Another discussion of objective morality has broken out, so I thought I would provide a home for it.
579 thoughts on “objective morality, for the umpteenth time”
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The Skeptical Zone
"I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken."
keiths:
sean:
I’m not talking about absolute certainty, which is impossible in any case. But if morality is objective, then the following statement is either true or false, period:
You can’t have one objective moral system in which the above is true, and another objective moral system in which it’s false. At least one of the two must be subjective.
walto:
keiths:
walto:
keiths:
walto:
Yep. Otherwise you wouldn’t have raised the objection in the first place. Would you seriously argue that people don’t have moral standards and don’t make moral judgments? That would be ridiculous.
Again, nope.
The point is that you need to have a definition of ‘morality’ handy in order to claim that morality exists. On your view, deciding on a def is sufficient to make an attribution subjective.
I agree that any coherent, actual moral system must be able to say whether it is “always immoral to lie”
Adding the word “objectively” to that assertion adds nothing. If the moral system is itself objective, then that word becomes redundant. If the moral system is not objective, then the claim is subjective either way.
But your prior objection (to which I was replying) was different anyway. You wrote that I’d,
Having found the “one true basis for [objective] morality” is different from supplying one true determination about some moral claim. As long as the moral system in question provides coherent answers to these questions, it does not matter whether that moral system is the one and only objective moral system or not.
sean s.
wslto,
Again, yep.
You’re confusing the definition of the word ‘morality’ with a specification of what is and isn’t moral.
Step 2 involves such a specification, but no such specification is needed to justify the claim that morality exists and that people make moral judgments.
No. I’m not talking about what counts as moral–just about what it means for morality to exist. Try to focus on that alone, as I am.
sean:
Sure it does. That statement can be true in one subjective moral system and false in another. Adding the word ‘objectively means that we are talking about the one true objective morality, supposing one even exists. (I don’t think it does, of course.)
Since you believe that morality is objective, can you name some objective moral truths and justify their objective status?
walto:
Are you talking about a situation in which one person holds, for example, that morality is a system of beliefs about right and wrong, while another defines it as a regimen of exercises designed to improve one’s golf swing?
sean,
We weren’t talking about “supplying one true determination about some moral claim”.
Here’s the exchange again:
keiths:
sean:
keiths:
As I have already written, it does not matter whether a particular objective moral system is the one and only objective moral system or not. Requiring evidence that I’m proposing the “one and true objective morality is not necessary.
Objective does not mean exclusive, or unique, or even verified or correct. The standard of objectivity speaks only to the sources and bases of the idea or concept. Darwin’s theories were not “subjective” until someone demonstrated they were the only possible theory, they were objective because of how Darwin justified them, even when they were still uncertain.
There can be multiple objective explanations for some phenomena; at some point one would expect all but one to be disproved; but even if disproved, explanations can STILL be objective, just objective and incorrect. On the other hand, multiple objective moral systems might turn out to be merely different versions of the same thing; I suspect that if there are more than one objective moral systems, they can be reconciled, much like “reconciliation” is sought between the four forces.
sean s.
Suppose I say, ‘Nowhere is there really a true system of morality in place, although here and there one can find taboos of various intensities.’ How will you ‘prove objectively’ that indeed there ARE systems of morality in place?
Always we must define our terms–in science as in ethics. If it is ‘subjectifying’ to have to define ‘human flourishing’ then it is equally subjectifying to define ‘morality’ (or ‘energy’ or ‘mass’).
It is not “subjectifying” (sic) to have to define terms.
Even objective terms need to be defined.
Do you have a definition for human flourishing which is not subjective?
I apologize if you already gave this and I missed it.
sean s.
Exactly, that was my point.
Not handy, no. I could crib one from Kraut, but, again, I’m without my computer at present.
I’m sure there’s something at SEP too, if anybody would care to look.
Unfortunately for me that’s about all I can do in terms of contributing to this thread, so there it goes:
Virtue Ethics
Well Being
Aristotle on Causality
sean:
Right. I’m not saying defining a term automatically renders it subjective. I’m saying that for any definition of “flourishing” that is sufficiently precise (with specified weights) to serve as a criterion for judging morality, that definition will also be subjective. You won’t get anything close to a consensus on it.
For example, as I mentioned upthread, people won’t agree on how to weight freedom vs social stability as a metric of “flourishing”.
If people can’t agree on a definition, there will have to be a stipulation, or there will just be no communication at all. If I were an aristotelian, I’d simply provide my def–i think ‘flourishing’ is basically a technical term at this point (unlike, say, ‘claim).
dazz,
Thanks, dazz.
sean:
Then you are using “objective morality” in a way that I don’t recognize.
When people say it’s objectively immoral to trip senior citizens for fun, they don’t mean that it might or might not be wrong, or who knows, or to each his own. They mean that it’s wrong.
walto,
And as soon as you stipulate a definition, there will be folks who will disagree that flourishing, as defined, is the proper and objective basis of morality. How will you prove them wrong?
sean,
Let me repeat this request:
Since you believe that morality is objective, can you name some objective moral truths and justify their objective status?
Yes. That’s the real encroachment–the only one I see, as i’ve said above. Objectivists have to respond to that query, certainly.
walto,
Here’s what you’re missing: Two people may agree on a dictionary definition of ‘flourish’ — this one, for instance…
…yet still disagree on the nuts and bolts of how to judge which of two actions better contributes to ‘flourishing’ in that sense.
In other words, the dictionary definition is insufficient to serve as a basis for moral judgments. You can stipulate a more precise definition, but such a stipulation will itself be subjective. Two people who agree with a dictionary definition may not agree on a more precise definition.
So there really are two “encroachments of subjectivity”: 1) the selection of “flourishing” as the goal of morality, and 2) the choice of a specific, precise definition of “flourishing” as needed to form a basis for moral judgments.
I agree that ‘be in a vigorous state; thrive” is the sort of def that is likely to result in squabbles. If that’s the best the Aristotelian can do, you may be right about a second problem. I don’t see that as unavoidable, myself, but I am not an Aristotelian. Maybe KN can suggest a definition that’s not so….squishy.
walto,
He’s already in trouble by dint of referring to human flourishing as the basis of morality. Sentient non-human creatures also matter, and I know from past discussions that he agrees with this.
He’ll need to modify “human flourishing” to something more general, and then justify it as a basis for objective morality. Good luck to him. I don’t think it can be done.
walto,
I’m sure Aristotelians can do better. The problem is that they have to define “flourishing” precisely enough to enable moral judgments, and any definition that is sufficiently precise is bound to engender disagreement.
I’m not an Aristotelian, either. I’m a Deweyan about the Good and a Rawlsian about the Right (and the priority of the Right over the Good). Radical liberalism all the way!
keiths,
I generally see discussions of well-being completely separated from discussions of morality these days. I generally hear it said that a life can be better FOR someone, without being a better life. So flourishing is pumped into prudential values without necessarily making its way into moral values (though, of course, it could find its way in there too with the help of some sort of utility function).
walto:
You’re neglecting the interpersonal. Jeopardizing the well-being of another is very much a moral issue.
Depends on your moral theory.
Even if your personal moral theory doesn’t take the well-being of others into account, you can hardly argue that discussions of well-being are completely separate from discussions of morality “these days”.
I find Rawls difficult, and his style always puts me off a bit. He was very smart and very important, obviously, but, to me at least, he’s kind of unsatisfying–maybe because his theory is so byzantine. And I like simple.
They are. There’s often an opening paragraph to the effect that ‘I’m not going to discuss morality but confine myself to prudential values here–what makes a life better for someone.’ A ton of prudential value lit over the past decade that says nothing whatever about morality–maybe because it’s harder. Dunno.
ETA: Look at Sumner, Dorsey, Keller, Feldman, Arneson, Kraut, or go back all the way to Lamont. That’s just a sprinkling. Can give you more when I get my box back.
walto,
Again, you’re neglecting the interpersonal. How our actions affect the well-being of others is still very much a part of discussions of morality these days.
Is it possible to make objective statements about subjectivity? Can one make objective, factual statements about subjective things? For instance, is the following statement objective and factual:
“Humans typically seek happiness or pleasure; and typically avoid pain and unhappiness.”
Is that a factual, objective statement or mere subjective opinion?
sean s.
Need a def of ‘subjectivity’ to answer that, obviously. Based on what you suggested above, it’s subjective. But I don’t think your proposal was thought through.
walto,
There are dozens of dictionaries available on the internet, not counting technical sources. Please assume “subjectivity” has a normal meaning.
sean s.
sean:
Yes. However, objective statements about subjective morality are not statements of objective morality.
Let me repeat my request:
Since you believe that morality is objective, can you name some objective moral truths and justify their objective status?
Ah. Finally. Progress.
I agree that objective statements about subjective morality do not constitute objective morality. If that was what “objective morality” was it would be nothing more than a critique of subjective morality; that’s something that I have zero interest in.
But clearly objective morality must include objective statements about subjective things. Morality touches on things like flourishing, happiness, right and wrong; all these are normally subjective topics that an objective morality must be able to address objectively.
Now at least we agree that it is possible to make objective statements about them.
I’m not ignoring your question, I think I can do those things but I think it’s premature. Heck! We just finally found a way to talk objectively about subjective things.
When you invited me to write an OP, I was very clear that a full OP would take some time; I’ve never promised it soonly. KF and I last debated this something like 2 years ago (on UD). I need to retrieve my writing from then, and fit it to this site. Your objections are significantly different from KF’s.
sean s.
walto,
In an earlier discussion of objective morality, you took a position which I summarized as follows:
You haven’t mentioned anything like that in the current thread. Have you abandoned it?
sean,
Okay, but in the meantime, please just name an objective moral truth or two so that the rest of us can begin thinking about whether they qualify.
That’s not unusual. Many moral answers are sensitive to the circumstances. Is it moral to chop someone’s foot off? If it’s gangrenous and your stuck with them out in the wilderness, it could well be. If you’re just reenacting a movie from the “Saw” franchise, not so much.
The only way any moral system (objective or not) can be consistent is to be fact-sensitive: change the facts, change the issues, change the circumstances, and the answer has to be able to change too.
“X is always wrong” is almost always incorrect or unreliable.
sean s.
Sorry, but I’m going to pass for now. However, since we all live in a large, interconnected, pluralistic, and diverse world, I’m pretty sure those facts should suffice to get you started on thinking about the problem.
A thought problem:
You’re locked in a room with someone very different from yourself and fully capable of killing you.
You two can communicate, and choose how to act.
How do you survive?
How do you escape?
sean s.
sean,
Not so. There is nothing inconsistent about Kant’s belief that lying is always wrong, for instance. Do you disagree?
In any case, walto’s proposal was quite specific, with objective morality being determined by an aggregating function across the desires of all sentient beings, and with the results of that aggregation being (imperfectly) available to us via our consciences.
It was a really odd proposal.
sean,
Why? I’ve merely asked you to state an objective moral truth or two. No justification required.
sean,
There are all kinds of strategies one could employ. How is this relevant to the question of what is objectively moral?
Hahaha
keiths,
You are free to pass on my thought problem; just as I am free to pass on your request. You requested something to begin thinking about, so I gave you something. I didn’t fulfill your request exactly as you wanted, but that is not my obligation. Do with this what you wish.
II disagree. An individual statement of belief does not constitute a moral system. Kant’s statement–of itself–may be internally consistent, but my comment was about systemic consistency. This is not a minor difference. Kant’s statement is not part of a consistent moral system.
sean s.
Ah well.
sean s.
I still think something like that is right for prudential values–although I now prefer what I call a ‘choice’ standard to desire satisfactionism. But I don’t know if I’d try to make a case for it for moral values anymore. Still half-baked, I’m afraid.
What I mean is that I’d still try to argue that the best world is a function of that type of aggregation, but I don’t mean ‘most moral’ by ‘best’ there. The problem is that morality is (like subjectivity) a hairy beast.
To be clearer, I’m still comfortable saying that values are both man-made and objective, if we’re talking about prudential values (what makes lives go well) for persons or societies. But I’m not so sanguine about moral values.
ETA: and ,as indicated above, I’ll try to provide a def of ‘objective’ this week-end. I’ll also give a def of voluntarism–the sense in which the values are created by human valuations.