Obscurantism

The subject of obscure writing came up on another thread, and with Steven Pinker’s new book on writing coming out next week, now is a good time for a thread on the topic.

Obscure writing has its place (Finnegan’s Wake and The Sound and the Fury, for example), but it is usually annoying and often completely unnecessary. Here’s a funny clip in which John Searle laments the prevalence of obscurantism among continental philosophers:

John Searle – Foucault and Bourdieu on continental obscurantism

When is obscure prose appropriate or useful? When is it annoying or harmful? Who are the worst offenders? Feel free to share examples of annoyingly obscure prose.

408 thoughts on “Obscurantism

  1. walto:
    Meaning isn’t strictly a matter of recognizing, and intentionality is a matter of aboutness.

    I’m not sure in your motivation in posting in this thread; maybe like some others at TSZ it is just to have a light conversation during breaks from your work. (Whereas my whole life is now one long break from work).

    But if you want to get into the philosophy of language style analysis of meaning, rather than discussing how an implementation of a given concept of meaning could have arisen naturally, then try this Millikan paper: On Meaning, Meaning, and Meaning. (PDF) Teaser quotation:

    My basic proposal is that there are these three basic kinds of linguistic meaning:

    (1) Conventional linguistic cooperative function, to be called “stabilizing function.”

    (2) Conventional semantic mapping functions (“functions” in the mathematical sense) which determine truth and other kinds of satisfaction conditions.

    (3) Methods of identifying –to be called “conceptions” and “conceptual components”– that govern individual speakers’ grasps of referents and of truth or satisfaction conditions, hence help to determine their dispositions to use and understand various conventional language forms.

  2. BruceS: I’m not sure in your motivation in posting in this thread; maybe like some others at TSZ it is just to have a light conversation during breaks from your work.(Whereas my whole life is now one long break from work).

    Who the hell knows. I guess it’s like why my daughter spends at least 8 hours a day in group chats or on instagram or whatever. I appreciate many of the links, though.

    But if you want to get into the philosophy of language style analysis of meaning, rather than discussing how an implementation of a given concept of meaning could have arisen naturally, then try this Millikan paper:On Meaning, Meaning, and Meaning.(PDF) Teaser quotation:

    Thanks. I’ll add it to the pile.

  3. walto,

    The human’s version is the data that wants explaining — it couldn’t not be genuine.

    Okay. So to you, “genuine intentionality” is the kind of intentionality that humans have.

    The two-bitser is more closely analogous to a hand-held can opener that only opens cans of certain shapes and sizes. How are they both different from us? As I said, in pretty much every way that matters–

    That wasn’t my question. I’m trying to understand the reasoning behind your claim that the two-bitser’s intentionality is “metaphorical” while the human’s is genuine.

    My question was:

    Could you pick a relevant difference, describe it, and then explain why it means that the two-bitser’s intentionality is “metaphorical” while the human’s is genuine?

  4. keiths:
    walto,

    Okay.So to you, “genuine intentionality” is the kind of intentionality that humans have.

    Right.

    That wasn’t my question.I’m trying to understand the reasoning behind your claim that the two-bitser’s intentionality is “metaphorical” while the human’s is genuine.

    So we’ve got that the human’s is “genuine”: it’s my view that whatever it is that the two-bitser and can opener have is nothing like it. The claimed similarities–that we may all be “mistaken” and that it may not always be clear when we are “mistaken” if the context is sufficiently varied, are, to me so obviously weak analogues that I don’t know what else to say.

    Perhaps you believe that your thought processes are sufficiently similar to what a hand held can opener (that is designed to open round cans only but sometimes manages to open herring cans) that you are satisfied that Dennett’s talk is more than (weakly) metaphorical. If so, we have extremely different intuitions on this matter.

    ETA: You may note here, that I have switched from the two-bitser to a can opener. But I maintain that the similarities between the slug “detector” and the round can “detector” are much more similar than what I do is to what either of those fellows do.

  5. walto:

    ETA: You may note here, that I have switched from the two-bitser to a can opener. But I maintain that the similarities between the slug “detector” and the round can “detector” are much more similar than what I do is to what either of those fellows do.

    The two-bitser is a much better example than the can opener, because it has an internal state that means it has detected something quarter-like.

    The relevant internal “state” of my hand-held can opener consists of two variables: the angle between the handles and the angular position of the knob. Unlike the two-bitser’s state, those state variables do not tell me that the opener has “detected” a can; the knob position is irrelevant, and the handles can be at the same angle regardless of whether a can is present.

    For that reason, I’ll stick to the two-bitser.

  6. walto,

    Perhaps you believe that your thought processes are sufficiently similar to what a hand held can opener (that is designed to open round cans only but sometimes manages to open herring cans) that you are satisfied that Dennett’s talk is more than (weakly) metaphorical. If so, we have extremely different intuitions on this matter.

    That’s a nonsequitur. It’s obvious that two-bitsers are vastly different from humans in many respects. Neither Dennett nor I deny that, but vast differences by themselves do not guarantee that human intentionality is “genuine” while two-bitser intentionality is not. There need to be relevant differences.

    The question isn’t how similar humans and two-bitsers are overall, or how similar their “thought processes” are. The question is this: Do two-bitsers and humans possess the same basic kind of intentionality? Specifically, are they both syntax-based systems that mimic unrealizable semantic systems possessing original intentionality?

    If they are, then the two-bitser’s intentionality isn’t metaphorical at all. This is what Dennett and I believe. The two-bitser’s intentionality is the same kind of intentionality that humans have, though vastly less complicated.

    On the other hand, you say that those are definitely not instances of the same kind of intentionality. One is merely metaphorical and the other is genuine.

    If so, then the following must be true of at least one property X:

    1. X is a property possessed by humans.
    2. X is a property not possessed by two-bitsers.
    3. X is a prerequisite for genuine intentionality. Entities lacking X cannot exhibit genuine intentionality.

    Can you name a property X that satisfies those requirements?

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