The subject of obscure writing came up on another thread, and with Steven Pinker’s new book on writing coming out next week, now is a good time for a thread on the topic.
Obscure writing has its place (Finnegan’s Wake and The Sound and the Fury, for example), but it is usually annoying and often completely unnecessary. Here’s a funny clip in which John Searle laments the prevalence of obscurantism among continental philosophers:
John Searle – Foucault and Bourdieu on continental obscurantism
When is obscure prose appropriate or useful? When is it annoying or harmful? Who are the worst offenders? Feel free to share examples of annoyingly obscure prose.
keiths:
walto:
But Dennett does offer an explanation of what people do when they mean things. They employ a syntactic capacity, shaped by evolution to approximate the behavior of an ideal semantic capacity.
Are you unsatisfied with that explanation?
Bruce,
Here’s the part that really convinces me that Graziano means what he says:
He’s confronting the paradox head on, and doubling down. It isn’t merely that the impression is erroneous. “There is no subjective impression”, he says. It’s a flat denial of the reality of subjective experience.
I didn’t think that Graziano was denying that there is subjective experience of some sort; I took him to be saying that since the brain does not model its own modeling (and why would it? how could it?), awareness is not as transparent and obvious as it seems to be.
On the semantic engine question, I don’t see what’s objectionable about saying that organisms are semantic engines. Dennett seems to be conflating the very idea of a semantic engine with a quasi-Platonic/quasi-Cartesian picture of what a semantic engine is.
Let’s just say I’m not blown away. When you hear that sentence: (“They employ a syntactic capacity, shaped by evolution to approximate the behavior of an ideal semantic capacity.”) do you have an AHA! experience? I mean, how exactly does employment of a syntactic capacity get us to this point? I recognize that, as we’ve gotten here, we’ve gotten here by evolution, so that’s not surprising. But, you know, how does the guy learn what Chinese means from memorizing the dictionary?
Or put another way, what do we need the syntactic capacity for in the first place? Why not just say, We’re “sorta” semantic engines, and evolution did it!
KN,
I think that all of us, upon first reading Graziano, think that he can’t actually mean what he says. How could anyone deny the reality of subjective experience?
But it’s right there in his own words. He isn’t merely saying that subjective experience is erroneous or less than transparent. He’s saying that we don’t have subjective experience at all:
I’ve heard that style argument before somewhere.
Perhaps in discussions of materialism.
keiths:
KN:
Because he’s largely right, perhaps? 🙂
That’s a good way of looking at it. Dennett’s concept of the intentional stance is really just a way of exploiting the usefulness of one part of the manifest image without committing to its fundamental truth.
The problem is that the laws of physics are meaning-independent. To argue that meaning is physical is therefore to claim either that a) the currently-known laws of physics are both incomplete and insufficient to explain the operation of brains, or b) that meaning is at root a syntactic phenomenon.
If you choose b), then you’re essentially agreeing with Dennett.
Is that because you think that biology can’t be reduced to physics, and that meanings may be irreducible in the same way that you consider goals and purposes in biology to be irreducible to physics?
petrushka,
Yes, you may be thinking of the Churchlands and their version of eliminative materialism. Here’s Paul Churchland:
We need syntactic capability for mathematics and formal logic.
Neither of those come naturally to most people. So most folk probably don’t need it. And that suggests that we don’t really have syntactic capacity, but that we manage to adequately simulate it out of our semantic capabilities.
walto,
Well, I’m used to the idea, so it no longer feels like a revelation. But it does ring true.
Keep in mind that we’re talking about “syntactic” in the sense of “independent of meaning”, not in the sense of “manipulating symbols according to purely formal rules.” Physics is independent of meaning, and it is certainly exploited by evolution.
He doesn’t. I agree with Searle that the guy doesn’t understand Chinese. “Guy who understands Chinese” is not equivalent to “system that understands Chinese, consisting of guy plus memorized dictionary and syntactic rules.”
“Sorta” semantic engines are syntactic engines, so the syntactic capacity is indispensable.
Because the whole point is to explain how “sorta” semantic engines evolved without invoking “original” or “intrinsic” intentionality. Evolution has no problem exploiting syntactic (aka physical) properties, and it can construct “sorta” semantic engines out of syntactic ingredients.
Bruce,
No, it’s there in the original paper:
Argh!!!
What do you mean by “physics is independent of meaning”? That somehow seems obviously wrong.
He does say the semantic engines are impossible at one point in IP.
But in the personal/subpersonal section IP (p. 88), he says “your brain does not understand English, you do”. (The rest of the paragraph basically say you do those things “all thanks for your subpersonal parts, [body and brain] and nothing else”.
I’m not clear on how he can maintain both the ideas from those two above paragraphs.. I think it amounts to whether or not he is an instrumentalist with regard to the intentional stance, especially when applied to the whole person.
Neil,
I mean that the laws of physics don’t take meaning into account. For example, recall the flip-flop we discussed earlier. The flop doesn’t care what its inputs or outputs mean; it responds only to the voltages, currents, and charges.
walto:
Bruce:
I feel your pain, Bruce. 🙂
Of course they do.
I don’t see the relevance. The flip-flop is not even mentioned in the laws of physics. It’s just a gadget. Its operation does depend on the meanings that are part of the laws of physics.
f=ma (Newton’s second law)
V=IR (Ohm’s law)
Both express the same mathematical relationship. We use Ohm’s law to design the flip-flop. How would you use Newton’s second law to design a flip-flop?
No, I say that they are not independent of meaning.
Neil,
You’re conflating the meaning of variables in an equation, as seen by a designer, with the meaning of physical currents in a flip-flop, from the perspective of pure physics.
Physics doesn’t care what the currents mean. They just are.
No, I’m not conflating anything.
You said: “Physics is independent of meaning”
Most normal people would take “physics” as a reference to the body of study by physicists.
What you apparently intended might have been better expressed as:
Physical objects and processes are oblivious to the meanings of our representations.
Exactly. Thanks.
As do I. As do I.
Keith:
The story is that Einstein’s GR replaced Newtonian gravity based on the single telling experiment conducted during an eclipse.
Even if that is true, I don’t think most of science works that way. There are usually a series of probes of nature, from different aspects, involved in both normal and paradigm-changing science.
Similarly, I personally don’t find it helpful to look for the single telling quotation to understand the nature of an author’s ideas on a complex topic.
Rather, as much as I can, I prefer to consider the whole body of work of the author on the topic, and place any passage into that context, in order to get a full understanding of what the author is trying to say.
Even better is when SEP has already done that and added the commentary of others who have taken a similar approach to understanding, as in the points I have made about the CR experiment and Searles papers.
(ETA: I try to apply the same process to understanding someone’s posts at TSZ)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_men_and_an_elephant
I get that it’s unfair to base a judgment of a position that’s been set forth in several books on a couple of paragraphs that you’ve been kind enough to put here, but I have to say that the claims that
(i) Human-style reference is sometimes mistaken;
(ii) Human-style reference confers an evolutionary advantage over its absence;
(iii) Whatever physical processes that may be associated with human-style reference are syntactical in the sense of comporting with physical laws; and
(iv) Our capacity for human-style reference was obtained through the operation evolution.
seem almost bereft of substance to me. Imagine, e.g., that there are a class of people in Nova Scotia that have the capacity to tell what others are thinking, hearing, seeing, etc., with the same sorts of imperfections that the rest of us have with our “semantical engines.” All those four principles would likely be true of those folks as well: we might not fully understand the mechanisms, but, were they the result of evolution? Sure–what else?
Anyhow, maybe I’d feel more excited if I actually read one or two of Dennett’s books on the subject, but it’s also the case that, in philosophy as in life, different strokes for different folks, so I kind of doubt it.
Can you use your magic moderator powers to move your post there and then I will reply to it there?
(OT: I notice the link to your image goes to somewhere on TSZ. Can anyone upload images there?)
Good point.
If you change your mind about your philosophical priorities on this issue of representation and intentionality, spend your time with Millikan, not Dennett.
OK. I’ve moved it here.
I think so and if not it can be easily remedied. Following a couple of issues, I added a plugin that allows more choice on posting privileges. I’m happy to upgrade anyone with some posting history on request. Flag it in “moderation issues”.
Duly noted.
I too am having a bit of trouble following what keiths is getting at here. He has written
the meaning of physical currents in a flip-flop, from the perspective of pure physics.
Physics doesn’t care what the currents mean. They just are.
I don’t know if he takes the position that the currents could just BE without MEANING anything–i.e., wouldn’t mean anything if there were no “semantic engines” (however imperfect) around, or if there is meaning that they would have “from the perspective of pure physics” even if there had never been and never would be a physicist.
You seem to be taking the position above that it is the REPRESENTATIONS that have meaning, not the currents. But, I’m not sure what keiths is saying.
Neil Rickert:
Neil,
The Internet is a wonderful resource. Take advantage of it!
phys·ics noun plural but singular or plural in construction ˈfi-ziks
: a science that deals with matter and energy and the way they act on each other in heat, light, electricity, and sound
Full Definition of PHYSICS
1
: a science that deals with matter and energy and their interactions
2
a : the physical processes and phenomena of a particular system
b : the physical properties and composition of something
[Emphasis added]
Neil,
Given that I’m using ‘physics’ in sense 2 above, do you see my point? The flop is just a collection of atoms responding to currents and voltages on its inputs. It’s all physics. Meaning is irrelevant.
Thank you for this; that’s exactly the problem I had in mind. And I do think that Dennett tends to waffle on the extent to which his talk of “stances” commits him any kind of realism or anti-realism.
On my view, the only reason to deny that sentient animals are semantic engines is if one is committed to the reducibility of biology to physics — or, put otherwise, if one accepts the “disenchanted conception of nature”. My first (so far) attempt to work through these issues is here. If I were to build on this account, I’d want to draw heavily on Brandom (about discursive rationality) and Merleau-Ponty (about embodied or ‘enactive’ pre-reflective intentional consciousness).
It seems that Keiths is a living example of Putnam’s “cats and cherries” problem.
In any case, I’m giving up on this. Communication is impossible.
Thanks for the link. Heavy going, I suspect, for someone without the background in Davidson and McDowell, but I will scan to try to get a high level appreciation.
In case you missed my earlier post, the Herschbach Thesis has a whole chapter on this ambiguity in Dennett’s personal/subpersonal description, a commentary on McDowell’s criticism of it, and thoughts on how the the views of enactivist Susan Hurley fit with the concept of persona/subpersonal.
I need to read it again before I would even attempt a summary here, but if you have time, it may interest you.
walto,
That would be remarkable enough, but original intentionality — if it existed — would be even more remarkable, in my opinion. We can at least see, in a far-fetched way, how the Nova Scotians’ telepathic powers might be possible and explicable in terms of physical law. Original intentionality is a different beast altogether. How could a physical representation come to be truly, intrinsically, metaphysically about its referent? It doesn’t seem that physical law, present or future, could explain that, even in principle.
If original/intrinsic intentionality is chimerical, that problem vanishes. The details of how human representational capacities evolved is still important and interesting, but it no longer seems out of reach in principle, as it would if original intentionality needed to be explained.
So, contra Searle, semantics (of the “sorta” type) can be derived from syntax, strong AI is not ruled out by the problem of original intentionality, and there is no need to explain how brains somehow magically give rise to original intentionality.
Join the crowd.
keiths,
One could use “physics” to mean “the discursive practices that inquire into fundamental processes of the universe” and “the physical” to mean “the fundamental processes of the universe studied by means of those discursive practices.”
BruceS,
I had missed your reference to Herschbach’s thesis! That’s very interesting — thak you! I knew him from ‘back in the day’ — he was a few years behind me in grad school. We didn’t talk much because at the time I was writing on Nietzsche’s criticism of Kant and hadn’t discovered McDowell or Sellars yet.
Neil Rickert:
Neil,
In the space of a single morning, you’ve been shown that your personal definitions of “blurb” and “physics” are both incorrect and/or incomplete.
If you’re interested in pinpointing the source of the communication problem, I’d suggest looking inward.
Meanwhile, my point is simple. A flip-flop doesn’t care what its inputs or outputs mean. It just operates. Change the meaning of its output from, say, “single-bit error detected” to “FIFO underflow”, and the operation of the flop will not change at all. It’s physics, and it’s oblivious to meanings.
That is really interesting, but I don’t get it. To the extent that ‘sorta intentionality’ is intentionality at all, it would seem to be itself inexplicable, even in principle. To the extent that it’s chimerical, it’s not really intentionality, is it?
And I don’t see why the original/derived biz matters. I mean, clearly, the word “dogwood” has derived intentionality. But doesn’t that just put off the mystery for a second? “Dogwood” refers to a certain batch of trees because of the intentionality of English speakers. If that latter intentionality is also derived there is some other thing from which English speakers derive their intentionality. Dennett seems to suggest that it’s “mother nature.” That seems unhelpfully metaphorical to me.
KN,
You could do that, but substituting ‘the physical’ for ‘physics’ in all of the latter cases would lead to awkward locutions.
Better for Neil to adapt himself to the English language, rather than vice-versa.
To be fair, you DID refer to ” the meaning of physical currents in a flip-flop, from the perspective of pure physics
I don’t think Neil can be faulted for thinking that locution suggests that physical currents have meanings from the perspective of pure physics.
At any rate, it all seems fairly clear now that you were referring to the operation of the physical processes. So I’m not sure why everybody is bailing from a thread on obscurity from as a result of that lil biddy thang.
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master — that’s all.’
walto,
Neil was already confused before I wrote that. The confusion arose from his undue restriction of “physics” to mean, as he put it, ” the body of study by physicists”, excluding the second common meaning supplied by Merriam-Webster above.
Besides, Neil knows that I think the currents don’t have meaning from the perspective of pure physics. That’s what started the whole debate about the flip-flop. Neil argued that
Note that he is talking about meaning “from the point of view of the stable process”, not from the point of view of a physicist. The dispute over the definition of “physics” was a fallback position for him, not his original argument.
My reply to his original argument:
I suspect Neil’s exit from the thread has less to do with his communication difficulties and more to do with his inability to defend his thesis about the intrinsic meaning of flip-flop currents.
walto:
Why? ‘Sorta’ intentionality is the kind exhibited by Dennett’s “two-bitser” when it recognizes a quarter. That doesn’t seem mysterious at all to me.
Dennett’s point is that our own intentionality is just a souped-up, more complicated version of the two-bitser’s intentionality. Searle would of course disagree.
It’s original/intrinsic intentionality that is chimerical, not ‘sorta’ intentionality.
It isn’t just a vague, metaphorical reference to Mother Nature. Dennett specifically credits evolution with creating our ‘sorta’ intentionality, and he points out that this is possible because ‘sorta’ intentionality — exhibited by humans and two-bitsers alike — is syntactic, and syntax is what evolution deals with all the time. ‘Sorta’ intentionality can be built out of physics, which eliminates the mystery of how original/intrinsic meanings could arise out of “mere” physics, or how evolution could exploit it if it did.
keiths,
The devil’s in the souping up/complicating. Meaning isn’t strictly a matter of recognizing, and intentionality is a matter of aboutness. The two-bitser’s intentionality isn’t just derived, IMO, its metaphoricaliieven with respect to the 1 or 2 types of ‘objects’ of its ‘attention.’
walto,
Recognition depends on meaning. You have a representation, and you test things against that representation to see how well they match. Representations are about the things they represent.
What are the relevant differences between a two-bitser and a human that make the two-bitser’s intentionality “metaphorical” while the human’s is genuine?
That’s not my view. That’s not necessarily a criticism of the analogy, however, because I don’t think that’s what the two-bitser does either.
Pretty much everything–although, as I said above, I don’t think either of our “meaning activities” are usually a matter of comparing our “representations” with reality.
keiths:
walto:
Okay. Could you pick a relevant difference, describe it, and then explain why it means that the two-bitser’s intentionality is “metaphorical” while the human’s is genuine?
The human’s version is the data that wants explaining — it couldn’t not be genuine. The two-bitser is more closely analogous to a hand-held can opener that only opens cans of certain shapes and sizes. How are they both different from us? As I said, in pretty much every way that matters–even though, e.g., we’re all susceptible of being destroyed with a hand grenade, and I can’t run much faster than either of them.