Shared Abductive Inference as a proxy Turing Test

This is the first part of a series of posts that are meant to help me think through the relationship between ID and Turing tests. Please be patient I will get to the controversial stuff soon enough but I want to lay some ground work first

Below is a quick refresher video explaining the three forms of inference for those interested.

It’s a given that abductive inference is the most subjective of the three and that is usually seen as a bad thing. I would like to argue that this subjectivity makes shared abductive inference a great proxy Turing test.

In the standard Turing test the examiner asks questions to see if he can distinguish the answers given by an Artificial Intelligence from those offered by a human. If he can’t do that he assumes that the AI is conscious (i.e has a mind).

What the examiner is really trying to get at is if the AI thinks like a human rather than like a computer.

What does it mean to think like me other than to share the same abductive inferences that I do?

Deduction is certainly not a uniquely human activity. Since the conclusion flows inevitably from the premises a simple algorithm could be written to come to a conclusion deductively no conscious thought is necessary. By the same token induction is also moving from premise to conclusion albeit in the other direction and with less certainty. Any computer could do that.

On the other hand abduction is the form of inference that is most human in that there is no logically compelling reason to chose one particular conclusion over another. Wildly different conclusions can be equally valid from a logical standpoint. We must subjectivity decide which conclusion is the best one.

Strangely enough more often than not we humans do come up with the same conclusion when presented with the same information at least for simple arguments.

For instance we see that it’s raining and conclude that it’s cloudy even though it sometimes rains when the sun is shining.

Or we might hear a rustling in the bushes and conclude that there is an animal there even though it could be the wind.

I think that if we encountered a nonhuman entity like an AI that almost never came to the same conclusions that we do in situations like this we would naturally conclude that it was not conscious.

By the same token if we came across an entity that often came to the similar conclusions when using abduction we would conclude there was a mind there behind it all.

Of course since that conclusion itself is based on abductive reasoning we could never be certain that our inference was correct.

What do you think about all this?

In my next post I will share a tangible example to show you how this might work in practice

Peace

PS As always I do apologize for the poor spelling and grammar

221 thoughts on “Shared Abductive Inference as a proxy Turing Test

  1. Patrick: How do you think your “immaterial” whatever affects the physical world? The answer to that is the mechanism.

    That’s your claim. You haven’t established it. Certainly not by your standard of requiring “objective empirical evidence.”

    Is there some reason you don’t like it when I quote definitions to you, or fifth does?

    Are you ever going to defend your claims about what Avida does? Or are you going to claim you’re not making claims about Avida too, and then try to shift the burden of proof to VJT?

    Do you just not know that you do this?

  2. Mung:

    dazz: So how would you describe the interface between the immaterial cause and it’s material effects?

    I wouldn’t. An interface is something between two physical systems.

    And I wouldn’t be so silly as to claim that I have ‘observed’ that it must be the case that there must be an interface between two non-physical systems or between a non-physical system and a physical system.

    Since you’re so hung up on words to the exclusion of concepts, let’s take a step back.

    Do you assert that something “immaterial” exists?

    If so, do you assert that whatever that is can affect physical objects like human brains?

    If so, how does it do that?

  3. Patrick: Do you assert that something “immaterial” exists?

    If so, do you assert that whatever that is can affect physical objects like human brains?

    If so, how does it do that?

    1. Yes. God.
    2. Yes. God created and upholds all that is material/physical.
    3. I don’t know.

    2.a. A lot in my life changed after I became a Christian. It would have been nice to be tracking whether or not those changes could be traced to something “in the brain” but that hasn’t been the case. So.
    3.a. I don’t know.

    Do you understand the problems involved in claiming that there must exist some “interface” or “mechanism” between cause and effect? Oh, wait, you’re not making any claims.

  4. What mechanism did God use to create the material/physical world. That’s what you’re asking Patrick. And I think it’s unwarranted of you to claim that God must have used some mechanism.

    What mechanism does God use to sustain the material/physical world in it’s existence. That’s what you’re asking Patrick. And I think it’s unwarranted of you to claim that God must be using some mechanism to do so.

    But you’re not making any such claims… so …

  5. walto: You give evidence of disembodied (or dead brain) consciousness.

    I’m not sure if dead brain consciousness is even possible for physical beings and disembodied consciousness would be undetectable able via empirical methods pretty much by definition.

    peace

  6. newton: can the immaterial be said to cause? If so what and how?

    I would say.

    1) material cause—– Pretty sure no
    2) formal cause——– yes probably
    3) efficient cause——probably not
    4) final cause———-I think so

    As to how that all works out. I am pretty sure a physical mechanism has nothing to do with it.

    peace

  7. Patrick: If so, do you assert that whatever that is can affect physical objects like human brains?

    I would say the immaterial frustration that I feel while trying to discuss stuff with you definitely gives me a headache 😉

    peace

  8. Mung: … An interface is something between two physical systems.

    Software is non-physical, and it requires interfaces to communicate between modules/functions/objects.
    Minds also require interfaces to communicate, namely speech and hearing, or visual reading and writing.

  9. Fair Witness: Minds also require interfaces to communicate, namely speech and hearing, or visual reading and writing.

    So do you think your mind communicates with your brain using some interface?

  10. Mung: So do you think your mind communicates with your brain using some interface?

    No. My mind is a process. A non-material emergent property of my physical brain. It’s what brains do. Mind and brain are examples of two different ontological categories.

    What I was referring to earlier was that for two brains to communicate, they need an interface like speech/hearing or writing/reading.

    Encoding and transmission of information always requires a physical medium. It’s how our universe works.

  11. Fair Witness: A non-material emergent property of my physical brain.

    What exactly is the mechanism by which the non-materiel emerges from the materiel?

    peace

  12. fifthmonarchyman: What exactly is the mechanism by which the non-materiel emerges from the materiel?

    Who cares, since once it has “emerged” from the brain it can have no causal effect on the brain.

  13. Fair Witness: What I was referring to earlier was that for two brains to communicate, they need an interface like speech/hearing or writing/reading.

    But you will admit, won’t you, that what you originally wrote was:

    Fair Witness: Minds also require interfaces to communicate, namely speech and hearing, or visual reading and writing.

    Minds. Not brains. So you’re retracting that? Are you rejecting the idea of mind altogether? No, I see you’re not. I see you want to retain the concept of a mind, though I have no idea why that should be the case. Why not join Patrick in the world of the un-minded brain? Anything can happen there.

    But that still leaves the question unanswered, which you had previously answered.

    Do minds require interfaces to communicate? Originally you said yes, minds require interfaces to communicate. then you changed your answer to say that it is not minds that require interfaces to communicate, but brains.

    How does your mind communicate with your brain, or is such communication unnecessary?

  14. Now I see why Patrick prefers to take the “I’m just ignorant” approach. Nothing can defeat an argument from ignorance.

  15. Mung: Who cares, since once it has “emerged” from the brain it can have no causal effect on the brain.

    Don’t confuse “emerged” for “escaped”.

  16. Mung: But you will admit, won’t you, that what you originally wrote was:

    Minds. Not brains. So you’re retracting that? Are you rejecting the idea of mind altogether? No, I see you’re not. I see you want to retain the concept of a mind, though I have no idea why that should be the case. Why not join Patrick in the world of the un-minded brain? Anything can happen there.

    But that still leaves the question unanswered, which you had previously answered.

    Do minds require interfaces to communicate? Originally you said yes, minds require interfaces to communicate. then you changed your answer to say that it is not minds that require interfaces to communicate, but brains.

    How does your mind communicate with your brain, or is such communication unnecessary?

    Since the mind is an emergent property of a brain, then there is no difference between two brains communicating and two minds communicating. Is that too difficult to understand? They are just two different levels of abstraction. You can deal with multiple levels of abstraction, can’t you?

    The brain is the physical thing that is the endpoint of the communication, but the mind is the process that is converting sounds and symbols into neuronal signals, and vice-versa. Does that make sense to you?

  17. Fair Witness: Does that make sense to you?

    No.

    Since the mind is an emergent property of a brain, then there is no difference between two brains communicating and two minds communicating.

    If it is in fact the case that the mind is an emergent property of a brain it does not follow that there is no difference between two brains communicating and two minds communicating.

    The brain is the physical thing that is the endpoint of the communication, but the mind is the process that is converting sounds and symbols into neuronal signals, and vice-versa. Does that make sense to you?

    No, that makes no sense.

    If the brain is the end point, who needs a mind? If the brain is the endpoint, how does it pass “the end” to it’s mind? By what mechanism dos the brain pass anything to the mind?

  18. fifthmonarchyman: I would say.

    1) material cause—– Pretty sure no

    Makes sense since it lacks material.

    2) formal cause——– yes probably

    Is the ideal triangle such a form?

    3)efficient cause——probably not

    Too bad, that is where the fun is.

    final cause———-I think so

    I would think that one you would be sure of

    As to how that all works out. I am pretty sure a physical mechanism has nothing to do with it.

    I suspected that was the answer, thanks.

  19. Mung: The mind emerged from the brain but the mind hasn’t escaped from the brain.

    Got it.

    Even an immaterial mind does not seem to escape the brain. Wonder why that is?

  20. newton: Even an immaterial mind does not seem to escape the brain. Wonder why that is?

    So you have an explanation of why an immaterial mind cannot escape a material brain. What is your explanation?

  21. Patrick: the immaterial exists but has no impact on reality

    More question-begging. When did “reality” get to be just the physical stuff? I thought that was the question you were discussing?

  22. newton: Makes sense since it lacks material.

    Is the ideal triangle such a form?

    Too bad, that is where the fun is.

    I would think that one you would be sure of

    I suspected that was the answer, thanks.

    I guess it’s unsurprising, but nearly so many threads here are spitting images of past ones–with all the old arguments, errors, etc. forgotten, of course.

    Anyhow, on one of the past 700 or so threads in which free will was discussed (just since I’ve been here), I mentioned that in the philosophy world (at least that of a few years back), those who supported libertarian free will, when pushed for a “mechanism,” generally backed what’s called “agent causation.” And I pointed to a nice summary of the doctrine I found on the web. Here it is again:

    https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwjAkfnk8OnQAhUG-mMKHYoaCcgQFggjMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.indiana.edu%2F~scotus%2Ffiles%2FAgent_Causation.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFx0qKAD-pF7muUt8CyTB_Ha_GD4A&sig2=RiGgh0NNNdntggz2G-6Crw&cad=rja

  23. Mung: So you have an explanation of why an immaterial mind cannot escape a material brain. What is your explanation?

    If I did, I wouldn’t wonder why.

  24. Mung: So you have an explanation of why an immaterial mind cannot escape a material brain. What is your explanation?

    Objects have properties.
    A property of an object cannot escape, or exist separately from, the object.
    Properties are in a different ontological category from physical objects. One might even say properties have an “immaterial existence”.

    Say you have a baseball. A property of the ball is that it is white in color.
    Can that ball’s whiteness escape from the ball? No.
    Can that baseball’s roundness escape from that ball? No.

    A property of brains is that they process information.
    This includes translation of sounds and sight into meaning, and vice versa.
    That is why we need the process of mind, which is a property of the brain – so the brain can do all the wonderful things that brains do.

    That specific process that is your mind cannot escape your brain.

  25. walto: those who supported libertarian free will, when pushed for a “mechanism,” generally backed what’s called “agent causation.”

    Thanks for the link
    from the paper

    Quote:

    In what follows, I will contend that the commonsense view of ourselves as fundamental causal agents – for which some have used the term “unmoved movers” but which I think might more accurately be expressed as “not wholly moved movers” – is theoretically understandable,internally consistent, and consistent with what we have thus far come to know about the nature and workings of the natural world.

    end quote:

    As a Calvinist I don’t hold to libertarian free will but would advocate something like “subordinate or secondary agent causation” in which God is the ultimate and primary cause but lessor agents are indeed genuine though derivative causes.

    here is one of many available summaries of that position

    http://www.the-highway.com/freewill_Byl.html

    peace

  26. Fair Witness: A property of brains is that they process information.
    This includes translation of sounds and sight into meaning, and vice versa.
    That is why we need the process of mind, which is a property of the brain – so the brain can do all the wonderful things that brains do.

    So “mind” is the brains process of processing information into meaning. Correct?

    Meaning for who? The brain?

    peace

  27. walto: I guess it’s unsurprising, but nearly so many threads here are spitting images of past ones–with all the old arguments, errors, etc. forgotten, of course.

    Interesting link

  28. newton: The research points to the prefrontal cortex. Might be more of a what

    interesting
    When the prefrontal cortex decays does meaning disappear?

    peace

  29. fifthmonarchyman: interesting
    When the prefrontal cortex decays does meaning disappear?

    peace

    It does for the prefrontal cortex. But it does not take a decay, meaning disappears when we forget.

  30. newton: But it does not take a decay, meaning disappears when we forget.

    Who is “we”?
    Was there no meaning at all in the universe before “we” arrived?

    That a pretty anthropocentric position. Don’t you think?

    peace

  31. Fair Witness: No. For the mind.

    Interesting—– newton says that the research points to the prefrontal cortex and you say it’s the mind.

    Does that make you anti-science?

    Does this “meaning for the mind” cease to exist when the prefrontal cortex decays?

    peace

    peace

  32. fifthmonarchyman: Interesting—– newton says that the research points to the prefrontal cortex and you say it’s the mind.

    Does that make you anti-science?

    There is evidence that many of the higher brain functions that we often label as coming from a person’s mind, take place in the prefrontal cortex.

    So I do not disagree with newton.

  33. Mung:
    . . .
    Are you ever going to defend your claims about what Avida does?
    . . . .

    Sure, although the topic has been done to death. Intelligent design creationists claim that irreducibly complex systems can’t evolve. Richard B. Hoppe shredded those claims in a post at The Panda’s Thumb a couple of years ago.

  34. fifthmonarchyman: Who is “we”?

    I guess my meaning was lost

    Was there no meaning at all in the universe before “we” arrived?

    Doubtful, my dogs know the meaning of a few words.

    That a pretty anthropocentric position. Don’t you think?

    Yes,it would be. But people hold lots of anthrocentric positions, know what I mean?

  35. Mung:

    Do you assert that something “immaterial” exists?

    If so, do you assert that whatever that is can affect physical objects like human brains?

    If so, how does it do that?

    1. Yes. God.

    How about souls?

    2. Yes. God created and upholds all that is material/physical.

    If you believe in immaterial souls, do you assert that they can affect physical brains?

    3. I don’t know.

    Then why do you believe?

    Do you understand the problems involved in claiming that there must exist some “interface” or “mechanism” between cause and effect? Oh, wait, you’re not making any claims.

    Don’t get stuck on the particular words. Are you claiming that an “immaterial” soul has an affect on physical brains?

  36. fifthmonarchyman:

    If so, do you assert that whatever that is can affect physical objects like human brains?

    I would say the immaterial frustration that I feel while trying to discuss stuff with you definitely gives me a headache

    You might not experience so much frustration if you clarified your arguments.

    How about addressing the actual question: Do you assert that an “immaterial” soul has an effect on physical brains?

  37. Patrick: Do you assert that an “immaterial” soul has an effect on physical brains?

    I have no idea what that even means. It’s like asking if a windstorm can effect a limerick.

    A soul is not a cause. People are causes.

    peace

  38. newton: Doubtful, my dogs know the meaning of a few words.

    By “we” I assumed you meant prefrontal cortexes I know rats have those but I’m not sure if dogs do.

    Regardless, I find it interesting you think that meaning did not exist in the universe until prefrontal cortexes arrived.

    Do you think meaning will cease to exist when Skynet succeeds in terminating the last prefrontal cortex?

    peace

  39. Mung: The mind emerged from the brain but the mind hasn’t escaped from the brain.

    Give that the mind has not yet escaped from the brain we ought to be able to observe what it is that is keeping it physically attached.

    If not, why not?

  40. Patrick: Intelligent design creationists claim that irreducibly complex systems can’t evolve.

    Really? So Micheal Behe, for example, claims that IC systems cannot evolve? Or did you have someone else in mind.

  41. newton: I guess my meaning was lost

    No doubt it got lost somewhere between your prefrontal cortex and the prefrontal cortex of your reader, because it would be silly to think it got lost within your own prefrontal cortex.

    🙂

  42. Patrick: How about souls?

    I’m not sure I can express what I think about “the soul.” I would say that I am not so confidant as others seem to be. 🙂

    If you believe in immaterial souls, do you assert that they can affect physical brains?

    To the extent that I believe in the soul I think of it and the body as more of a unity rather than a duality. So to me your question doesn’t really make sense.

    Then why do you believe?

    Why do I believe what? In God?

    Don’t get stuck on the particular words. Are you claiming that an “immaterial” soul has an affect on physical brains?

    I’m not getting hung up on words, I’m pointing out that you may very well be mistaken when you try to separate cause from effect and in claiming there must be some sort of interface between the two else the cause could not produce the effect.

    What causes heat? What is the interface between molecular motion (the cause) and heat (the effect)?

  43. Mung: No doubt it got lost somewhere between your prefrontal cortex and the prefrontal cortex of your reader, because it would be silly to think it got lost within your own prefrontal cortex.

    Probably,but if my constant misplacing of car keys are indicative, my prefrontal cortex is going downhill fast too.

  44. Mung:

    Epicureanism. The world made up of billiard balls. It’s why KN and Patrick don’t talk.

    There is an Epicurean restaurant around the corner, great falafels.

  45. Mung: No doubt it got lost somewhere between your prefrontal cortex and the prefrontal cortex of your reader

    I don’t think “your prefrontal cortex” makes sense in newton’s view.
    I think he is saying that he is a particular prefrontal cortex. There is no separate entity that possess a prefrontal cortex.

    I think on the other hand that Fair Witness is claiming to be a process that a particular brain (including a prefrontal cortex) does. I’m not sure how a process can possess anything whatsoever.

    peace

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