Shared Abductive Inference as a proxy Turing Test

This is the first part of a series of posts that are meant to help me think through the relationship between ID and Turing tests. Please be patient I will get to the controversial stuff soon enough but I want to lay some ground work first

Below is a quick refresher video explaining the three forms of inference for those interested.

It’s a given that abductive inference is the most subjective of the three and that is usually seen as a bad thing. I would like to argue that this subjectivity makes shared abductive inference a great proxy Turing test.

In the standard Turing test the examiner asks questions to see if he can distinguish the answers given by an Artificial Intelligence from those offered by a human. If he can’t do that he assumes that the AI is conscious (i.e has a mind).

What the examiner is really trying to get at is if the AI thinks like a human rather than like a computer.

What does it mean to think like me other than to share the same abductive inferences that I do?

Deduction is certainly not a uniquely human activity. Since the conclusion flows inevitably from the premises a simple algorithm could be written to come to a conclusion deductively no conscious thought is necessary. By the same token induction is also moving from premise to conclusion albeit in the other direction and with less certainty. Any computer could do that.

On the other hand abduction is the form of inference that is most human in that there is no logically compelling reason to chose one particular conclusion over another. Wildly different conclusions can be equally valid from a logical standpoint. We must subjectivity decide which conclusion is the best one.

Strangely enough more often than not we humans do come up with the same conclusion when presented with the same information at least for simple arguments.

For instance we see that it’s raining and conclude that it’s cloudy even though it sometimes rains when the sun is shining.

Or we might hear a rustling in the bushes and conclude that there is an animal there even though it could be the wind.

I think that if we encountered a nonhuman entity like an AI that almost never came to the same conclusions that we do in situations like this we would naturally conclude that it was not conscious.

By the same token if we came across an entity that often came to the similar conclusions when using abduction we would conclude there was a mind there behind it all.

Of course since that conclusion itself is based on abductive reasoning we could never be certain that our inference was correct.

What do you think about all this?

In my next post I will share a tangible example to show you how this might work in practice

Peace

PS As always I do apologize for the poor spelling and grammar

221 thoughts on “Shared Abductive Inference as a proxy Turing Test

  1. walto: I’m just curious. When did weighing become the only form of measurement?

    It’s not the only form of measurement. That is why I asked Pedant how he would answer questions like this and not only this question.

    walto: Many would say that that is true of decisions, thoughts, perceptions, etc. as well.

    There is a difference between “saying” something and demonstrating it.

    How would you go about demonstrating that decisions occupy a precise time and place?

    walto: I just think that it’s probably the case that nobody here has a good reason to take one or another.

    OK I’m fine with that position. There is a world of difference between saying we don’t have any reason to say decisions are not physical. And saying that decisions are physical.

    As soon as you can establish that decisions are physical things we can discuss if a mechanism is necessary for an immaterial mind to be involved in them for some reason.

    peace

  2. Neil Rickert: You cannot weigh space and time. Yet they are considered to be physical.

    Again weight is just one sort of measurement. I’m fine with any you come up with.

    Neil Rickert: I take mathematics to be something that is neither material nor physical. Yet mathematics students seem to think that their teacher is measuring their mathematics when assigning a grade at the end of the semester.

    I take mathematics to be immaterial.

    Teachers don’t measure “mathematics” they measure whether a student’s answers correspond with the standard ones. If they do teachers and students usually infer that the student has a grasp of the subject in question.

    peace

  3. fifthmonarchyman: It’s not the only form of measurement. That is why I asked Pedant how he would answer questions like this and not only this question.

    What? When?

    Please don’t make a reference to something without quoting the relevant statements.

  4. fifthmonarchyman: Teachers don’t measure “mathematics” they measure whether a student’s answers correspond with the standard ones. If they do teachers and students usually infer that the student has a grasp of the subject in question.

    No, that’s wrong — at least for this teacher (and for many others that I know).

    We normally tell students to show all of their work. If they get the wrong answer (often because of a careless mistake), but their work shows that they understood the method, then they get most of the credit. On the other hand, if they get the right answers but their work shows that they used a “method” that could not possible get the right answer, they may be called in to question whether they were cheating.

  5. Neil Rickert: We normally tell students to show all of their work. If they get the wrong answer (often because of a careless mistake), but their work shows that they understood the method, then they get most of the credit.

    OK that’s fine, then you are looking at the students work comparing it to what you believe he should have done and inferring that he has a grasp of the subject.

    The point remains the same, you aren’t measuring “mathematics” in any way

    peace

  6. fifthmonarchyman: OK that’s fine, then you are looking at the students work comparing it to what you believe he should have done and inferring that he has a grasp of the subject.

    The point remains the same, you aren’t measuring “mathematics” in any way

    peace

    How is that any point at all? Is “physics” measured by physics teachers?

    Of course one may believe that “physics” as a study is “immaterialist” indeed, but that wasn’t the point in bringing up mathematics and teaching. Not that there was a good point.

    I wonder what reaction time measures. Not sure why the immaterialist mind waits for nerve impulses to reach the brain before reacting, but I suppose that’s just one of those whimsical things that spirits do–make everything just look like it’s physical when it’s not, much like the designer enjoys making everything appear evolved.

    Glen Davidson

  7. GlenDavidson: How is that any point at all?

    It’s not a point. It’s a counter to Neil’s point.

    GlenDavidson: Is “physics” measured by physics teachers?

    No

    GlenDavidson: I wonder what reaction time measures.

    It measures the time it takes to react to certain stimuli. That seems like a no brainer.

    GlenDavidson: Not sure why the immaterialist mind waits for nerve impulses to reach the brain before reacting

    Why wouldn’t the brain be involved in reaction? No one is claiming that brains are not involved in the decision making process.

    Why must the materialist mind insist on attacking a straw man? Is your opponents actual position to difficult to deal with?

    peace

  8. fifthmonarchyman: As soon as you can establish that decisions are physical things

    I don’t know about ‘establish.’ I can imagine how one might establish that some thought was not identical to any neural process (say by a brainless thing demonstrating intelligence). But, if thoughts can be correlated with neural processes, I think whether they are identical to them or just caused by them is kind of a metaphysical choice–i.e. Not the sort of thing that can ever be ‘proved,’ more a function of the sort of ontology that floats one’s boat. What works best with science? What’s most parsimonious? What jibes best with common parlance? Those will be the determinants, but they don’t ‘establish’ either identity or non-identity.

  9. GlenDavidson: wonder what reaction time measures. Not sure why the immaterialist mind waits for nerve impulses to reach the brain before reacting, but I suppose that’s just one of those whimsical things that spirits do–make everything just look like it’s physical when it’s not, much like the designer enjoys making everything appear evolved.

    Right–the correlations get tighter every day. So if one has an interest in showing the existence of processes that are not identical to the neural processes in spite of those correlations, they may need to get William Murray to work some esp wizardry. I mean, the doubter can’t prove that the connection is one of identity, but what’s the difference? Maybe it’s an effect, an epiphenomenon–who cares? What difference can that make to anybody but the metaphysics puzzler who enjoys haggling over nothings? It makes no real world difference to anything or anyone that I can see.

  10. fifthmonarchyman:

    Why must the materialist mind insist on attacking a straw man? Is your opponents actual position to difficult to deal with?

    peace

    It’s too stupid to deal with, except by pointing out that it all appears to be “physical.” Your meaningless claims add nothing to the picture.

    At all.

    Glen Davidson

  11. walto: Right–the correlations get tighter every day. So if one has an interest in showing the existence of processes that are not identical to the neural processes in spite of those correlations, they may need to get William Murray to work some esp wizardry. I mean, the doubter can’t prove that the connection is one of identity, but what’s the difference? Maybe it’s an effect, an epiphenomenon–who cares? What difference can that make to anybody but the metaphysics puzzler who enjoys haggling over nothings? It makes no real world difference to anything or anyone that I can see.

    They certainly don’t try to explain it, or use it to really explain anything except for handwaving with respect to magical properties like (libertarian) “free will.”

    So far science has come up with real explanations by invoking neurons and energy, while “immaterialists” pat themselves on the back for “being right.” How many spirits dance in the brain? That’s easy–one, for so it is written

    Glen Davidson

  12. fmm,

    Why must the materialist mind insist on attacking a straw man?

    Try making a claim that can be tested, otherwise the straw man is all your own creation. It’s attacked because there is nothing else to attack, you have provided nothing else.

  13. walto: I think whether they are identical to them or just caused by them is kind of a metaphysical choice–i.e. Not the sort of thing that can ever be ‘proved,’ more a function of the sort of ontology that floats one’s boat.

    I agree. However what we find too often here is folks with a materialistic ontology demanding the rest of us act as if we have one as well, simply because they say so.

    That is why in almost every thread we get demands for a physical mechanism for immaterial to interact with the world instead of demonstrations of why a mechanism is even necessary.

    That is why we get the same ole “Give me empirical evidence that the immaterial exists” every time the subject even comes up.

    Frankly it’s juvenile and obtuse and it gets old.

    I would hope that those of you on the other side who understand this would try and police your ranks a little. It would make for more interesting discussions.

    peace

  14. walto: So if one has an interest in showing the existence of processes that are not identical to the neural processes in spite of those correlations, they may need to get William Murray to work some esp wizardry.

    You just said that this sort of thing can never be proven one way or the other

    Now you turn around and demand that the other side prove it.

    Do you even read your own posts?

    peace

  15. OMagain: Try making a claim that can be tested

    geeze

    It’s like walto’s post never even happened. We are right back at it with the “give me empirical evidence with for the non-empreical” tripe.

    What will it take?

    peace

  16. fifthmonarchyman: You just said that this sort of thing can never be proven one way or the other

    Now you turn around and demand that the other side prove it.

    Do you even read your own posts?

    peace

    It was a little complicated, and I probably wasn’t clear. I think the situation is like this:

    Someone might or might not be able to prove the correlations between brain and mind activities are no good. That’s where Murray comes in. If dualism or something along those lines is important to you, you have the opprtunity to prove that physicalism is false by, e.g. presenting evidence of a disembodied spirit.

    But suppose you can’t. Suppose the neuroscience trudges forward and the correlations are made surer and surer. That won’t mean the physicalists are right. It means that the identity questions devolve into the philosophical/pragmatic disputes I talked about. That will be the point at which no identity proofs or disproofs will be available. Physicalism is a philosophical (not a scientific) doctrine. But it depends on certain scientific findings.

    I ignored so-called functional identities in that post. I’d think that those claims too would have to begiin with the scientific evidence before the ontology stuff gets into high gear.

    One final note. If you really think that measurement is the mark of the physical, you should realize that psychological intensities have been measured since Fechner. That’s almost (but not quite) as far back as de Quincey!

  17. walto: If dualism or something along those lines is important to you, you have the opprtunity to prove that physicalism is false by, e.g. presenting evidence a disembodied spirit.

    By the same token If materialism is important to you have the opportunity to prove that nothing beyond the physical exists by demonstrating that the immaterial is impossible.

    I for one think the question can never be proven empirically one way or the other. That fact alone is evidence that the physical is not sufficient to explain everything that exists.

    I’m confident that the immaterial exists. I have no need of empirical proof of it’s existence. I take it’s existence as self evident.

    I understand that others don’t feel that way and I’m fine with you believing what ever you like. I would just appreciate it if you did not constantly demand that the rest of us act as if your perspective is the correct or default one

    peace

  18. walto: If you really think that measurement is the mark of the physical, you should realize that psychological intensities have been measured since Fechner.

    Again no one is saying that the physical is not involved here. It would be illogical if it weren’t involved.

    peace

  19. fifthmonarchyman: By the same token If materialism is important to you have the opportunity to prove that nothing beyond the physical exists by demonstrating that the immaterial is impossible.

    I’m not sure what that means. How could one do that?

  20. walto: Physicalism is a philosophical (not a scientific) doctrine.

    I think that that sentence needs to be tattooed on the arms of most of the participants of this forum so that they would see it before they begin every post.

    peace

  21. fifthmonarchyman: Again no one is saying that the physical is not involved here. It would be illogical if it weren’t involved.

    What you did say is something like “if it can be measured, it’s physical” and you quoted Webster as support. But there are measurements in psychology, so if measurement is the mark of the physical, at least some psychological events are physical.

  22. fifthmonarchyman: I think that that sentence needs to be tattooed on the arms of most of the participants of this forum so that they would see it before they begin every post.

    peace

    I agree with you about that. But I think both sides get confused about the issue. And I should say that it’s not universally agreed to by philosophers either. It’s just my view.

  23. walto: But there are measurements in psychology, so if measurement is the mark of the physical, at least some psychological events are physical.

    No, at least some psychological events have a physical component.

    I would say when it comes to humans they all do.

    peace

  24. fifthmonarchyman: you couldn’t
    That is the flipping point

    But, you see, that’s not “the same token.” One CAN demonstrate the existence of immaterial spirits. One CAN’T demonstrate their non-existence.

  25. Anyhow, enough of this. You need to get back to your abduction thesis! I’d like to hear it, anyhow.

  26. walto: One CAN demonstrate the existence of immaterial spirits.

    How in the world would one go about demonstrating the existence of immaterial spirits to a person who is an ontological phyisicalist? Any evidence could be denied AKA Fred

    peace

  27. You give evidence of disembodied (or dead brain) consciousness. Ask Murray. Can you convince the Freds? Maybe not: science isn’t math. But you win the tennis game.

  28. fifthmonarchyman:
    . . .
    That is why in almost every thread we get demands for a physical mechanism for immaterial to interact with the world instead of demonstrations of why a mechanism is even necessary.

    If the “immaterial” (still poorly/undefined) things you say exist have no impact on physical things like brains then no mechanism is required. Such things can simply be ignored.

    However, you and other theists here claim that “immaterial” entities like souls exist and have effects in the physical world. It is not unreasonable to ask how you know this and how those effects manifest.

    That is why we get the same ole “Give me empirical evidence that the immaterial exists” every time the subject even comes up.

    Any evidence or logical reasoning at all would be fine. Thus far you’ve provided nothing.

  29. walto: How much do their heads weigh?

    Good question. We ought to be able to weigh their heads before and after to see how much they have learned. Right?

  30. fifthmonarchyman: That is why in almost every thread we get demands for a physical mechanism for immaterial to interact with the world instead of demonstrations of why a mechanism is even necessary.

    In my case it is not a demanding I am accepting your premise that the immaterial exists.Given that what interests me is how immaterial works, we already have some experience with physical causation, can the immaterial be said to cause? If so what and how? So the question is about immaterial mechanisms, not physical.

    Sorry to digress but since you mentioned it ,I wanted to clarify

  31. newton: In my case it is not a demandingI am accepting your premise that the immaterial exists.Given that what interests me is how immaterial works, we already have some experience with physical causation, can the immaterial be said to cause? If so what and how? So the question is about immaterial mechanisms, not physical.

    Right. Giving up causal closure of the physical world (every physical event is entirely caused by some concatenation of other physical events) is kind of a big deal, so we’d like to know what kind of pig is claimed to be in that poke.

  32. Mung: Good question. We ought to be able to weigh their heads before and after to see how much they have learned. Right?

    We have tried to weigh the soul

  33. fifthmonarchyman: That is why in almost every thread we get demands for a physical mechanism for immaterial to interact with the world instead of demonstrations of why a mechanism is even necessary.

    And when Patrick as asked to support his claim or retract it, he simply disappears from teh conversation. As if it’s only people like FFM that have to support their claims or retract them.

  34. Patrick: Any evidence or logical reasoning at all would be fine. Thus far you’ve provided nothing.

    Any evidence or logical reasoning at all would be fine. Thus far you’ve provided nothing.

  35. walto: Right.Giving up causal closure of the physical world (every physical event is entirely caused by some concatenation of other physical events) is kind of a big deal, so we’d like to know what kind of pig is claimed to be in that poke.

    To have the first reason to think that anything “immaterial” matters.

    Glen Davidson

  36. Patrick’s claim was that for the immaterial to have any effect on the physical there must be some mechanism by which it does so.

    He’s given absolutely no reason why this must be so. It’s simply bare assertion.

    He then compounds his mistake by demanding that others provide evidence of this mechanism, and reasoning that if they cannot then he can take that as evidence against the existence of the immaterial.

    Such illogic.

  37. Mung: Any evidence or logical reasoning at all would be fine. Thus far you’ve provided nothing.

    Would you care to provide a little context for your accusation? You could combine it with support for your claim that Avida is “rigged”.

  38. Mung:
    Patrick’s claim was that for the immaterial to have any effect on the physical there must be some mechanism by which it does so.

    Not a claim, simply an observation. If the “immaterial” (care to define that rigorously?) affects a physical brain, the way it does so is a mechanism. If you’re saying that the immaterial exists but has no impact on reality, we can leave it there.

  39. Patrick: If the “immaterial” (care to define that rigorously?) affects a physical brain, the way it does so is a mechanism.

    It was your claim Patrick. I’m not going to absolve you of your responsibility to defend it or retract it. I know how you just love to shift the burden of proof. No dice.

  40. Mung:

    If the “immaterial” (care to define that rigorously?) affects a physical brain, the way it does so is a mechanism.

    It was your claim Patrick. I’m not going to absolve you of your responsibility to defend it or retract it. I know how you just love to shift the burden of proof. No dice.

    Here, I’ll type slowly for you this time: It’s not a claim, it’s an observation. If your “immaterial” whatever has an effect on any physical thing, the way that it does that is a mechanism. If you’re hung up on that word, I can rephrase it as “According to proponents of the ‘immaterial’, ‘immaterial’ things cause changes in material things.”

    So my questions remain: How do you know? How does it happen?

  41. Mung: Patrick: If the “immaterial” (care to define that rigorously?) affects a physical brain, the way it does so is a mechanism.

    It was your claim Patrick. I’m not going to absolve you of your responsibility to defend it or retract it. I know how you just love to shift the burden of proof. No dice.

    I have no doubt Patrick can respond just fine himself, but since Mung is being…well…

    Here:

    Mechanism

    Noun

    philosophy
    the doctrine that all natural phenomena, including life and thought, allow mechanical explanation by physics and chemistry.
    https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mechanism

    So yeah, but definition the point of interface between the “immaterial” and the brain would be a mechanism.

  42. Patrick: If your “immaterial” whatever has an effect on any physical thing, the way that it does that is a mechanism.

    That’s your claim. Still waiting for you to support it or retract it. But that’s not going to happen, is it Patrick. Just say “I’m not going to support my claim and I’m not going to retract it” and I’ll happily move on.

    And here’s another fine example of people making a broad physicalist/materialist claim. Everything physical, in order to be the effect of some cause, requires a mechanism. how do you know that, Patrick? Deduction? Induction? Wishful thinking?

  43. Robin: So yeah, but definition the point of interface between the “immaterial” and the brain would be a mechanism.

    For one who holds to the mechanical doctrine perhaps. But you fail at basic reasoning just as Patrick does. You guys do have your dogma though. Good for you.

  44. Mung: For one who holds to the mechanical doctrine perhaps. But you fail at basic reasoning just as Patrick does. You guys do have your dogma though. Good for you.

    So how would you describe the interface between the immaterial cause and it’s material effects?

  45. Mung:

    If your “immaterial” whatever has an effect on any physical thing, the way that it does that is a mechanism.

    That’s your claim.

    Again, not it’s not a claim. It’s simply what the words mean.

    How do you think your “immaterial” whatever affects the physical world? The answer to that is the mechanism.

  46. dazz: So how would you describe the interface between the immaterial cause and it’s material effects?

    I wouldn’t. An interface is something between two physical systems.

    And I wouldn’t be so silly as to claim that I have ‘observed’ that it must be the case that there must be an interface between two non-physical systems or between a non-physical system and a physical system.

    ETA: I’d also question the assumption that there is anything at all between cause and effect, like Patrick is claiming.

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