This video from David Wood seems to be pertinent to almost every discussion that takes place here. Perhaps it should be required viewing to any who would participate in this forum.
What do you think?
check it out.
https://youtu.be/YrGVeB_SPJg
peace
791 thoughts on “Scooby-Doo and the Case of the Silly Skeptic”
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phoodoo,
No it isn’t. A quote mine is neither an excerpt that represents the author’s view accurately (your previous attempt to say “this is what Allan says a quote mine is”) nor is it an excerpt that happens not to be responsive to the issue at hand (this one). To repeat: a quote is not a quote mine.
A thing that is a designer is a thing. You bet. I agree 100%.
Don’t forget objective!
Objective empirical evidence is the only evidence there can possibly be.
All I wanted was for Erik to tell me the standard definition of god that he claimed existed. Was that so much to ask? Apparently it was.
As I understand the tradition, classical theism would define God as transcendent: not just as beyond the immanent universe of space, time, contingency, and causation, but as beyond all of our linguistically mediated forms of intelligibility. In Greek Orthodoxy, meditation on the paradox of the Incarnation is itself a form of prayer and spiritual contemplation. For complicated reasons, this paradox or contradiction in Christianity was somewhat swept under the rug beginning with the insistence on univocal discourse in the 16th century, not to be really re-discovered until Kierkegaard. (I would guess that Kierkegaard was inspired by Meister Eckhart or the Cloud of Unknowing but I don’t really know.)
As transcendent to the sense-perceptible universe, God is not contingent but necessary, not spatio-temporal but eternal, without any physical properties, not detectable by the senses, etc.
Given this characterization it is perfectly clear that the only kind of argument that could demonstrate the possibility or necessity of God’s existence is an a priori argument.
It is worth noticing, by the way, that nothing in this conception of God entails anything about the truth or falsity of any sacred literature, whether Jewish, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, etc. It’s perfectly coherent that God as defined by classical theism exists and yet Christianity is quite badly mistaken about Him.
That said, the analogy between God and mathematical objects is a red herring.
Even if one is committed to Platonic realism about mathematical objects, that doesn’t really get at the question of God. Numbers (classes, sets) might in some weird sense exist without having any spatio-temporal location, but they do not have causal powers. God, if He exists, lacks spatio-temporal location and does have causal powers.
There’s certainly no contradiction in thinking that if something has causal powers, then it must have spatio-temporal location. With that premise, one can certainly be a metaphysical realist about numbers (classes, sets) but not about God.
Well you really dodged that bullet then didn’t you.
The standard definition is nothing less than God’s self revelation and humans can’t duplicate that act infallibly and comprehensibly but only approximately and derivatively therefore according to the “skeptic” we are free to pretend that no standard definition exists and ignore all evidence for God’s existence as well.
Whew that was a close one……Fred
peace
Sure but that is not the skeptical/atheist position. The skeptical/atheist position is that no evidence for God exists not even the God of the philosophers.
So the analogy to mathematical objects is both relevant and illustrative.
peace
How does that work with God, then?
Is it really true that you’re a virginal maiden, thus one of the only ones to whom unicorns will appear?
I know the lack of self-awareness that causes you project those charges onto myself.
Glen Davidson
Except that for Pythagoreans it’s unproblematic to say that numbers cause the existence of other things. Classical meaning of “cause” was much wider anyway, teleological.
Platonic realism about mathematical objects is directly relevant here, because Plato himself draws the parallel. But if you are not a realist about mathematical objects, then it’s your job to show how you are a realist about mathematics and in what way, if at all, mathematical proofs matter to you.
Questions: All locations are in space, but does space itself have location? Does space cause the location of objects or do objects cause their own locations in space? Does space have location or Or is “cause” inappropriate word here? Why?
For me when it comes to God I take his existence to be obvious. For starters you can’t have creation with out a creator.
So instead of being skeptical of his existence I’m skeptical of claims that’s it possible that he might not exist.
One method that I use for testing the truth of claims like that is by releasing the “how do you know ?” bot. I’m sure you are aware of that little exercise.
If the bot settles on a cogent foundational justification for knowledge that does not include God then it would be true that it’s possible that God does not exist.
Because I have such a methodology I am skeptical while not being in denial under the criteria given by Wood.
Do you have such a methodology when it comes to things that you are skeptical about like the existence of God?
First you accuse me of having not understanding “significant areas of knowledge beyond my religious beliefs” and now you accuse me of having a lack of self awareness.
That is some pretty powerful mental telepathy you are positing. ;-). You are aware that these sorts of abilities have not been empirically demonstrated to exist aren’t you 😉
peace
You seem unaware of the ability of communication to provide information to another..
Glen Davidson
I think you’ve conflated two different claims I made:
1. One can believe in God as defined by classical theism without accepting any specific claims made by any of the organized religions.
2. One can be a metaphysical realist about mathematical objects without being a metaphysical realist about God.
Additionally, since there are as many different versions of atheism as there are of theism, I would not want to identify any specific view as the atheist position. Nor would I want to conflate skepticism and atheism.
it’s entirely possible.
Yes but that is irrelevant to anything being discussed here
Again OK this is true but not especially relevant to the question of skepticism and denial.
The video is talking about the particular kind of “skepticism” displayed by Michael Shermer who holds to atheism while also holding in effect that no evidence is possible for God’s existence.
peace
OK, but that’s just an interesting historical fact about the Pythagoreans — unless there’s an argument that the Pythagorean conception of numbers is better than the conception that’s mostly accepted in 19th and 20th philosophy of mathematics: numbers are sets.
I don’t have a good philosophy of mathematics. These days I tend to think that mathematics is not about “objects” but rather about operations or procedures. The rational constraint of a mathematical proof consists in its internal consistency: given some freely stipulated axioms, one can logically derive theorems by performing operations on the relations stipulated by the axioms.
On the first question: no. If we think of the universe as a spatio-temporal structure modeled with a four-dimensional non-Euclidean geometry, then in order for space to have a location, there would have to be some meta-universe within which the universe is located. I don’t see how that makes any sense.
I don’t understand the second question — neither “space causing locations” nor “objects causing their own locations” makes any sense to me. I don’t see how locations are the sorts of things to which the concept of causation can be meaningfully applied.
OK. Shermer’s view seems quite badly wrong to me, so I’ll bow out of this discussion.
Why would I need to commit metaphysically to math axioms?
Let’s say I’m working with standard set theory at some point. Do I need to commit metaphysically to it in a way that the axiom of separation, which precludes the “existence” of semi-sets, makes it contradictory to work with semi-set theory? Of course not
We use math to build models of reality, it doesn’t require any metaphysical commitment.
You’re now making it very obvious that you’re not basing your argument on “deductive evidence” but on presuppositions. You want me to buy you premises or else I’m in denial.
Perhaps if you could agree with the fact that we can pick premises to prove almost anything you would understand why the skeptic doesn’t accept premises as true without objective (yes Mung, objective) empirical evidence to support them
I would hope that instead of doing that you would share what sort of evidence would convince you that God exists.
What is important is not recognizing Shermer’s error but making sure we don’t unintentionally do the same thing.
Your input could go a long way in that regard here.
peace
Is the premise that it’s wrong to accept premises as true without objective empirical evidence established by objective empirical evidence?
If not then clearly the skeptic is not justified in accepting it.
It’s just that sort of self-defeating presupposition that makes Fred’s “skepticism” actually denial.
peace
Given all my other intellectual and existential commitments, I can’t conceive of any evidence would convince me that God (as defined by classical theism) exists.
Then again, I never claimed to be a skeptic, and I certainly don’t think that theism is irrational.
It’s not self-defeating when parsed correctly.
Put correctly, it would be something like this:
Clifford’s Maxim: for any claim about the actual world, one ought not to accept that claim in the absence of sufficient empirical evidence.
But the maxim is a proposal about how one ought to go about forming beliefs — call it a belief policy — rather than assertion or claim about what is actually the case in the world. It is, to be precise, prescriptive rather than descriptive. As such it is not self-refuting in the way suggested.
That’s not to defend the Maxim, but it is argue that it is not self-refuting.
So it’s not actually the case that forming beliefs in the absence of sufficient empirical evidence is wrong but one aught not to go about forming beliefs in the absence of sufficient empirical evidence.
briefly stated
“It’s OK for you to do X but you should not do X.”
You really don’t see anything contradictory in that??
peace
Since there is no evidence that would ever convince you that God exists would it be correct to say that the question of God’s existence is not something you arrived at by an unbiased evaluation of the evidence but instead it’s something you presuppose apart from any consideration of evidence ?
Does that position sound familiar to you? 😉
peace
I don’t understand this objection. You seem to be confused about the difference between descriptive statements and prescriptive statements.
No,
When it comes to the materialist’s worldview I’m not clear on any available ground for making a prescriptive statement if it’s not based on the way things are in the materiel world.
peace
I would say that my inability to conceive of evidence that would convince me of God’s existence is a result of my position about how we conceptualize the world as we experience it, where that position is based on an epistemology formed by phenomenological and scientific considerations.
For me to be in a position where I could conceive of evidence that would convince me of Gods existence, I would have to have epistemological views that are pretty much the opposite of what I think is true. I would have to be a completely different person in order to think it possible that there might be evidence for the existence of God.
But so what? OK, so I’m not the kind of person who can believe in God — why does that matter so much to you?
I’m not articulating a materialistic worldview.
As long as you cling to this assumption that materialism and theism are the only options, we’re going to keep going in circles.
And please don’t say that you’re not aware of any other options, because I’ve been articulating a distinct alternative the entire time you and I have been talking — for at least a year if not more.
but the idea that one should not accept premises as true without objective empirical evidence to support them. Is a materialist idea by definition is it not?
I don’t assume any such thing. I do assume that most of the folks here are inclined toward materialism that includes most of the folks who hold that one aught not to believe anything that is not supported by “objective” empirical evidence .
I realize that you are a rare bird but wish that you spent more time explaining to the materialists the folly of their position instead of trying to prove to me that they would not be wrong if they agreed with you 😉
peace
It doesn’t matter except that that is precisely what Presuppositionalism posits, and you have repeatedly said that Presuppositionalism is pure hogwash.
peace
And sets exist or don’t they? Members of sets certainly do, right?
A very important statement, except that the axioms are not too freely stipulated either. They have to be about mathematical objects, relevant to mathematics. You cannot stipulate e.g. Clifford’s Maxim out of the blue and insist it’s a mathematical axiom. It isn’t.
And that’s where scholastic and classical concept of causation is wider than the modern concept. Physical objects are located, but in order to be located, the space must be presupposed, therefore space is metaphysically prior to objects. That which is metaphysically prior to another can be an efficient, formal or final cause of the other, but not the other way round. For scholastics and classicals, this hierarchy is very important, because this is how one arrives at the First Cause.
Wrong in what way? How would you set Shermer straight?
Some do, some don’t. 🙂
Metaphysical commitment would be an achievement for you: In addition to your physics, you will also formulate your metaphysics. And along with well-formed metaphysics, you will become properly competent to speak about God.
As soon as you mouth off about “true” and “false” or “good” and “bad” models, you betray that you are committed. Some commitment is inevitable, because if the models are to be about *reality* you must first know what you mean by *reality* and that’s a metaphysical commitment, not a physical one.
But you do the exact same thing:
And that’s why, you see, metaphysical commitment is important. By commitment, you delimit your premises to a certain hopefully internally consistent set and thus, instead of random premises, you have presuppositions that you have to defend and elaborate. As long as you think your premises can be random, rational discussion has not even started.
I’m not at all sure what “the materialist’s worldview” amounts to. That’s part of why I am not a materialist.
There a rule, that we should drive on the right side of the road. That sure looks prescriptive to me. For that matter, most traffic laws look prescriptive. Sure, they might look as if descriptive, but that’s only superficial. The reason that they look as if descriptive, is because we follow the prescription. If you were to visit England or Australia, the rule to drive on the right side of the road would not look the least bit descriptive, because in those places people drive on the left.
If you don’t know what else you are, you could be materialist without knowing it. Or a materialist in denial.
Of course there’s a difference between prescriptive and descriptive rules. Namely, descriptions are not even rules. On purebred materialism, a concept like “laws of nature” should be overruled, but in order to keep themselves in discussion, materialists selectively deny aspects of materialism, while inconsistently holding to other aspects.
“[Ernst] Mach preached a science based on sensory perceptions and vehemently opposed any scientific hypothesis about things that could not be felt nor seen.”
Oh, those were the days!
Another great maxim from behind your link: “We may believe what goes beyond our experience, only when it is inferred from that experience by the assumption that what we do not know is like what we know.”
I’m questioning the assumption part there. We should assume that everything we don’t know is just like what we already know from experience. Consequently, there is no such thing as new experience. Does this sound like a reasonable or fair assumption to you?
Isn’t it so that when you get fed up with certain kinds of experience, you will seek out a different kind of experience? Isn’t the different kind of experience *new* in some sense, until it dawns to you that all (sensory) experience is fleeting, so your mind will be directed in a transcendent direction? Doesn’t the transcendental dimension count as a new experience? Sure, there is analogy with the sensory realm, but aren’t they distinct parallel worlds that don’t conform to the same description and rules?
How does one arrive at such an assumption as seen behind your link? By speculation, I guess. How does one verify whether one has done sound speculation? Or should we be just happy with it because there are no gods in it?
I think the question…
…isn’t one that can be reliably answered.
Francis Collins says he came to believe in Christianity after seeing a frozen waterfall. I can’t be certain but does anyone doubt that if Collins was asked a day earlier what would make him believe a frozen waterfall would not have crossed his mind?
Belief isn’t rational. It’s formed from the constant barrage of external stimuli colliding with one’s personal experience, upbringing, culture and biology.
So when Shermer says ahead of time that he will believe in God when conditions X,Y and Z are met he’s talking shit (in my opinion). All he’s really doing is signalling a desire to appear open-minded, something atheist speakers are wont to do.
I can’t say what would make me believe in a God – I’ve no idea. And as Collins demonstrates – it could be literally anything.
Nicely said.
derp
map… territory…
wut?!?
Is there some reason to think that random mutations don’t cause random premises?
Thus far you have proven my point: Rational discussion hasn’t even started.
Now prove me wrong. Convince me that you have done your part rationally.
P1: I have done my part rationally.
P2: If you disagree, you’re in denial.
Conclusion: Fuck yeah!
derp!
Well, that would be the corollary
I’m not asking what would make you believe in God. I’m asking what God could do that would convince you that he exists. KN admits that he can conceive of absolutely nothing that God could do to demonstrate his existence. Do you disagree with him?
peace
is there any reason to think that random mutations can cause anything but random premises?
By the same token is there any reason to beleive that natural selection can “cause” anything at all?
peace
Natural selection can cause random premises to increase in number in the population. But then, so can random genetic drift.
FMM,
I can imagine all kinds of spectacular or subtle demonstrations a God might use to try and convince me – but like I said I’ve no idea whether any of them would work.
According to Erik no such thing is possible, so if a giant white bearded man broke out from the clouds yelling bible passages at sinners as they kept being hit by lightning one by one, well, that must be animatronics
Can you quote me on this? Or are you just picking random premises again?
I was obviously referring to the position that the classical theist God can’t be perceived. Isn’t that your position?