What does a theist mean by ‘God’?

Crazy little thing called God:

In ancient times, unusual physical events apparently scared the shit out of the locals, even the local philosophers. Events like lightning, earthquakes, meteors, floods and things of that nature prompted fears and speculations about the wrath of some critter, a critter much more powerful than ourselves, that suffered petty jealousy and fits of rage. The goal, assuming such a being, becomes appeasement. That is a highly rational belief. Bad things are bad. It’s worth investigating ways to avoid them. It’s probably why Richard Simmons became a celebrity.

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But the story of God also includes the effects of such natural pharmaceuticals as the psilocybin content in certain mushrooms, the mescaline content of certain cacti and many other wonderful things. The ingestion of these substances to differing degrees produces highly altered states of consciousness with a notable continuity of experience between them. That experience often leads to novel understanding which, to the ancient tripper, needed a name also. Maybe the two issues were somehow related.

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Finally, the ever present nasty knowledge of our own mortality added a nut to the trail mix. Now we have a god who is a creature which occasionally brings great calamity, a known alternative universe and the need for some experiential continuity bridging the state of alive with the state of dead. Add in some mumbo jumbo by a priest trying to impress a girl or claim a mandate for leadership and you have the stew from which a God is born. Sort of like Aphrodite born of the simmering foam, arriving on a chunk of potato and waving a hunk of meat menacingly.

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Eventually, each of those issues became known to be the result of ‘ordinary’ physical and biological processes. The God that used to explain data received through the senses, rationally explain I should add, ceased to explain those phenomena any more. The deeper mysteries still allow for a God as explanation but the rational tag doesn’t fit so well any more. Now that God doesn’t explain any of its original activity, we hold onto the idea simply because it is an idea, not because it’s a good idea. The common parlance for that behavior is “God of the gaps”. God suddenly loses any relevance. This God cannot be appeased because it doesn’t interact. It’s like trying to appease arithmetic.

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Our perceptions are what they are. We learned to measure most of them. Explanations for those perceptions however, change with experience. The God explanation has so far failed in every case to account for an event in our perceived universe. So, where a rational person once posited a God with the burden of proof on an unbeliever to proffer a better explanation, that burden was met in every single case until we get what we have now. The activity became a game of hunt for the gaps and fill them with knowledge, knowledge in all cases replacing God. There is also another word for what knowledge replaces.

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At any rate, clearly the burden was met and now has shifted to the believer to explain what the heck God is and does. It is not rational to believe in something which has no measureable effect, is odorless, colorless, tasteless, massless, chargeless and above all pointless.

So, unless this god has an attribute that matters to us here, in this universe, pointing to the universe and doing things like claiming an unmoved mover or some ineffable je ne sais quoi is merely masturbation to the memory of a lost lover. The argument means nothing because the mover has no qualities other than that it came first. Aspice, officio fungeris sine spe honoris amplioris.

Some say love, it is a river, but it isn’t a river. It’s an emotion or a complex mix of emotions. Some say God, it is a flower, but what good does that do? What’s wrong with the word ‘flower’? People tend to use a lot of words to get around the fact that any definition of God which doesn’t run into the problem of stupidity immediately faces the challenge of irrelevance.

In other words, just give one concrete attribute and defend it. All knowing? All loving? All powerful? A matter of any relevance whatsoever? None of the preceding have managed to hold up under scrutiny (although I am happy to go ahead and go through the motions if you like). What can a disembodied mind do? Can it turn water into wine? Can it drive a plexiglass wedge through an ocean to allow some nomads to escape an army? Can it feed the slavering crowd on a bagel and some lox? Does it have desire? Does it have goals? Is that consistent with all knowing and all powerful? Is this just a run-around? I guess I have to throw the teleologimacal argument in the same trash bin. Without a definition, the argument is empty. With a definition, the argument is unnecessary.

So, even though clearly our universe is big, really big, and even though we are little and tiny compared to the big, really big, universe, and even though the grand order of things exceeds our knowledge, our word ‘God’ is only a placeholder and has no actual meaning when examined. What we used to call God, we now have different and more specific words for. Gravity, electromagnetism, air pressure, chemistry and ideas like that replaced the entire dictionary of definitions we used to use for God. At this point it is clear that the personal deity idea was bunk. It is only still rational to believe in such a creature if the believer is ignorant of the bulk of human learning over the past 400 years. Given access to elementary education and the internet, the belief is either not rational or not relevant. You choose.

Perhaps someone can explain to me what they mean by God.

163 thoughts on “What does a theist mean by ‘God’?

  1. Pedant asks:

    In what way does that alter the situation that all empirical statements are provisional?

    What difference does that make to anything I’ve argued? I’ve said true statements can be discerned about (concerning) empirical observations; all true statements about something are of course provisional to the premises of the true statement being valid. As a practical matter, we all live and operate as if this is true. Arguing otherwise is, IMO, sophistry. One cannot even argue without implying that truthful statements can be made and discerned.

    Seversky says:

    There is no absurdity involved in comparing empirical observations to see where they are consistent or inconsistent unless you are a solipsist.

    Empiricism cannot validate itself. Your begged question lies in why one should consider “consistency” the arbiter of empirical validity, and what system judges such consistency. Nothing in empirical data requests confirmation nor does it state that consistency = greater validity; those are epistemological assumptions hopefully arbited by logic.

    Seversky asks:

    My question to you is: is it rational to believe in something because of the aforementioned benefits even though there is no empirical justification for so doing?

    If “the aforementioned benefits” are empirical, what do you mean there is no “empirical justification” for the belief? If by believing X I gain benefits to my existence, what other empirical justification do I require?

    As many others have pointed out before, what is irrational is to believe in the existence of something for which there is no evidence nor even necessity.

    Then it’s a good thing I haven’t made such a case, as I have always contended that belief in god is necessary for a rationally coherent worldview.

    Alan Fox asks:

    And which one [god] do you pick and why?

    Which god do I pick for what? I’m not required to make such a choice. My argument is that god as (1) first/sufficient cause, (2) source of good, (3) source of reason, and (4) source of free will intention is a necessary grounding for a rationally coherent worldview and a rationally coherent morality. What name anyone calls such a god, or whatever other characteristics they think god has, is entirely irrrevant to my argument.

    I note you remarked somewhere amongst your comments that the assumption of the existence of one deity necessarily excludes all others from existence. How so?

    No, I said the particular “one god” I premised excludes the existence of any other gods.

    Some interesting quotes from the crowd arguing against the capacity to make and discern true statements:

    …all empirical statements are provisional

    Is that a true statement?

    We all know that philosophers and theologians have constructed some clever arguments for the existence of a god but others have attacked them or provided counter-arguments

    Is that a true statement?

    and, as yet, we have no empirical evidence which could help decide the matter either way.

    Is that a true statement?

    We have evaluated and compared three different pieces of empirical evidence to come to our conclusion that our empirical inner ear evidence couldn’t be trusted..

    Would that be a true statement?

    If none of you are attempting to make true statements, nor expecting me to be able to discern true statements from your arguments, then what can your arguments be other than sophistry?

  2. I have no reason to argue against anything not claimed to be true (why argue against something that isn’t even claimed to be true?); nor am I compelled to argue for any claims of mine to anyone who does not believe true statements can be deliberately discerned, because there can be no expectation on my part that those people can discern the truth (or non-truth) of conclusions my argument reaches.

    All reasonable good-faith arguments are entirely based on the assumption that truthful statements can be deliberately (derived from accepted premises via proper deduction and inference) discerned by the participants. That is what good faith, rational argument is about.

    If not, then we might as well be dogs barking at each other.

    Now, is the god I’ve premised necessary for a rational worldview? I have no reason to make the case to those who claim that they cannot discern whether or not a conclusion is true based on the premises, or whether or not that conclusion truthfully comports with empirical existence.; or whether or not it is true that a premise is required in order to avoid an irrational conclusion.

  3. No, I said the particular “one god” I premised excludes the existence of any other gods.

    Now, is the god I’ve premised necessary for a rational worldview?

    I can see no difference between “premised” and “assumed” in the context of your remarks. You make your god up to fit whatever view you have formed about “life, the universe and everything”. It’s simple circularity. Fine, if it satisfies you.

  4. Has the OP been expanded?

    @ William:

    I agree with the OP in that, unless you are prepared to expand on what the word god means to you, or perhaps suggest a few attributes of your god, there is literally nothing to discuss as your god is no more than your personal invention.

  5. I love the smell of equivocation, or perhaps bait-and-switch, in the morning…
    Our boy WJM started out with the assertion that “logic discerns true statements”. But now, after that assertion has been pounded into a formless mist, WJM is condescendingly sneering about “nor am I compelled to argue for any claims of mine to anyone who does not believe true statements can be deliberately discerned”.
    Apparently, WJM doesn’t just think that “logic discerns true statements”, but in fact, that “true statements” can be “discern(ed)” only by logic. I wonder how WJM imagines he can use logic to “discern” the truth of the statement Cubist’s given name is Quentin Long ?

  6. Alan Fox,

    This seems to go back to Descartes and the assumption that one could make one or two unassailable statements — axioms — and proceed to derive everything else.

    An intoxicating idea, in all senses of the word.

  7. Murray:

    Some interesting quotes from the crowd arguing against the capacity to make and discern true statements:

    …all empirical statements are provisional

    Is that a true statement?

    Provisionally. It’s a working rule not discernible by deduction from a first principle – a rule of thumb based on experience. It works in science. See Galileo’s refutation of Aristotle on the motion of falling bodies and subsequent work on motion by Newton and Einstein.

  8. There is no difference in premised and assumed. The distinction was between the premise of “a” god, and the particular premise I tendered. One can premise “a” god, like Zeus, and such a premise doesn’t necessarily exclude other gods from existing. My particular “one god” premise does exclude other gods from existing.

    You make your god up to fit whatever view you have formed about “life, the universe and everything”.

    If by that you mean I posited qualities for god in order to provide sufficient basis for a priori commodities (like sufficient cause, free will, an objective good and capacity to discern true statements) that are required for a coherent rational worldview of any sort, then yes.

    I agree with the OP in that, unless you are prepared to expand on what the word god means to you, or perhaps suggest a few attributes of your god, there is literally nothing to discuss as your god is no more than your personal invention.

    I have provided 4 attributes of god – (1) first/sufficient cause (uncaused source of existence), (2) source of good; (3) source of free will/intent, and (4) source of reason.

    The short version: without an uncaused first/sufficient cause as grounding for existence itself, we are left with three rationally problematic explanations for cause and effect – infinite regress (which means no sufficient cause), effects causing themselves or effects caused by nothing. The latter two ruin rational thought. Only a posited uncaused cause as source of existence provides a rational solution to cause and effect.

    The uncaused first/sufficient cause requires intent as operational device to cause other things to occur, since it cannot be a “mechanism” that is caused to act. Thus, this uncaused cause acts by intent, setting effects into motion.

    In practical terms, we operate in real life as if intent is sufficient cause for what entities with intent do. Under all normal circumstances, we hold people responsible for their actions. We view intent as sufficient cause in and of itself. Also, we do not act as if effects can cause themselves, or as if “nothing” can cause an effect, nor do we operate as if there is infinite regress to all effects; we always search for and expect to find sufficient local causation. Even following cause and effect back through time requires that there is sufficient local causation in each cause-and-effect scenario; we don’t just shrug our shoulders and say “well, every effect has an infinite regression or branching community of causations, so we cannot begin to say what has ultimately caused any effect.”

    Again, in practical terms, we expect to be able to deliberately make and discern true statements about ourselves and the world. Every argument or investigation is predicated on this assumption; but, why should we expect this to be the case? Why should we expect logic to work? Why should we expect to have the free will capacity to access rational principles and why should we expect them to apply to ourselves or the universe? Why should there be rationally discernible patterns, and why should we expect to understand them?

    This is an integration of expectations that must be founded upon sound premises or else there is no reason to hold such a view in the first place (and many cultures did not hold such a view; they expected the world to ultimately be chaotic and undecipherable). Unless we assume the universe either “just happens to adhere” to logical principles by chance, and that human minds “just happen” to be able to functionally correspond to those rational principles by chance, then we must accept that such a correspondence is not “by chance” at all, but rather a necessary, deliberate opportunity of correspondence.

    Opportunity of deliberate, rational correspondence can either be taken as a deliberate and necessary aspect of existence and “chance” simply a description of ignorance of necessary and deliberate factors involved; or if our arguments “correspond” to anything in the world it can be seen as governed by “chance”; if governed by chance, then whether or not anything we say is “true” is simply by chance, not by a deliberate (free will) discernment of true statements.

    This “chance” condition would necessarily reduce arguments to the status of “dogs barking”, where every now and then what a dog barks happens to be true, but there is no way to verify or discern, because all systems of verification and discernment is actually just more chance dog-barking.

    Then we get to morality; we all behave and argue as if there is an objective good – that things others do are wrong not just because they violate our personal tastes or proclivities, but because we consider them innately wrong. Morality, which is a description of “oughts” we should perform to fulfill or pursue the good, cannot be obtained from any “is”; they require a purpose or goal.

    Because we must argue and live as if there is an objective good for humans, we must again provide the basis for there being an objective good – which would require a purposeful creator of humankind that created humans for a purpose, which would provide the “final cause” that would inform a system of moral oughts.

    Such “good” cannot be capricious or simply “chosen and enforced”, or else the “good” is nothing but a reflection of might-makes-right. The “good” must be an innate aspect of god as source of existence.

    Those are extremely condensed and incomplete explanations of why such commodities must exist, and must exist in the source of existence, which when combined as the intentional source of existence as first/sufficient cause, reason, and good. I think it is entirely reasonable to call such a necessary source of existence, intention, reason and good “god”.

  9. I’d have no reason to even make the attempt if the statement isn’t claimed to be true in the first place. If you are claiming it to be true (which, apparently you are not), then I don’t know how anyone would even attempt to discern whether or not it is true unless they devised a logical investigatory plan to determine whether or not the claim was truthful – such as, doing a search of identification records, photo IDs and interviews with friends, family, neighbors, workplace, school, etc. and seeing if they match up to the claim.

  10. Then why not state it as a provisional statement? Why state it as an absolute truth? You could say:

    “Empirical statements may or may not be provisional.”

    But then, what’s the point of even making such a statement? You see, when you are caught making a claim of truth, you and others backtrack and then add “well, I mean that provisionally”, but if you actually form the original statement in a way that accounts for its supposed provisional nature, there isn’t even any reason to make the statement.

    Let’s transform some of the other claims of truth I listed into their supposed “provisional” forms:

    “and, as yet, we may or may not have any empirical evidence which could help decide the matter either way. ”

    “We may or may not have evaluated and compared three different pieces of empirical evidence, and may or may not have come to a conclusion that our empirical inner ear evidence couldn’t be trusted..”

    You see, there’s no reason to even write such “provisional” statements. Who cares if what you say “may or may not” be the case? If you are going to claim that your statement is “more likely” to be true, that in itself is a claim of truth given the known facts and premises – unless, you are going to begin an infinite regress of provisional disclaimers.

    Making an argument that leads to a statement that one claims is true (but may be wrong about that claim) is what argument is about; it is a debate attempting to find true statements, with the expectation that both parties are in good faith looking to find the best, most likely, true statement about the subject that is under debate and given the premises at hand.

    We either argue with the point of discerning the best true statement given the facts and premises, or we are just indulging in sophistry and rhetoric.

  11. William J Murray: ” One can premise “a” god, like Zeus, and such a premise doesn’t necessarily exclude other gods from existing. My particular “one god” premise does exclude other gods from existing.”

    Here are a few scenarios.

    1) Only your “one god” exists.

    2) Many gods exist, but they simply stand around watching your “one god”.

    3) Many gods exist, who help your “one god” as equal peers.

    4) Many gods exist, who help your “one god” as underlings.

    How do you determine which it is since none of these conditions would lead to a result that is different than the “one god” scenario?

  12. William J Murray: ““We may or may not have evaluated and compared three different pieces of empirical evidence, and may or may not have come to a conclusion that our empirical inner ear evidence couldn’t be trusted..”

    Premises themselves are provisional, the act of “making” a premise is not.

    In logic, an available input is “not” provisional, but the value at that input is.

    By saying I “provisionally evaluated” and “provisionally came to a conclusion”, you are saying I may or may not have performed any act of reasoning here.

    You have not claimed that “premises” are provisional here, you have called the “process” of logic provisional.

    In effect your are claiming that most of the people here who disagree with you, only provisionally accept that we actually “think”.

    No one here has said that.

  13. William J Murray,

    Murray:

    Then why not state it as a provisional statement? Why state it as an absolute truth?

    I didn’t say it was an absolute truth. You seem to have assumed that.

    You could say:

    “Empirical statements may or may not be provisional.”

    No, I couldn’t say that, because if an empirical statement were not provisional it would be an absolute truth. That would be a logical contradiction, because something cannot be black and not black at the same time.

    But then, what’s the point of even making such a statement?

    I’ve explained that it’s a working rule with proven successes. It’s the everyday way that people interact with their environment. If your toaster doesn’t work, do you peremptorily throw it out or do you form hypotheses that might explain the malfunction, such as the toaster isn’t plugged in, there is a blown fuse, the mechanism is jammed, you didn’t pay your electric bill, etc.? By testing alternative possibilities, you may eventually arrive at an explanation that satisfies your need to make toast. That’s as close to absolute truth as you’re going to get until the next time you want to make toast.

    You see, when you are caught making a claim of truth, you and others backtrack and then add “well, I mean that provisionally”, but if you actually form the original statement in a way that accounts for its supposed provisional nature, there isn’t even any reason to make the statement.

    Not at all. You have misrepresented the argument, as I have just explained above.

  14. My premised god is premised as being the ultimate source of existence. Other entities can exist (having been caused to exist by god), but they cannot “also be” the ultimate source of existence, therefore by definition they cannot be “god” as premised.

  15. William J Murray: “My premised god is premised as being the ultimate source of existence. Other entities can exist (having been caused to exist by god), but they cannot “also be” the ultimate source of existence, therefore by definition they cannot be “god” as premised.”

    I didn’t say the other gods could “also be the ultimate source of existence”, I said that they could exist without, “having been caused to exist” by “your god”.

    I offer as evidence that “your god” exists, but has no cause.

    Logically, entities as powerful as “your god”, can exist without being caused.

    Further, if they are benign, you could not detect it.

    Since they have played no part in the universe that you are experiencing, why do you forbid their presence if they are NOT “caused by your god”?

  16. No, I couldn’t say that, because if an empirical statement were not provisional it would be an absolute truth. That would be a logical contradiction, because something cannot be black and not black at the same time.

    Is the claim that something cannot be both black and white at the same time only provisionally true, or is it absolutely true? But then, what’s the point of even making such a statement? If it is not absolutely true, why phrase your claim that a thing “cannot” be both black and white at the same time? Why not phrase it “A thing probably cannot be both black and white at the same time” or “A thing might not be both black and white at the same time”.?

    I’ve explained that it’s a working rule with proven successes.

    Is that a true statement? Or only provisionally true?

    It’s the everyday way that people interact with their environment.

    True or only provisionally true?

    Et cetera. Your entire debate is conducted as if you and I can make and discern true statements from false. Qualifying such claims as either “absolute” or “provisional” is sophistry. We make claims of truth in virtually every sentence, and as you have pointed out, arbit those claims by logic (“or else they’d be contradictory”).

    That is exactly the point I’ve been making all along: we expect to be able to make and discern truthful statements about the world based on observational input extrapolated by logic from fundamental epistemological premises (such as consistency = validity)and even ontological assumptions {like the assumption that an exterior reality exists).

  17. Toronto,

    My god as source of existence (not “a” existence, or “some” existences, but source of existence itself) logically precludes the existence of any god not caused by my god. IOW, nothing exists except as caused by my god because existence itself comes from my god.

  18. Toronto:

    You are free to premise a god that is not “the source of ALL existence” if you wish to allow for other gods, but that is not my premise.

  19. William J Murray: “You are free to premise a god that is not “the source of ALL existence” if you wish to allow for other gods, but that is not my premise.”

    Your view of how logic works is very puzzling to me.

    You seem to think that premises are “compound” and can be changed based on your needs at the time.

    That’s not the way logic works.

    If you have a premise, that premise must hold, unless you have a valid “logical” construct that can change its YES/NO value.

    You haven’t shown any logic that prohibits another “uncaused /has always existed” entity.

    You have shown many times however, that your premises are required by your conclusion.

    Since your premises are not bound by logic, there is no reason for you to go through the exercise of logic.

    You have a reason for god that only you can understand, and I can accept that, but you haven’t shown the logic in it, which is why so many others here cannot understand it either.

  20. Murray:

    Is the claim that something cannot be both black and white at the same time only provisionally true, or is it absolutely true? But then, what’s the point of even making such a statement? If it is not absolutely true, why phrase your claim that a thing “cannot” be both black and white at the same time? Why not phrase it “A thing probably cannot be both black and white at the same time” or “A thing might not be both black and white at the same time”.?

    You need a course in logic. The claim that something cannot be black and white at the same time is a logical rule that prevents us from contradicting ourselves. Nobody in their right mind wants to contradict themselves, do they? Calling that rule “true” adds nothing to our understanding. Calling the rule against self-contradiction “absolutely true” adds no enhancement to our understanding.

    (By the way, everything I claim is an opinion, not a claim of absolute truth. Kindly bear that in mind.)

    I’ve asked you before from whence you have derived your ideas about truth and logic, but you’ve not answered. Why not? I suspect that they come from 13th Century scholastic philosophy. Is that the truth, the absolute truth? Or not?

  21. Pedant: I’ve explained that it’s a working rule with proven successes. (The rule being that all empirical propositions are provisional hypotheses.)

    Murray: Is that a true statement? Or only provisionally true?

    It’s my opinion that it is probably correct (true), based on my personal experience and what I’ve learned about the history of its application to science. Do you deny its correctness? Can you think of an empirical proposition that is absolutely, incontrovertibly correct?

  22. Pedant: It’s the everyday way that people interact with their environment. (Referring to the hypothetical nature of empirical statements.)

    Murray: True or only provisionally true?

    It’s my opinion that it is probably correct (true), based on my personal experience. Do you deny its correctness? Please make an effort to deny it.

  23. Murray:

    Your entire debate is conducted as if you and I can make and discern true statements from false.

    I contend that there are two kinds of truth claims: deductive truth claims and inductive truth claims. If you agree, or not, please so signify.

    Qualifying such claims as either “absolute” or “provisional” is sophistry.

    You’re the one who uses the term “absolute” to refer to all truth claims. (Please correct me if I’m mistaken about that.) I draw a distinction between deductive truth claims (which are only as good as their premises and the application of logical consistency.) and inductive truth claims (which are provisional, because they are dependent upon the evidence at hand.)

    Now, please tell me whether the premise that an omnipotent and omniscient god exists is a deductive or inductive truth claim.

  24. You seem to think that premises are “compound” and can be changedbased on your needs at the time.

    Of course premises can be compound, as in IF X, and IF Y, and IF Z, then Conclusion. Of course premises can be changed if they need to be – meaning, if they produce false or irrational results.

    That’s not the way logic works.

    Is that a true statement?

    That’s exactly the way logic works. You begin with premises, work to conclusion, and if the conclusion is known to be false or irrational, check your inferences and check your premises and make changes where necessary. You can also begin with a necessary conclusion like “I can deliberately discern true statements about the world” and then work your way back to see what kind of premises are required to achieve that conclusion. Working one’s way back from that necessary conclusion (as well as other either necessary or known “conclusions”, such as logic as arbiter of true statements, an objective good, sufficient cause, etc.), it is my argument that the only logical set of founding premises that can support those necessary conclusions includes the kind of god I’ve premised.

    Like in a mathematical formula, you can work the formula front to back or back to front to find the missing answer/variable; it just depends on what you have to work with. We always have “what we experience in the world” available as one part of the formula to check our work.

    If you have a premise, that premise must hold, unless you have a valid “logical”construct that can change its YES/NO value.

    Is that a true statement?

    Premises are only as good as the conclusions they lead to; if they lead to invalid conclusions, then as they say, check your premises.

    You haven’t shown any logic that prohibits another “uncaused /has always existed” entity.

    Is that a true statement?

    Apparently, you don’t like the fact that part of my premise prohibits the existence of such entities, so you refuse to acquiesce to that part of my premise structure. When I directly state that I am premising that my god is (definitionally) the source of all existence, the rebuttal that “other such gods can exist” is not true according to that premise, because another god cannot also be “the source of all existence”, which is part of how I am defining “god”.

    Your insistence that “other such gods could exist” would be like me premising that there is a single, universal ancestor to all life on earth, and you saying that “other single, universal ancestors to all life on earth could exist besides the one I am premising. It’s an irrational challenge to the premise. If there is a single universal ancestor to all life on earth, there cannot be any others by definition; if there is a god that is the source of all existence, then by definition there are not any “other gods” that are also “the source of all existence”.

    You have shown many times however, that your premises are required by your conclusion.

    Is that a true statement?

    Since my conclusion is “No rationally coherent worldview is possible without these premises”, then you’ve just agreed that I’ve proven my point; my conclusion requires the a priori commitment to the kind of god I’ve premised.

    Since your premises are not bound by logic, there is no reason for you to go through the exercise of logic.

    Are you claiming that to be a true statement?

    Sure there is; I extrapolate the logical consequences of the premises to see if they produce a logically coherent worldview, and also extrapolate other premises (such as the no-god premise, and the multiple-god premise) to see if they can produce rationally coherent worldviews. The multiple-god premise is discarded because they do not produce a rationally coherent worldview (in the first place, it multiplies entities needlessly, which violates the principle of parsimony, or Occam’s Razor; in the second place, it adds the potential for discordant cause & effect, intention, reason and good which would simply be “subjective” according to the multiple, competing gods and not grounded in the very nature of existence).

    You have a reason for god that only you can understand, and I can accept that, but you haven’t shown the logic in it, which is why so many others here cannot understand it either.

    Are those presented as true statements? I think not. Nothing there but rhetoric.

  25. I agree that truth claims can be inductive and deductive. They can also be abductive, although most abductive claims are directly about probability.

    I don’t answer your questions about “where I got my ideas” because it is entirely irrelevant to the debate, and there is no specific source I “got my ideas” from. My “ideas” have been developing over 52 years of experience.

    I agree that ALL truth claims are provisional in the sense that they are subject to errors of evidence, logic or perception and corrections thereof. My problem with the way “provisional” has been used in this thread is that IMO it has been used as the term somehow magically prevents one from having to defend their claim of truth, or changes the fact that we must behave and argue as if we can deliberately discern true statements. If we do not have the expectation that we can deliberately discern true statements – provisional or not – then we have no reason to debate, investigate the world, or consider the ramifications of epistemological and ontological premises.

    Arguments are either the pursuit of true statements, or they are rhetorical in nature. If they are the former, then they proceed with the implicit expectation that humans can deliberately discern true statements from false even if we agree that such statements are provisional. If we have such an expectation, one can consider that expectation a “conclusion” – “we have the expectation that we can deliberately discern true statements”.

    IMO, most people just unconsciously assume this expectation, and give no thought to it as a conclusion that must be warranted somehow. Why should we have such an expectation? What are the premises that are required to produce such an expectation? Can such an expectation be warranted from materialistic/deterministic premises? Or is a god of some kind required to have such an expectation?

    And that is part of my argument for god; that the expectation that we can deliberately discern true statements cannot be warranted from a materialistic/deterministic basis, but can only be sufficiently warranted from the premise of the kind of god I’ve described. That such statements are accepted as “provisional” is entirely irrelevant.

    The methodology we employ to discern true statements from false is logic (whether inductive, deductive, or abductive). We make assumptions and gather data, but all of that is useless without a methodology for processing such data via those epistemological and ontological assumptions into statements we hold to be true.

    Such statements must be defended. Claiming they are provisional, IMO, is like claiming “liquid water is wet”. All true statement claims are provisional; that doesn’t relieve one from having to defend them.

    If you aren’t going to make claims of truth that you are required to defend, I have no reason to debate you. If you are going to claim that humans cannot deliberately discern true statements, then I have no reason to argue – indeed, nobody does, and nobody has any reason to conduct science or bother with logic at all.

    If you are willing to admit we must proceed with the expectation that we can deliberately discern true statements, then show me how such an expectation is warranted via any set of premises that do not include a god.

    If you are not willing to admit that we must proceed with such an expectation, then there is no reason to debate, because we do not expect to be able to deliberately discern any true statements in the debate, and then all we are doing is flinging rhetoric at each other.

  26. Now, please tell me whether the premise that an omnipotent and omniscient god exists is a deductive or inductive truth claim.

    You’d have to ask someone who premises such a god.

  27. The only relevant part of this is that in order to make the claim that something is probably true, one must be proceeding with the expectation that we can deliberately discern true statements, even if the “true statement” is that another statement is “probably true”.

    See my more extensive response below.

  28. Again, the point is that in order to make the “probably true” claim that another statement is “probably true” (do we have an infinite regress of “probably true” claims?), is if we expect that humans are capable of deliberately discerning true statements – even if we also expect that they often fall short or make errors along the way.

    See below for more extensive commentary.

  29. William J Murray, thank you for your thoughtful reply. I think it identifies much common ground between us.

    I agree that truth claims can be inductive and deductive. They can also be abductive, although most abductive claims are directly about probability.

    Excellent. That’s major common ground. I am delighted.

    I don’t answer your questions about “where I got my ideas” because it is entirely irrelevant to the debate, and there is no specific source I “got my ideas” from. My “ideas” have been developing over 52 years of experience.

    Thanks for the answer. I think, though, that where we get our ideas is relevant to our discussion, because it provides context that can assist understanding. I depend for my thinking about these matters on two sources, Practical Logic by Monroe C Beardsley, Prentice Hall, 1950 and Language, Truth and Logic by Alfred J Ayer, Dover, 1952.

    I agree that ALL truth claims are provisional in the sense that they are subject to errors of evidence, logic or perception and corrections thereof.

    Outstanding! We’re on a roll!

    My problem with the way “provisional” has been used in this thread is that IMO it has been used as the term somehow magically prevents one from having to defend their claim of truth, or changes the fact that we must behave and argue as if we can deliberately discern true statements.

    No, that has not been my intention and I don’t see any reason for you to continue believing that, since we now have agreement on the provisional nature of truth statements, which is precisely what I wanted to clarify.

    But I’m not clear on what the adverb “deliberately” adds to the verb “discern.” If one undertakes to investigate a truth claim, surely one is choosing to undertake that investigation. What function do you have in mind by repeatedly employing the modifier “deliberately” in this context?

    I’ll pause now, awaiting an answer to that question, with the intention of responding to the more contentious remainder of your post thereafter.

  30. Toronto: “That’s not the way logic works.”
    William J Murray: “Is that a true statement?”
    ………………………
    Toronto: “You have shown many times however, that your premises are required by your conclusion.”

    William J Murray: “Is that a true statement?”

    ……………………………………………………………..
    1) If you can’t prove you are infallible, no statement you make is any more “true” than mine. They are simply your opinions.

    2) I might be wrong, so simply prove to me you are infallible and can be trusted to make statements that are “true” and I’ll accept anything you say.

  31. William J Murray: “Of course premises can be changed if they need to be – meaning, if they produce false or irrational results.”

    That allows you to come to any conclusion you like.

    It is also something that can’t be debated with you since the premises you end up with are the ones that provide your desired conclusion.

    No one can prove you wrong.

  32. I use the modifier “deliberately” to draw attention to an aspect of “discerning true statements” that must be dealth with; whether or not we are also assuming (consciously or not) that we have the libertarian free will to make and arbit such discernments.

    If, under some views of materialism/determinism, human consciousness is a deterministic (meaning computed physically from prior material input, whether or not such computed results can be predicted), then “deliberacy” (sense of free will) is nothing more than a feeling that is generated and associated with other output.

    In this scenario, we aren’t deliberately discerning true statements; we are computing statements that are accompanied by a feeling that they are true and a feeling that we deliberately discerned them. The computed output could as easily have been generated by a machine without such feelings or sensations; those feelings are without any real impact or merit, because they can as easily be generated while accompanying absurd, obviously false and self-contradicting statements coming from a person who believes in complete predestination.

    IOW, if our statements and associated sensations are computations of prior material cause, we can as easily bark like a dog, drool like an idiot and simultaneously feel that we are making the most profoundly true statement available. Nothing can intentionally prevent that scenario from occurring because “intentionality” (deliberacy) is just a manufactured sensation (and many people do, in a meaningful sense, bark like dogs, drool, and believe they have said something true).

    In this sense, no true “deliberacy” is available by which we can independently arbit and examine our statements and logic for error; there is only the sensation of deliberacy that can be manufactured into accompanying any absurd statement.

    If deliberacy is not true (as in libertarian free will), we cannot expect to deliberately discern true statements; we can only expect to utter true statements by happenstance combinations of fortuitious material causations. Even our “recognition” of true statements and sense of “proof” would be sensations generated by causes that could accompany completely false claims.

    So, “deliberately” means “intentionally from libertarian free will.” It is my contention that we cannot act or argue in any other fashion, even if we argue that libertarian free will doesn’t exist – we must argue under the assumption that it does, or else we could not expect others to deliberately discern that any of our statements would be true.

    IOW, under materialism/determinism, all we can hope to do is somehow trip causative triggers in the physical processes of our opponent that might cause them to change their mind to what we think, even though we cannot have any real confidence that what we think is actually true (other than a sense of “confidence” that is simply manufactured in accompaniment).

    To that end, I might as well threaten my opponent or bark or dance a jig – who knows what physical stimulus might trigger a change in their output? Or, at least, might trigger a change in my output that would make me think they were agreeing with me?

  33. IOW, deliberacy is either taken as a sufficient and necessary causative agency in and of itself, or it is taken as a sensation generated by other causes. If it is the latter, then “discern” is interchangeable with “compute” and feelings of deliberacy are irrelevant. If it is the former, then one must have a worldview (premises) compatible with libertarian free will.

  34. That people can discern truth might be of interest to cognitive scientists. It is, however, irrelevant to what is being discussed here.

    It is readily observable, that people disagree over what they discern as truth. And therefore we cannot place any reliance on their discernment abilities.

  35. It is, however, irrelevant to what is being discussed here.

    It’s not only relevant, it is crucial to what I am discussing, and whether or not we can rely on their discerning ability is irrelevant to the point I am making.

    The point is that we must act and argue as if people have the capacity to deliberately discern true statements. If we ground that expectation in a worldview that disallows such a capacity, then we being irrational every time we make an argument that relies both on our and their capacity to deliberately discern true statements.

  36. William J Murray: ” If we ground that expectation in a worldview that disallows such a capacity, then we being irrational every time we make an argument that relies both on our and their capacity to deliberately discern true statements.”

    “Truth” to humans is analog, not digital.

    We can never be sure, but we can reach a value high enough to base decisions on.

    We can only have digital truth, i.e. yes/no, if we are infallible.

    I don’t understand why you cannot see why that would have to be true.

    You are just a human being like us, and just as fallible.

    That infallibility necessarily prevents you from being able to discern “absolute truth”.

  37. My argument about “truth” doesn’t require any truth be taken as “absolute”, nor does fallibility matter one bit.

    You apparently don’t understand what my argument is about, Toronto. My argument isn’t about a claim that some things we discern as true are in fact absolutely true, or are in fact only provisionally true; it is about the basis of any argument that seeks out true statements – the expectation that humans can deliberately discern true statements.

    Without the expectation that humans **can** deliberately discern true statements, we would have no reason to argue or use logic.

  38. William J Murray: “Without the expectation that humans **can** deliberately discern true statements, we would have no reason to argue or use logic.”

    This is **precisely** what I am arguing against.

    There is no reason to assume that we are supposed to be able to discern any sort of absolute truth at all, since we don’t know what our purpose here is supposed to be.

    If our purpose is to solve a problem for the god who created us, then clearly keeping us blind to things that are unnecessary for our purpose is valid and would lead us to focus on our task which is the problem we are expected to solve.

    In your view however, there are answers, absolute truths known by the god who created us, that are just waiting for us to discover.

    If so, what is the point of our existence, since we would then contribute nothing to the god that created us that he didn’t already have without us?

  39. Nothing but straw man here. I’ve never made the case that humans can discern any absolute truths.

    Every post you make supports my contention that we must argue and debate as if humans have the capacity to discern true statements. Otherwise, you wouldn’t argue via logic, and you wouldn’t expect me to be able to discern that your argument is valid. That’s why I keep pointing out where you make assertions of truth and expectations that I understand (discern) the validity thereof.

    I’ve also never claimed that our purpose is to solve some problem. You apparently made that up out of whole cloth.

  40. Seriously, Toronto, you need to consider the idea that you really do not understand the argument. It has nothing whatsoever to do with whether or not the truthful statements we make & discern are held as provisional or absolute.

  41. William J Murray: “I’ve also never claimed that our purpose is to solve some problem. You apparently made that up out of whole cloth.

    You didn’t say it.

    I said it.

    What it means is that you didn’t understand what I wrote.

  42. Earlier today, I asked Mr Murray why he so often uses the word “deliberately” to qualify the expression “discern true statements” and he replied:

    I use the modifier “deliberately” to draw attention to an aspect of “discerning true statements” that must be dealth with; whether or not we are also assuming (consciously or not) that we have the libertarian free will to make and arbit such discernments.

    As I suspected, that word was a reference to a presupposition about free will that pertains to Mr Murray’s argument for theism. He went on to say:

    If, under some views of materialism/determinism, human consciousness is a deterministic (meaning computed physically from prior material input, whether or not such computed results can be predicted), then “deliberacy” (sense of free will) is nothing more than a feeling that is generated and associated with other output.

    I have emphasized the words some views of materialism because that morphs into all views later on in his essay (which is a bit sneaky). However, I will take him at his initial word here and say (1) that there seem to be many varieties of materialism and of determinism, and (2) it does not seem that either viewpoint necessarily entails the other.

    I personally find the question of whether free will is real or illusory beyond my ability to decide, and in any case irrelevant to whether I can reason and cope with my environment adequately. What counts for me is that I experience being the pilot of my mind and I make decisions and formulate hypotheses irrespective of how philosophical debates on such matters fluctuate.

    Thinking is a skill that I have learned, just as driving is a skill that I have learned. I don’t feel the need to “deal with” philosophical issues about free will vs determinism or theism vs materialism to employ my thinking skills. (Maybe my thinking is as flawed as my driving, but so far I haven’t had a major accident – I could be very lucky.)

  43. Taking up where I left off before the above exchange about free will, Mr Murray has, with emphasis, posed this challenge to me:

    If you are willing to admit we must proceed with the expectation that we can deliberately discern true statements, then show me how such an expectation is warranted via any set of premises that do not include a god.

    As I indicated in my previous post, I see no need to provide any warrant to justify my ability to evaluate truth statements. I’ve been doing it all my life, with better results accruing with greater experience. I’m at the top of my game. Why should I feel the need for an imaginary god or set of premises that entail such a god to support that conviction?

  44. William J Murray: “Seriously, Toronto, you need to consider the idea that you really do not understand the argument.”

    I believe this contains your argument in the proper context:

    William J Murray: “If you are willing to admit we must proceed with the expectation that we can deliberately discern true statements, then show me how such an expectation is warranted via any set of premises that do not include a god.”

    The following rebuttal is not meant to be flippant but rather show you that your conclusion does not follow from your premises.

    In the above quote of yours, replace the phrase “true statements” with “humourous statements”.

    Now, have you ever seen an atheist laugh?

  45. Who has any expectation of being able to discern TRVE statements?

    That’s mental masturbation. Neither our brains nor or language support certainty.

    Just my opinion.

  46. Pedant,

    As I have said repeatedly, premises that support one’s arguments are only necessary if one wishes to develop a rationally coherent worldview. One is always, of course, free to believe whatever they wish – rationally justifiable or not.

    Having a “conviction” that something is true (“I can deliberately discern true statements”) is not different from any other conviction (“I am god incarnate”, “Infidels must die”, “Everyone else in the world is my prey”) unless one can justify their “conviction” within the framework of a rationally coherent worldview..

    In the sense that you have stated it above, “convictions” can be simply unjustified (without sound premises as basis) sensations. I haven’t argued that rationally incoherent views (or views that have not been examined for justifiable basis) cannot work in the world; in fact, I’ve said that there’s nothing preventing entirely irrational outlooks from providing very successful, enjoyable lives.

    But figuring out if one’s worldview can or cannot provide an enjoyable and successful life isn’t the point of my contribution to this debate; that you can function just fine by simply assuming you can discern true statements without providing warrant for such an assumption is completely irrelevant to the question of if God is a necessary basis for a rationally coherent worldview. I’m not claiming that accepting that a god exists is necessary for an enjoyable and productive life, but that it is necessary for a rationally coherent worldview.

    The nature of this (my current) debate about whether or not we logically should assume a god of some sort exists isn’t based on examining a varying degree of enjoyment or productivity any view might produce in life, but rather on a relentless and as objective as possible logical examination of one’s views – which means examining one’s assumptions to see what they must – logically – indicate.

    If you “see no need” to provide the basis or warrant for your assumed capacity to deliberately discern true statements, or to even investigate what free will must mean in that assumption, or how any of your other fundamental worldviews must logically interact with those assumptions, then you are not engaging my argument, you are simply saying you don’t wish to participate.

    You are under no obligation to explain your views to me or anyone else that I know of. You are not even under any obligation to explain them to yourself. If what really matters to you is that you live an enjoyable and productive life, and your beliefs seem to suit that purpose just fine, why bother entering a debate with me when I have clearly indicated that it is precisely about examining something that you are now disclaiming any need to debate?

  47. I have emphasized the words some views of materialism because that morphs into all views later on in his essay (which is a bit sneaky). However, I will take him at his initial word here and say (1) that there seem to be many varieties of materialism and of determinism, and (2) it does not seem that either viewpoint necessarily entails the other.

    I have only heard or read “some views” of materialism/determinism. All that I have read lead to deliberacy being an accompanying sensation, not a sufficient and necessary cause. When we say “I deliberately did X”, as a practical matter we assume that will (deliberacy) to be a sufficient causative agency, which is why we hold people accountable for their actions.

    If you (or anyone else) has a view of materialism/determinism that provides the basis for considering free will a sufficient and necessary cause in and of itself, and not just a sensation that happens to accompany some actions or decisions, feel free to make that case.

    However, as you have said below, you apparently don’t have any interest in making such a case to rebut my position that only theism can provide sufficient warrant for causative deliberacy.

  48. Because one is an atheist doesn’t mean their worldview is rationally consistent. My argument is not that atheists cannot deliberately discern true statements, but rather that they cannot rationally justify the expected capacity of people to deliberately discern true statements via atheistic premises.

  49. Murray:

    If you (or anyone else) has a view of materialism/determinism that provides the basis for considering free will a sufficient and necessary cause in and of itself, and not just a sensation that happens to accompany some actions or decisions, feel free to make that case.

    I question whether free will is “ever and always a sufficient and necessary cause in and of itself.” As does the legal system, when it considers “mitigating circumstances” in holding people accountable for their actions..

    However, as you have said below, you apparently don’t have any interest in making such a case to rebut my position that only theism can provide sufficient warrant for causative deliberacy.

    How can one rebut a case that is not a case but a mere assertion? If you’ve made such a case, and I’ve missed it, kindly repeat it (this is a long thread and I haven’t the patience to go back and reread every post.)

  50. Murray:

    If you “see no need” to provide the basis or warrant for your assumed capacity to deliberately discern true statements, or to even investigate what free will must mean in that assumption, or how any of your other fundamental worldviews must logically interact with those assumptions, then you are not engaging my argument, you are simply saying you don’t wish to participate.

    You forget that I have been participating by disagreeing with you. So far, I see your “argument” as being a stance of “theism warrants rationalism; prove me wrong.” Not an argument at all.

    You and StephenB are birds of a feather: “atheists are irrational; prove me wrong.”

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