Society, Morality, and Rape

Brent, at Uncommon Descent, asked:

Is rape morally wrong because society says so?

Or:

Does society say rape is wrong because morality says so?

 

I answered:

I’m going to annoy you, I’m afraid, Brent, in my answer, but in for a penny…

“Morality” doesn’t “say” anything. People do. Collectively, people form a society, so it is reasonable to say that “society” says something – if that something is the collective mores, or precepts of a society.

So I’d say that people in a society collectively construct a shared system of moral precepts and those precepts include, in most societies, the precept that rape is wrong.

This seems to be fairly universal, probably because most societies develop a system that places a taboo on one person exploiting another for personal benefit. This is not surprising given that we are a social species and do better when we cooperate with each other than when we act individualistically.

So my answer is “closer to that first thing”, because the second doesn’t really make sense.

However, I would phrase it as:

In most societies, rape is regarded as morally wrong, because it violates the principle that underpins the continuation of a society that has potential net benefits for all.

He replied:

Sorry to take the last bit first, but . . .

However, I would phrase it as:

In most societies, rape is regarded as morally wrong, because it violates the principle that underpins the continuation of a society that has potential net benefits for all.

I’m surprised you would say this, not that it is inconsistent with your own beliefs on the matter, but that it leaves you completely open to, and obviously guilty of, WJM’s charges that a Darwinist system (system consistent with “Darwinism”) cannot condemn rape.

And the first bit last . . .

“Morality” doesn’t “say” anything. People do. Collectively, people form a society, so it is reasonable to say that “society” says something – if that something is the collective mores, or precepts of a society.

So I’d say that people in a society collectively construct a shared system of moral precepts and those precepts include, in most societies, the precept that rape is wrong.

This seems to be fairly universal, probably because most societies develop a system that places a taboo on one person exploiting another for personal benefit. This is not surprising given that we are a social species and do better when we cooperate with each other than when we act individualistically.

So my answer is “closer to that first thing”, because the second doesn’t really make sense.

Which all means that my original challenge to your system of morality, in fact, is correct and undermines it completely; there is no actual morality whatsoever.

If people of a society are the source of morality, then people of a society govern morality, and morality doesn’t govern people of a society.

And I invited him to continue the conversation here.

What Brent seems to be saying is that a morality – a system of oughts and ought nots – somehow doesn’t count as “morality” if it is constructed by a socciety of human beings.

My response to Brent is to ask: what morality can he name that is not constructed by a society of human beings?

 

 

416 thoughts on “Society, Morality, and Rape

  1. faded_Glory: Patient, moi? Not so much in RL! On the web though, time flows at its own speed. No pressure, but I do hope you will respond eventually. I have of course been in these sort of discussions with others before, and never got far past this particular point, so here’s hoping for progress.

    In purely practical terms, I find it difficult to see why it matters if morals are subjective, owned by the individual (always of course knowing that individuals exist in their society, that their personalities are influenced by that society, and that they in turn influence it themselves), or if they are absolute but apparently easy to misunderstood even in hugely fundamental ways. After all, it doesn’t get more fundamental than to claim that some people are inherently inferior to others (for reasons of characteristics they possess involuntary such as race, gender etc). That step taken, one can justify pretty much anything!

    So tell me Brent, why does it even matter if morals are subjective by themselves, or the subjective interpretations of an apparently quite easily misunderstood absolute standard?

    Now, if all this was just a free-floating philosophical discussion, frankly, then who cares? But there are practical implications – I already noted that not seldom are we subjectivists being told that we shouldn’t be criticising anyone or anything because we have no justification to do so. Since I believe that our propensity to criticise and judge is inherent to our human nature, being denied the right to do so is tantamount to being denied our humanity. Strong words, but this is how it feels to me. Of course it could be that such ripostes are the last measure of people who haven’t got an actual argument, but even so, it can be quite grating. Not saying that you made this argument on this thread, but WJM certainly did.

    fG

    fG, I’m probably going to do a horrible job in this reply hitting everything you want, but I think I can get close and I’ll trust that you’ll help me to help you where I haven’t.

    The very end of your last post first: WJM didn’t say you cannot judge, what he said (and by said, I mean his point was) was that you cannot do so logically and coherently from within your belief system. This is where major, major confusion arises in this discussion. You have this deep, deep sense of not only right and wrong, but also of a specialness for humanity. They are tied together, of course, because you have to judge that it is not good to be denied your humanity. I agree. It is something very special, and it is morally wrong to be denied what is rightfully yours. But this again just suggests that you really know that there is an objective right and wrong “out there” that you are able to tap into. From there, it heads to God very quickly.

    What you have posted earlier is probably a better question/challenge/suggestion that what I was thinking: conscience. But let me get back to that in a moment.

    First, you said just above, “In purely practical terms I find it difficult to see why it matters . . .” Well, define practical. I would argue that anything that is misunderstood isn’t very practical. If, for example, the teacher is looking for the answer that you happened to give him, but he sees that you actually made some errors in your calculations and just got the answer by luck, he is not going to let that slide. And well he shouldn’t, for if he does, he knows that your future work is going to produce error after error, after error.

    And in this case, this is what WJM, I, and many others are on about. Are you going to deny that morality is the basis for a functioning society where people can live and prosper and actually enjoy their existence? Of course not. It is your whole system of ethics anyway. But, if the moral code is based on shifting sand, which also according to your system, it must be, it is not able to safeguard society. The Nazi’s had a system of ethics. It was not good for society. If they kept their ethics within their own society, they may have just killed each other. But part of their ethic was that it was their duty to impose that ethic on other societies. How can a relativist understanding of morality deal with this? It cannot, simple as that.

    I feel like I’m skipping something important here, but can’t think of it . . .

    Well then, back to the conscience question. I should first like to ask what this conscience is. Is it the moral code? I don’t think you can answer yes to that question, for if you do you’ve only come up with another name for the moral code and the discussion hasn’t moved an inch. Is it, then, a part of the process of apprehending what the moral code is? I would guess you’ll say yes to this. But it seems that you still haven’t moved the conversation an inch, or if you have, it has moved in my favor. Why in my favor? Because if we need some thing, a conscience, to be enabled to apprehend the code, it seems to suggest that the code itself is “out there”, and we need this thing to plug into it. And if we all have this conscience to so plug in, then, as I’ve been saying, no one need to believe in God first in order to apprehend the moral code.

    And that is exactly what I do say. We tap into the moral code through conscience first, apprehend the rightness and wrongness of certain things, and live accordingly. But, when we pause to think about the right and wrong convictions we feel — like about rape, torture, or Nazi death camps — we can’t conceive of these things being right under any circumstances, and therefore really, objectively, wrong, whether people agree with us or not.

    And when we come to this astonishing conclusion, we must further conclude that there is an actual standard to which we are striving to meet. And speaking as a Christian, I say that God gave us this strange thing called a conscience as a very strong and difficult to dismiss clue not only to His existence, but also to the fact that He cares how we act. That is very sobering.

  2. Lizzie:
    Brent,

    Brent, as you have made the effort to write such a long post, I won’t move it to Guano on this occasion, but please read the site rules – claiming that other posters are lying is against the rules.

    I will respond to your post in more detail later.

    I’ll peruse them now and sincerely appreciate you not moving my post there.

    Honest question though: If we cannot call anyone a liar or such, is it also prohibited to post lies? I mean, yeah, often we have to judge motives and can’t be sure that someone is actually lying, but there are occasions where lies are actually being told. Do you delete those?

  3. Brent: And in this case, this is what WJM, I, and many others are on about. Are you going to deny that morality is the basis for a functioning society where people can live and prosper and actually enjoy their existence? Of course not. It is your whole system of ethics anyway. But, if the moral code is based on shifting sand, which also according to your system, it must be, it is not able to safeguard society. The Nazi’s had a system of ethics. It was not good for society. If they kept their ethics within their own society, they may have just killed each other. But part of their ethic was that it was their duty to impose that ethic on other societies. How can a relativist understanding of morality deal with this? It cannot, simple as that.

    There is no difference from the Nazi’s ethical system to yours. Both are constructs that have no objective reality.

    They might have different end-results for certain people, but fundamentally there is no difference with regard to their source. It was made by people, not god.

    I mean, had the Nazi’s won then their system, whatever it ultimately turned into, would be the system and considered normal by those within it. No doubt the Jewish question would have been whitewashed as history is written by the victors. And in 500 years time it would be part of history, like so many other awful things that happened.

    And speaking as a Christian, I say that God gave us this strange thing called a conscience as a very strong and difficult to dismiss clue not only to His existence, but also to the fact that He cares how we act. That is very sobering.

    Why do you suppose this god-given “conscience” failed to prevent slavery, rape of captured women and all the other things I can read about in the bibble? It does not seem to prevent priests from abusing those in their care.

    It’s because your (and the authors of the bibble) moral code is also based on shifting sand, but you just don’t realize it. You have convinced yourself that there is something more to it then there actually is.

    Is homosexuality immoral Brent?

    If so, what should be done to those who practice it?

    Is cannibalism immoral Brent? Why? What do you say to those to whom it is a normal part of everyday life? Some people eat their dead! Who are you to say that practice is right or wrong?

  4. but there are occasions where lies are actually being told. Do you delete those?

    fer’instance?

    But, when we pause to think about the right and wrong convictions we feel — like about rape, torture, or Nazi death camps — we can’t conceive of these things being right under any circumstances, and therefore really, objectively, wrong, whether people agree with us or not.

    Some people ‘like’ being tortured. Some Nazi death camp guards no doubt enjoyed what they did. Some people have rape based sexual fantasies.

    Therefore there is no objective right or wrong. That you have convinced yourself that everybody thinks like you do is, frankly, irrelevant.

    The Nazi’s thought that the death camps were the right thing to do! Is that so hard to understand? I don’t think they were pretending……

    Or do you think that they knew it was wrong and did it anyway? Why would they do that? If they thought it was wrong they’d not have done it!

    So, homosexuality, immoral or moral? Or other? Please, do say, as you have access to objective morality I’d like to have it clarified once and for all!

  5. Brent: I’ll peruse them now and sincerely appreciate you not moving my post there.

    Honest question though: If we cannot call anyone a liar or such, is it also prohibited to post lies? I mean, yeah, often we have to judge motives and can’t be sure that someone is actually lying, but there are occasions where lies are actually being told. Do you delete those?

    It is not prohibited to post things that are not true. It is not even prohibited to post things the poster knows is untrue. It simply a requirement of this site that w if poster A makes a statement that poster B thinks is untrue, that poster B makes the working assumption that poster A believes it to be true, whether B actually thinks that poster A believes it to be true or not.

    In other words, it is fine to show that a statement is false. But it is against the rules to allege that the maker of the statement knew it to be false.

    As I’ve said, this is not any kind of moral position, just the rules of this particular game, which does, at times, seem to be a kind of 3D chess.

    But worth playing, I think all the same.

  6. This is a really interesting discussion. It has everything to do with the problem of violence and whether violence is avoidable.

    We can imagine the absolutist as saying, “if there are no moral absolutes, then there is no principled or rational basis for preferring our morality over Nazi morality. So the Allies cannot offer any kind of moral justification for having done everything possible to defeat the Axis powers that does not itself take for granted the Allies own moral perspective. Hence, at the very end of the day, when all is said and done, it’s still “might makes right,” and that makes nonsense of the very idea of morality — morality without an absolute isn’t real morality, but just a post hoc rationalization of violence.”

    But, conversely, we can also imagine the non-absolutist as saying, “every attempt by a group of human beings to arrogate for themselves the title of ‘absolute’ has resulted in atrocity and oppression — after all, it must be pointed out, the Nazis and Communists were no less absolutist than the Catholic Church (for example) has traditionally been. When you assert that your own position is the absolutely correct one, you close yourself off from the possibility of criticism and dialogue, and you risk demonizing and treating as sub-human those who don’t fully agree with you. So it is the absolutist who bears the complicity with violence.”

    Here’s the thing: I think that the absolutist’s criticism of the non-absolutist, as I’ve framed it here, is completely right. But I also think that the non-absolutist’s criticism of the absolutist, as I’ve framed it here, is also completely right. The danger of a complicity between morality and violence is very real, whether one is an absolutist or not. The absolutist and the non-absolutist are both correct about each other.

  7. Brent: And that is exactly what I do say. We tap into the moral code through conscience first, apprehend the rightness and wrongness of certain things, and live accordingly.

    So what is your conclusion about John Calvin’s and his cohort’s roles in the burning at the stake of Michael Servetus for heresy?

    These people were assuming they were speaking for their deity; your presumed source of absolute morality.

    Is it moral to kill someone for heresy? Was it moral in Calvin’s time? Is it moral now?

    Does morality evolve or not?

    How do people know when they are tapped into the absolute moral code? How does one’s conscience tell them that?

  8. Kantian Naturalist: Here’s the problem: suppose we have two theories, T1 and T2, and T2 gives us more accurate predictions, or has fewer anomalies, or has been more rigorously tested, than T1. So, it’s reasonable to conclude that we should prefer T2 over T1. But what makes it better?

    What makes it better is that T2 gives better predictions or has fewer anomalies. Nothing more needs to be said.

    A scientific realist would say that the epistemic virtues of T2 over T1 are how we now that T2 is better than T1, but what actually makes T2 better than T1 is that T2 is a more accurate model of reality — it is closer to “how the world really is”.

    But that is surely nonsense. There is no metric by which we could say that T2 is more accurate. Or, as Al Gore might have put it, “there is no controlling authority.”

    That philosophers say these kinds of things, that they see truth as some kind of controlling authority, is why I sometimes wonder whether philosophy should be considered a religion.

    The question is, however, about how we define the limit of the series T1, T2, T3 . . . . Tn.

    We have no reason to believe that there is such a limit.

    As long as we are slightly off topic …

    I have occasionally commented about mathematical Platonism. For myself, I am a fictionalist rather than a Platonist. That is to say, I take mathematical objects (such as numbers) to be useful fictions. I have had people tell me that I am wrong; that you cannot do mathematics that way; that the use of mathematics in science requires Platonism. But I am never given a credible argument for this. I only see assertions. From my perspective, the way I do mathematics does not depend on whether mathematical entities are platonic objects or fictions. And the way that I use mathematics in solving real world problems actually favors nominalism (which is about the same thing as fictionalism).

    When I look at Brent’s argument for absolute morality, it seems to be the same argument — or, more accurately, the same lack of an argument. Apparently, it is inconceivable to Brent that there might not be a Platonic code of true morals just as it is inconceivable to some philosophers of mathematics, that you could do mathematics without Platonism.

  9. KN,

    You are conflating absolutist with dogmatist. It isn’t the case that an absolutist is automatically a dogmatist, though some are. It sounds like absolutist actually means dogmatist, and I think some here really think they mean the same thing. Absolutist only means people who believe in an absolute standard that is unchanging. It does not mean that we will all agree exactly on what that standard is, or how it applies even to the degree that we do see eye to eye.

    Now when I say “unchanging”, you may automatically think that implies dogmatism, but there are two things to be said to that (actually more, I’m sure, but for now): One, if we are discovering the moral standards as we go, then we immediately admit that “we” (our group or society or whatever) don’t have the whole thing yet, and cannot therefore judge too harshly others who differ. Two, if those standards are really more like principles, say, like unselfishness, then there is a whole lot of room for interpretation of what constitutes unselfishness. All men can agree that people really, objectively, ought to be unselfish, but without being dogmatic when it comes to applying that rule as there are different ideas of what amounts to selfishness. This accomodates the naturalist view also in that morality can, in that sense, also be according to culture.

    Here in Japan where I live, it is selfish to eat your own snack in front of someone without giving them some, while in the U.S. it is not seen as selfish.

  10. Kantian Naturalist:
    .So, it’s reasonable to conclude that we should prefer T2 over T1. But what makes it better?
    The question is, however, about how we define the limit of the series T1, T2, T3 . .

    I’d offer the usual candidates for comparing theories both of fit observations: simplicity, generality, unification, riskiness of predictions, fruitfulness for new research, coherence with other explanations/laws, degree and length of review and challenge in the scientific community, aesthetic opinion of the experts. One could claim that extreme simplicity, unification, etc as well as stability after long testing mean we must be close.

    The example you mention on the number of variables seems similar to material I have come across which tries to quantify “simplicity” based on the number of free parameters. I’d be interested in the reference, but I can only access things publicly available on the internet.

    I guess, however, that one could argue that all of the above can tell which theory is preferable from two competitors, but cannot tell you how close you are to some presumed absolute theory.

    Kitcher only needs this latter property. I understand him to reject absolute moral truths and to instead say that we should concentrate on moral progress with truth as a secondary, pragmatic quality of such progress. For judging progress in the moral domain he appeals to functional arguments: something is progress if it works better at solving a problem. And the core moral problem for human society is a failure of the project of increasing altruism, a project which started as part of human biological evolution and which has continued to be part of cultural evolution.

    He says more on this and also talks about how such an approach can have normative force, but I have not got that far in understanding him yet.

  11. Kantian Naturalist: In the case of quantitative theories, Jay Rosenberg (no relation to Alex Rosenberg, that I know of) proposes a very clever solution: we can build a simulation of T1 in T2, and we can build a simulation of T2 in T3. (Think of how we model Newtonian mechanics within relativity theory.) If the numerical values of the variables necessary to model T2 in T3 are smaller than the values needed to model T1 in T2, then T3 is closer to the absolute description of physical reality than T2 and T1.

    I suspect this is a little far-fetched.

    Theories in physics are tested quantitatively; out to as many decimal places as current technology allows.

    If one has a theory whose predictions check with experiment out to something like 13 decimal places plus or minus six standard deviations in the last decimal place, then we have a pretty good handle on reality within the limits of our ability to test it.

    If two theories agree out to that limit of precision, then we can’t distinguish between them in a particular measurement; but we can check their consistency against a more general overview in which these theories may be embedded. We then tentatively accept the one which is most consistent until better data come along.

    Research at the frontiers is a lot like groping around in the dark until we hit something that tells us which direction to proceed.

  12. Mike, you keep asking me questions and I keep ignoring them. The reason is that they are missing the point, one; two, I’ve answered some similar questions already, and three, I think you don’t need to ask the questions because, since you know my position already, you almost certainly know how I would answer.

    If there is a point you want to make, post your question with my assumed answer, and make the point. I’ll correct you if need be.

    Argggggh! Well, since I’ve typed this much . . .

    Morality doesn’t evolve. Calvin was wrong (mistaken about how morality should have applied to the situation, or broke his own conscience in which case he should have known better).

    People only know they are tapped in if they realize that their moral intuitions are objectively true, subsequently ask the relevant questions as to how that should be the case, and are honest with themselves. Otherwise, they are tapped in via their conscience but don’t realize it.

  13. Brent: leaving aside the vexed word “evolved” – would you not agree that morality has change over the years?

    Take slavery as a simple example.

  14. Brent,

    Yes, that’s very helpful — thank you. But I wasn’t deliberately conflating absolutist with dogmatist — I was trying to point out that at least one of the non-absolutist’s criticism of absolutism rests on that conflation.

    So, what would it be like to be a non-dogmatic absolutist? (Call this “self-critical absolutism” or “critical absolutism”, perhaps?) What distinguishes the critical absolutist in practice from the dogmatic absolutist or from the non-absolutist? To ask the usual pragmatist question, does this difference make a difference?

  15. If you mean our idea of what is morally acceptable, then of course it has evolved.

    If you mean the objective moral standard itself, then no.

    As for slavery, that is a word with a lot of baggage (more or less rightly so), but there have been different systems of slavery throughout history, and I doubt that some were worse than the young workers from around Japan that go work in the big factories. You wouldn’t think it, but they practically are enslaved once they get there. My wife had to escape, and many others do as well. If you just say you want out of the “program” they will pressure you to stay and threaten you for not fulfilling your contract. Anyway, it isn’t all chains and shackles, which is never acceptable unless we are talking convicted felons, which basically become slaves of the state.

  16. Neil Rickert,

    It’s probably fair that some philosophers want there to be a controlling authority, and others are more or less radical about doing without one. I mentioned Rosenberg’s argument because I think it does the best job that any philosophers have yet done in making real sense of the thought that “scientific progress” consists in progressive approximation to the basic structure of reality. It builds on previous philosophers (esp. Peirce and Sellars) and responds to criticism raised by Quine, Rorty, Kuhn, and others.

    One reason for wanting convergent realism to be true, and I’ll admit that I find this fairly compelling myself, is that it grounds the difference between ‘progress’ and ‘change’, and actually explicates the basis and sense of ‘scientific progress’. But I’ll admit that this conflicts with my nominalistic scruples. Oy, such a mess!

  17. Brent: Morality doesn’t evolve. Calvin was wrong (mistaken about how morality should have applied to the situation, or broke his own conscience in which case he should have known better).
    People only know they are tapped in if they realize that their moral intuitions are objectively true, subsequently ask the relevant questions as to how that should be the case, and are honest with themselves. Otherwise, they are tapped in via their conscience but don’t realize it.

    Despite the noted condescension, a little progress; finally.

    So your view of an “absolute morality” that “doesn’t evolve” is that humans grope around to try to find it; and if they find all of it, they will be “perfect” in some way?

    Whereas your understanding of the “relativist” is that anything goes and they will drift into being as evil as they can justify being evil as long as almost everyone else is the same way?

    You seem to have some deep inner revulsion toward those who don’t believe in your deity or that there is an “absolute” morality that comes from your deity.

    However, there is a perspective that credits humans with the ability to learn from their evolving circumstances and being able to get along with each other without also destroying themselves and the environment that sustains them.

    The feedback for this behavior is nature itself; not some abstract “absolute” moral code. One doesn’t need an absolute moral code to learn not to burn oneself a second time with fire; or any other behavior that makes life miserable. Humans – or any other creatures for that matter – simply require a collective memory of past unpleasant consequences and the ability to negotiate to avoid behaviors that produce such consequences.

  18. Brent:
    If you mean our idea of what is morally acceptable, then of course it has evolved.

    If you mean the objective moral standard itself, then no.

    This is just gobbledygook. I can’t see any difference between a moral standard based on a society’s norms and a moral standard supposedly based on an objective standard but, since we don’t know what that objective standard is, actually based on society’s norms.

    How do you decide what’s moral without knowing your objective moral standard? Conversely, if you know your objective un-evolving moral standard, how can our morals evolve?

    Several people including myself have asked you variants of this question, and you have ignored all of them only th repeat your unsupported claim. Have you ever thought of, you know, actually discussing the issues people have raised?

  19. Kantian Naturalist:
    Brent,

    Yes, that’s very helpful — thank you.But I wasn’t deliberately conflating absolutist with dogmatist — I was trying to point out that at least one of the non-absolutist’s criticism of absolutism rests on that conflation.

    And afterward you said that the criticism was valid. Color me dumb this time, I guess I’m missing the point somehow (though I was fairly certain I wasn’t).

    So, what would it be like to be a non-dogmatic absolutist?(Call this “self-critical absolutism” or “critical absolutism”, perhaps?)What distinguishes the critical absolutist in practice from the dogmatic absolutist or from the non-absolutist? To ask the usual pragmatist question, does this difference make a difference?

    It would probably look a lot like Romans 14 where we see people forbidden to do things they normally have no problem with in front of those who do have a problem with it.

    But further, the problem is that you are equating people who thought they or their group was absolute, with those who think something outside of themselves is absolute. This is in no way comparable. In fact, the opposite result should be expected; humility. Why then has the result often not been the opposite in the case of the Catholic church? Well, you already rightly pointed out, they thought they were the absolute. I’m sorry to leave off with a (mildly I think) stinging question, but didn’t you notice a lot of Christians also were a little unhappy with the Catholic church over the whole deal?

  20. Mike Elzinga: Despite the noted condescension, a little progress; finally.

    So your view of an “absolute morality” that “doesn’t evolve” is that humans grope around to try to find it; and if they find all of it, they will be “perfect” in some way?

    Whereas your understanding of the “relativist” is that anything goes and they will drift into being as evil as they can justify being evil as long as almost everyone else is the same way?

    You seem to have some deep inner revulsion toward those who don’t believe in your deity or that there is an “absolute” morality that comes from your deity.

    However, there is a perspective that credits humans with the ability to learn from their evolving circumstances and being able to get along with each other without also destroying themselves and the environment that sustains them.

    The feedback for this behavior is nature itself; not some abstract “absolute” moral code.One doesn’t need an absolute moral code to learn not to burn oneself a second time with fire; or any other behavior that makes life miserable.Humans – or any other creatures for that matter – simply require a collective memory of past unpleasant consequences and the ability to negotiate to avoid behaviors that produce such consequences.

    Thank you for confirming that my initial instinct to ignore you was the correct one.

  21. Brent,

    To be clear, I am not endorsing the conflation of dogmatism and absolutism — I’m on your side here, insofar as we agree (don’t we?) that the only kind of absolutism worth having is a non-dogmatic or critical absolutism.

    It would be a further question whether critical absolutism (my term) is intelligible under atheism, or if critical absolutism only makes sense in terms of theism. But presumably we can agree on critical absolutism and disagree on that question.

  22. Since I am a moral relativist and honest about it, Murray has said in an older comment of an older post that none of this is supposed to apply to me but it still makes me angry.

    Brent, Murray,

    Why exactly do I need an objective absolute standard of right or wrong to know I would not like to be murdered? When I get together with the rest of the people in my society to make a set of rules that everyone must obey, why am I not justified in protecting my life by advocating that murder be punishable? No, that won’t absofuckinglutely-triple-goddamn-dare-you GUARANTEE that no one will ever commit murder. I think the fact that we have to have laws is all the evidence we need that human psyches are not infused with a holy writ. It’s called protecting ourselves.

    Grounding the shared code of conduct of society in simple human liberty and self-protection should be a no brainer. I personally think the absolutists are unhappy about the fact that a lot of misery and suffering has come to an end precisely because so much of their religious dogmatism has been dumped by society. Jesus is no longer calling the shots so they must find a way to reinsert him and they think a logic chain dangling into empty space will somehow do that.

    Three Men Walking

    One normal guy walks up. I ask him to jump. He does.

    Another guy walks up. He is as normal as the first guy, with one exception. He is walking in the air. I ask him to jump. He tries, but cannot. He is not grounded.

    A third guy walks up. He is as normal as the other two, with a different exception. He is walking on the ground, but says that he doesn’t believe in the ground. I ask him to jump. He does.

    Let me add a fourth man. The fourth man realizes he is standing on a foundation built by 10,000 years of human suffering, misery, experimentation, trial, and error across a vast number of civilizations. That foundation is cracked in many places, the spalling is horrible, there are scores of layers of paint eroding down to the original base stone, and there are still thousands of laborers toiling away adding new mortar and bricks. He sees no ground under the narrator. Only that foundation, which the narrator has no understanding of how it was built, but who is holding a hammer and chisel and thinks he is somehow going to fix things with them. The fourth man realizes there is still much work to be done.

  23. Much of this “discussion” reminds me of Aquinas’s attempt to rationalize Aristotle with the teachings of the Church by characterizing Man as being at the intersection of the Natural World and the Spiritual World; receiving knowledge from both. Man receives knowledge from the Natural World through the senses; but the Natural World is corrupted by Sin, so knowledge from that realm is suspect.

    One receives knowledge from the Spiritual World by revelation, which is approached by prayer and meditation. The Spiritual World is the realm of God and is therefore not corrupt. So if knowledge from the Natural World conflicts with knowledge obtained from the Spiritual World, the Spiritual Knowledge takes precedence over the sin-corrupted knowledge from the Natural World.

    This might be interesting 13th century philosophy, but it has morphed today into the war between religion and science. Sinful, “materialist” scientists get their knowledge empirically from the natural world; while prayerful, thoughtful believers get their knowledge from a spiritual realm.

    Materialists, being corrupted by sin and pride, get it all wrong by ruling out the deity; whereas the faithful get it right because they are open to spiritual evidence that takes precedence over empirical evidence; they can reject science altogether and still be right by “proper reasoning.”

    The social fallout from this war is that the faithful are morally superior to the materialists. Anyone who holds that the material world is our only source of knowledge is a true enemy of the deity; and such individuals are reviled and cursed as being liars and defilers of the human race.

    The “absolute moral code” is to be found in the spiritual realm, and it can be discovered by “right reasoning” and prayerful introspection. Empirical moral codes are derived from the material world of sin and degradation; and the people who use such moral codes are morally inferior; they have no “logical reason” for justifying such codes.

    This is the common morality theme we see in the ID/creationist opposition to the teaching of evolution; and it is taking place in a lawsuit being brought by creationists in Kansas at this very moment. The fear being expressed in the suit is that children will start learning about evolution in kindergarten, and by the time they get to sixth grade, they will be “Darwinists.”

  24. petrushka:

    I notice that in the Kansas complaint, natural history impinges on religion.

    I read the whole thing. Ugh!

    If there is one defining characteristic of sectarians seeking to make war on others, it is to accuse those others of having a “religion” that threatens these sectarians.

    Sectarians are always asserting that freedom of religion doesn’t mean freedom from religion as long as it is them imposing their religion on everyone else.

    But the minute anyone wants to teach secular science correctly, these sectarians scream that a religion is being imposed on them.

    No one is taking their churches away from them. There are no black helicopters swooping in with men in black rounding them up in their churches and throwing them in prison.

    These sectarians have their churches, and they want the benefits and protections that secular society provides them; but they don’t think secular parents have a right to educate their children with the best science we know.

    They are asserting that “both sides” should be taught or no side be taught. So they are saying that their sectarian beliefs must be taught in public schools or that evolution cannot be taught. So they contradict themselves in the same complaint.

    Irony meters are exploding all over the place as a result of this lawsuit.

    If there is to be any monument to the hypocrisy of these sectarians, it will be this lawsuit. It’s all in their complaint; every bit of it. They are engaging in the appalling chutzpa of accusing their enemies of doing exactly what ID/creationists have been doing for decades; the accusations just drip from every paragraph of the complaint.

    ID/creationists cannot hide their motives behind their “logic.”

  25. petrushka:I disagree. Law is the embodiment of morality. Consensus has become the dominant method for producing law.

    When I say consensus I do not mean everyone agrees. i mean everyone consents to be ruled by law and by the means of making law.

    I don’t know how you and I are saying different things. Anyone who doesn’t consent to rule of law risks risks being punished.(Assuming they’re caught of course.) How are we differing?

    I can recall a slogan used in the Jim Crow South (USA) to the effect that you can’t legislate morality. Which meant that even if segregation was immoral you could not enforce a law that required races to like each other. Or something like that.

    I remember that too, thought the slogan is even older than that. It was wonderful turnabout when the slogan was adopted against the moralists in order to justify ending the laws concerning sexual morality.

  26. faded_Glory:See, Aardvark, this is what I mean. We have no business to condemn anyone.

    WJM, our business is driven by our conscience. Just like yours. It is all anyone ever needs. Dressing it up in the white robes of the assumed Creator of the Universe makes not a iota of difference.

    fG

    Yes I can see that now. I can add that to my other two motives they hold. As much as they abhor relativism they are using it as a shield to protect themselves from criticism. It hurts to be called inhuman monsters and if relativism can protect them and shield them from being called bigots they will grab for it. Why they think that will work is beyond me.

  27. Brent:
    If man governs morality then morality does not govern man.

    But, you still say that my argument isn’t obviously true. However, if I came to TSZ with an OP stating:

    If A is superior to B, then B cannot be superior to A.

    You would have said, “Well, no kidding, Sherlock.” But when I apply the same logic to your naturalistic view of morality, you say it isn’t obviously true. Yeah, OK!

    It’s not the same logic.

    As you observe, you won’t find any disagreement about the statement in your latter example, as long as one maintains the same criteria for “superiority” between the first half of the sentence and the second. Crucially, the meaning of “superior” would be consistent between its two uses.

    But in your oft-repeated thesis, there is no such consistency in the meaning of “govern”. The meaning of “govern” in the first half is quite different from the meaning of “govern” in the second.

    In the first half (man does or does not govern morality), the meaning is that moral rules are derived from human society. In the second half (morality does or does not govern man), clearly no one is talking about whether humans are somehow “derived” from this abstract thing called “morality”. A different meaning of “govern” is in play. But what exactly?

    The meaning of “govern” that WJM offered, for the second half of your thesis, is that humans are subjected to “necessary and inescapable consequences”, of a “spiritual” or “karmic” nature, connected to the (im)morality of their behaviour. But to affirm the existence of such consequences is a rather stronger position than absolutism: One could coherently agree with you about absolutism in general without agreeing with WJM about those consequences. More to the point, if we define “govern” in that way, most of us here (I think) would agree that morality indeed does not “govern man”, and several of us would probably add a “so what?”. Nothing about this lack of “governing” would support your broader thesis that there is something incoherent about a naturalistic view of morality. You’d need to take a different tack.

    Now correct me if I’m wrong, but I suspect that your intended meaning of “govern” (in the context of whether morality does or does not “govern man”) is different from WJM’s. Could you spell out what it is?

    In any case, in order to claim an analogy between your thesis and your later example (involving the “superiority” relation), you’d have to be equivocating on “govern”.

  28. William J. Murray:A further point: no sane person **acts** like a moral relativist – only sociopaths do this.People will, on the one hand, claim that morality is a social construct, but then take a stand against a currently accepted moral standard.They are thus abandoning their principle of morality-by-social-consensus and moving to “individual-as-arbiter-of-morality.If extended as a moral principle, this means that either **any** social moral code is acceptable, or **any** personal moral code is acceptable.Otherwise, hypocrisy.

    Murray,
    How exactly can a society come to a consensus if no one contributes to forming one? Is there a time limit on how long we have to try to shape the consensus? Once a consensus is reached what reason is there to not try to change it again? Are we only allowed to have an input once in our entire life?
    These are serious questions. Please give us some answers.

    But, nobody (nobody sane, anyway) actually acts that way.We all feel there are moral principles that are right and true no matter what any individual says, and no matter what the law says, and no matter what the social consensus says. Some of us would fight to the death for these principles, or at least put ourselves in harms way to stand up for them.

    Believing the consensus is wrong is not the same as believing our own morality is an absolute standard. It can mean that but the one is not contingent on the other. Since you are so enamored of logic you should be able to see the fallacious conflation without my help.

    But what is the justification for such behavior under moral relativism? What is the justification for moral outrage or condemnation from the relativist point of view?There is no principled justification – just hypocrisy, where how one behaves is in contradiction to what they profess to believe.If you believe there are no moral absolutes,

    Personal disgust? A desire not to be hurt? A desire not to see other people hurt? It might not affect you but personally I get shivers when I see other people injured in some way. They run down my spine and are quite painful. And I have never been known to be a particularly empathetic person. The social justice warriors over at Pharyngula would not like the person who I have sometimes been in my life. And yet I can feel other’s pain. Do you really have no analog?

    you have no business condemning anything in the Bible whatsoever, nor anything any religious zealot does in service of their own personal, or social moral good.

    I don’t need you or anyone to approve of my business. Like Dickens said, humanity is my business. I have some small bit of power and the perogative to use it, not use it, or delegate it in defense of my life and my values. This is basic Libertarian(capital L) dogma and I dimly remember you claiming you were libertarian(though I may be remembering wrong). I am Libertarian and I am quite happy to live by it. I can also try to protect others with it and if you insist on getting in the way, look out. The only thing I have to accept is that I could lose.

  29. Mike Elzinga,

    This. I quite agree with Brent that the secular absolutists* have no logical chain tying them down to anything. His problem is he has constructed this entire chain of beautiful logic but because there isn’t any absolute morality, or source of such, the chain isn’t anchored to anything. It is simply drifting in empty space. I don’t see how his situation is any different.

    *I am guessing Lizzie is in this category but I am basing that on the characterizations by Brent and Murray. I didn’t see it myself but she may correct me.

  30. petrushka:I’m thinking of doing an OP on this.

    Reading through the morality discussions here has led me to speculate that Moraling (neologism) is a faculty similar to language. It is inborn; it varies somewhat from individual to individual; bits and pieces of it occur in other social animals; and it doesn’t really appear in the absence of social learning.

    Like language it can be analyzed, formalized and taught, but like language, the strongest and deepest learning is informal and is the “automatic” result of social interaction.

    I propose a new verb: to moral.

    Moralize is already in use and has negative connotations.

    To moral means to emit moral behavior, to behave toward others with regard to consequences, potential harm or benefit.

    Petrushka,
    May I exchange email with you? I would really appreciate your input.
    moc.liamg@liefp.reinrod
    just reverse the order of the letters

    My apologies to everyone for the serial posting. I am off now.

  31. Mike Elzinga,

    After my last post to you I realized that it was possible you weren’t being the crank I thought you were. If I got the wrong intended “tone”, I apologize.

    Wrong tone or not, however, my frustration is still warranted, I believe, as what you are saying/asking is quite obviously out of line with my position, and is easily known to be so by reading my posts. That said, when threads get long like this we tend to look for replies directly to our own posts, and we miss things. I’m quite guilty of that at times, and believe we all are.

    So, if you were not posting in the attitude I thought, I’m sorry. If you were, well . . .

  32. Kantian Naturalist:
    Brent,

    To be clear, I am not endorsing the conflation of dogmatism and absolutism — I’m on your side here, insofar as we agree (don’t we?) that the only kind of absolutism worth having is a non-dogmatic or critical absolutism.

    It would be a further question whether critical absolutism (my term) is intelligible under atheism, or if critical absolutism only makes sense in terms of theism.But presumably we can agree on critical absolutism and disagree on that question.

    KN, I knew I must be missing something. I think I’m getting it now, though.

    Yes, we certainly agree that a dogmatic morality isn’t desirable, and in my opinion is an oxymoron anyway.

    It would be a further question whether critical absolutism (my term) is intelligible under atheism, or if critical absolutism only makes sense in terms of theism.

    I don’t think this question is very clear. What do you mean by “intelligible” and “makes sense”? I have two ideas: One, is atheism able to accommodate, and two, would atheists have access to.

  33. Brother Daniel: It’s not the same logic.

    As you observe, you won’t find any disagreement about the statement in your latter example, as long as one maintains the same criteria for “superiority” between the first half of the sentence and the second.Crucially, the meaning of “superior” would be consistent between its two uses.

    But in your oft-repeated thesis, there is no such consistency in the meaning of “govern”.The meaning of “govern” in the first half is quite different from the meaning of “govern” in the second.

    In the first half (man does or does not govern morality), the meaning is that moral rules are derived from human society.In the second half (morality does or does not govern man), clearly no one is talking about whether humans are somehow “derived” from this abstract thing called “morality”.A different meaning of “govern” is in play.But what exactly?

    The meaning of “govern” that WJM offered, for the second half of your thesis, is that humans are subjected to “necessary and inescapable consequences”, of a “spiritual” or “karmic” nature, connected to the (im)morality of their behaviour.But to affirm the existence of such consequences is a rather stronger position than absolutism:One could coherently agree with you about absolutism in general without agreeing with WJM about those consequences.More to the point, if we define “govern” in that way, most of us here (I think) would agree that morality indeed does not “govern man”, and several of us would probably add a “so what?”.Nothing about this lack of “governing” would support your broader thesis that there is something incoherent about a naturalistic view of morality.You’d need to take a different tack.

    Now correct me if I’m wrong, but I suspect that your intended meaning of “govern” (in the context of whether morality does or does not “govern man”) is different from WJM’s.Could you spell out what it is?

    In any case, in order to claim an analogy between your thesis and your later example (involving the “superiority” relation), you’d have to be equivocating on “govern”.

    Nice post and well said.

    Man governing morality means, yes, he is the source and creator of the moral code. And the moral code governing man means to “inform him of what ought to be done”.

    On the surface this may appear to be an unequal meaning, but it most definitely is not actually the case, for when we say “source or creator”, it automatically entails that the creator is not only the author of what the thing ought to be, but also of what it ought to do. So, saying man is the source doesn’t just stop there, it also means that man puts the essence of what the thing is into it, and the intended purpose is also put into it. Again, the prisoner is holding the keys to his own cell.

    And therefore, at the end of the day, the naturalist’s view reduces to, man ought to do what man wants to do.

    And as I’ve said before, this just doesn’t jive with how morality actually works in the world, and should therefore be seen as an inadequate explanation. Further, the naturalist usually at this point begs the question by saying that, in fact, our morality is quite restrictive on our wants after all. But that is assuming that the naturalist view is the correct account in order to prove that morality on his view would not be barbaric.

    Anyhow . . .

    Perhaps a better way to visualize it is this:

    Man informs the moral code of what it ought to be, while the moral code informs man what he ought to be.

    This is surely problematic.

  34. Aardvark:

    Mike Elzinga,

    This. I quite agree with Brent that the secular absolutists* have no logical chain tying them down to anything. His problem is he has constructed this entire chain of beautiful logic but because there isn’t any absolute morality, or source of such, the chain isn’t anchored to anything. It is simply drifting in empty space. I don’t see how his situation is any different.

    *I am guessing Lizzie is in this category but I am basing that on the characterizations by Brent and Murray. I didn’t see it myself but she may correct me.

    I don’t know about “logic” in any moral code; and I don’t know of any “secular absolutists.”

    The “secular,” or more appropriately, the empirical approach to morality is based primarily on survival of humans as a group; and it relies a great deal on empathy and the ability to recognize that others should be treated as one prefers to be treated.

    But, as I mentioned above, a lot of that relies on collective memory of consequences for past behaviors and the intelligence to negotiate agreements on what constitutes desirable collective behavior. That is not an easy task. Humans are drawing on feedback from nature; they don’t always remember the lessons of the past, and they are often competing with each other for resources as well as trying to cooperate.

    However, the “absolute moral code” is just as problematic. People who think they have access to the thoughts of a deity quite obviously don’t; as we can readily see from the continuous splintering of religions into warring sectarian factions.

    I don’t see any practical difference between trying to comprehend an abstract absolute moral code and trying to make sense of nature and human relationships. It is a haphazard process either way; and I don’t know of any evidence that would suggest that believers in deities are any more moral than secular folks.

    But I do find it offensive when sectarians resort to demonizing secular people with innuendo that secular people have no “rational moral foundation.” Sectarian hatreds are some of the vilest, deadliest, and most irrational found on this planet.

  35. Aardvark:
    Mike Elzinga,

    His problem is he has constructed this entire chain of beautiful logic but because there isn’t any absolute morality, or source of such, the chain isn’t anchored to anything.It is simply drifting in empty space.I don’t see how his situation is any different.

    This simply begs the question against the absolutist position. You have to assume the naturalist view in order to say the absolutist’s understanding has no anchor.

  36. Mike Elzinga: I don’t know about “logic” in any moral code; and I don’t know of any “secular absolutists.”

    The “secular,” or more appropriately, the empirical approach to morality is based primarily on survival of humans as a group; and it relies a great deal on empathy and the ability to recognize that others should be treated as one prefers to be treated.

    But, as I mentioned above, a lot of that relies on collective memory of consequences for past behaviors and the intelligence to negotiate agreements on what constitutes desirable collective behavior.That is not an easy task.Humans are drawing on feedback from nature; they don’t always remember the lessons of the past, and they are often competing with each other for resources as well as trying to cooperate.

    However, the “absolute moral code” is just as problematic.People who think they have access to the thoughts of a deity quite obviously don’t; as we can readily see from the continuous splintering of religions into warring sectarian factions.

    I don’t see any practical difference between trying to comprehend an abstract absolute moral code and trying to make sense of nature and human relationships.It is a haphazard process either way; and I don’t know of any evidence that would suggest that believers in deities are any more moral than secular folks.

    But I do find it offensive when sectarians resort to demonizing secular people with innuendo that secular people have no “rational moral foundation.”Sectarian hatreds are some of the vilest, deadliest, and most irrationalfound on this planet.

    Speaking at least for the Christian perspective, it doesn’t follow that just because we believe that the moral code is rooted in God that those who are Christians, or of any other religious stripe, will live completely morally. Far from it, for we also have the doctrine of original sin.

    Now if you want to focus on Christians exclusively and say that they should, according to their own views, live morally superior lives, fine. Firstly, however, you’ll have to put the Catholic church in the margins, because for as long as it has existed, honest Christians have opposed her, and will agree wholeheartedly with many or perhaps all of your criticisms of it.

    NOTE TO ALL:

    Now, not only to you, Mike, but to most posters here, something needs to be gotten straight. Much of what is being attacked as the absolutist view is a straw man. Please don’t get riled by that critique, for many of you it seems sincerely believe the straw man is the real man, however it is that you have been led to believe it. Almost every time I read the last few comments, I start to consider leaving this thread and say it is impossible to continue, for there is just too much web to untangle and it feels quite overwhelming. This is in spite of the fact that the straw man that people are trying to knock down clearly in most cases doesn’t jive with anything I’ve posted about the absolutist position.

    One thing to be straight about is this: The absolutist position does not mean that there is a rigid “do and don’t do” list. As far as I can tell, absolutists would say there are absolute principles, as I mentioned earlier, like unselfishness. Within that absolute principle, of course there is a lot of leeway for interpretation. But the absolutists also usually include a principle of charity and grace. So, if we run into someone who offends our sense of selfishness, we are actually morally required to step back and think for a moment before blaming that person. Perhaps, after thought, we’ll see that what they are doing (or not doing) barely offends our sense of selfishness at all, and we could imagine that there is a reason and way of thinking that makes their actions quite unselfish after all. Motives are what usually, if not always, determine the rightness or wrongness of an action.

    So, though those who adhere to an absolutist position will have rigid opinions on some things, I don’t see how it is any more rigid than the relativist position on other things. For example, the relativist judges judging with vehemence that is comparable it seems to the judgment of God. Relativists are rigid in applying their moral standards as much as absolutists and theists in my opinion.

  37. Mike Elzinga: But I do find it offensive when sectarians resort to demonizing secular people with innuendo that secular people have no “rational moral foundation.” Sectarian hatreds are some of the vilest, deadliest, and most irrational found on this planet.

    There’s a reason why they’re so intent on accusing non-religious folks of having no moral foundation – to deflect attention/criticism from their wicked religion-inspired conduct. The mega-preachers get paid to attack the atheists, then volunteers like Brent learn tactics from the ones getting paid. That whole “moral foundation” argument is a well-practiced derail for any discussion which threatens to hit too close to their own consciences for them.

  38. Brent: So, though those who adhere to an absolutist position will have rigid opinions on some things, I don’t see how it is any more rigid than the relativist position on other things. For example, the relativist judges judging with vehemence that is comparable it seems to the judgment of God. Relativists are rigid in applying their moral standards as much as absolutists and theists in my opinion.

    My references to religion were not restricted to the Catholic Church. Protestant history has been rife with sectarian warfare, splintering, and vindictive killings over doctrine, just as was the case with the Nicene Councils. This has been true of all the Abrahamic religions. Your criticism of Catholicism is just more of the same.

    But it extends to other religions as well.

    And if you think there is reason to be skeptical about the existence of a sectarian war on secular society, read in its entirety the complaint in the lawsuit being brought by sectarians against the science standards in Kansas.

    You are not likely to see a more complete articulation of what these sectarians think – but don’t know – about science and what they think it will do to morality.

  39. Brent:
    Perhaps a better way to visualize it is this:

    Man informs the moral code of what it ought to be, while the moral code informs man what he ought to be.

    This is surely problematic.

    Why?

    You still have no argument other than “it’s obvious”.

    It isn’t obvious.

  40. Brent: Now, not only to you, Mike, but to most posters here, something needs to be gotten straight. Much of what is being attacked as the absolutist view is a straw man.

    But this is your strawman, not ours. By that, I don’t mean you personally. It is a theist’s strawman.

    Theists attack atheists as having no basis for morality. On your view, that’s the strawman right there.

    Your position seems to be that there is a basis for morality, a basis that is available to everybody — a kind of platonic list of absolute morals. But that atheists/materialists have no explanation for this. That does not leave room for the demonizing of atheists that we regularly see coming from theists over this issue.

    If there’s a strawman out there, then it is the theists that you have to educate.

    As far as I can tell, absolutists would say there are absolute principles, as I mentioned earlier, like unselfishness.

    Well that’s good. But what we see, is that many theists are following the Ayn Rand “selfishness is good” idea in their politics and in their “prosperity gospel.”

  41. Brent:
    Now if you want to focus on Christians exclusively and say that they should, according to their own views, live morally superior lives, fine. Firstly, however, you’ll have to put the Catholic church in the margins, because for as long as it has existed, honest Christians have opposed her, and will agree wholeheartedly with many or perhaps all of your criticisms of it.

    I gather that you respect some of these criticisms made by Christians of the Catholic church.

    I’d like to understand what process such criticisms must incorporate for you to accept them, and in particular what aspects of the process remain theological, and hence unavailable to a naturalist.

    My point to understand what theology brings once you admit that a rational process is required to discover/construct (no need to choose for this aspect of the discussion) standards for moral behavior.

  42. Lizzie: Brent: leaving aside the vexed word “evolved” – would you not agree that morality has change over the years?

    Take slavery as a simple example.

    I think this has been addressed in several posts as part of a longer point and possibly hard to pick out. See Brent’s Sept 25th post from 4:10 (sorry, don’t have the link stuff worked out).

    As I understand, Brent questions how a relativist can say a societies morals have progressed rather than just changed.

    If you answer with something like such a society functions better or treats all people more equally in some sense, then those would be the the unacknowledged grounds of the third man in his analogy.
    And would mean you are not a true relativist, at least as I understand philosophers to use the term. You are saying that morals are not just what a society constructs, but further there are some properties which you can use to judge such constructions.

  43. BruceS: And would mean you are not a true relativist, at least as I understand philosophers to use the term.

    There are no true relativists. As used by philosophers, “relativist” seems to be highly exaggerated term. Perhaps it is deliberately exaggerated to highlight what philosophers want to discuss.

    In mathematics, we consider partially ordered sets. A set is linearly ordered by the relation “>” if for any two items x and y we can say that either x > y or y > x. In a partially ordered set, you cannot compare any two items. Only some pairs of items can be compared. The typical progressive view of changing morality is that it trends in the right direction, but you cannot always compare two particular instances.

  44. Mike Elzinga: My references to religion were not restricted to the Catholic Church.

    No, I understood that. I wasn’t implying that by putting the Catholic church in the margins that it dealt with everything.

    Otherwise, no time or energy to post.

  45. Much of Brent’s thinking appears to be Medieval and earlier.

    In fact, the thinking of most fundamentalists, particularly about things like evolution, is that this modern thinking destroys the foundations of morality. This is pretty much what the current complaint by ID/creationists in Kansas is all about; and the paranoia in that complaint is glaringly evident.

    Given what was not known in pre-Renaissance thinking, and given the history of religion, it may have been “logical” to think that morality was a Platonic form floating out there to be grasped by prayer and introspection. Plato’s influence on the doctrines of the Catholic Church is well known.

    The problem came with the rediscovery of Aristotle and the early inklings of empirical knowledge that gradually became empirical science beginning in the Renaissance.

    Now there is some similarity in trying to apprehend the laws that govern the universe and trying to apprehend an “absolute” moral code out there. One doesn’t know ahead of time what these are, and there are many guesses. However, in both cases, experience, testing, and verification are used to determine what rules apply.

    But here is the big difference; scientific consensus converges and religious consensus diverges. In the centuries during which science has been formally practiced, we have seen convergence to common understanding across all socio/political lines about how nature behaves. On the other hand, during those same centuries – and even in the centuries before – we see religious consensus continually fragmenting into sectarian hatred and war.

    And the irony is that these sectarian wars will use the technology that comes from science. Even warring sectarians agree on the fruits of science when it serves their purposes.

    Scientific facts are objectively verifiable; religious “facts” are not.

    Sectarians who distort science in order to justify sectarian absolutism routinely interfere in the affairs of others in order to inject their sectarian beliefs into society. Their belief in an “absolute moral code” is bolstered not only by their complete ignorance of scientific and religious history; it is also justified in their own minds by their demonizing caricatures of science and secular people as well as people in other religions.

    If one needs another clue about the difference between scientific consensus and religious consensus, just look at the political tactics of demagogues. They will play to and nurture religious provincialism and bigotry, but they only demonize science. They are just as afraid of scientific objectivity as are sectarians.

  46. Hmmm. Well, one of the greatest progressive and socialist thinkers of the 20th century, Martin Luther King Jr., certainly believed in moral absolutes. Would we say that his worldview was “medieval”? If not, why not?

    The convergence/divergence business that Mike brings up is good, but I worry that Mike’s way of putting it conflates religious divergence with moral divergence. It seems to me, on the contrary, that there’s been a good deal of moral convergence as well (though not as unequivocal as in the case of science), except for those cases where religious doctrines interfere with moral deliberation.

    Put otherwise, what seems to be missing from this discussion is the ‘fighting faith’ of the Enlightenment — that there are absolute moral principles, but that religious doctrines can, and often do, interfere with their pursuit. Conversely, while the insistence on moral absolutes is often made by apologists for one religion or another, we should not thereby conclude that only religionists (of whatever stripe) can or should appeal to absolutes. It could be that there are good reasons to think that there are moral absolutes, while it still being the case that no religion has any privileged access to them.

    One could, perhaps, follow Plato’s vision of critical absolutism but take an attitude towards the Abrahamic faiths similar to Plato’s attitude towards Greek myths: fit for entertaining and placating, but at best a distorted image of the truth, and one for which the truly educated person has no need.

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