Since objective morality is The Topic That Won’t Die here at TSZ, I think we need Yet Another Thread to Discuss It.
A Sam Harris quote to get things rolling (h/t walto):
There are two mistakes I see moral subjectivists making. The first mistake is believing in the fact-value dichotomy. The second mistake is conflating moral philosophy and psychology, suggesting that our psychology ought to be the sole determinant of our beliefs.
I’ll only address the fact-value dichotomy mistake here. Subjectivists typically exaggerate the gap between facts and values. While there is a useful distinction to be made between facts and values, it’s usually taken too far.
Let me explain. Facts in science are held in high epistemic regard by non-religious people, including me. But scientific facts are theory-laden. And theory choice in science is value-laden. What values inform choices of scientific theory? Verifiability, falsifiability, explanatory value, predictive value, consistency (logical, observational, mathematical), parsimony, and elegance. Do these values, each taken alone, necessarily make or prove a scientific theory choice correct? No. But collectively, they increase the probability that a theory is the most correct or useful. So, as the philosopher Hilary Putnam has put it, facts and values are “entangled.” Scientific facts obtain their veracity through the epistemic values listed above. If I reject those epistemic values (as many religious people do), and claim instead that a holy book holds more epistemic value for me, does that mean science is subjective?
I maintain the same is true of morality. Moral facts, such as “X is right or good,” are at least value-laden, and sometimes also theory-laden, just like scientific facts. What values inform choices of moral belief and action? Justice, fairness, empathy, flourishing of conscious creatures, and integrity (i.e. consistency of attitudes, beliefs, and behavior between each other and over time). Do these values, each taken alone, necessarily make or prove a moral choice correct? No. But collectively, they increase the probability that a moral choice is the most correct or useful. So again, as the philosopher Hilary Putnam has put it, facts and values are “entangled.” Moral facts obtain their veracity through the values listed above (and maybe through other values as well; the list above is not necessarily complete).
Now, the subjectivist can claim that the moral values are subjective themselves, but that is no different than the religious person claiming scientific values are subjective. The truth is that we have no foundation for any knowledge whatsoever, scientific or moral. All we have to support scientific or moral knowledge is a web of entangled facts and values, with values in science and morality being at the core of our web. Our values are also the least changeable, for if we modify them, we cause the most disruption to our entire web. It’s much easier to modify the factual periphery of our web.
If we reject objectivity in morality, we must give up objectivity in science as well, and claim that all knowledge is subjective, since all knowledge is ultimately based in values. I reject this view, and claim that the scientific and moral values listed above provide veracity to the scientific and moral claims I make. Religious people disagree with me on the scientific values providing veracity, and moral subjectivists disagree with me on the moral values providing veracity. But disagreement doesn’t mean there is no truth to the matter.
Erik:
Why? What makes it objectively moral?
Um, has it occurred to you that death is not the only possible punishment? Jesus, Erik.
keiths:
Erik:
How did you determine that adultery is objectively immoral and worthy of punishment?
Erik:
I’m not the one defending objective morality. Remember?
More cruel and idiotic commands and pronouncements from Yahweh (all taken from the NIV translation):
Leviticus 20:15-16:
Leviticus 20:18:
Leviticus 20:27:
Leviticus 21:9:
Leviticus 21:16-23:
Deuteronomy 22:5:
Deuteronomy 22:11:
Deuteronomy 25:11-12:
What a great God you’ve got there, fifth.
Objectively in the sense of regardless of my opinion or yours. Leave an immorality unattended and it spreads. Punishment contains it. Doesn’t depend on assumptions or guesses or feelings.
Does it ever occur to you pay attention to the salient point: Should it be punished? And does the punishment not depend on what sort of culture you live in?
What other ways of being immoral are there? Subjectively? Presumably? “As a metaphor…”? And why should those exclude objective morality?
You were supposed to be assuming it for the sake of the argument. Good that you acknowledge now that this was not the case. You are insistent on misunderstanding each and every point about it. Your case against objective morality is even worse than your case against Plantinga’s Free Will defense was. In the latter case you misconstrued what it means to have free will. Here you directly assume your conclusion and you don’t address objective morality in any sense, except by superficial assertion. If you don’t assume your conclusion, then show me the premises that lead to your conclusion.
no I’m saying that morality is an individual enterprise with context and you are treating it like it’s a blanket set of rules
You have yet to show an instance where an Israelite was commanded to stone an adulterer.
The verse you quoted with the command about stoning was not about adultery as we would describe it but a very specific instance of breaking a promise before marriage.
The law was definitely cruel though it was not imposed arbitrarily from on high but agreed on by the entire community (Exodus 19:8). When it came to the laws surrounding adultery they involved a very explicate and public breach of a contract that typified the contract between the nation and it’s God.
In other words there was a context that you and I are not privy too. You are judging a culture you don’t understand from your perspective as a secular Westerner. How Xenophobic and racist of you.
peace
So now you are just throwing stuff at the wall and hoping that something will stick.
That did not that work out in the problem of evil thread what makes you think it will work now?
peace
That’s an excellent example of stretching the definition to the breaking point. You “presuppose” that an entity described in a book full of contradictions actually exists. You only believe in that god because of your childhood indoctrination. You’re simply assuming your conclusion.
If you started with concepts like “An external reality exists” or “I think therefore I am” or even “Something thinks” and then reasoned your way to a position from them, those would consitute presuppositions. You are using the term simply to skip the hard work of supporting your claims.
In online discussions this is just a good reason to dismiss anything you say as fundamentally intellectually dishonest (even if you are sincerely taken in by it yourself). In the real world it can become an actual problem. When your beliefs boil down to the bumpersticker theology of “The Bible says it, I believe it, that settles it” then there is no possibility of reasoning with you. The only possible useful reaction is to use force to defend against your attempts to impose your sectarian dogma on others. You and those like you are the reason for the Culture War.
You have never demonstrated that this assumption of your conclusion serves as a “foundation for things like knowledge or morality.” You’ve been challenged to provide the argument to support that claim many times and have failed to do so.
LoL. You don’t appear to be defending any morality whatsoever. But you don’t like it when people distort what you say. Even though you do it to others all the time.
You’re asking for an actual argument.
Patrick,
Can you support this claim or assertion?
Absolutely. Google is your friend.
Patrick,
I am looking forward to your first argument. 🙂
In point of fact, there are arguments in Van Til and Bahnsen for why objective knowledge is only possible if one presupposes theism. The Wikipedia article on presuppositional apologetics is a useful beginning for the curious.
Kantian Naturalist,
Do you think these come out of Aquinas’s arguments?
I wouldn’t know.
My limited understanding is that presuppositional apologetics is firmly opposed to Thomism. Presuppositionalism holds that we must begin with God in order to reason, whereas Aquinas holds that can reason our way to God. The existence of God is a premise for the presuppositionalist, but a conclusion for the Thomist. Thus the two approaches seem quite opposed, from what I can tell.
fifth:
No, I’m showing that your problem goes well beyond a Bible verse or two.
Are you ashamed of those other verses as well? Eager to argue that they were never enforced, as if that would help you?
fifth:
Exodus 19:8, NIV:
Reminds me of those Communist elections in which there was one candidate on the ballot, chosen by the Communist Party. But hey, it was an election, right? Therefore it represented the will of the people, not the Party.
Your gullibility is astounding, fifth.
The Israelites had a choice of accepting God’s terms or else. They didn’t get to negotiate the punishment for adultery or for any other transgression.
God dictated the stonings. And according to you, God’s revealed will is objectively moral.
Therefore:
According to fifthmonarchyman, it was objectively moral for the Israelites to stone people for the particular offenses that God laid out in his commandments.
fifth,
You are ashamed of your God and of the stupid and cruel commandments he issued back then. That’s good. It shows that you have a conscience.
Unfortunately, your response is to try to whitewash. You’re pretending that those commandments were never enforced, which is ridiculous and wouldn’t help you even if you could support it.
I remember you doing the same thing when we discussed this doozy:
I commented at the time:
Those who would like to see the World’s Worst Apologist at work can find the entire exchange starting here.
Erik:
keiths:
Erik:
That’s a definition, not a demonstration. Show us that stoning adulterers fits the definition.
You can reduce the prevalence of practically any behavior by punishing it, and increase the prevalence again by declining to punish it. That doesn’t make the behavior objectively immoral.
You won’t see many North Koreans hanging Kim Jong-un’s portrait upside down or drawing a mustache on it, for obvious reasons. That doesn’t make it objectively immoral to do so.
keiths:
Erik:
Subjectively, of course.
Subjective morality doesn’t exclude the possibility of objective morality.
Now how about answering the question?
How did you determine that adultery is objectively immoral and worthy of punishment?
So you are not really challenging objective morality. Good we got this cleared up too. You can stop pretending now as if you had something there that needs a further answer.
keiths:
Erik:
Of course I am. I see no evidence that it exists, and you certainly haven’t provided any.
How about answering my question? How did you determine that adultery is objectively immoral and worthy of punishment?
I see no evidence that you are challenging it.
You said that subjective morality does not exclude objective morality. Similarly, internal organs don’t exclude external objects. They can co-exist just fine. Neither challenges either one.
Jesus, Erik. I’m not arguing that “subjective morality exists; therefore objective morality doesn’t.” Read my comments.
You claim that objective morality exists. Can you answer the question?
You did bother to make that determination before making your claim, right?
Correct.
The thing is, you are not arguing at all. Not in a meaningful way anyway, i.e. from premises to a conclusion.
I’m still waiting for someone to define “subjective.”
Erik,
If you can’t answer my question, then just say so. No one will be surprised.
You claim that objective morality exists, and you’ve even told us what that would mean, if true:
What you haven’t done, and by all appearances can’t do, is to show that “adultery is objectively immoral” fits that description.
It’s OK to admit that, Erik.
You’ll be waiting for a long time. Everyone here thinks they know what they mean by “objective” and “subjective” and that it’s perfectly clear what they’re disagreeing about.
I don’t think anyone here has figured out what they themselves mean by “subjective” or “objective,” and I very much doubt that there’s much agreement on the meaning of those terms. Hence the constant game of burden-tennis.
Not so. In my view, discourse can only proceed when there are mutually agreed-upon terms. Keiths has not provided and is not even trying to move towards any definitions, so no meaningful dialogue with him can occur. Approximately like with fifth.
It is utterly unclear what keiths is disagreeing with when he says he sees no evidence for objective morality. What is morality for him and what evidence would he expect? Nobody knows.
Erik,
You’re dodging, Erik.
Your own words:
Show us that adultery, or any other activity you regard as objectively immoral, satisfies those criteria.
If you can’t, then say so instead of dodging the challenge.
Any objectively immoral activity in fact does satisfy those criteria. For example, you threw out the “stoning of adulterers” expecting that stoning would raise some scruples. Well, it does. And so does adultery, regardless of your opinion of it.
walto:
That’s odd. In your first comment, you seemed quite comfortable with the term:
So was KN:
In any case, I’ve explained my take on the distinction:
Erik’s take is similar:
keiths:
Erik:
The fact that something “raises some scruples” doesn’t make it objectively immoral. Some people think it’s unscrupulous to stone adulterers. Others think it’s unscrupulous to refuse to stone them.
Try again.
Not quite. Your examples imply empiricism. Mine go beyond that, even though empiricism is a point of reference by means of analogy. Such as:
By analogy, you are saying that the fact that something is seen doesn’t make it objectively extant.
Then what does?
Erik,
Read this again.
Haha. You want to ‘be sure.’
“All of that is evidence in favor of my intuition, but I want to be sure. ”
Yes, very funny. Anything else?
walto,
Why not do what a philosopher would do, and try to come up with a counterargument?
ETA: You too, Erik.
To what? If the test of objectivity is that you have to be sure. The physical world isn’t objective either.
Look at it again: “All of that is evidence in favor of my intuition, but I want to be sure. ”
It’s funny because meanwhile you claimed you saw no evidence. Now deal with the evidence and maybe we can actually have a sensible discussion.
Jesus, Erik.
What part of this are you struggling with?
walto,
To my comment, which explains why the deliverances of the conscience are not on an equal footing with those of our senses.
You can’t identify moral illusions in the same way that you would identify optical illusions such as the Müller-Lyer illusion.
You are the one struggling.
For a while you claimed you saw no evidence of objective morality. But in that post you say you see it.
After encountering evidence, you can say “…but I want to be sure” only if you are a denialist.
Don’t be a denialist. Deal with the evidence.
Do they have to be on an equal footing to be objective? Does objectivity require you to be sure or to be just like empirical knowledge? Both? Neither?
Oh oh oh I know I know
😉
peace
Erik,
This is not that hard.
The comment is written from the point of view of someone who believes that objective morality exists — someone who therefore also believes that moral illusions are possible. He wants to know whether his intuition about the objective immorality of egging his neighbor’s house is correct or an illusion.
He tries to make a determination of the objective morality/immorality of the egging, in the same way that he might go about deciding whether the Müller-Lyer illusion is in fact an illusion. He fails, because morality can’t be triangulated objectively in the way that the relative length of the Müller-Lyer lines can.
Here’s another example from the original thread:
Erik,
I repeat:
The fact that something “raises some scruples” doesn’t make it objectively immoral. Some people think it’s unscrupulous to stone adulterers. Others think it’s unscrupulous to refuse to stone them.
Try again.
Show us that adultery, or any other activity you regard as objectively immoral, satisfies your criteria: