objective morality, for the umpteenth time

Another discussion of objective morality has broken out, so I thought I would provide a home for it.

579 thoughts on “objective morality, for the umpteenth time

  1. walto,

    No intelligent person could read this thread and fail to understand what I mean by “objective” and “objective morality”.

    It’s been a bad thread for you. The low point was probably when you inadvertently mocked your own position:

    walto:

    or foolishly insist that we shoul all continue to use ‘objective’ in such a way that ‘I have the flu’ may be both an objective claim and false?

    keiths:

    Dude, you just mocked your own position!

    …followed by a walto pseudo-flounce…

    Ok, we’re done.

    …as if I were responsible for your silly mistake.

    You’ve also made an ass of yourself with your false accusations (of quote mining and equivocation), and with your attempt to dismiss criticisms as “lame”, when in fact you’re unable to respond to them.

    I’m guessing you don’t get high marks for “Deals constructively with criticism” on your performance reviews. That’s unfortunate, because it’s an essential skill for anyone who aspires to be a philosopher.

    On the other hand, some good has come of the thread. You’re now aware of some serious flaws in the paper you’re circulating. That gives you an opportunity to do a rewrite. Had you not quoted it here, you’d be unaware of the need.

  2. walto,

    Here’s an opportunity for you to deal constructively with criticism, for a change. In an earlier discussion, you claimed that our consciences actually sense objective morality. I criticized that claim:

    Yes, and it’s symptomatic of another problem with walto’s model — the lack of selective pressure for the ability to sense objective morality, assuming the latter even exists.

    Evolution “cares” only about what gets genes into future generations. It doesn’t care about objective morality, so there is no reason to expect that our consciences have evolved to be accurate diviners of objective morality. A false or purely subjective sense of morality is perfectly fine by the lights of evolution — all that matters is that it promotes reproductive success.

    I asked:

    If there’s no selective pressure for our consciences to sense objective morality, then why would they do so?

    See if you can suppress your childish urge to dismiss the criticism as “lame” and to run away from it. Deal with it head-on, the way a good philosopher would.

  3. keiths: A false or purely subjective sense of morality is perfectly fine by the lights of evolution — all that matters is that it promotes reproductive success.

    I asked:

    If there’s no selective pressure for our consciences to sense objective morality, then why would they do so?

    No idea. Perhaps they don’t. But it’s worth pointing out not only that it’s possible for everything that seems reasonable–given our perceptual responses–to be false, but also that the same concern you raise here could (and has been) raised about consciousness generally–unless it’s construed as behavior. Reproductive success may not require it.

  4. walto,

    …the same concern you raise here could (and has been) raised about consciousness generally–unless it’s construed as behavior. Reproductive success may not require it.

    Hence the “access consciousness”/”phenomenal consciousness” distinction, with access consciousness (a-consciousness) having behavioral consequences while phenomenal consciousness (p-consciousness) presumably does not. The problem with that idea is that it’s incoherent: any first-person reports of p-consciousness — and there are plenty — can only be the result of access, thus undermining the distinction.

    So p-consciousness may not exist as a distinct entity, in which case its evolutionary provenance is no longer troublesome.

    Either way you still have a problem with the conscience, because the conscience clearly does influence behavior. Thus it is more like a-consciousness than p-consciousness, and it’s susceptible to selective pressures.

    The only reason to trust the conscience as an indicator of objective morality would be if reproductive success, by sheer coincidence, happened to align with objective morality. But why would it?

  5. keiths: The problem with that idea is that it’s incoherent: any first-person reports of p-consciousness — and there are plenty — can only be the result of access

    How do you know that? I’d especially think a skeptic like you would contend they all might be delusory!

    keiths: Either way you still have a problem with the conscience, because the conscience clearly does influence behavior.

    What is “the conscience”? Is that like Freud’s super-ego?

    There were some philosophers (Adam Smith was one, I believe) who held that there was a distinguishable “moral sense”–if that’s what “the conscience” is supposed to be. But it’s not a very popular view any more, I don’t think.

    keiths: The only reason to trust the conscience as an indicator of objective morality would be if reproductive success, by sheer coincidence, happened to align with objective morality.

    Again, just as it’s possible for all of our moral judgments to wrong, it’s also possible for all of our perceptual judgments to be wrong. Not being a skeptic, like you are, I believe we know some of this stuff, nevertheless. I wouldn’t make an evolutionary/genetic case for any of it myself, though.

  6. walto,

    My Cartesian skepticism is irrelevant here. We’re talking about your model of objective morality, and the evolutionary objection I’ve raised holds even without invoking Cartesian skepticism.

    What is “the conscience”? Is that like Freud’s super-ego?

    In your model, conscience and the emotions were purportedly capable of sensing objective morality. I’ve explained at length why that doesn’t make sense, and the evolutionary objection is one reason.

    Without selective pressure, there is no reason to expect conscience and the emotions to be accurate indicators of objective morality. If you disagree, I’d be interesting in hearing your counterargument.

  7. keiths: and the evolutionary objection I’ve raised holds even without invoking Cartesian skepticism.

    I hope so, since it’s actually inconsistent with it! That was my point.

    What’s my “model” of objective morality?

  8. {Note to self: I wonder what it feels like to be so desperate to fight with somebody all the time.}

    WON’T ANYBODY HERE FIGHT WITH KEITHS? OR AT LEAST TAKE HIS “CHALLENGE”?

    ETA: Actually, your last post wasn’t particularly “fighty”–so I take this back.

    I haven’t thought about any possible connections between a theory according to which emotions are intentional and evolutionary pressures. But at first thought, my sense is that the answer depends on what values are. I don’t see anything inconsistent between such claims, so long as values aren’t ethereal, things–necessary truths, as FMM has recently claimed.

    But if they’re not, one gets back to your epistemic challenges, which, since we’ve been through at length two or three times previously, I don’t see the point of discussing again. You don’t seem to have altered your views on anything, so far as I can tell.

  9. walto:

    {Note to self: I wonder what it feels like to be so desperate to fight with somebody all the time.}

    WON’T ANYBODY HERE FIGHT WITH KEITHS? OR AT LEAST TAKE HIS “CHALLENGE”?

    Try to tamp down the insecurity, walto. You’ve done poorly in this thread, and it obviously stings. Your impulse is to try to cut your opponent down to size, rather than acknowledging your errors and learning from them. You’ve even resorted to false accusations and lying.

    Learn to accept your limitations, instead of fighting to the death to deny them. This is a difficult subject for you, and you have a lot to learn. Expend your energy on learning, not on denial.

  10. walto,

    I hope so, since it’s actually inconsistent with it!

    No, they’re consistent with each other. Remember, I don’t claim that perception isn’t veridical — just that we can’t know that it is veridical. That makes all the difference, and it’s why skepticism doesn’t have the dire consequences that KN mistakenly attributed to it.

    What’s my “model” of objective morality?

    The one you proposed in our earlier discussions, in which objective morality depends on an “aggregating function” over the desires of all sentient beings, and in which we sense objective morality via our consciences and emotions.

  11. walto,

    I haven’t thought about any possible connections between a theory according to which emotions are intentional and evolutionary pressures.

    Yes, and that’s a big part of the problem. You accept evolution, and you accept the causal closure of the physical, yet you haven’t thought about why our consciences and emotions would be an indicator of objective morality, as your model requires. It’s a major oversight.

    But at first thought, my sense is that the answer depends on what values are. I don’t see anything inconsistent between such claims, so long as values aren’t ethereal, things–necessary truths, as FMM has recently claimed.

    In your model, values are derivable from the aggregating function, wherever and however that is implemented. Hence the evolutionary objection, and also these criticisms:

    Regarding the aggregating function, where does it happen, and how is it accomplished physically? Is it inside each of us, or outside somewhere? Are the desires of all sentient beings beamed to the aggregating point or points? Is it just the sentient beings within our light cone whose desires are aggregated? How do our consciences query the aggregating function to determine whether something is objectively moral?

  12. keiths: I hope so, since it’s actually inconsistent with it!

    No, they’re consistent with each other. Remember, I don’t claim that perception isn’t veridical — just that we can’t know that it is veridical. That makes all the difference,

    I think the claim that perception is likely to be veridical in virtue of evolutionary pressures to be so is inconsistent with the claim that we have no reason to suppose that perceptions are veridical–as the Cartesian does. FWIW, I don’t agree with either of those positions, myself.

    keiths: The one you proposed in our earlier discussions, in which objective morality depends on an “aggregating function” over the desires of all sentient beings, and in which we sense objective morality via our consciences and emotions.

    I don’t think that’s inconsistent with an evolutionary take at all. For example, suppose the desires are about living and reproducing.

  13. As for this:

    {Note to self: I wonder what it feels like to be so desperate to fight with somebody all the time.}

    Give yourself a shake and look at the title of the blog. I’m not “desperate to fight”; I’m just skeptical of what you’ve been saying, and I’m giving my reasons.

    Try not to fall apart when someone challenges you, walto. Discussion is what TSZ is for.

  14. keiths: I’m just skeptical of what you’ve been saying, and I’m giving my reasons.

    Nope. You like to fight. You should actually read the stuff you post and repost and repost. Almost all of it is gratuitously nasty. The paradox is that many more people would discuss things with you (which I get that you actually enjoy) if you could find a way to do it in a less obnoxious fashion. But I take it you enjoy trying to hurt people as much as you do discussing issues with them.

    It’s too bad.

  15. walto,

    I think the claim that perception is likely to be veridical in virtue of evolutionary pressures to be so is inconsistent with the claim that we have no reason to suppose that perceptions are veridical–as the Cartesian does.

    It isn’t inconsistent for a Cartesian skeptic to hold that evolutionary pressures will favor veridical perception. The skeptic just acknowledges that evolutionary pressures may not apply if we are deeply wrong about the structure of reality.

    walto:

    What’s my “model” of objective morality?

    keiths:

    The one you proposed in our earlier discussions, in which objective morality depends on an “aggregating function” over the desires of all sentient beings, and in which we sense objective morality via our consciences and emotions.

    walto:

    I don’t think that’s inconsistent with an evolutionary take at all. For example, suppose the desires are about living and reproducing.

    First of all, not all desires promote reproductive success: an obvious counterexample is the choice to use contraceptives.

    Second, you forget that you’re aggregating across the desires of all sentient creatures. What’s good for one organism’s reproduction won’t necessarily be good for another’s.

    There’s simply no reason to expect selective pressures to line up with your proposed aggregating function.

  16. walto,

    Which of us has resorted to false accusations and lies in this thread? You, of course. It’s a longstanding pattern.

    It infuriates you when I point out your mistakes, and you resort to dishonesty in an effort to cut me down to size. Why not simply acknowledge your mistakes and learn from them, like a good philosopher would?

  17. keiths:
    walto,

    It isn’t inconsistent for a Cartesian skeptic to hold that evolutionary pressures will favor veridical perception.The skeptic just acknowledges that evolutionary pressures may not apply if we are deeply wrong about the structure of reality.

    I would put it that if the skeptic is right it doesn’t matter whether evolutionary pressures apply–either to perceptions or to emotions.

    First of all, not all desires promote reproductive success:an obvious counterexample is the choice to use contraceptives.

    Second, you forget that you’re aggregating across the desires of all sentient creatures.What’s good for one organism’s reproduction won’t necessarily be good for another’s.

    There’s simply no reason to expect selective pressures to line up with your proposed aggregating function.

    Again, I haven’t said they do or have any particular view on the matter one way or the other, I just don’t see why they couldn’t. And I also note the similar unlikelihood of every veridical perception being reproduction-enhancing. For all I know if many more perceptions were visions of likely mates, there’d be more people.

    In any case, I don’t hang my hat on productiveness-of-evolutionary success: if one takes that as fundamental, one seems to me to be proposing it as a moral standard. And it doesn’t seem like a particularly plausible one to me.

  18. keiths: Which of us has resorted to false accusations and lies in this thread? You, of course. It’s a longstanding pattern.

    It infuriates you when I point out your mistakes, and you resort to dishonesty in an effort to cut me down to size. Why not simply acknowledge your mistakes and learn from them, like a good philosopher would?

    This is an example of trolling, IMO. If you want people to interact with you, you should cut the shit.

  19. keiths:

    It isn’t inconsistent for a Cartesian skeptic to hold that evolutionary pressures will favor veridical perception.The skeptic just acknowledges that evolutionary pressures may not apply if we are deeply wrong about the structure of reality.

    walto:

    I would put it that if the skeptic is right it doesn’t matter whether evolutionary pressures apply–either to perceptions or to emotions.

    No, because as I keep emphasizing, the skeptic does not claim that perception is non-veridical:

    Remember, I don’t claim that perception isn’t veridical — just that we can’t know that it is veridical. That makes all the difference, and it’s why skepticism doesn’t have the dire consequences that KN mistakenly attributed to it.

  20. keiths,

    Of course all perceptions could be veridical in spite of skeptical doubts. In the same way, all emotions could be legitimate in spite of skeptical doubts.

  21. keiths:

    First of all, not all desires promote reproductive success: an obvious counterexample is the choice to use contraceptives.

    Second, you forget that you’re aggregating across the desires of all sentient creatures. What’s good for one organism’s reproduction won’t necessarily be good for another’s.

    There’s simply no reason to expect selective pressures to line up with your proposed aggregating function.

    walto:

    Again, I haven’t said they do or have any particular view on the matter one way or the other,

    Your model depends on it, unless you can come up with some non-evolutionary explanation for why our consciences and emotions should be accurate indicators of objective morality. Can you?

    I just don’t see why they couldn’t.

    I explained why, in the comment I just quoted. There’s no reason to expect selective pressures to line up with objective morality. Do you understand the reasons I gave?

  22. Re your guanoed comment. The only other participant here who posts in that fashion is Gregory. And while you attempt to make it about me, you fight in the same obno manner with Jock, with Alan, with Fmm, with KN, etc. Your posts are regularly ad hom–simply intended to hurt. (The ones to fmm are particularly disgusting, imo).

    I put up with it because I think you’re smart and say interesting and acute things occasionally. So, like others, I ‘flounce’ and return, trying to look past your abusive behavior. But others will not. They’ll ignore you or leave, as will I at some point.

    Why do you hate being disagreed with so much? Why does it turn you so mean? What’s the point of ending up having nobody to interact with at all?

  23. walto: Of course all perceptions could be veridical in spite of skeptical doubts.

    That’s a bit black-and-white. After all most of us can perceive colour. Perception is a kind of modelling and our perceptive models vary in accuracy depending on the range and accuracy of our sensory inputs.

  24. This discussion has reminded me of the ‘why people can’t admit when they’re wong’ threads. The confusion there was that the problem was entirely misplaced. What causes issues is that, whoever may be right or wrong, some people get really upset about being disagreed with, and react by hurling insults as though that is likely to produce the admission they seek.

    If one is comfortable with one’s views and the reasons one has for them, one ought to be able to live with the real possibility both that others might not agree and that one is completely wrong. The desire to obtain admissions from others–particularly by insulting them– seems to me beyond weird.

    Skepticism doesn’t require badgering, imo. You make your case and that’s it. Why repost the same stuff 15 times even if you think it’s utterly right (even if it isn’t chock full of insults)? It’s needy and silly. And, of course, if it DOES contain insults, it’s also nasty.

    Ok, you can move this too if you want.

  25. In terms of how folks are using “objective morality” here, is that supposed to be moral cognitivism plus moral realism? Or just one of those? Or both and something else?

    By “moral cognitivism,” I mean the view that moral statements have truth-values — they can be true or false — as opposed to non-cognitivism, which holds that moral statements don’t have truth-values because they are more like expressions of taste or sentiment.

    By “moral realism” I mean the view that moral statements are made true by referring to mind-independent facts, or if they are false, because they don’t refer to mind-independent facts.

    (Notice then that one could be a non-cognitivist or an anti-realist; I don’t think there’s much point in being both.)

    I think that one of the harder problems lurking here about is, if anything like moral realism is true, what is the nature of those moral facts, and how would we find that out? The view I’ve been urging here is that those facts are facts about the conditions that facilitate cooperation and flourishing. Those are facts that we get not just from philosophy but from ecology, sociology, political science, psychology and the cognitive & affective neuroscience, etc. And that’s quite consistent with the idea, central to the social sciences, that some of those conditions are cultural constructions.

  26. walto,

    Of course all perceptions could be veridical in spite of skeptical doubts. In the same way, all emotions could be legitimate in spite of skeptical doubts.

    And if perceptions truly are mostly veridical, then evolution really occurs and selective pressures do in fact matter. That’s a problem for you, because there is no reason to expect selective pressures to align themselves with your “aggregating function”, and thus no reason to expect our consciences and emotions to be accurate indicators of your objective morality.

    It’s a fatal flaw in your model.

  27. keiths:
    walto,

    And if perceptions truly are mostly veridical, then evolution really occurs and selective pressures do in fact matter.

    No, that doesn’t follow at all: perceptions could all be veridical whether or not there were any such thing as evolution. Evolution is simply an explanation of why that might happen.

    That’s a problem for you, because there is no reason to expect selective pressures to align themselves with your “aggregating function”, and thus no reason to expect our consciences and emotions to be accurate indicators of your objective morality.

    No, as I’ve already explained twice, it wouldn’t be a problem anyhow. The two views are completely consistent.

    It’s a fatal flaw in your model.

    No.

  28. Kantian Naturalist: In terms of how folks are using “objective morality” here, is that supposed to be moral cognitivism plus moral realism? Or just one of those? Or both and something else?

    I’ve been trying to find out what keiths means by the term since the beginning of the thread. I’ve come to understand that he at least means ‘true’–and in addition something like impartial. I’m on board with the impartial part, but for the reasons you gave in your last (excellent) post involving Kant, Mackie and Blackburn, wouldn’t include true.

    On the cog/non-cog question I prefer to hedge a bit, because of my voluntaristic tendencies. I.e., I don’t think values are independent of valuations in the same way that empirical propositions are independent of perceptions. (Not meaning to suggest there that the empirical props are totally independent either–i’d leave that question to you!) But the relationship is different, imo.

  29. walto: On the cog/non-cog question I prefer to hedge a bit, because of my voluntaristic tendencies. I.e., I don’t think values are independent of valuations in the same way that empirical propositions are independent of perceptions. (Not meaning to suggest there that the empirical props are totally independent either–i’d leave that question to you!) But they’re different, imo.

    For sure, there’s an important distinction to be drawn somewhere in there!

    There’s something about the constructivist position in meta-ethics that I really like (once a Kantian, always a Kantian, I guess). But the deeper I get into Hegel and pragmatism, the more intuitive it seems that the constructivism has got to be cashed out in terms of social practices rather than anything deduced from the very nature of rational agency.

  30. Kantian Naturalist: (Notice then that one could be a non-cognitivist or an anti-realist; I don’t think there’s much point in being both.)

    I’m not clear as to these definitions. What if I hold that that moral statements have truth-values but are not mind-independent?

    Kantian Naturalist: if anything like moral realism is true, what is the nature of those moral facts, and how would we find that out?

    You know my answer to that question.

    But perhaps more importantly why is it critical that we know these things?

    It’s possible that the truth value of moral statements could forever be unknown to us. It would still be of some value to know that objective moral statements are either true or false.

    peace

  31. fifthmonarchyman: It’s possible that the truth value of moral statements could forever be unknown to us. It would still be of some value to know that objective moral statements are either true or false.

    I agree, but the very suggestion has raised keiths hackles for some reason.

  32. walto: I agree, but the very suggestion has raised keiths hackles for some reason.

    You know the reason. 😉

    peace

  33. fifth:

    It’s possible that the truth value of moral statements could forever be unknown to us. It would still be of some value to know that objective moral statements are either true or false.

    walto:

    I agree, but the very suggestion has raised keiths hackles for some reason.

    What an odd thing to say. What makes you think that the idea of an existing but unknown (or unknowable) objective morality has “raised my hackles”? I actually suggested that possibility to sean samis earlier in the thread.

    ETA Here:

    It’s logically possible for objective morality to exist even if you have no access to it. (That would make your argument a bit more difficult, however.)

  34. keiths: What makes you think that the idea of an existing but unknown (or unknowable) objective morality has “raised my hackles”?

    Several dozen of your posts on this thread according to which nothing can be objectively moral unless it is both true and known

    Instead of regaling us repeatedly with excerpts of your posts that you’re obviously particularly proud of, maybe you should go back and read all of them.

  35. Interesting that walto makes the claim without bothering to verify it, and fifth likewise piles on without bothering to check whether walto is correct.

  36. walto:

    Several dozen of your posts on this thread according to which nothing can be objectively moral unless it is both true and known

    Where have I made that claim?

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