The Varieties of Religious Language

Kantian Naturalist and I have been hopscotching from thread to thread, discussing the nature of religious language. The main point of contention is the assertoric/disclosive distinction:  When is religious language assertoric — that is, when does it make claims about reality — and when is it merely disclosive, revealing attitude and affect without making actual claims?

I’ve created this thread as a permanent home for this otherwise nomadic discussion.

It may also be a good place for an ongoing discussion of another form of religious language — scripture.  For believers who take scripture to be divinely inspired, the question is when it should be taken literally, when it should be taken figuratively or metaphorically, and whether there are consistent and justifiable criteria for drawing that distinction.

2,384 thoughts on “The Varieties of Religious Language

  1. Kantian Naturalist: First of all, the idea that Judaism (and Islam) are orthopraxic rather than orthodox isn’t some crazy idea that I made up.

    All the Abrahamic religions have, as a matter of practice, had periods of militarism and colonialism. Judaism never seems to have been big on conversion, but its alternative was even more horrific.

    I think when you speak of practice you need to consider that post-enlightenment practice may not be the same as religious practice. It may, in fact, be secular practice.

  2. petrushka: I think when you speak of practice you need to consider that post-enlightenment practice may not be the same as religious practice. It may, in fact, be secular practice.

    It’s certainly true that the Jewish Enlightenment, or Haskalah, saw a major liberalization in Jewish practice. Since traditional Judaism was an orthopraxic religion, the liberalization of practice as Jews assimilated into modernity raised very acute questions about Jewish identity that we’ve been struggling with ever since.

    In Reform, Reconstruction, and Conservative Judaism, there are lively and intense debates going back in the late 19th century about “Jewishness”, and those debates are still going on today — we see this for example in how we conduct debates about whether there are limits to a Jewish critique of Israel, can one be a good Jew and support the BDS movement, and so on.

  3. Kantian Naturalist: The point isn’t that Judaism isn’t solely orthopraxic, but that creeds play a very limited role in Judaism. Jewish life is centered on obeying the commandments or mitzvot, which is to say it is about conduct. Assertions about the nature of reality do play some role, of course, because belief and action can’t be wholly separated — but it isn’t a creedal religion. There’s no analogue to the Apostolic Creed or Nicene Creed to determine who does and doesn’t count as a member of the Jewish community.

    All nice and dandy in theory, but blatantly false in reality. For example, what percentage of Moses Law are Jews following, so you could say “Jewish life is centered on obeying the commandments”? They do none of the offerings, they don’t stone anyone, so in what sense are they following the commandments?

    Since they are not actually following the commandments, they necessarily have an interpretative theology that permits them to ignore most of the letter of the scriptures. And the core of this theology is, succinctly, creed. It may not be expressed and formulated the same way as in Christianity, but why would it, when it’s a different religion?

    So, orthopraxis is an obviously wrong word to describe mainstream Judaism. It describes Islam much better.

  4. Erik: So, orthopraxis is an obviously wrong word to describe mainstream Judaism. It describes Islam much better.

    But Islam is fragmented and becoming more fragmented. What, exactly, does it mean to practice Islam?

  5. petrushka: Your opinion evolved in response to geology finding evidence contrary to the global flood. Prior to Hutton et al, the consensus was that there was a global flood.

    After the fact revisionism is intellectually dishonest, particularly when dealing with revealed history.

    In spirituality, there’s such a thing as esotericism, which is distinct from institutional religion and radically opposed to literalism. Your line of argument misses this completely.

  6. petrushka: But Islam is fragmented and becoming more fragmented. What, exactly, does it mean to practice Islam?

    Orthopraxis means do as told. If there’s a scripture, and the scripture contains rules of conduct, laws and rituals, then orthopraxis means following the scripture, literally. You do the math, how well Muslims follow Quran and Jews the Torah.

  7. Erik: In spirituality, there’s such a thing as esotericism, which is distinct from institutional religion and radically opposed to literalism. Your line of argument misses this completely.

    What part of spirituality is revealed by untrue histories? I didn’t miss spirituality. I consider it irrelevant. One can have any kind of private understandings or insights or whatever, but a problem occurs when one tries to communicate them.

  8. Erik,

    I concur that Rabbinic Judaism is grounded in a sophisticated hermeneutics of Torah, and that process began with the writing of the Babylonian Talmud, the Sayings of the Fathers, and other texts. But I think one would be hard-pressed to find the creedal statements that have guided that hermeneutic process.

    The only doctrine of faith in Judaism, as I understand it, the Shema (“hear, o Israel, Adonai (the Lord) is your God, Adonai is one”). Perhaps I’m mistaken, but such at any rate is my impression.

    I’m not persuaded by the thought that Judaism must have creeds because it is a religion; that seems to beg the question, because it assumes that creeds must be central to any religion, and that’s precisely what I’m contesting. I think that Christianity is quite distinct in being creedal. At any rate, could we at least agree that creeds play a much more significant role in Christianity than in other religions?

  9. Patrick: Your claim directly contradicted what Weinberg actually said.

    Sure, if you interpret what I said literally. It wasn’t meant to be taken literally.

  10. Mung,

    Sure, if you interpret what I said literally. It wasn’t meant to be taken literally.

    You misspelled “seriously” twice there.

  11. Kantian Naturalist: I’m not persuaded by the thought that Judaism must have creeds because it is a religion; that seems to beg the question, because it assumes that creeds must be central to any religion, and that’s precisely what I’m contesting.

    Except that I didn’t say that Judaism must have creeds because it is a religion. I maintain that it must have creeds because they have an interpretative theology that permits them to ignore most of the letter of the scriptures or, as you put it, it “is grounded in a sophisticated hermeneutics of Torah”.

    You probably interpret the term “creed” narrowly, as a public recital of articles of faith in front of the congregation. I interpret it as articles of faith that every member of the religion is supposed to learn as they attend their equivalent of Sunday schools. Since it’s well known that Jews have such an education program where the “sophisticated hermeneutics” are conveyed so that kids learn to bypass the letter of Torah, it’s undeniable that articles of faith or core tenets of belief exist. That’s the kind of creed I was talking about.

    What’s the “greatest commandment” in Judaism? It’s “Hear, O Israel! The Lord our God, The Lord is One.” Anything about practice here? The word “commandment” isn’t even properly applicable here. It’s an article of faith or tenet of belief. To me, your orthopraxis claims seem to rest purely on unjustified extrapolation from the choice of word “commandment” in Judaism, even though it’s used exactly like “article of faith” in Christianity.

    And you don’t have to be persuaded. This is not my intention. You are a Jew, I’m not, so you are supposed to know better, but I’m not persuaded by your claims of orthopraxis. This is all I’m saying.

  12. Thanks for your contributions to this conversation, Erik.

    “You are a Jew, I’m not, so you are supposed to know better, but I’m not persuaded by your claims of orthopraxis.” – Erik

    As it seems, KN is a disenchanted, misoriented, confused atheist. He has actively turned his back on the reformed Judaism of his childhood. This raises the question of whether or not he counts as a ‘Jew’ at all, since the meaning of the term is unequivocally religious. ‘Atheist Jews’ (or ‘secular Jews’, though this is now less clear and precise in light of new works on secularism) are therefore a poignant example of contradiction in terms. One cannot be ‘God’s chosen people’ if (one believes) there is no God!

    As with you, I’m not at all persuaded by KN’s self-serving philosophistic claims. But one thing seems clear; that he is (i.e. actively lives, believes in) neither ‘orthodox(y)’ nor ‘orthoprax(is).’ He sure is steeped wide and proud in myopic atheist analytic USAmerican philosophy though!!

  13. petrushka: I draw a line between vegans and people who want to outlaw meat. Between people of faith and people of dominion.

    Nicely put. Just wondering, assume a scenario where vegans became politically organised and managed to convince a slim majority of voters that meat-eating should be outlawed. Should dietary secularism hold sway?

  14. Gregory,

    The trouble for you, Gregory, is that religious authority needs to be replaced by religious persuasion, if some traditional religions are going to maintain their hold.

    From a disinterested view, the persuasive element needs work.

  15. Gregory:
    As it seems, KN is a disenchanted, misoriented, confused atheist. He has actively turned his back on the reformed Judaism of his childhood. This raises the question of whether or not he counts as a ‘Jew’ at all, since the meaning of the term is unequivocally religious. ‘Atheist Jews’ (or ‘secular Jews’, though this is now less clear and precise in light of new works on secularism) are therefore a poignant example of contradiction in terms. One cannot be ‘God’s chosen people’ if (one believes) there is no God!

    I maintain Jewishness also has its ethnical aspect in addition to religion. Their scriptures are surely big on genealogies, so I suspect they are like Mormons: You as an individual may think you have abandoned the religion, but they never think so. They regard you as a prodigal son. You are in the bloodline, so they wait patiently until blood invites you back home. Something like that.

    Gregory:
    As with you, I’m not at all persuaded by KN’s self-serving philosophistic claims. But one thing seems clear; that he is (i.e. actively lives, believes in) neither ‘orthodox(y)’ nor ‘orthoprax(is).’ He sure is steeped wide and proud in myopic atheist analytic USAmerican philosophy though!!

    Yes, it’s been crystal clear. He may disagree with this evaluation, but he should know he’s not fooling anybody.

  16. Erik: Except that I didn’t say that Judaism must have creeds because it is a religion. I maintain that it must have creeds because they have an interpretative theology that permits them to ignore most of the letter of the scriptures or, as you put it, it “is grounded in a sophisticated hermeneutics of Torah”.

    You probably interpret the term “creed” narrowly, as a public recital of articles of faith in front of the congregation. I interpret it as articles of faith that every member of the religion is supposed to learn as they attend their equivalent of Sunday schools. Since it’s well known that Jews have such an education program where the “sophisticated hermeneutics” are conveyed so that kids learn to bypass the letter of Torah, it’s undeniable that articles of faith or core tenets of belief exist. That’s the kind of creed I was talking about.

    What’s the “greatest commandment” in Judaism? It’s “Hear, O Israel! The Lord our God, The Lord is One.” Anything about practice here? The word “commandment” isn’t even properly applicable here. It’s an article of faith or tenet of belief. To me, your orthopraxis claims seem to rest purely on unjustified extrapolation from the choice of word “commandment” in Judaism, even though it’s used exactly like “article of faith” in Christianity.

    And you don’t have to be persuaded. This is not my intention. You are a Jew, I’m not, so you are supposed to know better, but I’m not persuaded by your claims of orthopraxis. This is all I’m saying.

    So you’re saying there’s no such thing as a food Jew? 🙂

  17. Erik: Since it’s well known that Jews have such an education program where the “sophisticated hermeneutics” are conveyed so that kids learn to bypass the letter of Torah, it’s undeniable that articles of faith or core tenets of belief exist. That’s the kind of creed I was talking about.

    But that seems to be a wholly a priori argument. There’s no evidence here as to what goes on in Jewish education programs. Suppose you visited a Hebrew school and didn’t observe any articles of faith being conveyed. Would you insist that they must exist, even though you don’t see them being taught? Or would you say that the education program is not authentically Jewish because there are no articles of faith?

    In any event, what I was really getting at is that the mitzvot are what one does, not what one asserts to be the case. (Which is not to deny that asserting is also a kind of doing.)

    With regard to Rabbinic Judaism, the problem is one of how to keep the commandments in exile and without a Temple or a priesthood. That’s where the hermeneutics involved in Talmud and other interpretations comes into play as to which mitzvot must be observed, and how they can be observed, and which ones are suspended until the Messiah comes.

    With modern Jewish denominations (Reform, Reconstruction, and Conservative), the differences lie in degrees of traditionalism, attitude taken towards tradition, and how assimilated (and at what costs) into secularism. Many Reform Jews do not keep kosher; Reconstructionist and Conservative Jews do. In general, it’s probably fair to say that Reform Judaism is Protestantized Judaism — Reform Jews are quite similar to liberal Protestants in their attitudes towards religion.

    (This is not surprising, given that Reform Judaism was developed by 19th-century German Jews who wanted to assimilate into German society at that time. By contrast, contemporary Orthodoxy has its roots in an Eastern European Jewish rejection of modernity.)

  18. Erik: Yes, it’s been crystal clear. He may disagree with this evaluation, but he should know he’s not fooling anybody.

    I have no idea why you would think that I’m even trying to fool anyone. I’ve been perfectly transparent about who I am, what I believe, and why I believe it.

    However, whether you or anyone else here takes the time to read carefully what I write and actually understands it is not my responsibility. There are some people here who are constitutionally incapable of understanding me; I’ve learned to ignore them.

  19. Alan Fox: Nicely put. Just wondering,assume a scenario where vegans became politically organised and managed to convince a slim majority of voters that meat-eating should be outlawed. Should dietary secularism hold sway?

    I grew up on speculative fiction and have always thought of the future in terms of hundreds or thousands of years. I assume, for a number of reasons, that the future of food will be genetically engineered fungus and plants. I eat meat, but if you showed me a good meat substitute — even if more expensive — I’d be a vegetarian in a heartbeat. I already include a lot more vegetarian meals than my parents could have imagined.

  20. Kantian Naturalist: (This is not surprising, given that Reform Judaism was developed by 19th-century German Jews who wanted to assimilate into German society at that time. By contrast, contemporary Orthodoxy has its roots in an Eastern European Jewish rejection of modernity.)

    Although my knowledge of history is sketchy, this is consistent with my understanding. Modernism in religion — all Abrahamic religions — stems from enlightenment thinking and is pretty much secular. Observance of forms and rituals, art and music, are maintained more for aesthetic value than for theological value. A large part of this value is in maintaining community. The downside is it also maintains tribalism.

    A footnote that I find amusing: While in college, my daughter shared a rented house with three other girls, one of them an orthodox Jew. The Jewish girl maintained all of her cooking paraphernalia and foodstuffs in a segregated cupboard. She could not cook while anyone else was cooking. She could not turn the stove on during the Sabbath, but could use it if it just happened to be turned on by someone else. On certain days, all foodstuffs had to be wrapped in plastic.

    You will excuse me if I say that while ritual has aesthetic appeal, I find it ludicrous outside the venue of stage performance. And sometimes offensive. This young woman attended many dinner parties at my house (parties hosted by my daughter). She never ate anything, even though we provided vegetarian alternatives.

  21. Kantian Naturalist: In any event, what I was really getting at is that the mitzvot are what one does, not what one asserts to be the case. (Which is not to deny that asserting is also a kind of doing.)

    I’m well aware what you are getting at. The problem is that this does not distinguish Judaism in any way. Christians too are supposed to do stuff rather than merely believe (Epistle of James) so, by the characteristic of “orthopraxis”, Judaism doesn’t stand out in any way.

    Kantian Naturalist: However, whether you or anyone else here takes the time to read carefully what I write and actually understands it is not my responsibility. There are some people here who are constitutionally incapable of understanding me; I’ve learned to ignore them.

    I understand what you write just fine. It’s just that my comparative studies on the Abrahamic religions have yielded different conclusions.

  22. Paul vs James, Peter, and Jesus.

    Paul won.

    ETA: Fundamentalism is faith over works. It seems to infect all the Abrahamic religions. Militant Islam is just the most noticeable head sticking up at the moment.

    But it’s always been Wack-A-Mole.

  23. Erik,

    Here are some questions for you:

    1. If it was a local flood, why did Noah need an ark? Why didn’t he and his family simply leave the area?

    2. If it was a local flood, why did all of those animals need to be carried on the ark? The animals from the surrounding unflooded areas could have repopulated the flooded area. Only the unique local species would have needed to be carried.

    3. If it was a local flood, why did God say he wanted to wipe out “all mankind” and “all life under the heavens, every creature that has the breath of life in it”? A local flood can’t do that.

    4. If everything were thoroughly rotten, why would God kill just some humans and some animals, as a local flood would? It makes no sense.

    5. Please explain to us how it is possible for a flood to cover the top of Mt. Ararat (16,854 ft) and still be a local flood.

    6. God promised never to bring such a flood again. Yet there have been thousands of local floods since then. Do you think God has been breaking his promise over and over?

    The Bible describes a global flood, and the Bible got it wrong. Why is that so hard for you to accept? Humans make up fantastic stories. You don’t really think the Bible is the infallible word of God, do you?

  24. keiths: I’ve selected passages from the flood story and added comments showing just how obvious it is that the flood, as described in Genesis, was global. The local flood interpretation is a blatant distortion of what the text clearly says.

    Well, well. keiths finally admits he’s engaged in interpreting the texts. Can we expect a followup post explaining why his interpretation is the desired interpretation?

    keiths: He’s talking about all humans and all animals. This ain’t no local flood.

    The keiths interpretation.

    keiths: He’s talking about everybody — all people — in case you didn’t get the message the first time.

    The keiths interpretation.

    keiths: You wouldn’t need an ark for a local flood. You could just travel out of the area before the flood hit. This was clearly a global flood.

    The keiths interpretation.

    keiths: On the other hand, if the flood were global — and in the author’s mind, it obviously was — then you would need two of each creature.

    The keiths interpretation.

    keiths: Every kind. Not just the local ones.

    The keiths interpretation.

    keiths: Is it sinking in?

    Yes, it’s obvious you are bringing your own interpretation to the text. How do you justify your interpretation?

  25. contra keiths:

    11 Now the earth was corrupt in God’s sight and was full of violence.

    How on earth was the earth literally corrupt and literally full of violence?

  26. contra keiths:

    13 So God said to Noah, “I am going to put an end to all people, for the earth is filled with violence because of them. I am surely going to destroy both them and the earth.

    Yet all people were not literally destroyed and the earth was not literally destroyed.

  27. Mung,

    You can fight it out with Erik. He’s the one who said that the literal interpretation is true.

  28. Meanwhile, let’s compare interpretations.

    Here’s a passage:

    19 They [the waters] rose greatly on the earth, and all the high mountains under the entire heavens were covered. 20 The waters rose and covered the mountains to a depth of more than fifteen cubits.

    I interpret that to mean that the mountains were underwater. How do you interpret it?

  29. contra keiths:

    17 I am going to bring floodwaters on the earth to destroy all life under the heavens, every creature that has the breath of life in it. Everything on earth will perish.

    Except all life was not literally destroyed.

  30. keiths: You can fight it out with Erik. He’s the one who said that the literal interpretation is true.

    In case you missed it, I’m challenging the claims you made. If you can’t defend them it’s no less than I expect from you.

    Here’s what Erik wrote:

    There are plenty (other) things in the Bible that cannot be taken literally. For example I mentioned the prophecy of Immanuel which the New Testament evangelist takes to be about Jesus. Things like this have posed no problem for Christianity. Guess why. They only puzzle literalists. The mainstream exegesis has never been literalist.

    What is it that you think Erik and I ought to fight over, and why?

  31. Mung,

    Is this going to be yet another thread in which you are afraid to answer my questions?

    I repeat:

    Here’s a passage:

    19 They [the waters] rose greatly on the earth, and all the high mountains under the entire heavens were covered. 20 The waters rose and covered the mountains to a depth of more than fifteen cubits.

    I interpret that to mean that the mountains were underwater. How do you interpret it?

    It’s a straightforward question. How do you answer it?

  32. keiths, I created a specific thread for your questions:

    The Grand Inquisitor

    Now that you’ve admitted to being engaged in interpretation, it’s time to take up your claims in other threads.

    Let’s revisit your claims made in this thread:

    Munging Hell

    keiths:

    Is this going to be yet another thread in which you are afraid to answer my questions?

    What a load of self-serving BS.

    Now that you’ve admitted to being engaged in interpretation, it’s time to take up your claims in other threads.

    Let’s revisit your claims made in this thread:

    Munging Hell

  33. Going back to the original issues brought up by this OP, I remembered a little parable about it from 1959 in Hall’s Our Knowledge of Fact and Value.

    Perhaps a bit of fiction will help me make my point.

    Frank and George had just come from Sunday worship
    in a Protestant church in a small university town in southern
    United States.

    “Wasn’t Jones’s sermon great?” asked Frank.

    “I’ll admit it was very moving, Frank.”

    “I know how deeply segregationist you are, George, but
    didn’t our minister’s plea to remember that all people are
    children of God and thus of one family change your atti-
    tude?”

    “Yes it did, Frank. I still think Negroes are inferior
    in native ability to whites, but Jones pointed out rightly
    that God loves those of lesser intelligence as much as those
    of greater, and that we, his children, should do the same.”

    “Well, that’s a great admission coming from you,
    George. By the way, do you know my friend Smith, the
    philosopher?”

    “I’m glad to join you, if you don’t mind,” said Smith.
    “I couldn’t help overhearing your conversation and as I’m
    interested in the logic of concepts in our practical discourse
    I’d like to try my analysis to see what you think of it.”

    “Go right ahead,” George replied. “I must confess
    I’m a bit puzzled myself about how Jones in twenty minutes
    changed my attitude so profoundly.”

    “Well, what do you think of this? You are accustomed
    to having people condemn you, tell you that hate and
    prejudice are wrong and unchristian. This arouses an
    antagonistic attitude in you.”

    “You’re absolutely right.”

    “But Jones started differently. He said that God loves
    us all, whatever our color and whatever our beliefs about
    color. This effected a positive approach, which was en-
    hanced, in your case, by admitting the possibility that
    Negroes may be inferior, but that God loves them never-
    theless, just as a human father loves his less intelligent
    children as truly as he does the genius in the family. Then
    by concentrating on what this implies for the church, avoid-
    ing the issue about the schools and the general social mix-
    ing of the races, he continued to strengthen your favorable
    attitudes.”

    At this point Frank broke in: “You know. Smith, you
    bother me. Jones has just won a major victory in persuad-
    ing George to accept desegregation in the church. I’m
    afraid your analysis of his methods may undo his good
    work.”

    “Oh, I hope not,” continued Smith. “I’m for integra-
    tion. Moreover, I claim that my kind of analysis helps the
    non-philosopher in his practical thinking — in persuading
    others and in making his own decisions. Let me put it up
    to George. Have I undone Jones’s good work or have I
    aided him?”

    “Well, Smith, I can’t say that you have done either,
    although you have helped clarify his effectiveness.”

    “I’m still uneasy,” said Frank. “Perhaps it’s because
    I’ve heard that Smith is an atheist and a moral skeptic.”

    “Your information was quite wrong, Frank. An atheist
    opposes a theist whereas I claim that their whole con-
    troversy is a mistake about the logic of religious terms.
    Expressions like ‘God,’ ‘God loves us,’ ‘We are God’s
    children,’ must not be taken as referring or as trying to refer
    to anything; their use is partly ceremonial, being constit-
    uents in worshipful behavior, partly appraisive, persuasive,
    advisive, that is, practical. In the latter respect they are
    like ‘father,’ ‘father loves us,’ ‘we are father’s children’ in
    influencing our attitudes and thereby modifying our be-
    havior, but utterly unlike the latter in that they are not used
    to declare any fact.

    “That goes for moral terms, too. ‘We ought to treat
    Negroes as our brothers,’ ‘In the good life all men love and
    respect one another’ do not assert a duty nor describe any-
    thing. They are injunctions to others or commitments of
    ourselves to do something. So far as ‘reasons’ are offered
    for them, this is not to be considered as giving evidence of
    their truth but as adding strength to their practical effective-
    ness.”

    At this point Frank could restrain himself no longer.
    “You see, George, what I mean? On Smith’s account our
    preacher wasn’t talking about God’s love of all his children
    and the good example this sets us to love our black brothers
    even if we consider them inferior, nor did he lead you to
    think about such matters. He was simply influencing you
    and you were being influenced. Now, does this supposed
    ‘insight’ enhance the moving quality of his sermon?”

    “Hell, no!” (I must here apologize for George’s lan-
    guage; he was obviously upset.) “If I hadn’t thought that

    he was talking about God and God’s love and our duty to
    follow His example and the goodness of a certain sort of
    life I would not have been moved at all. I’m only a
    scientist, and a philosopher can get me all twisted up in
    semantics. But let me tell you this, Smith. When we lay-
    men talk about God and our moral obligations, however
    much we may differ in our concepts of God or the good
    life, we are concerned with something we take to be ob-
    jective, just as objective as genes or molecules — we are not
    simply trying to influence one another’s behavior.” At
    this point George turned and walked away without as much
    as a polite “Good-bye.”
    I want this bit of fiction to help me make my point,
    namely, that ordinary language is as intentional about mat-
    ters of value as it is about matters of fact. If it were taken
    somehow to prove that there is a God or that segregation
    is wrong because people commonly beheve these things,
    it would thwart my purpose. A reliable determination of
    what is good, just as of what is the case, requires the use of
    methods which, though finally sanctioned by common sense,
    do not amount to an uncritical acceptance of some popular
    belief, no matter how widespread.

    I think any straightforward analysis of our evaluative
    language must come out with the consequence that it is
    thoroughly objective and intentional. The proponents of
    the so-called emotive theory have done us both service and
    disservice. They are right in emphasizing that our ordinary
    value-talk is emotionally expressive. They are wrong when
    they make a sharp distinction between emotive and cogni-
    tive verbs and suggest that though the latter can express
    assertions the former cannot. If we trust ordinary speech,
    emotions are as assertive as any experience and as ob-
    jectively oriented. The whole division between emotive
    and cognitive terms has been foisted onto everyday Ian-
    guage by outsiders trying to save what they can of a
    philosophical commitment.

    The point of this is that we should take the assertoric or intentional aspect of language seriously whether the context is perceptual, valuational, or religious. Strip the referential aspects away and you really don’t have a language at all.

  34. walto,

    I can fully agree that prescriptive discourse is just as fully assertoric as descriptive discourse. (And what kind of Sellarsian would I be if I denied that?)

    And I do think that assertoric discourse is ‘weakly inferential’, in that both inference and reference are required for assertoric semantic content.

    However, it is a further question whether religious vocabulary should be understood assertorically, even by people of faith themselves. The point I’ve been raising here is that the need for a fully secular public morality, given the dual constraints of pluralism of comprehensive doctrines and democratic legitimacy, in turn strongly suggests the need for a ‘wall of separation’ between morality and religion. And one way of doing that is to distinguish between assertoric discourse (both descriptive and prescriptive) and disclosive discourse (whether ‘sacred’ or ‘profane’).

    I’d be reluctant to endorse a theory of semantics on which metaphors and symbols weren’t meaningful.

  35. Kantian Naturalist: The point I’ve been raising here is that the need for a fully secular public morality, given the dual constraints of pluralism of comprehensive doctrines and democratic legitimacy, in turn strongly suggests the need for a ‘wall of separation’ between morality and religion. And one way of doing that is to distinguish between assertoric discourse (both descriptive and prescriptive) and disclosive discourse (whether ‘sacred’ or ‘profane’).

    So, religious language should not be assertoric, because it’s bad for democracy. What if it’s a democratic religion, some Christian socialists or animist collectivists?

  36. keiths:
    Erik,

    Here are some questions for you:

    1. If it was a local flood, why did Noah need an ark?Why didn’t he and his family simply leave the area?

    Did I say it was a local flood? I said that literal interpretation was the least important.

    Anyway, to answer your question: Noah saw no flood yet. God told Noah there was going to be a flood, along with instructions what to do about it. In Noah’s place, would you just hope it would be a local flood and you’d be safe?

    keiths:
    2. If it was a local flood, why did all of those animals need to be carried on the ark?The animals from the surrounding unflooded areas could have repopulated the flooded area.Only the unique local species would have needed to be carried.

    Questioning instructions when you have not seen the flood yet. Not wise.

    keiths:
    3. If it was a local flood, why did God say he wanted to wipe out “all mankind” and “all life under the heavens, every creature that has the breath of life in it”? A local flood can’t do that.

    Garden of Eden was local, kinda, wasn’t it? Maybe “all mankind” of the time was not too global either.

    keiths:
    4. If everything were thoroughly rotten, why would God kill just some humans and some animals, as a local flood would? It makes no sense.

    Should I answer also questions that make no sense?

    keiths:
    5. Please explain to us how it is possible for a flood to cover the top of Mt. Ararat (16,854 ft) and still be a local flood.

    Where did I say it was a local flood? A flood sweeping over a single continent or even half a continent can also be called global. The 2004 tsunami in Indian ocean only affected the coasts of Indian ocean from India to Indonesia, but it was not local. It was global.

    keiths:
    6. God promised never to bring such a flood again.Yet there have been thousands of local floods since then.Do you think God has been breaking his promise over and over?

    If we are to interpret literally, mankind was wiped out in Noah’s flood. No such flood has occurred later.

    keiths:
    The Bible describes a global flood, and the Bible got it wrong.Why is that so hard for you to accept?Humans make up fantastic stories. You don’t really think the Bible is the infallible word of God, do you?

    The Bible got it wrong how?

  37. Erik: the need for a ‘wall of separation’ between morality and religion.

    Abrahamic religions seem to be largely comprised of prescriptions and proscriptions. Even the faith first crowd seems to require an action (believe).

  38. Erik: The 2004 tsunami in Indian ocean only affected the coasts of Indian ocean from India to Indonesia, but it was not local. It was global.

    Only if you don’;t give a damn about what words mean.

    ETA: Question: Prior to the work of early geologists, would bible believers have minces words about global vs local. Prior to Hutton et all, did anyone doubt that the Flood was global?

  39. petrushka: Only if you don’;t give a damn about what words mean.

    I care about words, which is why I don’t impute either “local” or “global” on the flood in the Bible. I doubt the writer of that story had much clue about the distinction, so that’s why the story is not about “local” or “global”. It’s about the flood.

  40. Erik: so that’s why the story is not about “local” or “global”. It’s about the flood.

    The writer was very clear about the language. You are obfuscating and weaseling.

  41. Kantian Naturalist:
    walto,

    However, it is a further question whether religious vocabulary should be understood assertorically, even by people of faith themselves. The point I’ve been raising here is that the need for a fully secular public morality, given the dual constraints of pluralism of comprehensive doctrines and democratic legitimacy, in turn strongly suggests the need for a ‘wall of separation’ between morality and religion. And one way of doing that is to distinguish between assertoric discourse (both descriptive and prescriptive) and disclosive discourse (whether ‘sacred’ or ‘profane’).

    The question of whether religious talk by religious people is assertoric cannot actually be answered by considering whether it would be a good thing for societies or politics if it were so construed.

    That’s philosophy by wishful thinking. It’s a cushy pragmatism indeed that determines the truth value of something based on whether it would make us more comfortable.

  42. Erik: So, religious language should not be assertoric, because it’s bad for democracy. What if it’s a democratic religion, some Christian socialists or animist collectivists?

    My point wasn’t that a religion should be democratically organized. The core line of thought I’m pursuing here is this:

    (1) public morality is conducted in a language of rational prescriptions, or norms that are binding on all;
    (2) in an ideal democracy, the norms binding on all should be norms that all can consent to;
    (3) norms that are only intelligible within some specific metaphysical position cannot be consented to by those who do not share that position;
    (4) therefore, such norms would be excluded from consideration of public policy in an ideal democracy;
    (5) therefore, public morality has nothing to do with religion (or with any non-religious metaphysics);

    This line of thought can happily accommodate the idea that religion can be important, even crucial, for “personal morality” — what Foucault called “the care of the self”.

    The further question is how to distinguish between public morality (which I think ought to be secular, in a pluralistic democracy) and personal morality (which obviously can be religious, or not). I was pursuing the thought that drawing a distinction between assertoric and disclosive language might fit that bill, but I am actually not entirely sure that this distinction is wholly workable or if it can carry out the task I’ve assigned to it.

  43. walto: The question of whether religious talk by religious people is assertoric cannot actually be answered by considering whether it would be a good thing for societies or politics if it were so construed.

    That’s philosophy by wishful thinking. It’s a cushy pragmatism indeed that determines the truth value of something based on whether it would make us more comfortable.

    I think you’ve missed my point by a rather wide margin, but since usually understand each other quite well, I suspect that the error lies on my part.

    I was not offering a suggestion as to how we should interpret the actual utterances of people of faith — although I have my suspicions that rather fewer utterances will count as assertions if the principle of charity is applied.

    Rather, I’m experimenting with the idea that people of faith ought to change how they (or we) articulate that faith so that the articulation of faith is consistent with the requirements of peaceful cooperation in a secular and pluralistic democracy.

    I am not proposing the assertoric/disclosive distinction as a basis for interpretation of religious utterances (though I have some doubts that all religious articulation is as assertoric as is assumed here), but as a basis for rendering religious articulation consistent with secular, pluralistic democracy — whereas in actuality it very often is not.

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