A rumination on why I think “democracy” has to mean more than “majority rules” or “the favorite wins”—even when only a single candidate or proposal is being chosen.
The possibility of Condorcet “cycles” infecting the preference-rankings of groups is pretty well known by now—especially since Arrow’s impossibility theorem. The idea is that a group entirely composed of individuals whose preference-rankings are transitive may end up liking (as a group) A more than B, B more than C, and C more than A. This can happen because different sub-groups make up the three aggregate ratings. This (and other voting paradoxes even involving pairwise comparisons and Borda counts) have led some observers to denounce majoritarianism. Such critics consider it either an approach that can’t provide unambiguous winners when there are more than two choices, or worse, something that unambiguously provides the wrong answer.
Now, as I look at these matters, there are at least two essential characteristics of fair democratic choosings. First, they are egalitarian in this way: they must, to use the old Benthamite language, “count each vote as one and none as more than one.” That is, they cannot countenance weightings of most kinds, whether they are considered to follow from any rankings (cardinal or ordinal) of the voters or from any external assessments regarding the value of this or that vote or voter. Second, they are egalitarian in another way: the authority granted winners of elections must, in some rational manner, reflect ratios involving both the number of eligible voters and number of votes received. (I will not take up this latter requirement in this OP.)
While simple majoritarianism seems to share both of those desiderata, I take it that the latter (my own view) can’t rightly be characterized as a majoritarian position itself because it does not accept what is commonly known as “the majority criterion.” What is that? It simply requires that If there exists a majority that ranks a single candidate higher than all other candidates, that highest-rated candidate must win. As will be seen, there are good reasons for those with sound democratic principles not to join with majoritarians on this matter. In any case, the (let’s call it) “Egalitarian Proportional Democracy” I’m pushing for here shares with majoritarians the views that political actions and offices must be taken and distributed on the basis of the number of voters who want or don’t want something, rather than on how much they want them (as well as on the other matter that I’m not planning to discuss here). But surely that doesn’t tell us very much. Can at least the egalitarian portion of my description of Egalitarian Proportional Democracy be fleshed out? Let me try.
Suppose eight people are having a party and are trying to decide what soda to bring. [Based on an FMM comment, I add here the assumption that, for whatever reason, it would be a major hassle for there to be more than one choice of soda at the party.] And let there be four possible choices: Cola, Lemon-Lime, Orange and Root Beer. There’s no unanimity among the revelers, so, being the good (small-d) democrats they are, they think that the majority ought to have its way and plan a vote to decide the matter. Here is the result when they are asked to give their favorite (here designated with ‘X’):
A B C D E F G H
Cola X X X
L-L X X
Orange X X
RB X
As can be seen, while Cola receives a plurality of the vote, no flavor gets a majority. One member therefore suggests a run-off with the first and tied-for-second contenders only, leaving off RB all together since it did so poorly. Here are the results of this run-off election (with ‘A’ indicating an abstention):
A B C D E F G H
C X X X A
L-L X X A
O X X A
This vote didn’t help: there has been no movement at all because voter H absolutely loathes all the flavors except RB and refuses to pick any of the others as a passable choice for the party.
The revelers aren’t completely stuck though, because there are other voting possibilities. Let us suppose that, like me, this group has no truck whatever with the inter-personal assessments of preference intensities required for cardinal ordering, and that they are also skeptical of ordinal rankings to the extent that those assume similar “distances” between preferences. They think, that is, that there could be a huge divide between one person’s 1st and 2nd choices, and hardly any at all between another ranker’s 1st and 2nd picks.
Fortunately, two members of this group have been regularly assaulted by emails from voting reform organizations: one, from a group that pushes Approval Voting (“AV”), and another that favors Score Voting (“SC”). Those two discuss the matter with the other six party planners and the SC advocate is able to convince everyone that they can exclude all the questionable preference weights by using the following scale:
FAVORITE……………………………………………………………………4 PTS
GOOD ENOUGH (WOULD DRINK IT IF AVAILABLE)………………….3 PTS
PASSABLE (NEVER HAD BUT WD TRY IT IN A PINCH)……………..2 PTS
NOT OK (NEVER HAD & WON’T TRY EVEN IF THIRSTY)…………..1 PTS
REALLY DISLIKE………………………………………………………….. 0 PTS
The AV supporter is on board with undertaking a new vote that would use this scale, but only if the assignments of 4, 3, or 2 points are counted as “Approvals”—meaning that the voter can “live with” the choice. This is agreed upon as well, and the third vote is taken. For ease of counting, I represent the approvals here with an “(A)”:
A B C D E F G H TOT. Apps
C 4(A) 4(A) 4(A) 2(A) 2(A) 1 0 0 17 5
L-L 2(A) 2(A) 2(A) 4(A) 4(A) 2(A) 2(A) 0 18 7
O 3(A) 2(A) 0 3(A) 3(A) 4(A) 4(A) 0 19 6
RB 3(A) 0 0 0 1 3(A) 2(A) 4(A) 13 4
As can be seen, while the Plurality victor was Cola, the SC winner is Orange and the AV winner is L-L!
Perhaps it will seem that this embarrassment of “winners” is the result of the weirdness of there being so many “never tried it” votes with respect to what seem like common carbonated drinks. But it is important to realize that an attitude of “I really don’t know much about her (or it).…” toward political a political candidate or proposal isn’t unusual at all. Look at the results above again, but this time, think of it as a political election for a representative, with each coming from a different Party. (Perhaps replace “Cola” with “Corporatist”; “L-L” with “Liberal”; “Orange” with “Outsider” and “RB” with “Republican”.) This may make it clearer that there can be a large number of decisions in which the assignment of one or two points (approval or disapproval) will largely be a function of the varying amounts of risk that voters are willing to take. Some people will be OK with this or that relatively unknown candidate or proposal; others will not be willing to take any chances.
Keeping all this in mind, which “winner” will the authentic egalitarian support in this election? The Corporatist, because he is the favorite of the largest number of voters? The Outsider, who got the highest score? Or the Liberal, who most voters found to be minimally acceptable? In my view it is the number of approving voters that the sensible democrat must take to matter most. Just as we ought not to be stuck at parties with nothing we can stand to drink, we ought not to be stuck with ruler/representative A when more people among us can stand candidate B. On this view, if it is to be used to determine what “the people” do or don’t want, majoritarian/egalitarian-style aggregation should be understood as the counting of approvals, where each person’s approval is given the same weight as everyone else’s, regardless of how enthusiastic or tepid it is. That tack definitely seems more conducive to stable regimes than one in which candidates that a ton of the populace don’t approve of get to take office.
That is my current take on the matter. I recognize that I have here avoided all of the complicated issues surrounding strategic voting and how that is likely to affect results (if you’re curious, see the Wikipedia article on “Approval Voting.”) Anyhow, I look forward to comments to get a better handle on this. Thanks.
Moved a comment to Guano.
I stopped at the first big word.
This reminds me that I meant to tell you that, in some comment or other a few days ago, you wrote “uttered in” when I think you meant to write “ushered in.”
Your post as well as the SEP article on voting methods concentrate on what criteria seem intuitively fair, and then use toy examples to evaluate methods with respect to such intuitive standards.
But it seems to be that practical, empirical considerations are at least as important:
1. What types of system will the relevant voters consider legitimate in the sense of authoritative. This will vary by the relevant voter population. For general elections involving everyone, I suspect simple is best, hence FPTP. For smaller, more homogeneous voter populations, such as voters to select a party’s candidate, more complex systems may be acceptable. Of course, both my intuitions need empirical research.
2. How often do the situations used to challenge toy examples occur in real elections? SEP mentions this issue in passing in the conclusion.
3. What are the intuitions of real voters, as opposed to those of political philosophers. This is an opportunity for experimental philosophy/psychology.
4. Is it possible to change via education voter preferences with respect to legitimacy so that more complex systems are acceptable. The recent BC referenda could have been a time to research this.
5. What type of systems are used in democracies world wide, how si their nature correlated with citizen views of government effectiveness.
I’ve made a posting career of criticizing Mung for not being clear on what he means in using certain words. ‘Darwinism’ comes to mind.
I like the idea that all citizens must put their names in a hat and, if your name is drawn, you must serve as a member of government for four or eight years. No choice. That is the only way to get a true cross section of society. Besides, could that be any worse than what the US has now?
I have not followed this thread, so maybe this is repeat:
Wasn’t Kansas a lesson in how much Kansas folks have to fear from their state government when it comes to taxes and economic policies?
I guess it was also an example of the type of state-level experimentation I mentioned; one that had very sad consequences for the citizens who chose to be subjects in it through their democratic votes.
So maybe we need an ethics committee to regulate government experiments at the state level?
The lot system was used in ancient Athens. I’ve seen it pushed for in journals occasionally.
Wrong thread, J-Mac.
Moved the request to move it, too…
Yes–all those are good. Thanks.
I wouldn’t be in favor of that, myself.
Interesting question. I would think that if I traveled back in time, knowing what I now know, that I would clearly be anti-federalist. But I admit I could be utterly mistaken about that. The Federalist Papers. and The Anti-Federalist Papers were two of those books I bought in my youth that I never actually got around to reading. Some things never change.
I read the OP. The main problem with “Approval Voting” is that it too complex. If you can’t explain it to Bubba in one sentence he won’t trust it and will assume that it is unfair to him.
I don’t think it does.
All that is necessary is for someone on the Supreme Court to begin to take the 10th amendment seriously again and strike down federal laws that overstep constitutional bounds.
Another way it might happen is for a group of the states to refuse to yield to bogus power grabs from the federal government and to stick too their guns.
They might decide to allow medicine sales with out a prescription in their states for instance or they might decide that dairy processors in their states don’t need to follow the Federal Milk Marketing Orders.
The point is that states and local governments need to begin to take back the power. The more this is done the easier it will be to do it. Before long the balance would be restored.
Long story short we I don’t think have a voting problem we have a power problem.
peace
I thought Jerry Fodor did a good job of explicating the essence of Darwinian thinking in his interview with Suzan Mazur. I just wish it were available on Kindle so I could copy/paste. Stay tuned, and if you don’t hear anything feel free to keep pressing.
There are indeed certain people who post here who I respect, probably more than they might think. You’re one of them.
FFS. I am getting all maudlin after only three ciders.
Federalism is not a panacea it just means the power is closer to the people.
peace
“You put an X next to all the candidates you’re OK with, and whoever gets the most Xs wins.”
One of the main things claimed for AV is its simplicity. Don’t even need to change the ballots or machines apparently
Hah. Well from your point of view, the power problem in this instance is that the Federal government has the power. Ask George Wallace how “sticking to their guns” worked out when the Feds said they had to integrate.
You’re quite the fabulist sometimes.
It’s a legitimate use of federal power to protect the rights of minorities. I don’t think the national guard would allow themselves to be used make sure that prescriptions were required for antibiotics in Arkansas
I certainly don’t think that your idea has much chance of implementation
Peace
They don’t need to send troops to get their way. They have many tools to use against recalcitrant states. Hey, just withholding funds from net taker states would do it. As I said, Fifth, you’re a dreamy fabulist.
Also, your own views about what are or aren’t “legitimate” uses of federal power aren’t mentioned anywhere either in the Constitution or in any federal statutes, afaik.
What do they win, the border wall? What about who comes in second? I mean if we are talking about the will of the people, shouldn’t second place count for something? Maybe we need to vote on it!
How about the declaration of independence
Created equal and all that
Federal funds are like crack
Hard to kick but it would be worth it in the end
Peace
Or ask what happened to states that defied the federal government on marijuana laws.
I keep thinking that people who want to change the rules are hoping for rules that will favor the outcomes they want.
I keep thinking that any rules that don’t have outcomes baked in will gamed, and the net result after a few election cycles will be similar to what we have now.
That isn’t to say that all sets of rules are equally desirable. Just that all sets of rules that prevent tyranny will, over time, produce similar outcomes.
You might not think that England, France, Germany, USA, Canada, etc are similar, but I do.
It would take five someones,
But the Constitution provides the mechanism, if two thirds of the States feel the Federal Government is overstepping their bounds , they can call a convention and pass an amendment(s) to curb the national government.Then get 38 states to ratify it.
Really bad improv. It’s the same exceptionalism that got us into this mess. Dreams of Empire and our role in WW2 were prominent themes, as was the perceived ‘undemocratic’ EU – our system is SOOO much better.
In what way?
As good as job as J-M in explaining QM. OK, that’s overkill, but does that help make my point?
Fodor even says he does not know what he is talking about as I recall. But even if he does not say it, he is not someone reliable on biology.
(Like the AI guy on wheels and fitness that I linked to, by the way,at that other thread I posted at PS).
It would be great if you just explicitly yourself the point you are trying to make, rather than post a bigger quote.. But not in this thread. Sorry Walto. OTOH, the reason most threads beat your comment count is the off-topic posts, I would guess.
That was an allusion to bioethics of course. I agree it makes no sense in democratic choices where the subjects “freely” choose (via Facebook research?) to subject themselves to economic rubbish. So my idea was not meant seriously when I posted it.
But, come to think of it, how different is it from the AI/human censors that FB et al propose for censoring their content?
Another practical issue with voting policy:
State Capture:
How Conservative Activists, Big Businesses, and Wealthy Donors Reshaped the American States–and the Nation
https://newbooksnetwork.com/alexander-hertel-fernandez-state-capture-how-conservative-activists-big-businesses-and-wealthy-donors-reshaped-the-american-states-and-the-nation-oxford-up-2019/
Exactly right. People are selfish and will try to manipulate any rules to their own advantage. The best system is the one that makes the inevitable manipulation as difficult as possible.
Systems that last over the long term tend to be those that do just that or ones in which tyrants have no obstacle whatsoever in imposing their will.
peace
BruceS,
The rich and powerful gaming democracy by wielding undue influence on employees is not new. Partly what turned a friend into a lifelong leftwing activist was his mother’s insistence in voting for her former factory owner and employer when he stood for parliament as she was worried he might get to hear and she would be evicted from her estate cottage.
My grandfather, then in his early forties with a young family (my father was born in 1913), was volunteered into the First World War by his employer.
Gaming is not limited to the rich and powerful. Everyone does it.
People generally become rich and powerful because they are especially good at gaming. That holds regardless of their political leanings.
peace
Both thsoe siutation are terrible, but in particular the WW1 example..
As it turns out, the other book by the author being interviewed at NBN is about employer political influence in the US.
Still, I think there is a difference between isolated or even class-based bad behavior in the UK (England?) and the coordinated, big money driven efforts in the US.
I see it as similar to the UK’s ugly KBO but adaptive constitution versus the elegant but brittle US version. Or biological design (UK) versus human-engineering design (US).
Unfortunately, neither approach has turned out to be proof against a starkly divided electorate.
True,it is just way easier for the rich and powerful. The politicians are eager to help
There has been a noisy trope going on in US politics for some time about electoral fraud. It seems, in principle, that it is possible to register to vote illegally, or to impersonate a legal voter, or to vote “early and often”. But it also seems to be far less common than the converse practice of lopping legitimate voters off the electoral roll.
Is there any credible evidence that ballot stuffing has changed the results of any elections?
An interesting example, but the power still remains at the federal level if it is to their federal advantage to end the experiment. The same as immigration “crisis”, it has become politically beneficial to characterize the guy who roofs your house or cares for your child as a violent criminal, forcing Americans to consume drugs, stealing all the low wage jobs from Americans, publically talking Spanish.
No.
There is evidence that harvesting of absentee ballots in North Carolina has.
Yes and it does not matter if your last name is Koch or Soros or Zuckerberg.
Not to repeat myself but the obvious solution is to make the pie smaller so that bought influence is not worth so much.
Peace
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_machine
peace
Did you catch my take on the “immigration crisis”?
from here http://ftp.iza.org/dp1231.pdf
quote:
Immigrants are highly geographically concentrated. Compared to the native born they are more likely to live in the central parts of Metropolitan Areas in “gateway (major international airport)cities” in six states (California, New York,Texas,Florida,New Jersey and Illinois). The shift away from the east coast metropolitan areas to California reflects the change in the origins of immigrants from Europe/Canada to Asia,Mexico and other parts of Latin America.
end quote:
Seen as an attempt by more densely populated states to take political power from less densely populated regions it seems like it should be a Federal issue don’t you think?
Local and state governments are resisting federal power on both sides of this issue with sanctuary cities and Joe Arpaio’s saturation patrols.
It remains to be seen how successful these sorts of efforts will be in the long term.
Peace
Ah, you want a time machine now, too. You could ride it with mung!
This makes a good point. Different sorts of goals call for different sorts of aggregation. Approval voting is good for finding a single consensus candidate for a varied electorate. For minority representation, other sorts of aggregation rules are better. As I’ve said above a couple of times, I’m personally a fan of SNTV. And I do think that the number of people who support somebody or something is important. Minorities should be represented, and majorities should rule.
Naturally, the Feds care about some of their edicts more than others. They can always get their way if they really want to, but often they don’t give a shit. They’re just satisfying some lobbying group or other.
Interesting that you mention marijuana laws. My wife is an appellate level administrative judge and recently had a case (there have been some in other states, too, including New Mexico and Maine) regarding whether an insurer can be required to provide pot–when docs think it’s reasonable and necessary treatment–even if there’s a Federal law prohibiting the use of marijuana for any purpose at all. That is, can a state require a private entity to break a Federal law?
The study that I’ve been very moved by myself is this:
Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens
Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001595Published online: 18 September 2014
https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens_and_page_2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc.pdf
Actually, most people just have the right parents.
Good point.
Much larger inheritance taxes would make the pies smaller, but I’m guessing you wouldn’t support those.
Well, here the elections go on permanently, money is political speech, political speech is protected, and corporations are people. Dunno how much of that is true in the UK.
Interestingly (or disgustingly, if you have my own views on this matter), the
equal-suffrage-of-the-states-in-the-Senate provision is an exception to that general amendment rule. Any state losing any power in the Senate would d have to agree with the change. (I think, though, that total elimination of the Senate could be accomplished by the usual method…..at least if SCOTUS weren’t packed with Federalist Society appointees.)
That article doesn’t address “ballot-stuffing” at all. In fact it suggests that the major political machines went out of their way to avoid it:
“Machine workers helped win elections by turning out large numbers of voters on election day. It was in the machine’s interests to only maintain a minimally winning amount of support. “