There’s a lot of (mostly very obscure) talk about “the soul” here and elsewhere. (Is it supposed to be different from you, your “mind,” your “ego” etc.? Is it some combo of [some of] them, or what?) A friend recently passed along the following quote from psychologist James Hillman that I thought was nice–and maybe demystifying–at least a little bit.
By soul I mean, first of all, a perspective rather than a substance, a viewpoint toward things rather than a thing itself. This perspective is reflective; it mediates events and makes differences between ourselves and everything that happens. Between us and events, between the doer and the deed, there is a reflective moment — and soul-making means differentiating this middle ground.
It is as if consciousness rests upon a self-sustaining and imagining substrate — an inner place or deeper person or ongoing presence — that is simply there even when all our subjectivity, ego, and consciousness go into eclipse. Soul appears as a factor independent of the events in which we are immersed. Though I cannot identify soul with anything else, I also can never grasp it apart from other things, perhaps because it is like a reflection in a flowing mirror, or like the moon which mediates only borrowed light. But just this peculiar and paradoxical intervening variable gives one the sense of having or being soul. However intangible and indefinable it is, soul carries highest importance in hierarchies of human values, frequently being identified with the principle of life and even of divinity.
In another attempt upon the idea of soul I suggest that the word refers to that unknown component which makes meaning possible, turns events into experiences, is communicated in love, and has a religious concern. These four qualifications I had already put forth some years ago. I had begun to use the term freely, usually interchangeably with psyche (from Greek) and anima (from Latin). Now I am adding three necessary modifications. First, soul refers to the deepening of events into experiences; second, the significance soul makes possible, whether in love or in religious concern, derives from its special relation with death. And third, by soul I mean the imaginative possibility in our natures, the experiencing through reflective speculation, dream, image, fantasy — that mode which recognizes all realities as primarily symbolic or metaphorical.”
James Hillman — Re-Visioning Psychology
There might be grounds for being skeptical of certain ways of doing metaphysics, but it seems to me that metaphysics is not really avoidable.
Here’s how I see it. Claims about existence and reality are built into assertoric discourse. The only way to avoid implicit metaphysical commitments is to avoid assertoric discourse. (The ancient Pyrrhonian Skeptics attempted to do this. Whether they were fully successful is up for debate.) But if existence claims are built into assertoric discourse, then any explication of that discourse — an articulation in language of what we are implicitly doing when we assert — will have to involve a metaphysics.
I myself have grave doubts about how analytic philosophers tend to do metaphysics. I think that the vast majority of analytic metaphysicians relies on the dual errors of never fully coming to terms with Carnap’s response to Quine and also never taking in the full measure of Sellars’s exposure of the incoherence of the Given. But that’s not a criticism of metaphysics as such.
My position is that all available evidence indicates that the mind is what the brain does. Consciousness is one of a number processes that make up the mind.
Actually, there is no evidence whatever that “indicates that the mind is what the brain does.” That’s just a definition you like.
What would be evidence for that?
First, it’s not insignificant whether we identify mindedness with the brain or with brain-body-environment interactions. The latter position stands a chance of killing Cartesian skepticism and also makes proper room for language and culture. And we need that if we’re to properly understand the similarities and differences between human minds and non-human animal minds. The differences between human brains and non-human primate brains are less impressive than usually thought, or so argues Herculano-Houzel in The Human Advantage.
Second, there’s at least a nominal difference between consciousness and cognition. The whole Chalmers problem turns on this: it’s one thing to explain cognition in neurocomputational terms, and quite another to explain consciousness in neurocomputational terms. I have no qualms with the former. (At present I’m reading Hohwy’s The Predictive Mind, which does an excellent job of explaining how the trick is pulled off. I’m working through Hohwy’s ongoing debate with Andy Clark as part of my current research project.)
But a neurocomputational explanation of cognition is not a neurocomputational explanation of consciousness, if consciousness can be explained in neurocomputational terms at all.
KN:
When I was taught “the mind is what the brain does,” it was as a slogan for a research program. Specifically, as a slogan for functionalism within cognitive science. It’s not a bad slogan for that research program. There are some serious problems with functionalism, and I myself am not a fan.
Point is, as a slogan for a research program, it’s neither a definition that Patrick happens to like nor a theory for which there’s empirical support.
You might say that it’s a slogan for a paradigm, using the word in something like Kuhn’s sense. A paradigm is not a theory but a way of thinking about how to do science, including how to build a theory, how to gather evidence, and how to test a theory in light of evidence.
And although functionalism has its critics (including myself), it’s still the dominant paradigm in cognitive science.
Kantian Naturalist,
KN Yes, I accept that amendment/correction. It’s a slogan.
Newton, the correlations suggest that mental activity depends on brain activity, and types of one are now assoociated with types of the other. That’s all big. But suppose somebody denies there are such things as ‘minds.’ Maybe this person says brains are what control lots of bodily functions. Now you say ‘Wait! Minds are what brains do.” if she says ‘what’s your evidence for that?’ What will you proffer?
*butts in*
I already offered the guillotine test, which has been conducted on many occasions. Separating the brain in its head from the rest of the body results in cessation of mental activity. No disembodied minds seem to survive the process.
There’s a mountain of evidence that links consciousness, cognitive ability, memory, sensorimotor abilities to specific regions in the brain. Trauma, disease such as stroke and tumours all demonstrate the link.
EMR techniques are good enough now to observe (admittedly at low resolution) how energy consumption in areas of the brain is associated with mental activity.
I have very recent experience with a family member of how a combination of sleep deprivation, stress from work, poor nutrition can combine to induce a temporary psychotic episode. This was totally resolved by medication to aid sleep, regular meals and a break from work.
We may have no more than a hazy idea of how our brains function but that is no reason to create some arbitrary and imaginary concept such as an “immaterial” mind.
No no. This interlocutor denies there’s any such thing as “the mind” in the first place. The guillotine test won’t be necessary with her. You say “the mind is what the brain does.” She replies, “No, the bodily activities are what the brain does.” So you say, “well let’s call those activities ‘mind'” and she says, “that’s a silly idea, obviously just suggested to confuse the moronic.”
So, now what’s your “empirical evidence” for the claim that “the mind is what the brain does.” Patrick says all the evidence points to that being true, but she says it’s just a bad definitional choice (or a slogan). So, where’s the evidence?
walto,
I’d like to get a better handle on the case as you’re imagining it.
When she denies that minds exist, is she also denying that words like “thinking”, “feeling,” “wanting,” “seeing,” “expecting,” “hoping”, “deciding”, “imagining” have their functions within our more-or-less ‘ordinary’ ways of classification? That these words have some role in our everyday coping with the world, each other, and ourselves?
I’m interested in seeing where your eliminativist is going to draw the line.
Would she refuse to use any of these ‘mental’ terms in her own everyday navigation of social spaces?
Or would she condescend to use them, but always adding a silent asterisk that says “but there’s no mind doing all those things!” (What would the practical function of the silent asterisk be, I wonder?)
Well, to give one version, there’s a member of my quickphil group who is a Skinnerian purist. He’s a professional behaviorist, who I think may have studied with Skinner himself. He’d say that all those terms that apparently refer to mental acts must be cashed out in strictly behavioral terms. (He even uses words like “mand” and “tact”!)
Someone else might say we are just being beguiled by language or something along those lines, and insist that all there really is in the world are sensations. Maybe that person denies minds from a “neutral monist” perspective. Or maybe our anti-mind person admits the mental acts but denies people need anything properly referred to by the term “minds” for them to take place. I guess there are a lot of variants, including eliminativism. It’s all, you know, philosophy at this point; not science. There’s no dispositive “empirical evidence.”
At some point we come to pragmatic reasons for preferring one theory to another. Patrick’s view that his own preferred position has all the empirical evidence is just a simplistic confusion. (But, of course, he’ll keep parroting it as long as he lives.)
Commenting only about myself.
I take “the mind” to be an abstraction. For me, that makes it a useful fiction, implying that it doesn’t really exist.
However, I don’t have any problem with “thinking”, “feeling,” “wanting,” “seeing,” “expecting,” “hoping”, “deciding”, “imagining”. Those are all aspects of human behavior. They don’t actually require the existence of a mind.
I haven’t been reading that group recently — must get back to it. But I’m pretty sure that I know exactly who you mean.
Aren’t those the best kind?
walto,
I agree that when it comes to extremely generic theoretical considerations, appeals to empirical evidence aren’t going to help us. There’s no appeal to empirical evidence that can tell us whether we should prefer physicalism (physical objects cause sensations) or phenomenalism (physical objects are logical constructions of sensations).
That said, I do think that philosophical argument is strongly in favor of physicalism of some kind or other.
One reason why this stuff is tricky is that it’s all interconnected. Phenomenalism won’t even make sense as a possible view unless you already accept a Cartesian picture of what minds are. (I teach Berkeley as a reductio ad absurdum of Cartesianism in my early modern class.)
If one rejects a Cartesian picture of the mind — say, in favor of an Aristotelian, Kantian, Rylean, or Heideggerian picture — then very different choices have to be made about the metaphysics of mind and also the epistemology of mind.
And whether one thinks about mindedness in terms of (and this is not an exhaustive list!) Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Ryle, or Heidegger (to confine ourselves just to the “Western” tradition) is itself informed by a whole host of other considerations, and not just “philosophical” ones (let alone “semantic investigations”).
Why are there so many books on Occam’s Razor? That just seems wrong to me.
Can I use one of Ockham’s Razors to excise my mind from my brain?
🙂 🙂
I’m not averse to this entirely, though I’d urge small caveats here and there. I’m not as opposed to positing cognitive processes as serious behaviorists are, and I’m not even opposed to positing ‘representations’ if those carry out serious explanatory work. (On that point I break ranks from my fellow pragmatists.)
Here’s one way of framing the question: is there an intelligible way in which “psychological activities” (e.g. thinking, feeling, wanting, seeing, expecting, hoping, deciding. imagining, etc.) from a natural kind distinct from “physical activities” (e.g. swimming, running, eating, sleeping, etc.)?
First I would probably say “I agree the brain does many things, one being what we call the mind. ”
Or I could just ask” how do you know”
I mostly agree with that.
I’m not into “natural kind” thinking. I agree that there is some sort of distinction there, though not a completely crisp distinction.
People use those terms (what you call “psychological activities”) in their ordinary language, and seem to be able to communicate reasonably well using those terms. However, the uses of “mind” and “mental” often seem more tenuous.
I’ve never much like “mind is what brain does,” first of all because “mind” in that sense simply isn’t a verb (yes, a brain may “mind,” but that’s simply if it’s “obeying” or some such thing). The point made isn’t too bad, I suppose, especially since a dead brain isn’t an oxymoron, but a dead mind (unless as an insult or the like) really is. A dead person has no mind, and psychologists, et al., study “the mind,” which is the brain in action.
But I don’t know why it wouldn’t be better to say that the “mind” is the brain considered as subjective experience, or the like. Of course there are questions of the subconscious and the unconscious, however they don’t seem too difficult to include into “mind” to the degree that they affect overall experience and function. I don’t think that consciousness is all that “mind” is, in other words, although I also don’t think that basic control of heart function is typically understood as “mind” either (brainstem function isn’t what we typically consider to be “mind,” although I don’t think there’s anything inherently wrong with including it in “mind,” either, since it’s a none too precise term).
So I think I agree mostly with the sentiment that mind is what brain does, but it’s painfully bad English, and I don’t think that “mind” typically includes all of brain function anyway, even if I agree that it likely could without really violating the meaning of “mind.” “Mind” isn’t a very exact term for anything, I’d say, being something of a holdover from dualistic, religious beliefs, yet it’s still a convenient term for probing subjective experience rather than doing neuroscience per se.
Glen Davidson
To make the case as briefly as possible: If you can’t deny them, then they are there. That which doesn’t go away no matter how hard you deny it is called reality, not appearance.
Latest example, Neil Rickert: “I take “the mind” to be an abstraction. For me, that makes it a useful fiction, implying that it doesn’t really exist.”
So if mind doesn’t really exist, then doesn’t it follow that nobody can be out of their minds? There are no mental illnesses that would require treatment, etc.?
As long as Neil has not made a case to explain himself, he cannot be taken seriously. He is not on reality’s side by any stretch of the imagination.
Or would you say he is on reality’s side and I am on appearance’s side? Make a case for it. Thanks. Show that you can do ontology.
Exactly so! So-called “mental” illnesses are in reality physical illnesses.
Nor is he on the side of fiction, or so he says. If course when he calls something a useful fiction, one has to wonder what he could possibly mean when he claims to be skeptical of ontology. I think he’s just incredibly confused.
In reality? Like, according to those who actually treat the illnesses?
I agree with this particular point. To say that something is fictional is to make an ontological claim.
Granted. The difficulty I have with your position is that, for all you have argued here, the distinctions you want to draw are just those of your own parochial conceptual framework.
There are many conceptual schemes, from hundreds (thousands?) of cultures, religions, philosophies. One would need some degree of assurance that out of all of them, you have happened upon the one that carves nature at its joints!
That’s a figure of speech. I did say that I considered the mind a useful fiction. You have just illustrated one of the ways that such fictions can be useful.
Yes. By unfortunate coincidence, I have just been closely involved with someone having a (so far, unique and out-of-the blue) psychotic episode. I’ve every reason to think that episode had physical causes, which, once addressed, resulted in rapid recovery from the episode. Brain activity is a chemical process and is disrupted when there is a chemical imbalance. Emotions such as fear and anger are chemical reactions (hormones are chemicals). To say these events are physical processes does not belittle or demystify them, it just saves time. No need to start inventing “immaterial” causes.
Which interlocutor? I apologise for not reading all the comments before posting. I’d certainly agree that the noun “mind” leads us to reify. You certainly don’t need a concept of mind or mental processes to study cognition.
Let’s hope it remains a historical test.
I take the point it is ungrammatical. I’d ask if we need “mind” as a noun. Is it a useful or meaningful concept for understanding how, for example, humans function in toto?
Humans indeed function as a whole.
Why would I say that?
As it’s not a view I hold (bodily activities are “mind”) nor have I come across that idea before, I don’t think I need to consider it – just dismiss it.
I previously listed some. The object was to indicate there is no need to reach for some imaginary “immaterial mind” to explain how humans work.
True that it’s ungrammatical, yes. True that it’s as useful a definition of “mind” as we could get, yes. I sidestep the issue by suggesting “mind” is not useful as a concept for trying to understand how humans function and think. We need to understand basics first.
I agree.
For what? That thinking is a physical process that happens in the brain? I already indicated some. Do you disagree that thinking is a purely physical process that happens in the brain?
Everyone (including you) has some degree of assurance that they have happened on the one true “conceptual scheme”.
The fact is that all of us (including you) have no real reason to believe that our pet theory is the correct one. That is unless the author or nature chooses to reveal his mind to us.
peace
I can bring to my consciousness the mental image of an object. At this moment I am imagining a centaur. I’m sure you can do the same.
Can you explain what it is that is deciding which image to bring up, where is it retrieving the image from, what it is that is displaying the image, and what it is that is receiving the image?
Yes, but I find the image is oddly two-dimensional. and it’s a force-fit. I can’t switch off the idea that that the concept is dysfunctional.
Nope. I’m not sure anyone can yet. But that doesn’t persuade me to throw up my hands and say “must be an immaterial process!”.
Moved a comment to Guano. Please attack ideas, not fellow members.
Alan, I think it would be good if you actually read the posts you are responding to (and perhaps the posts THEY were directed at as well) before posting. For example, I didn’t say anything about grammar: that was glen, I believe.
It’s kind of pointless to try to have a discussion with someone who is napping part of the time. I have no idea what to say about all those red herrings. “Nice fins” maybe?
That comment doesn’t belong in Guano, Alan.
I think the one preceding it, from phoodoo, doesn’t belong there.
keiths,
We have a dedicated thread for moderation issues.
walto,
You’re probably right. I’ve had personal stuff on my mind (heh).
If He doesn’t then what?
I don’t disagree. Referring to the brain is a shorthand for the full physical system involved. I also agree about the magnitude of the differences both between us and other primates. I would also include some cetaceans.
I don’t see that as a significant difference, if it is one at all. Later in this thread Neil Rickert said:
I disagree with Neil to the extent that I think those behaviors he listed, and others, are what make up “the mind”. Consciousness seems to be just self-referential cognition.
Why would you think it couldn’t be? We have no evidence for anything other than physical processes taking place in the brain (-body-environment). We have evidence that trauma and drugs, for just two examples, that impact the physical brain also impact consciousness. There is no reason to think that anything “immaterial” is involved.
In the whole history of science, never have gods, demons, sprites, or pixies ever been found to be the cause of any observation. Souls are unlikely in the extreme to be the first exception.
In what context would it matter?
Obviously one set consists primarily of subjective experiences while the other consists of activities with an objective component. Even this breaks down, as Alan Fox has pointed out, when those behaviors are performed under observation by neuroscientists’ imaging technologies.
Alan Fox,
Epistemology, if it is to be a true search for knowledge must be built on a solid base and I think this is where much of modern philosophy errs. Starting from cognition, consciousness, mind, body, brain, subject, I; we have already made assumptions before we begin. A study of knowledge must start from thinking, not a thinking mind or a thinking brain, but simply thinking. To come to the conclusion that there are such things as bodies, minds, souls, mental pictures or whatever requires thinking, so that is the point where any epistemology should begin.
Steiner
You believe that the processes we have been discussing are a result of brain activity. Presumably this is because you have either carried out, witnessed or read about experiments or procedures where processes such as thinking are correlated with brain activity. How do you know the causal relationship between these activities?
Which modern philosophy did you have in mind? Pretty much everybody gets more things right than Steiner, who bases his claims on things like the shape of lambs’ bladders.
Not sure about philosophy “erring”. That’s for philosophers to address.
You’re not going to get very far on the road to discovery without making assumptions, testing them and discarding those that don’t fit observation.
Not sure about that either. I’ve a theory (well, more of an unsupported assertion, really) that no entity is capable of comprehending systems more complex than itself. But, collectively, with shared knowledge and experience, perhaps it is not insurmountable.
That doesn’t quite parse for me. Is there a missing “no”? The only really important point I’ve been making is I see no justification for appealing to “immaterial” concepts.
I’m with walto regarding Rudolph Steiner. Someone passed on a book called “Bees”. It kind of destroys Steiner as a person who might have something sensible to say.
I think it is hugely premature to move to “immaterial” explanations for, say, how humans think, before getting to grasps with what goes on in the real world.
I previously listed some examples here
There’s a reason for that. Truth, itself, is a human construct. So, of course, we construct it to favor what we want to favor.
You seem to be arguing for foundationalism. Experience suggests that it doesn’t work.
How can there be thinking before there is something to think about?
So you would categorize e.g. nosebleed and schizophrenia as the same kind of illness and you think it makes everything clearer. You even speak of the same causes, so it means it would be roughly the same treatment for both! Why haven’t anyone thought of this before? So much clearer and simpler.