Simple question, but surely the most important of all questions. If there are objective moral truths, what are they?
221 thoughts on “THE moral code”
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The Skeptical Zone
"I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken."
Don’t get caught.
Socrates would disagree. I’m not advocating his self-destructive craziness myself, but he is held up as a shining light by many.
I wonder if you rephrased your question to ask if there are objective ethical truths, you’d get different answers. After all, “ethicists” acquire some semi-scientific respectibility, while “moralists” seem to be little more than busybodies. “Morals” usually collects so much sociosexual baggage that it ends up having little to do with real ethics.
I contend that, if there is a possible objective definition of “humanity” that transcends local cultural standards, and if ethics is a field relating to human empathy and its derived behaviors regardless of any particular cultural affinity, then it’s possible that there could be some sort of objectivity in the study of ethics.
Morals, not so much.
If no-one using this site believes in objective morality then they will stop going on about it.
I really don’t think it helps to use the word objective where intersubjective is meant.
1. I’m not sure the two aren’t mutually exclusive, since we’re dealing with a couple of contexts here.
2. Do you think that Game Theory is an objective field of study?
I think that in a field relating to human empathy, as you say, then “objective” can’t be what is meant.
You don’t think human behavior can be studied objectively?
Depends what you mean. I think such a use of “objective” can certainly allow for confusion and equivocation.
My issue with “objectivity” is in relation to making ethical or moral judgements. Yes, there could be analysis of ethics that does not involve making such judgements.
1. Be excellent to each other
2. Party on, Dudes!
You may laugh, but I know of no theology that has done better.
On some construal of “objective,” I’d be quite willing to say that there are objective moral truths — Kant’s categorical imperative, for example.
On other construals of ‘objective’ — such as the one that Murray prefers — I would not be willing to say that.
So everything depends on just ho one characterizes the notion of “objectivity.”
And lying?
Also, exactly what construal?
One wonders whether ‘pain’ can be an objective phenomenon. I have a view, but I wonder how those who argue on the externality (to the entire species) of ‘objective morality’ might address the issue?
On my view, there are objective moral truths in the following sense: that what makes a particular moral framework right or wrong to adopt does not depend on the beliefs or desires of any particular people. Rather, a moral framework is right or wrong to the degree that it enables the satisfaction of basic human needs and fosters the cultivation of basic human capacities.
That’s clearly ‘objective’ in one sense, and I would say an important sense. And that’s objective enough for me. More importantly: as we discover new facts about human needs and capacities, we have reasons to revise our moral frameworks. As our sense of empathy expands to include other groups, we have reasons to revise our moral frameworks. I’d be the last person to deny that our moral frameworks are both fallible and corrigible.
In those terms, the categorical imperative says what it is that one must do in order to have a morally decent society in which needs are satisfied and capacities are fostered.
The categorical imperative fails the Jews (and homosexuals, gypsies, communists, intellectuals…).
If one looks at a population using different ‘ethical strategies’, the categorical imperative is not effective where other strategies exist. I don’t see how the argument that it would be an effective strategy if everyone used it makes it objectively the correct strategy for an individual. Also, is tactful lying not essential in society?
KN says:
#1:
#2:
Except that #2 is, in fact, an example of “the beliefs and desires of a particular people” (those that accept #2), which #1 says is not a basis for objective moral truths.
Unless you have something other than “conceptual frameworks” of people to hang your moral basis on, you’re basically saying that objective moral truths are not what any particular people say, but are what a particular group of people say – those who agree with you about the categorical imperative. Without a reference outside of conceptual frameworks of groups of people, you are having your cake and eating it too.
So, all you are really saying is that only your particular group of people have access to objective morality. Everyone who believes differently is wrong, for no apparent principled reason other than “because you say so.”
Hi William! Big boy pants on? Good!
What *is* the moral code? Isn’t it self-evident?
But you “hang” your framework on a deity you’ve invented?
But that’s what you are saying! Except that it’s not possible for anybody to have access to your “objective morality” except you as it flows from the deity you invented.
William J. Murray,
William – what you need to do is show how believing in a deity and believing you ought to do what the deity says you ought to do is a judgement outside of a moral framework rather than just being an alternative framework.
Why would I need to support something I’ve never claimed?
Perhaps one of these days you’ll understand my arguments to the point that you can form meaningful questions/challenges. That day is not today.
As I have said repeatedly, certain aspects of the moral code are indeed self-evident. Those aspects are either held as objectively valid/true, or not. If held as objectively true, then human “oughts’ necessarily refer to something beyond subjective, or intersubjective conceptual frameworks, which ends up requiring a god of some sort.
Other aspects of the moral code can be logically ascertained from those self-evidently true moral statements. It’s a lot like starting out with self-evident logical principles, or self-evident mathematical or geometrical principles, and then logically finding necessarily true statements, conditionally true statements, and generally true statements.
As your views seem destined to remain inexplicable to everyone else (with the possible exception of Robin) I’m not expecting miracles either..
Anyway, lets try some straightforward clarifying questions. Do you have a moral code? What is it? Do you think you derived it objectively? Is it absolute?
I assert neither you nor anyone else can genuinely claim to have an absolute (God-given or whatever) moral code, other than subjectively.
In that case how does theism enable you to be more objective than KN?
So what is your moral code?
If you have a moral code, how did you obtain it?
Is it absolute?
Is it objective?
How do you know?
ETA whilst the questions are directed at William Murray, anyone else is welcome to give their own answers.
There’s the faintest whiff of the suggestion that the Holocaust shows that the categorical imperative failed. I can think of several approaches that one might take here to explicate and justify that idea, but since I don’t know which one you’d like to take, I hesitate to say much more.
One thing I will say, though, is that the existence of evil is certainly no objection to the very idea of an objective morality. An objective morality says nothing about what we must do — then it wouldn’t be about morality. It is concerned with what we ought to do — and of course people can (and do) fail to do, or refuse to do, what they ought. The Third Reich is an example of a moral failure of an entire society.
Now, it is a really interesting question as to how massive moral failures are possible, and what (if anything) can be done to prevent or even mitigate them is, I think, probably the most pressing question of post-WW II Western culture. But that’s a distinct issue from the question of whether or not there is an objective morality. or perhaps better put, whether or not there is an objective standard for evaluating competing moralities, and what grounds the reasons we can give for revising our moral framework(s).
I’d like to see a more fleshed-out way of putting the thought that “the categorical imperative is not effective where other strategies exist”. For that matter, I’d like to see more examination of the question whether “different ethical strategies” mentioned here are alternatives to the categorial imperative or just different ways of satisfying the categorical imperative. (Presumably the orthodox Kantian would insist that they would have to be the latter, in order to count as ethical strategies in the first place.)
As for the bit about “tactful lying”: what we want is to identify the conditions of a morally decent society, not a morally perfect society. Angels do not lie, but human beings are not angels.
KN understands my argument very well, also. Your “us” is diminishing in regards to your idea that my arguments are incomprehensible to “us”.
Those are straightforward questions, but they outside of the range of my arguments. Nobody knows anything (beliefs held to be true) except subjectively, so your assertion about morality is trivial. The question is whether or not what one has in mind, what they believe they know, must be assumed to correspond to an objectively existent phenomena in order to have rationally consistent beliefs.
Well then, KN may oblige us and carry your tablets down from the mountain for us.
So what is your moral code?
If you have a moral code, how did you obtain it?
Is it absolute?
Is it objective?
How do you know?
ETA I see you responded above and I responded to your responses above.
I start with self-evidently true moral statements, then use logic to infer necessarily true moral statements, conditionally true moral statements, and generally true moral statements.
Those aspects of it which are self-evident and objective are.
Those aspects that are binding to everyone are.
Self-evident truths, logical inference from there, the necessary collapse of moral principle and logic without it.
And what is your answer to your own question?
You decide what is self-evidently true, I guess.
So, from above, you decide.
How do you decide?
How is this different from “I decide”?
All decisions about all knowledge of any sort are ultimately decided on by the individual. Saying that my moral philosophy is obtained by making decisions is trivial.
I assume it corresponds to an objectively existent phenomena.
William, it’s your own fault. You have given the impression, perhaps inadvertently, that there was some absolute or objective code that could be derived by logic. If you now are confirming what I think, that people decide, ideally for themselves and in consensus with their fellows, a workable moral code, then what has all the verbiage spread over many threads been about?
It might help if you clarify in what sense you are using “objective”. as in “fair, unbiased” or “existing independent of thought or an observer as part of reality” or some other meaning?
Indeed you assume! What have I been saying? If you assume something, it hardly matters whether we can establish it’s “objective” existence. I think the use of “objective” in your sentence is superfluous; a tautology.
Jello. Can’t you list some of these “self evident” things? I bet they come with so many caveats as to be matched to “socially normative”
The problem with proclaiming something ‘self-evidently true’ is that it takes only one counterexample of someone not finding it self-evidently true to demonstrate that it is indeed, not self-evidently true. If we are not going to accept the invariably ensuing weaseling that such persons are deluded, irrational, willingly blind etc. etc. – and why should we? – then we have no choice but to accept that ‘self-evidently true’ concepts are only self-evidently true to some, not to others, and therefore subjective. Ergo, they cannot form the basis for a system of objective morality.
fG
This is what I mean when I say that you can’t ask meaningful questions or make intelligent comments unless you understand the argument. My argument has never been that I could prove anything to be factually, objectively existent, and has always been about (1) what one believes to be true in terms of moral statements, (2) how one believes them to be true, and (3) what worldview premises are necessary to rationally accommodate those beliefs.
You are mistaking your erroneous inference for implications on my part. I’ve been very explicit in my statements; your inability to understand or retain that information is not my problem. I’ve always stated that, in order to have a coherent morality, we must assume morality refers to an objective commodity. I never said anyone could prove it.
No, I’m not confirming that. I’ve been arguing the case that KN and Robin apparently understand, and you still do not.
People “decide for themselves” everything they know or believe, whether it is about morality or anything else. You keep reiterating that trivial statement like it means something significant in this particular argument.
You don’t understand what “self-evidently true” means. “Self” does not refer to the person, it refers to the thing or statement itself. Because someone denies that 1+1=2 is a self-evidently true statement doesn’t make it not self-evidently true.
IOW, Alan,
I’m not denying that people go about their lives subjectively figuring out what morality is for them – whether they look through holy book, read some philosophy, go by feelings and empathy, whatever. We’re all subjective entities; we decide on our moral beliefs, obligations and rights like we do anything else – from a subjective perspective.
Reading a book or making the claim that one’s moral code is “objective” in nature doesn’t change the fact that one comes to that conclusion subjectively – by their own understanding or choices. I’ve never disputed that.
My point is that after or during the process of subjectively “figuring out” one’s worldview and where morality fits in their worldview, we are faced with very specific logical problems when it comes to moral acts, rights and obligations. One of those problems has to do with holding the view that there is no objective (transcending individual, group and cultural conceptual frameworks) basis for morality, yet believing (1) that it is immoral for anyone to torture children for personal pleasure, regardless of their conceptual framework, (2) that you have a principled moral right other than “might makes right” to intervene, and (3) that there is a principled obligation for anyone and everyone to act if the witness such a thing.
What this means, and thus is the basis of my argument, is that atheists cannot believe in self-evidently true moral statements and/or objectively true and binding moral statements, rights and obligations and have a rationally consistent belief system and that, ultimately, moralities accepted as subjective/relative boil down to might makes right, whether they include that in their codex or not.
If you believe morals are all relative/subjective, and you have the right to act simply because you say so (might), I have no quibble with your position, other than to say I wonder why you bother to use the word “morality” at all.
And as I keep noting, and you keep ignoring, is that non-atheists behave, on many measures, worse then atheists. So it appears that “might does not make right” in practice.
I’m not saying this is a counterpoint to your argument, rather something I’d like you to respond to regarding your argument. Let me know if you don’t understand this distinction.
Who denies that 1+1=2?
fG
I still take exception to this caricature. One does not have the right to act simply because one says so, and nobody claims that this is the case – strawman. One has the right to act because one has moral concepts that justify why one ought to act, and how. This is not a matter of might, it is a matter of justifying one’s actions. It is not the Might that justifies the actions and makes them Right – it is the strength, logical rationale and consistency of the argument from moral concept to actual action that does so.
If you deny that people are justified to act on their moral beliefs, that a) what good are moral beliefs at all, and b) what other justification could there possibly be? Is the only alternative to never act at all? Even not acting can often be a moral act!
fG
Presumably, on pains of giving up our intuitive sense of the notion of “rationality,” someone who denies a self-evident truth is, in some way, deficient in their rational faculty (i.e. “irrational”).
Would you please list, describe, or otherwise identify those aspects of the moral code that are self evident?
Reciprocating Bill to WJM:
Like Bartleby, I think William would prefer not to.
I don’t think Murray needs to answer that question — he’s already done so numerous occasions here, and if you find his response inadequate, then by all means, shoulder the burden of showing why.
I don’t share his views — quite the opposite, as everyone here is painfully aware — but I think he’s done his job in presenting and defending his argument, and he deserves credit for that.
KN,
Could you provide a link? I know he’s said that torturing infants for pleasure is self-evidently immoral, but I’m not aware of anything else on the list.