nobody attempts to say that it is “moral” to act selfishly, although a few may argue that acting selfishly is not wrong. I’d call that amorality, myself.”

    I´m not sure. I think Maddoff didn`t agree for most of his life and if he were not caught he would still think in that way.
    No matter of what you think there are 7 billions humans on the earth is morality related with the number of them that think what is right or wrong.
    Again Do you agree that your definitin of “Good acts” is relative.

  7. The problem running rampant in this thread, of course, is stealing the concept. Terms are used that imply a value of meaning that do not exist as such from the Darwinistic perspective. Stripped of that basis of meaning, the words become nothing more than empty rhetoric that appeals to the emotional content of words that the Darwinist has no right to employ.

    For example, the term “evil”. What does “evil” mean under Darwinism? It means whatever anyone thinks it means. One could offer a similar soliloquy referring to the bombers as representing “the good”, and those they killed as “evil”. Without any objective basis to call one thing evil and another good, using those terms is subjective and empty – nothing but rhetoric.

    Why should anyone believe that acts of love, generosity, etc. have more impact than (subjectively termed) acts of evil? Meaning? Everyone’s life has subjective meaning – nobody disclaims that. But if we’re just talking about meaning as in impact, whose life had more meaning – that of the bombers, or that of any of the victims? Anyone know any of the victim’s names? I bet we all know the names of the bombers. Their names and acts will have quite a bit of meaning and value, whether one considers it good or bad. Since the good/evil value of any such act is purely subjective, one could as easily say that those that commit such acts have far more meaningful lives than their victims.

    I guess if you were addressing a group that had no knowledge of your views, empty rhetoric might work – not because it means anything, but because those listening will assume you mean something that you do not – that you cannot, under Darwinism – without stealing theistic concepts.

    Under Darwinism, love and hate, kindness and violence are categorically equal manifestations of interacting molecules – all just physical stuff, bumping around, causing other physical stuff to happen – including emotional reactions. From such a framework, your offering of comfort is nothing but hollow, laughable rhetoric.

  8. Why should I agree that “do no harm” has anything to do with “good”, if I were a Darwinist?

  9. William J. Murray: Under Darwinism, love and hate, kindness and violence are categorically equal manifestations of interacting molecules – all just physical stuff, bumping around, causing other physical stuff to happen – including emotional reactions. From such a framework, your offering of comfort is nothing but hollow, laughable rhetoric.

    Why would that make them anything other than real?

    If I proclaimed myself a “Darwinist”, and then proclaimed an intense dislike for William J Murray, would that be more “hollow” than if I proclaimed myself a committed christian, then evinced the same intense dislike? Would it be any different if I was a Wiccan, a pagan, a Buddhist, a Satanist?

  10. The problem running rampant in this thread, of course, is stealing the concept. Terms are used that imply a value of meaning that do not exist as such from the Darwinistic perspective. Stripped of that basis of meaning, the words become nothing more than empty rhetoric that appeals to the emotional content of words that the Darwinist has no right to employ.

    Personally, I think “the problem” (if there is one) is that you don’t actually understand evolution at all and are offering up a strawman to knock down, and that you don’t particularly understand the use of words and language, thus you are once again confusing the map for territory.

    For example, the term “evil”. What does “evil” mean under Darwinism? It means whatever anyone thinks it means. One could offer a similar soliloquy referring to the bombers as representing “the good”, and those they killed as “evil”. Without any objective basis to call one thing evil and another good, using those terms is subjective and empty – nothing but rhetoric.

    Here’s the thing William – concepts don’t have to have some concrete, objective standard in order for words used to describe said concepts to have meaning. Every language has thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of words that are not based to absolutes. “Cold” is a great example. So is “evil”. That these words are used to represent relative conditions does not make them any less meaningful. Nor, might I add, does it require stealing concepts from those who hold that there are invisible absolutes governing those concepts. All that is required is for people who wish to communicate to agree on a meaning.

    Why should anyone believe that acts of love, generosity, etc. have more impact than (subjectively termed) acts of evil? Meaning? Everyone’s life has subjective meaning – nobody disclaims that. But if we’re just talking about meaning as in impact, whose life had more meaning – that of the bombers, or that of any of the victims? Anyone know any of the victim’s names? I bet we all know the names of the bombers. Their names and acts will have quite a bit of meaning and value, whether one considers it good or bad. Since the good/evil value of any such act is purely subjective, one could as easily say that those that commit such acts have far more meaningful lives than their victims.

    Whether or not the bombers’ lives have more “meaning” (in some subjective sense) does not inherently make their lives more appreciable or inspiring to others. Sure, what little most Americans now know of the two brothers may well be memorable, but will that memory inspire anything from anyone. Is it important that anyone’s life inspire others? No…at least I don’t think so. However, it’s still a quantifiable measure of the someone’s life. In other words, if you are going to philosophize on the “meaning” of a person’s life, it seems to me that inspiration would be an inherent quality characteristic. And I daresay, more people will be inspired by the acts of those fighting back from injuries from the bombings and the acts of those creating other events/races in the names of those who died in the bombings than from the actions of the bombers.

    I guess if you were addressing a group that had no knowledge of your views, empty rhetoric might work – not because it means anything, but because those listening will assume you mean something that you do not – that you cannot, under Darwinism – without stealing theistic concepts.

    Ooo…it’s amazing how far those strawmen fly when you hit them!

    Under Darwinism, love and hate, kindness and violence are categorically equal manifestations of interacting molecules – all just physical stuff, bumping around, causing other physical stuff to happen – including emotional reactions. From such a framework, your offering of comfort is nothing but hollow, laughable rhetoric.

    Uggh…so much inaccuracy here. Tell me William, are you under the impression that “Darwinists” cannot tell the difference between sodium chloride and hydrogen peroxide? Between gold and boron? If, as you seem to insist, under “Darwinism”, all things are “just physical stuff, bumping around, causing other physical stuff to happen”, are “Darwinists” (or any other non-theists for that matter) all lying when they categorize things? Do they constantly confuse those categories? Are they all incapable of driving cars or putting satellites in orbit? I’m really curious William how you think we Darwinists function in this world given that you insist that to us everything is just atoms bumping into one another.

  11. damitall2: Why would that make them anything other than real?

    I don’t think that I claimed that hollow, laughable rhetoric wasn’t “real”.

    Proclaiming your dislike of me is an honest statement of what we would all know to be a subjective view. Of what comfort value is it to me that you say you personally dislike the person that caused the death or injury of a loved one? What is the purpose of characterizing those you dislike (or practices you dislike) as “evil”, if not to attempt to objectify your personal dislike and attempt to manipulate others into disliking them as well?

    Are you saying that the terms “evil” and “dislike” are synonymous, under Darwinism? If you are, I agree. For a Darwinist, the term “evil” is an objectification of a personal opinion in an attempt to manipulate others towards one’s own personally desired end.

    From a theistic perspective, evil is not the same as “personal dislike”, and is not per se an attempt to simply manipulate others into desired behavior, although it can be used for such.

  12. From a theistic point of view, evil seems to be whatever the preacher says god says it is, taking into account the current trendy interpretations of scripture.

  13. Lizzie:

    . . .

    Nobody attempts to say that it is “moral” to act selfishly, although a few may argue that acting selfishly is not wrong.I’d call that amorality, myself.

    . . .

    I refer you to Ayn Rand, who argues exactly that, albeit with a particular definition of “selfish” in mind.

    (I don’t self identify as an Objectivist either.)

  14. damitall2,
    As far as I can tell from WJM’s strange worldview, YES! Since ‘dislike’, (and all other abstractions) are not real. Only molecules are real, and all they do is bounce around randomly.

    The only way out of this nihilism is by imagining something not made of molecules bouncing around randomly, and attaching all abstractions we find meaningful to it. Since ‘materialists’ don’t believe in this something, their world is by definition meaningless.

    Of course in order to continue to hold this belief after engaging in dialog here and at UD for at least a few years, WJM would have had to completely ignore everything he’s heard coming from a ‘materialist’; because I can point out plenty of lucid, rational and easy to understand explanations of ‘meaning’ without reference to God.

    And that’s exactly what he’s done. If you are a ‘materialist’ he has completely ignored what you have to say.

  15. I’d like to add to what I asked earlier. William, I’m curious, but you truly believe that “Darwinists” are emotionless or that we cannot tell the difference between our emotional states or that we think there is no difference between emotional states? In other words, given your statement about atoms just bumping into one another and all things seemingly being equal to “Darwinists”, are you under the impression that to a “Darwinist”, there’s no difference in feeling between…say…anger and contentedness? I really curious William. Do you think that “Darwinists” have no reason to react differently to feelings of fear and love or that we can’t tell the difference?

  16. Patrick: I refer you to Ayn Rand, who argues exactly that, albeit with a particular definition of “selfish” in mind.

    (I don’t self identify as an Objectivist either.)

    Yes, I was thinking of Ayn Rand. I don’t think she invalidates my point, actually. She’s the exception that proves the rule (that amorality is not immorality).

  17. Lizzie:

    I finally disagree with Lizzie on a substantive issue!

    I see nothing particularly morally good about altruism per se.My simple definition of good acts is summed up in the Wiccan Rede:An it harm none do what ye will.

    (No, I do not self identify as Wiccan.)

    Cool
    But I’m not sure that counts as substantive disagreement.

    “First, do no harm” is a good start. I sometimes more harm is done by those who seek to benefit others than those who don’t (trying to “cure” homosexuality, for example).

    But altruism is still embedded in your principle – to whom is the “harm none” to be done, if not to others?

    Altruism strikes me as a principle that requires positive action, even in some cases sacrifices of one’s own values in the pursuit of another’s. I would need some convincing to accept that onus.

    One of your countrymen provided an insightful definition of morality that I have trouble finding fault with:

    “There is a very interesting debate raging at the moment on the nature of sin, for example.”

    “And what do they think? Against it, are they?”

    “It is not as simple as that. It’s not a black and white issue. There are so many shades of gray.”

    “Nope.”

    “Pardon?”

    “There’s no grays, only white that’s got grubby. I’m surprised you don’t know that. And sin, young man, is when you treat people as things. Including yourself. That’s what sin is.”

    “It’s a lot more complicated than that–”

    “No it ain’t. When people say things are a lot more complicated than that, they means they’re getting worried that they won’t like the truth. People as things, that’s where it starts.”

    “Oh, I’m sure there are worse crimes-”

    “But they starts with thinking about people as things…”

    (Granny Weatherwax conversing with Mightily Oats the Omnian priest in Carpe Jugulum..)

    (Yes, I do self-identify as a Pratchettite.)

  18. Didn’t Gordon Gecko say essentially the same thing, though he used the word “greed” instead of “selfish”?

  19. Science has a better approach to morality and ethics because it has a better approach to determining cause and effect and a better approach to estimating long term consequences of actions.

    There really isn’t much disagreement over the concept that willfully causing pain or harm is bad.

    The serious disagreements are over the details of what is harmful, and those details are wrapped up in projections of future harm or benefit.

    Traditional approaches to morality and ethics make their projections based on — well, tradition. Tradition embodies a lot of cultural learning and is often a good starting point, but it can be improved on. We have improved on traditional medicine, even though a lot of pharmaceuticals are modified herbal remedies.

    And so forth.

  20. That these words are used to represent relative conditions does not make them any less meaningful.

    Different meanings. Evil from a Darwinist perspective has a completely different meaning than evil from a theistic perspective. You assertion that evil has relative meaning assumes the Darwinian perspective.

    Liz’s post, however, didn’t employ the term “evil” in the Darwinistic sense because she expects it to have comfort value to those reading, which would require the listener to also personally hold that the acts are evil, and also personally hold that evil acts are outweighed and outlasted by good; but there is no such reasonable expectation – or even any such demarcation – available under Darwinism. She is either knowingly employing empty rhetoric she knows will manipulate theism-based concepts of evil and good, or she is unconsciously stealing concepts she has no right to.

    And I daresay, more people will be inspired by the acts of those fighting back from injuries from the bombings and the acts of those creating other events/races in the names of those who died in the bombings than from the actions of the bombers.

    There’s absolutely no objective reason to have hold such a position. To a Darwinist, the two sides of the marathon bombing are essentially nothing more than, say, the Mt. St. Helens eruption, where lots of living creatures got killed. Evil and good are nothing more than subjectively imposed labels. You’re trying to say that somehow the deaths of the creatures will have “value” or “meaning” that the volcano won’t have simply because you don’t like the fact that the volcano killed so many creatures.

    You’re commentary demonstrates that though you intellectually hold the position of Darwinism, you cannot commit yourself fully to the fact that good and evil – under Darwinism – are of the same meaning and value as saying “I don’t like lemon pie” or “vanilla is my favorite ice cream” – you’re trying to claim that because you personally don’t like lemon pie, eating it has quantifiably worse outcomes than not eating it. There is no objective value to things you dislike or like; trying to make it appear so without saying so is either empty rhetoric or stealing the theistic concept.

    Uggh…so much inaccuracy here. Tell me William, are you under the impression that “Darwinists” cannot tell the difference between sodium chloride and hydrogen peroxide?

    There is a difference between the intellectual belief that Darwinism is true, and Darwinism actually being true. If Darwinism was actually true, then no, I wouldn’t expect anyone – self-proclaimed Darwinist or not – to be able to “tell the difference” between sodium chloride and hydrogen peroxide, because “they” would just be the function of their bumping molecules, and if the bumping molecules caused it, a person would know, believe, and say that salt was gold, a unicorn, or a flying spaghetti monster.

    If I was a Darwinist, I would expect people to know, say and believe whatever their particular collections of interacting molecules happened to make them know, say and believe – whether it made any sense to me or not. If I were a Darwinist, I wouldn’t expect what I understand of what other people say to have any significant relationship to what they meant, because I would believe that we all have our own individual interpretations of sounds, words, phrases,etc. guided by our particular system of interacting molecules.

    But all of that is only true if I was a Darwinist living in a theistic reality, because if I was a Darwinist living in a Darwinistic reality, I would only know, expect, and believe whatever my collections of bumping molecules happened to put into my mental library, which could as easily be the worship of Thor, or solipsism, magic, Islam, or Darwism. If I lived in a Darwinistic world, there is no difference between “me” and whatever nonsense my happenstance collection of bumping molecules happened to make me say, believe and know, and so if I say “I know god exists” or “I know the difference between sodium chloride and hydrogen peroxide”, it is from the exact same source of all knowledge – happenstance colliding molecules – and thus both statements are equal as statements of knowledge (in a Darwinistic world).

    But, Darwinists never argue as if Darwinism is true; their arguments are always – always – founded on theistic foundations. Otherwise, there’s no more reason to argue than there is for a fig leaf to try and change the pattern and shape of a maple leaf; Darwinism and theism would be equally true beliefs by the only available meaning of “true” under Darwinism: bumping molecules make you hold it as true.

  21. Robin:
    I’d like to add to what I asked earlier. William, I’m curious, but you truly believe that “Darwinists” are emotionless or that we cannot tell the difference between our emotional states or that we think there is no difference between emotional states? In other words, given your statement about atoms just bumping into one another and all things seemingly being equal to “Darwinists”, are you under the impression that to a “Darwinist”, there’s no difference in feeling between…say…anger and contentedness? I really curious William. Do you think that “Darwinists” have no reason to react differently to feelings of fear and love or that we can’t tell the difference?

    There’s a difference between the intellectual position of Darwinism, and Darwinism actually being true. I didn’t say there was “no difference” between love and hate from the subjective perspective, but rather that there was no value difference at the molecular level. The interacting molecules that produce hate and violence are not evil molecules, are they? The interacting molecules that produce love and good are not loving and good molecules, are they?

    We “are” those interacting molecules, under Darwinism. One person feels anger and sorrow after the bombings; another feels joy and elation. Are any of those systems of interacting molecules good or evil?

    To a Darwinist, there is no objective difference between either side. It’s just stuff that happens. That they subjectively feel one way or another about one side or the other doesn’t mean anything more than that; you either like or dislike lemon pie. So? Why call lemon pie “evil” just because you dislike it? Why claim that “not enjoying lemon pie” somehow is more inspiring to more people, or generates more “good”, than enjoying lemon pie?

    What comfort should I take from you saying that you dislike what they did, or saying that the lives of those lost will have meaning or value, when the exact same can be said, from another perspective (under Darwinism) about the bombers? You’re saying absolutely nothing that cannot equally be said about the bombers, or about anyone. If you can say the same thing about anyone, what value or meaning does it have for me?

    None.

  22. William J. Murray: What is the purpose of characterizing those you dislike (or practices you dislike) as “evil”, if not to attempt to objectify your personal dislike and attempt to manipulate others into disliking them as well?

    Couple of steps too far, there, Willy.
    I did not characterise you as evil. If I thought you were evil, I should say so, but AFAIK you have said or done nothing aimed at or even capable of, harming individuals or societies.There are a few things about you that I dislike, none would I say are “evil”. I have no need or duty to objectify my dislikes, I am quite happy to agree that they are subjective. Others may or not share them but I have no need to try to manipulate others into disliking you, why would I?. Religions are for manipulating people, and I’m not about to start one.

  23. petrushka: There really isn’t much disagreement over the concept that willfully causing pain or harm is bad.

    There really isn’t much disagreement that god exists, either, it’s just a question of which god. Do you now believe that a god of some sort exists?

    If, at a time and place, “there isn’t much disagreement that throwing imperfect children over a cliff is good”, or “there isn’t much disagreement that treating women, children and people of different races as possessions is good”, does that make such things good – just because there isn’t much disagreement about it?

    So, should we all accept as good or bad whatever society at the time generally agrees upon?

  24. What’s the categorical difference between stuff you dislike and stuff you call evil?

  25. Perhaps because ‘being a Darwinist’ likely involves a fair approximation of the experience of ‘being William J Murray’. The latter merely externalises the senses that both types of human being share (whether really God-created or ‘natural’), and looks down upon those who do not.

  26. Ayn Rand argues from actual consequences as opposed to intended consequences. It’s a bit like the old argument regarding permissive child rearing.

    The truth is almost always orthogonal to the plane of the argument.

  27. William J. Murray: There really isn’t much disagreement that god exists, either, it’s just a question of which god. Do you now believe that a god of some sort exists?

    If, at a time and place, “there isn’t much disagreement that throwing imperfect children over a cliff is good”, or “there isn’t much disagreement that treating women, children and people of different races as possessions is good”, does that make such things good – just because there isn’t much disagreement about it?

    So, should we all accept as good or bad whatever society at the time generally agrees upon?

    Had I been born into such a society, and never heard of/thought of an alternative, I might. So might you. Who can tell?

    It’s a rather futile question, often asked in an attempt to make people appear inconsistent, and therefore Wrong.

    But whatever one asserts about what one might have felt or believed at a time and in a society that is now inaccessible to us is just that – an assertion.

  28. William J. Murray: There really isn’t much disagreement that god exists, either, it’s just a question of which god

    I nearly missed that!

    Tripe. Codswallop. Bullshit. There is a vast amount of disagreement on that subject. Even if a majority of the world’s humans believes in a god or gods unspecified, there are enough that don’t to make your “really isn’t much” a bit silly.

  29. That these words are used to represent relative conditions does not make them any less meaningful.

    Different meanings. Evil from a Darwinist perspective has a completely different meaning than evil from a theistic perspective. You assertion that evil has relative meaning assumes the Darwinian perspective.

    Hate to break it to you William, but even from a theistic perspective the word “evil” has a relative meaning. “Evil” in Reform Theology has a different meaning than in Catholicism and in turn is completely different in Judaism. So what is this “theological perspective” of which you write? And then there’s the take on evil in Hinduism…

    Liz’s post, however, didn’t employ the term “evil” in the Darwinistic sense because she expects it to have comfort value to those reading, which would require the listener to also personally hold that the acts are evil, and also personally hold that evil acts are outweighed and outlasted by good; but there is no such reasonable expectation – or even any such demarcation – available under Darwinism. She is either knowingly employing empty rhetoric she knows will manipulate theism-based concepts of evil and good, or she is unconsciously stealing concepts she has no right to.

    Personally, I think you are reading a lot into what Lizzie wrote, but I’ll leave this for her to address.

    And I daresay, more people will be inspired by the acts of those fighting back from injuries from the bombings and the acts of those creating other events/races in the names of those who died in the bombings than from the actions of the bombers.

    There’s absolutely no objective reason to have hold such a position.

    Sure there is: 9/11, Columbine, Gabrielle Gifford’s shooting, Michael Donald, Emmett Till, the assassination of President Lincoln, The Holocaust, Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King Jrs’ assassination, etc.

    In no case has any action considered “evil” ever inspired more evil that the reactive inspiration of “good”. NO CASE. That is certainly an objective reason for my assessment.

    To a Darwinist, the two sides of the marathon bombing are essentially nothing more than, say, the Mt. St. Helens eruption, where lots of living creatures got killed.

    Certainly not to this “Darwinist”. The real difference being Mt St Helens having no concept of “devastation” or “killing”. The bombers in Boston, alas, had some concept of those two consequences and were in fact counting on those consequences occurring.

    Evil and good are nothing more than subjectively imposed labels. You’re trying to say that somehow the deaths of the creatures will have “value” or “meaning” that the volcano won’t have simply because you don’t like the fact that the volcano killed so many creatures.

    No, I’m not trying to or actually saying that at all. What I am saying is that other people will see meaning in the deaths of those from the Boston bombing that they won’t see in the deaths associated with Mt St. Helens’ eruption because they will see the former deaths as a product of intentionally arrogant, selfish, and cruel behavior. And since the killings in Boston are seen as intentional, they are labeled as evil. The deaths from Mt St. Helens’ eruption are not seen as intentional and thus are not considered evil or necessarily as inspiring.

    You’re commentary demonstrates that though you intellectually hold the position of Darwinism, you cannot commit yourself fully to the fact that good and evil – under Darwinism – are of the same meaning and value as saying “I don’t like lemon pie” or “vanilla is my favorite ice cream” – you’re trying to claim that because you personally don’t like lemon pie, eating it has quantifiably worse outcomes than not eating it. There is no objective value to things you dislike or like; trying to make it appear so without saying so is either empty rhetoric or stealing the theistic concept.

    That is because the terms “evil” and “good” do not have the associated emotional and contextual magnitude as “I like X” or “I don’t like X” from a semantic perspective. For the same reason, the cuss word that means “sex act” has significantly more impact in conversation than saying, “fudge!”

    Uggh…so much inaccuracy here. Tell me William, are you under the impression that “Darwinists” cannot tell the difference between sodium chloride and hydrogen peroxide?

    There is a difference between the intellectual belief that Darwinism is true, and Darwinism actually being true. If Darwinism was actually true, then no, I wouldn’t expect anyone – self-proclaimed Darwinist or not – to be able to “tell the difference” between sodium chloride and hydrogen peroxide, because “they” would just be the function of their bumping molecules, and if the bumping molecules caused it, a person would know, believe, and say that salt was gold, a unicorn, or a flying spaghetti monster.

    So just to be clear then, according to you if “Darwinism” were not true, people would not be able to determine and compare the different properties of sodium chloride and hydrogen peroxide, or would sodium chloride and hydrogen peroxide have the same properties? It’s a subtle distinction, but I’d like to know which you are claiming.

    Know that in either case the claim makes inherently no sense. What you are effectively claiming is that there’s no such thing as this life, world, universe…anything except this “god” of yours (at least, as far as you can tell) and that you are merely “experiencing” (for lack of a better concept) some illusion this “god” has presented to you. I mean, there’s no way you can even be sure that anything else exists, given a “god” that must validate your senses.

    If I was a Darwinist, I would expect people to know, say and believe whatever their particular collections of interacting molecules happened to make them know, say and believe – whether it made any sense to me or not.

    I can understand where you get that idea. Unfortunately, it doesn’t match what we actually know about condensing matter. So as a “Darwinist” I know the limited parameters (in a general sense) of the particular collections of interacting molecules that other people can have and thus I know that people are not that different when it comes to perceptions.

    If I were a Darwinist, I wouldn’t expect what I understand of what other people say to have any significant relationship to what they meant, because I would believe that we all have our own individual interpretations of sounds, words, phrases,etc. guided by our particular system of interacting molecules.

    Ok. Well, being a “Darwinist”, I happen to know there are only so many variations of sounds, words, phrases, etc that people have based on vary limited groups of interacting molecules, so I have every expectation that most people will understand what I or others say and that such will have a direct relationship with what is meant. Simply because molecules – and by association molecular processes – do not work the way you are describing them.

    But all of that is only true if I was a Darwinist living in a theistic reality, because if I was a Darwinist living in a Darwinistic reality, I would only know, expect, and believe whatever my collections of bumping molecules happened to put into my mental library, which could as easily be the worship of Thor, or solipsism, magic, Islam, or Darwism. If I lived in a Darwinistic world, there is no difference between “me” and whatever nonsense my happenstance collection of bumping molecules happened to make me say, believe and know, and so if I say “I know god exists” or “I know the difference between sodium chloride and hydrogen peroxide”, it is from the exact same source of all knowledge – happenstance colliding molecules – and thus both statements are equal as statements of knowledge (in a Darwinistic world).

    Well, I for one am quite content in the knowledge that evolution/”Darwinism”/reality are not the strawmen you have presented.

    But, Darwinists never argue as if Darwinism is true; their arguments are always – always – founded on theistic foundations. Otherwise, there’s no more reason to argue than there is for a fig leaf to try and change the pattern and shape of a maple leaf; Darwinism and theism would be equally true beliefs by the only available meaning of “true” under Darwinism: bumping molecules make you hold it as true.

  30. damitall2: Why would that make them anything other than real?<

    Allan Miller:
    Perhaps because ‘being a Darwinist’ likely involves a fair approximation of the experience of ‘being William J Murray’. The latter merely externalises the senses that both types of human being share (whether really God-created or ‘natural’), and looks down upon those who do not.

    I have no idea what this means. Try again? Who am I looking down upon? Those who don’t share my likely senses? How does that translate into any position that I should not harm others?

    If I proclaimed myself a “Darwinist”, and then proclaimed an intense dislike for William J Murray, would that be more “hollow” than if I proclaimed myself a committed christian, then evinced the same intense dislike? Would it be any different if I was a Wiccan, a pagan, a Buddhist, a Satanist?

  31. petrushka:
    From a theistic point of view, evil seems to be whatever the preacher says god says it is, taking into account the current trendy interpretations of scripture.

    Nope.

  32. We “are” those interacting molecules, under Darwinism. One person feels anger and sorrow after the bombings; another feels joy and elation. Are any of those systems of interacting molecules good or evil?

    Whoa! Back the truck up! Here’s the problem William; the molecules “bumping into one another” that make up the thing we call the kidney are different from the molecules “bumping into one another” making up the blood. Ditto for the molecules making up the pituitary gland and the molecules that make up the thyrotropin. And ditto for the molecules then that erupt to provide anger vs happiness. All of those interactions are happening on a scale WAAAAAAY below the determination of good and evil. For instance, the determination of “evil” vs “good” has zero to do with the amount of thyrotropin in anyone’s system; it has to do with the interaction of meta-molecular structures called human individuals interacting with other meta-molecular human individuals.

    Bottom line, your question doesn’t make sense as asked, at least not to this Darwinist, because it shows a complete lack of actual understanding of the layers of different molecules bumping into one another and how the products of one layer of bumping molecules creates a whole new set of meta-systems at the next level. And that’s just one of the errors in your strawman.

  33. Hate to break it to you William, but even from a theistic perspective the word “evil” has a relative meaning.

    I wasn’t talking about the “word” evil, I was talking about the concept of evil as an objective commodity under theism vs a subjective commodity under Darwinism.

    When I say “evil means something different under theism than it does under Darwinism, this is what I’m talking about. In theism, evil as a concept refers to an objective commodity. Under Darwinism, it refers to a subjective commodity. These are two fundamentally different perspectives of “what evil is”.

    When a Darwinist employs the term “evil” in any way that implies an objective commodity, they are either stealing the concept or they are employing rhetorical manipulation.

    In no case has any action considered “evil” ever inspired more evil that the reactive inspiration of “good”. NO CASE. That is certainly an objective reason for my assessment.

    A patently vacuous statement, considering that any act and resulting consequences can be seen as good or evil depending on one’s perspective (under Darwinism), since there is no objective standard to judge any of it by.

    No, I’m not trying to or actually saying that at all. What I am saying is that other people will see meaning in the deaths of those from the Boston bombing that they won’t see in the deaths associated with Mt St. Helens’ eruption because they will see the former deaths as a product of intentionally arrogant, selfish, and cruel behavior.

    Or, they’ll see the bombing as the product of glorious martyrs of whatever cause fighting against whatever evil they see around them. Also, people often attributed volcanic eruptions to intentional agencies. Some people probably still do; whether or not they do, and however they interpret the event in question, is just a matter of happenstance interactions of molecules (under Darwinism). Whether one sees the bombing as an intentional act or just the happenstance culmination of physics is – to a Darwinist – just a matter of happenstance interactions of molecules.

    How people react afterward is just a matter of brute physics. Whether or not you believe that reaction to be ultimately good or bad – just happenstance interactions of molecules, of which the sensation of “intention” is just another byproduct.

    So just to be clear then, according to you if “Darwinism” were not true, people would not be able to determine and compare the different properties of sodium chloride and hydrogen peroxide, or would sodium chloride and hydrogen peroxide have the same properties? It’s a subtle distinction, but I’d like to know which you are claiming.

    If Darwinism WAS true, people would not be able to make such determinations – meaning, they wouldn’t be able to deliberately discern such such things. “Intention” and “deliberacy” and “discernment” are also stolen theistic concepts that Darwinists have no right to. Under Darwnism, these are basically side effects of happenstance interactions of molecules; they are not causal necessities – they are mere sensations.

    I can understand where you get that idea. Unfortunately, it doesn’t match what we actually know about condensing matter. So as a “Darwinist” I know the limited parameters (in a general sense) of the particular collections of interacting molecules that other people can have and thus I know that people are not that different when it comes to perceptions.

    And yet, they say, believe, and know entirely different and conflicting things. They babble nonsense. They believe crazy stuff. Humans can believe practically anything, even the most absurd nonsense, in great numbers. They can literally bark like dogs, drool, and believe they are having a very wise conversation with Plato. The facts contradict your response. What I have said matches what we actually see when it comes to human behavior. Are you saying that all the people that believe in crazy nonsense are violating the properties of “condensing matter” somehow? Of course not – under Darwinism, the reason people believe, know and say crazy shit is the exact same reason they hold that people believe, say and know reasonable or factual stuff – happenstance, interacting molecules. Nothing more.

    Your explanation that you know how interacting molecules work and their limitations and parameters when it comes to how humans interact, think, believe and “know” things is self-referential nonsense. That’s all you are, Robin – happenstance interacting molecules. Under Darwinism, there is no more value in your statement that such molecular interactions produce true statements about the parameters of molecular interactions than in my rejoinder “nuh-uh” because both – under Darwinism – are ultimately produced and authorized from the exact same source.

    Your source of true discernments can easily say both X and not-X, and by the only definition of “what is true” under Darwinism, both statements are true as long as the person making the statements believe them to be true (a sensation produced by happenstance interacting molecules).

  34. Robin: And since the killings in Boston are seen as intentional, they are labeled as evil. The deaths from Mt St. Helens’ eruption are not seen as intentional and thus are not considered evil or necessarily as inspiring.

    One problem with the theistic view of evil is that to an omnipotent and omniscient god, everything that occurs is intentional. Volcanoes are simply an agent of the mysterious ways.

    When I spoke of trendy interpretations and what the preacher says, I am thinking of Jerico to Jonestown.

    Some people see a difference. I see none. Preachers and theologians interpret the divine will. There is no direct line for the rest of us.

  35. I guess avoiding historical examples that demonstrate the problems in appealing to moral consensus as a guide for one’s morality is one tactic.

    If I say that I do not believe harming others intentionally is evil, am I wrong? If so, why? According to what?

  36. There really isn’t much disagreement that god exists, either, it’s just a question of which god. Do you now believe that a god of some sort exists?

    Certainly nothing like a person or a human consciousness, and nothing separate from what we perceive as existence.

    All the major religions (Western) worship a fiction that I find indistinguishable from the layman’s concept of Satan. I find that extremely offensive.

  37. William J. Murray:
    The problem running rampant in this thread, of course, is stealing the concept.Terms are used that imply a value of meaning that do not exist as such from the Darwinistic perspective.

    Well, taking it, for the purposes of this argument that, by “Darwinist” you mean “atheist” (Darwin’s theory is perfectly compatible with perfectly conventional theism) or “materialism”, let’s examine this:

    Stripped of that basis of meaning, the words become nothing more than empty rhetoric that appeals to the emotional content of words that the Darwinist has no right to employ.

    We have as much right as anyone.

    For example, the term “evil”. What does “evil” mean under Darwinism? It means whatever anyone thinks it means.

    I’ve seen “evil” defined in many ways by Darwinists, atheists, Christians, Buddhists, scientists, you name it. Theists are not known for their unanimity about what constitutes “evil”.

    That is why I propose that we distinguish between the concept I am terming “morality”, by which I mean the idea that we “ought” to be “good”, where good means not putting our own interests ahead of those of others; and the term “ethics” which concerns questions as to what is in the best interest of which others.

    My point is that we can all agree – Darwinists, atheists, theists, whoever – with what constitutes morality, even if we disagree about ethics. Our “right” to do so derives from the simple fact that we are a social species, and that there is a potential tension between what suits us personally, and what suits us as a group – thus setting up conflict between “want” and “ought” – and thus morality. Moreover, as a species capable of symbolic representation, we are able to reify morality, and encode it in proscriptive laws, and prescriptive social duties.

    One could offer a similar soliloquy referring to the bombers as representing “the good”, and those they killed as “evil”. Without any objective basis to call one thing evil and another good, using those terms is subjective and empty – nothing but rhetoric.

    As I said, we can disagree about ethics, but I suggest there is no real disagreement about what constitutes morality. Let’s take a classic ethical dilemma: what would you do if you saw a runaway rail truck approaching a group of people on a track, and could throw the points so that it was diverted to a branchline on which was standing a single person? We can disagree about what we “ought” to do in such a circumstance, but no-one would seriously question that we “ought” to decide. Nor, I think, would anyone seriously consider that a person who decided to change the points was guilty of evil intent, even though the consequence was the death of a person who would otherwise have lived. Although, if it turned out that she threw the points primarily because the person standing on the branch line was her rival in love, she might well be acting evilly, even if the upshot was the survival of other people people who would otherwise have died.

    In other words, we can agree that those who act to cause harm for their own benefit are acting evilly, even if we can’t always agree on the least harmful course of action. And that is not a “borrowed” value – it arises directly from the fact that we are a social species.

    Why should anyone believe that acts of love, generosity, etc. have more impact than (subjectively termed) acts of evil?Meaning?

    Well, I am not sure that it is true. I hope it is. That is why I offered it as words of comfort in my OP. And I think it is – I think the world is slowly becoming more moral – in the sense that more people, year by year, seem to be convinced by the idea that raising the quality of life for everyone is a goal worth working for, and, moreover, drawing the pool of “others” ever wider as the decades pass.

    Everyone’s life has subjective meaning – nobody disclaims that.But if we’re just talking about meaning as in impact, whose life had more meaning – that of the bombers, or that of any of the victims? Anyone know any of the victim’s names?I bet we all know the names of the bombers. Their names and acts will have quite a bit of meaning and value, whether one considers it good or bad.Since the good/evil value of any such act is purely subjective, one could as easily say that those that commit such acts have far more meaningful lives than their victims.

    I don’t think it is “purely subjective”. I think there are fairly good, and widely agreed standards of judging guilt. That’s why, legally, intention matters. Murder is intentional killing. Manslaughter is a lesser crime. And someone who is deluded is widely considered to have impaired moral responsibility. On the other hand, you could also argue that we have, as part of our moral responsibilities to others, the duty to consider deeply what is right. So even if it were to become clear that the bombers had held the (in my view deluded) belief that some greater good to others would be served by the murder of innocents, and that the innocents themselves would be immediately rewarded in heaven, my instinct is still to blame them for not thinking more deeply as to what constitutes ethical behaviour. Putting religious convictions about the value of the afterlife ahead of the value of our present life, despite paltry evidence that it actually exists, seems to be an occupational hazard of religion.

    But none of that affects the perfectly simple and objective judgement that those who died in Boston were harmed, as were their families – as are we all. Just as the man on the branch line was harmed, even though the guy who threw the points was not acting evilly.

    I guess if you were addressing a group that had no knowledge of your views, empty rhetoric might work – not because it means anything, but because those listening will assume you mean something that you do not – that you cannot, under Darwinism – without stealing theistic concepts.

    Not harming others, and reciprocating good, is not a theistic concept. It’s simple common sense for a social species.

    Under Darwinism, love and hate, kindness and violence are categorically equal manifestations of interacting molecules – all just physical stuff, bumping around, causing other physical stuff to happen – including emotional reactions.From such a framework, your offering of comfort is nothing but hollow, laughable rhetoric.

    The idea that love and hate, kindness and violence, are properties of people and their inter-relationships, and that people are composed of interacting molecules, does not mean that people, or, for that matter “love and hate, kindness and violence” are “just physical stuff”. That’s like saying that an ocean wave is “just H2O”. It isn’t. We don’t have to invoke anything other than physical interactions to account for an ocean wave, but it cannot be understood at the level of molecules. It isn’t even made of water – in fact it’s not “made of” anything. It’s the property of an interface.

    I’d say that “love, and hate, kindness and violence” are just as real as an ocean wave, and no more “reducible” to molecules than an ocean wave is. But in neither case does the phenomenon in question continue to exist when you remove the molecules.

  38. William, I believe you have stated that you do not think that all human beings have free will.

    Do you consider that an objective fact, or a subjective opinion?

  39. A patently vacuous statement, considering that any act and resulting consequences can be seen as good or evil depending on one’s perspective (under Darwinism), since there is no objective standard to judge any of it by.

    Can I get a copy of these “objective standards” that you mention?

  40. I’m right there with you Petrushka. The moment one conceives of an omnipotent and omniscient entity as being the arbiter of truth and reality, that entity becomes responsible for all of reality. Hence my earlier comment to William:

    What you are effectively claiming is that there’s no such thing as this life, world, universe…anything except this “god” of yours (at least, as far as you can tell) and that you are merely “experiencing” (for lack of a better concept) some illusion this “god” has presented to you.

    Everything that happens is the outcome of the intent of this being…except, as you note, those things the leaders of the various religious factions say are not. And that’s arbitrary. William’s argument makes it clear that nothing ultimately can be understood under the perspective of theology because anything that happens on any given day is arbitrary, whimsical, and unpredictable. The mind of the god is unknowable (except when it is)…

  41. Going a bit farther, to an omniscient being, time would be a static dimension like length and width. to such a being, everything has already happened.

    So things like choice and responsibility have no relevance. Everything that has happened and will happened is just a butterfly pinned to a board for examination by an entity that exists outside of time.

  42. I’ve just remembered that William doesn’t use the word “objective” in the way that, say, a scientist does.

    I’d call something “objective” it can be agreed on, more or less, by independent observers, and “subjective” if it is highly variable depending on the observer.

    So I’d say that “morality” – in the sense that I am using the term, i.e. as the notion that when our personal desires conflict with the best interests of others, we “ought” to consider the interests of others, is pretty objective, i.e. agreed upon by independent observers.

    And I’d say that “ethics”, as defined in this context as the question as to what actually is in the net best interest of others, is more “subjective”, but can still be informed by objective facts. For example, for those of us who do not consider the evidence for heaven, hell, or any kind of afterlife to be at all persuasive (because highly “subjective”) will tend to look at more “objective” evidence when weighing up ethical issues. For example, data would seem to suggest that children parented by same-sex couples do just fine – therefore it seems there is no reason to consider that parenting by same-sex couples should be considered unethical behaviour. On the other hand there is considerable evidence that sugar is really quite bad for children’s health, and so a good objective argument that promoting the sale of sugary drinks to children for profit is unethical.

    Now, many religious people will disagree with me diametrically on this, but I don’t think that is because ethics is “subjective” – I think it’s because ethics is difficult, and people differ in what they consider a “fact” (even when the facts seem pretty damn obvious). I don’t consider hell a fact, and therefore I don’t consider that homosexual sex is bad for people. I do consider the harm done by sugar to be a fact, and therefore I do consider that selling sugary drinks to children is bad for them.

    That’s why I think that if anything, we “materialists” are rather better at ethics than religious people – less likely to be swayed by poorly evidenced, and subjectively over-rated non-facts. We have t-tests.

  43. “Under Darwinism, love and hate, kindness and violence are categorically equal manifestations of interacting molecules – all just physical stuff, bumping around, causing other physical stuff to happen – including emotional reactions.”

    Thank you, William, for providing an example of what I was talking about in the Belling a Cat thread.

    “just” is such an innocuous looking word isn’t it?

  44. Lizzie: I’d say that “love, and hate, kindness and violence” are just as real as an ocean wave, and no more “reducible” to molecules than an ocean wave is. But in neither case does the phenomenon in question continue to exist when you remove the molecules.

    Or, indeed, tin cans on a string. I think this is the core issue for many IDists. They, in my opinion, cannot abide the idea there is nothing special about them, nothing different about their “molecules” to any other molecule in a non living non “special” object.

    Hence the persistence of ‘Élan vital’ with the IDers.

    ribosomes do not appear to be reducible to matter and energy

    Is that right Joe? lol.

    Nothing special = no obvious sign the universe has a deity that cares about them. And I think that’s why they are ID supporters in the first place – the definite vagueness of religion was not sufficient to smother their fear of oblivion.

  45. William J. Murray: Liz’s post, however, didn’t employ the term “evil” in the Darwinistic sense because she expects it to have comfort value to those reading, which would require the listener to also personally hold that the acts are evil, and also personally hold that evil acts are outweighed and outlasted by good; but there is no such reasonable expectation – or even any such demarcation – available under Darwinism. She is either knowingly employing empty rhetoric she knows will manipulate theism-based concepts of evil and good, or she is unconsciously stealing concepts she has no right to.

    My rhetoric was neither empty nor borrowed, though I confess it was optimistic.

    I do think that good deeds last longer than evil ones, and my evidence for this is simply that I think we are, in general, a kinder society than we used to be. Things may still go horribly pear-shaped, but I am encouraged by the younger generation, who in general seem far more tolerant, far less prone to “do harm” whether in the deluded belief that they are doing good, or just because they don’t care about the consequences of their actions, and more prepared to think ethics through from scratch, rather than just inherit old shibboleths, than previous generations.

    I’m still amazed, and delighted, that you guys elected a black president in my life-time, that gay marriage is actually legal in many places, that good healthcare is increasingly regarded as a human right, rather than a privilege for those who can afford it, that capital punishment is increasingly regarded as barbaric, and that climate change and environmental degradation are things we need to do something about, if we can, for those who come after us.

    I’ve always liked, and thought true, Aesop’s parable of the Sun and the Wind.

    But I could be wrong. I hope I’m right.

  46. We have as much right as anyone.

    Well, under the nihilistic perspective of Darwinism, where “right” means “I can do whatever I cand and want”, then yes. Under rational theism, however, employing deceptive rhetorical terms for emotional contrivance is not a “right”; it’s evil.

    William, I believe you have stated that you do not think that all human beings have free will.

    Do you consider that an objective fact, or a subjective opinion?

    Subjective opinion.

    That is why I propose that we distinguish between the concept I am terming “morality”, by which I mean the idea that we “ought” to be “good”, where good means not putting our own interests ahead of those of others; and the term “ethics” which concerns questions as to what is in the best interest of which others.

    Why should I agree to this definition of good? If I disagree, what then? So what?

    As I said, we can disagree about ethics, but I suggest there is no real disagreement about what constitutes morality.

    I can’t understand what you’re trying to say. Obviously, there is real disagreement on whether or not blowing up non-combatant women and children is good or evil; so are you saying that whatever side of the issue you fall on, the fact that you “should” make a decision, one way or another, is an agreement that “the decision” constitutes a moral one? Are you claiming that no one would “not consider” the opportunity to make a decision in such a case a moral opportunity?

    If so, I disagree. I think there are people where “morality” never even enters their mind when making decisions. They have no concern about whether what they do is “right” or “wrong”, but rather simply act on impulse.

    I don’t think it is “purely subjective”. I think there are fairly good, and widely agreed standards of judging guilt.

    Who said anything about “guilt”? Straw man diversion. The subject is “good/evil” value, not “guilt”. Just because many people agree that something is evil doesn’t make that view any less subjective. If most people like the taste of lemon pie, that doesn’t make “lemon pie tastes good” any less subjective a statement.

    So even if it were to become clear that the bombers had held the (in my view deluded) belief that some greater good to others would be served by the murder of innocents, and that the innocents themselves would be immediately rewarded in heaven, my instinct is still to blame them for not thinking more deeply as to what constitutes ethical behaviour.

    Do you also blame volcanoes for not “thinking more deeply” about the havoc they might cause if they erupt? If the thoughts one has, deep or not, are the result of mechanistic, happenstance interactions of matter, it makes no more sense (under Darwinism) to expect one pile of molecules to “think more deeply” than any other pile of molecules when it does something you disagree with. Molecules do not think; we cannot command our molecules to “think more deeply” because we ourselves – under Darwinism – are the molecules and the thoughts they produce. This is more self-referential nonsense. The way you use personal pronouns as if “I” and “we” and “you” and “they” are something other than whatever the happenstance interactions of molecules produce is stealing a theistic concept.

    Under Darwinism, “you” and “I” and “he” and “she” and “we” and “they” are the same thing as “whatever pile X of happenstance, interacting molecules produces”; “I” am not a prescriptive, causal entity; “I” am a descriptive, caused entity – under Darwinism. Your reference to people as if they are independent, prescriptive, causal entities other than whatever pile X of molecules happens to produce is a stolen concept.

    IOW, if my thoughts are caused by happenstance interactions of molecules, saying “I should think more deeply” is the same as saying “your happenstance interactions of molecules should have produced deeper thought, and should have produced a different action” .. which is ludicrous. They produce whatever they produce. You might as well say that the geothermal processes that generated the erupting volcano should have done something different.

  47. I wasn’t talking about the “word” evil, I was talking about the concept of evil as an objective commodity under theism vs a subjective commodity under Darwinism.

    Except that “evil” isn’t an objective commodity under theism. That was my point. It’s completely subjective – look up the differences between the Catholic, RT, Judaic, and Hindu concepts. Or are you engaging in the No True Theist fallacy and insisting that only your particular perspective is theistic?

    When I say “evil means something different under theism than it does under Darwinism, this is what I’m talking about. In theism, evil as a concept refers to an objective commodity. Under Darwinism, it refers to a subjective commodity. These are two fundamentally different perspectives of “what evil is”.

    I understand that’s what you think is true, but what I’m pointing out is that in fact, it isn’t. “Evil” is not an objective in even most theological circles. It’s objective (as far as it goes) in Christianity perhaps, although I’d argue that even within Christianity the concept is variable. But it most definitely is NOT objective across all theologies.

    When a Darwinist employs the term “evil” in any way that implies an objective commodity, they are either stealing the concept or they are employing rhetorical manipulation.

    I disagree. When a given society defines “evil” as mass murder (or any other distinct set of characteristics), then the use of that term in that society is quite objective. The key is whether the term is distinctly defined, not whether one posits some disembodied entity as an arbiter of the distinct definition.

    In no case has any action considered “evil” ever inspired more evil that the reactive inspiration of “good”. NO CASE. That is certainly an objective reason for my assessment.

    A patently vacuous statement, considering that any act and resulting consequences can be seen as good or evil depending on one’s perspective (under Darwinism), since there is no objective standard to judge any of it by.

    And yet, the very fact that every act is not labeled as evil by arbitrary groups of these elusive “Darwinists” demonstrates you are wrong. Sorry William, but your strawman “Darwinists” may well be easy to knock down, but they bear no relationship to any actual people.

    No, I’m not trying to or actually saying that at all. What I am saying is that other people will see meaning in the deaths of those from the Boston bombing that they won’t see in the deaths associated with Mt St. Helens’ eruption because they will see the former deaths as a product of intentionally arrogant, selfish, and cruel behavior.

    Or, they’ll see the bombing as the product of glorious martyrs of whatever cause fighting against whatever evil they see around them.

    Two question on this statement: 1) how exactly does this impact my point concerning intent? and 2) why would this matter in general given that so few people are attributing it as such. Heck, the majority of Muslims have come out condemning the act, so in what way does the above support your position or somehow rebut mine?

    Also, people often attributed volcanic eruptions to intentional agencies.

    Only irrational theists as far as I can tell. And frankly, those sorts of attributions don’t appear to have a lot of impact on most people. Well, except to give a good deal of people a chuckle:

    http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-september-26-2005/this-week-in-god—hurricane-katrina-coverage

    Yeah…ok…this isn’t a volcano eruption, but still. It’s the ol’ “intentional agency” routine.

    Some people probably still do; whether or not they do, and however they interpret the event in question, is just a matter of happenstance interactions of molecules (under Darwinism). Whether one sees the bombing as an intentional act or just the happenstance culmination of physics is – to a Darwinist – just a matter of happenstance interactions of molecules.

    And here’s where you demonstrate you really don’t get chemistry and physics at all. Sorry, but not only does “Darwinism” note a distinct difference between the properties of the molecules bumping into one another that leads to volcanoes erupting and properties of people who incorporate subproperties such as memory, senses, neural motor control, tool use, etc., it provides an explanation for why they are different and predictions that demonstrate that understanding.

    How people react afterward is just a matter of brute physics.

    I would be fascinated to see substantiation of this claim. Perhaps you’d care to provide a reference to a “Darwinist” who explains this from a “Darwinian” perspective.

    Whether or not you believe that reaction to be ultimately good or bad – just happenstance interactions of molecules, of which the sensation of “intention” is just another byproduct.

    Uh…riiiight…Well, your strawman is entertaining William, I’ll give you that. Erroneous, but entertaining. 😀

  48. WJM, another postmodernist who thinks scientific theories are political manifestos.

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