If Darwinism fails then supernatural causes are back on the table and should be included in science.
I do not think there can be a science of the supernatural.
I do not think that if Darwinism fails that supernatural causes will become acceptable.
If the hope of ID is that supernatural causes will be allowed back into science if they can only just get rid of Darwinism, ID is doomed.
The tools and methods of ID cannot differentiate a supernatural cause from a natural cause anyways.
Thoughts?
Dennetts position seems to be very similar. There can’t be anything non-physical going on so anything like Qualia that seems to be non-phyisical must be an illusion and pointing to neuroscience as the only way forward.
I really think a much better approach is to just admit that we haven’t a clue and don’t have a clue how to get a clue.
It’s not called a hard problem for nothing
peace
A very smart one , but just a man.
They were the application of mathematics to describe the physical world.
Sounds like we agree, Newton demonstrated the some aspects of world were comphrensible through mathematics.
His abilty to observe was limited by the tools he had available. He believed time was absolute, empirically disproved. His laws of motion failed in certain situations. But the mathematics was sufficient to navigate the solar system.
Just as the concept of laws is an imperfect approximation.
peace
Searle disagrees with you on consciousness. You are citing Searle as an certified expert on consciousness in order to prove KN wrong not about his view consciousness but about what Dennet thinks.
Does not seem a good strategy to introduce an expert who undermines your position.
Dennett’s position on “consciousness” is nuanced. He wrote a book called Consciousness Explained FFS. What Dennett dismisses, is the idea of an immaterial consciousness, a supernatural element. In Bacteria to Bach and Back Again, (“consciousness” appears around 160 times according to Kindle) he lists 12 ideas, his “newfound solutions”. Number 11 is
, Chapter 14 is entitled Consciousness as an evolved user-illusion that develpos the idea that consciousness is not a mysterious property unique to humans.
All depends on definitions, of course.
This is just more semantics. You need consciousness, in the general sense, in order to be able to experience feelings (such as affection). One can be made aware of an affection, in the very specific sense that you’re describing, by focusing your attention on it.
Entities lacking consciousness do not experience feelings or sensations. Zombies do not have an affection for brains, rivers do not feel an urge to flow downhill and vacuum cleaners do not have a preference for 120 volts alternate current. That’s just word games.
Aware is a good synonym for conscious. Some want to use the idea to justify the imaginary soul.
For me, Dennett provides good explanations of the conceptual and scientific issues with phenomenal experience as conceived in common discourse. But he is not so good at providing the positive case for explaining how qualia should be conceived. In particular, I understand how DVDs encode colour and music, but why do I still hear and see things when I play them?
I find Dennett’s interpreters do a better job at explaining this
Frankish’s Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness is a must-read for those who want a clear explanation of Dennett’s illusionism. I think he does a better job than Dennett of addressing the basic appearance-reality gap objection. Here is his answer (but read the whole paper for full appreciation):
[start of quote from Frankish]
As Searle puts it, “where consciousness is concerned the existence of the appearance is the reality. If it seems to me exactly as if I am having conscious experiences, then I am having conscious experiences”
This is often presented as a crushing objection to illusionism, but it is far from compelling. It turns on what we mean by seeming to have a greenish experience. If we mean having an introspective experience with the same phenomenal feel as a greenish experience, then, trivially, there is no distinction between seeming and reality. But of course that is not what illusionists mean. They mean introspectively representing oneself as having a greenish experience, and one can do this without having a greenish experience. The objector may reply that, in order to create the illusion of a greenish experience, the introspective representation would have to employ a greenish mode of presentation, which would itself have an introspectable greenish feel. However, illusionists will simply deny this, arguing that the content of introspective representations is determined by non-phenomenal, causal or functional factors.
[end of quote]
Why do qualia seem on introspection to be “ineffable, intrinsic, private”. Although Prinz thinks Dennett goes too far by taking an eliminativist (ie illusionist) position instead of the reductive position that Prinz supports, he agrees with Dennett that qualia are not what they seem. Prinz explains how those introspective properties can be mapped via explanation to scientific phenomena. For details, see his Is Consciousness a Trick or a Treat?
For Clark, the seemings we experience can be explained by taking a Bayesian Predictive Processing approach. He interprets Dennett by explaining qualia as the predictive dispositions/judgements/assertions we have in response to sensory input, not the reverse (that is qualia do not cause dispositions etc., it is the other way around). It is then possible to reconstrue qualia as real in the sense of Dennettian real patterns.: “Reconstructed through the lens of Bayesian prediction, qualia-seemings reflect patterns that are as real as any others”. In his response to Clark’s paper and in the paper KN links, Dennett agrees with the PP approach.
For comparison, Graziano’s illusionism was discussed some time ago at TSZ. As I understand him, he sees the illusion arising from representations of the brain’s modelling of the attention of others being applied to our own attention.
Philosophers respect Searle’s work in Philosophy of Language. His Chinese Room thought experiment has had lots of air play.
But, as KN points out, his explanation of qualia is not taken seriously by many philosophers.
Block is much better for the biological approach to phenomenal-consciousness. The interview here is a good introduction.
FWIW, roughly speaking Block is a reductive physicalist who takes an identity approach to phenomenality and brain states (he rejects functionalism, even the Dennett and Prinz style neuro-functionalism).
I agree, However what most folks deal with is the headline version that I objected to. I think that the nuances are just attempts to own the headline with out owning the implications.
Soul just means self.
Soul- psuché (a) the vital breath, breath of life, (b) the human soul, (c) the soul as the seat of affections and will, (d) the self, (e) a human person, an individual.——Strongs Concordance
When you call it imaginary you are committing exactly the same error as Dennett.
Perhaps like him you want to nuance your statement
peace
Consciousness is personal experience. So yes you need Consciousness to personally experience anything. However you can have feelings (such as affection) with out personally experiencing them.
Of course they do they just aren’t conscious of it.
No they don’t “feel” the urge to go downhill but they do have a strong compulsion to do so.
Vacuum cleaners will tend to perform according to their purpose when you give them electricity as apposed to hay.
A horse on the other hand will do the opposite.
That obvious fact does not say anything about the consciousness of either thing.
It’s not word games it’s contemplation on what consciousness is and what it’s not.
A person simply has no basis for declaring anything beyond himself to be conscious except revelation or as you point out bare naked choice.
peace
Thanks for the reminder that we’ve been over this before. 😕
fifthmonarchyman,
We can argue about whether there is a non-material or supernatural soul till the cows come home. I have no need for the hypothesis. It explains nothing. No problem if you find the the idea appealing.
There is that nuance that I was talking about.
I won’t argue that there is an non-material soul as I’m not a cartesian dualist but I will argue that a human is not reducible to physics (ie is supernatural).
It explains why there are not two Kirks.
You have no explanation for that fact so you are forced to deny the obvious.
peace
peace
fifthmonarchyman,
No. But I’m reminded of another thread authored by Keiths on split-brain patients who exhibit dual personality following trauma, disease or surgery destroying communication between left and right hemispheres.
Do they have two souls or share?
Here
How?
Are these affections reducible to physics?
Right
And isn’t the nature of qualla the basis of the quote KN provided from Dennet explaining his position on consciousness?
Then maybe Searle is not the best judge of theories of consciousness. Since he certainly disagrees with yours , so I would think that view would be a no brainer for you.
Thanks will read up on him.
Ah, so the science that YOU (rather than Alan) have in mind is NOT of the testable sort. (No more chance at a quick fitty for me, I guess. 🙁 )
So, you were wrong when you said this, right?
Could you please ask your original to say Hi to Tin-tin for me while he’s there? Thanks.
Very interesting! I’ve only read the Kukla and Huebner essays in that Philosophy of Daniel Dennett volume but I’ll definitely read the Clark essay sometime this week. On the face of it, Clark’s way of Dennetting qualia seems compelling to me.
In retrospect, Dennett would have been in a better position if he hadn’t used the term “user illusion” as a metaphor for the kind of reality that the manifest image has.
The big question that no one has been able to resolve is this: if scientific realism is a species of metaphysical realism, but cognitive science shows that the mind constructs the world it experiences, then doesn’t cognitive science undermine scientific realism?
The first person to articulate this problem was the Neo-Kantian philosopher Friedrich Lange. To say that Lange is obscure would be an under-statement, but credit should be given where credit is due: in his History of Materialism Lange argued that the kind of psychological experiments that Helmholtz was doing showed that Kantian idealism was right and that materialism is false. Lange was a huge influence on Nietzsche and also (ironically enough) on Russell. (Ironic given Russell’s snarky dismissal of Nietzsche.)
I don’t think that the difficulty of this problem has been fully acknowledged by Sellars, Dennett, or Clark — though they all dance around it at one stage or another.
Kantian Naturalist,
Kantian Naturalist, Not seeing the problem either. Isn’t metaphysical realism the idea that reality is independent from human thought? We perceive reality indirectly, I’m sure, but why does that undermine the idea of independent reality?
You define “supernatural” by the limitations of current physics? I don’t think that makes any sense.
I only know of this issue of as captured in the topic of conceptual (or cognitive) penetration of sensory processing. MacPhereson has a breakdown of the various positions related to PP in The relationship between cognitive penetration and predictive coding .
The penetration of early sensory processing of eg vision is important in some accounts and you can find arguments about whether or not it occurs, all based in results from the science of vision.
Evolution would also seem to encourage PP innate priors which pick out real causal structures of affordances.
With respect to scientific realism: AFAIK, the main argument for scientific realism is still some variant of Putnam’s no miracles argument. Denying realism by claiming conceptual penetration across the whole of the intersubjective cross-checking process of science would seem to require another type of miracle that would be better explained by scientific realism of some sort.
My take: scientific scientific realism is fine. But philosophical scientific realism is problematic.
The problem is that philosophers have made truth the central core of their version of realism. But there is no there there. That is to say, they do not have an account of truth that could provide what they need.
From a scientists point of view, realism should be about whether the world of our experience is real. It should not be about whether our scientific theories are true. Many scientists don’t see the distinction between realism and anti-realism, and I agree with them on that. The core of realism should be our pragmatic judgments rather than our judgments of truth. For truth is, itself, a human construct.
It looks like we hit the core of our disagreement. In my book, feelings cannot be divorced from conscious experience.
Exactly!
Remember soul just means self
A personality is not a person.
This is not complicated.
If you can speak of a person having multiple personalities you’ve already answered your own question.
peace
Geeze,
It’s like pulling teeth with you
There are not two Kirks when there are two identical physical bodies because there is more to Kirk than physics.
peace
That is a good question. I would say some definitely are not and some probably are.
The difference is detailed in that Johnathan Edwards book I linked earlier
peace
As evidenced by the praise he received when I mentioned him he is a judge who’s opinion folks here are not so quick to dismiss as my own.
When you are vastly outnumbered you look for allies where you can find them. The enemy of my enemy is my friend and all that
peace
Actually my method is a test of what I’m discussing here.
It’s not exactly distinguishing between an exact physical replica and my wife but it is a proof of concept.
Baby steps
Peace
Come on Neil do I really need to go over this again?
“Not reducible to physics” is an entirely different animal than “not explicable by known physics”.
The latter defines “supernatural” by the limitations of current physics.
The former most certainly does not
peace
You are almost my favorite again
Is it true that truth is a human construct? If that was actually the case how would you ever know?
peace
Can you share the feelings of others?
Perhaps instead of feelings stimuli would be a better word for what I’m taking about. Would that qualification eliminate the disagreement?
peace
LOL
peace
You mean the fact that you think you could do it is a test result?
No I mean that distinguishing between an actual phenomena and best model possible is a test result.
Now I realize that the best model possible does not equal an exact physical replica and a particular phenomena does not equal a whole person.
But it’s interesting none the less
The point is that this is an actual experiment and the subject is the supernatural as I’ve defined it here.
As I said in the OP I don’t care if you call it science or not I just want it to be useful.
peace
From my point of view, it is neither true nor false. That particular statement is one where we do not have widely accepted criteria for assessing truth.
Since I have not claimed “that was actually the case”, I suppose I don’t need to answer. However, my general approach is to look at how people go about making assessments of truth and falsity. Sometime people just make truth claims with no way of off assessing them. And whether those claims are true or false is then much argued with a lot more heat than light. But if we look at the cases where there is a way of assessing truth claims, we notice that people apply accepted standards. So I see truth as coming from the invention of standards and the need to evaluate in accordance with those standards.
So it’s just an opinion. Fine I think the Patriots are what’s wrong with football, that and a dollar will get you a coke
Peace
Not when they use the transporter there isn’t.
Kirk is a he and not a they
That is true regardless of the time
As long as logic holds that is
Peace
“ They” could refer the tech who operates the transporter and the transportee or ”they “ could refer to a landing party. Or it could be the writers on the show. Or it could be just a general referent . Have you watched the show?
I expect before he was born Kirk was neither a he ,she or it. So time is relevant.
Care to supply the premises and how the conclusion follows?
Peace
You are relying on human social conventions, yet asserting that it is logic.
The whole point of these kinds of problems, is that they challenge our conventions.
Please give a real life example of how this would be useful? Sounds like a lot of human judging is involved
It’s all he has done so far. We await developments.
Taken as a figure of speech, yes. We are talking empathy again. Why do you ask?
I don’t think so. Affection is not a stimulus. Neither are any of the other feelings that we discussed.
I’m trying to understand what you mean by “feeling”. It seems to be a slippery word for you.
No affection is a compelling tendency. Something that affects.
That depends on the entity that holds them.
Again, I think you are assuming that animals are persons like you. When the fact is they could be entirely instinctual beings where X yields Y and nothing personal is involved at all.
That would not make them unworthy of our love and protection it would only make them different from us.
peace
In my own place of employment I’m often asked to determine what caused a particular result was it human involvement or did it come from some environmental factor or equipment or something in the material inputs.
It’s very useful to know if the result was an affect of personal choice.
peace