Premise:
- A “bad state” is a state that an organism would want to change.
- A “good state” is a state that an organism seeks to achieve.
Therefore:
- A “bad action” is causing an organism to enter a state that they would want to change.
- A “good action” is helping an organism achieve a state that they don’t want to change.
Unfortunately, sometimes the good state of one organism depends on the bad state of another (or of the same organism at a different time). So for any organism (and we are probably the only ones on this planet at this time) with the capacity to weigh up actions on the basis of cui bono? (and when?), there will be frequent tension between competing claims. I suggest that our methodology for resolving these claims are what constitutes what we call our “morality”, and that our methods of agreeing on this methodology are what constitutes our justice systems. I also suggest that both arise directly from of our capacity to weigh up alternative courses of action on the basis of competing claims to the right to a “good state”, and need have nothing to do with whether or not there is a God or gods who care either.
Man of all creatures
Is superlative
(Away melancholy)
He of all creatures alone
Raiseth a stone
(Away melancholy)
Into the stone, the god
Pours what he knows of good
Calling, good, God.
Away melancholy, let it go.Speak not to me of tears,
Tyranny, pox, wars,
Saying, Can God
Stone of man’s thoughts, be good?
Say rather it is enough
That the stuffed
Stone of man’s good, growing,
By man’s called God.
Away, melancholy, let it goStevie Smith, “Away Melancholy“
Although of course, if there is such a God, and that God is good, she might care very deeply.
William J. Murray,
I don’t think of my view as physicalist, but I suspect you think it is. That’s fine by me — I’m not going to quarrel over labels like that. Life is too short.
Where we quite clearly disagree is over this:
While I ponder about how to best express my views on my drive home, let me ask you: on your view, can a monkey or a cat reason? Can it think? Can it act purposively or intentionally?
If you answer “yes” to any of those questions, what’s the difference between what a monkey or a cat can do and what a normal mature human being can do?
I want to frame the issue here in these terms because
(a) I think it’s much more helpful to get down to specifics of comparative cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience than it is talking in vague, broad terms about “causation”, “reasoning”, “physical states”, and so forth;
(b) I suspect that, compared to you (and to most theists) I have a somewhat more inflated conception of what monkeys and cats can do, cognitively speaking, and also a less inflated conception of what humans can do. As a consequence the ‘gap’ is narrowed from both sides, so to speak, and is more easily crossable by neo-Darwinian processes.
We can also think here about the role of social norms in regulating social behavior in highly intelligent animals dependent on group cooperation — animals such as elephants, dolphins, and chimps — as it seems quite plausible to me that morality is not exclusive to human beings.
KN:
We can also think here about the role of social norms in regulating social behavior in highly intelligent animals dependent on group cooperation — animals such as elephants, dolphins, and chimps — as it seems quite plausible to me that morality is not exclusive to human beings
Again, I think it’s plausible that what we’re calling morality generally, evolved within species according the social arrangements of each species. What is moral behavior for a dog would be anathema to the cat, and vice versa. Herd animals have different patterns of “right” social behaviors than loners; hunters different from herbivores.
And the mechanism for moral evolution strikes me as equally plausible – that individuals who violated the rules had lower survival rates. The golden rule is found in all human societies because people are enough alike for this to be an effective and useful rule of thumb. And it’s a rule inapplicable for a strict pecking order (like a dog pack) or for lone hunters (like cats).
I suppose for the theists, the idea of evolution providing our moral precepts is as unacceptable as evolution providing our physiologies. Much easier in both cases to confect and then worship an imaginary poofist.
Yes, I agree.
But it won’t happen.
I agree. Sometimes I slip into old bad habits.
When I see brain state I stop reading. Nothing useful will follow.
A brain state is just a physical state. Physical states are extremely useful in describing and analyzing physical systems.
It won’t happen again.
And yet the idea of a state space is central to DST.
I never liked daylight savings time.
Kantian Naturalist,
In those other animals you mentioned, essentially their moral code is “might makes right”. If a male chimpanzee wants to eat the baby of another chimp, they will simply do so. Do you think they then become outcasts in their society?
So it seems what you want to call “moral” in an animal culture, is quite different than the principle of “do no harm” that we see in human culture. Aren’t you really just using the idea of morality as a substitute for the word co-operation? Are you willing to just call human morality simply human co-operation? Because I think there will be some problems there.
It’s worse than that. You are saying that you have a view of morality, whereas you really don’t. At all.The discussion would be meaningful if you had a view of morality, so there would be two things to compare.
Phoodoo, why not take a break from your usual MO of “making shit up hoping it supports your worldview” why not, for a refreshing change, read a paper /. do some research?*
http://www.onekind.org/education/animal_sentience/empathy/empathy_in_chimpanzees/
*Remember when you just read the extract of one, then wrote a whole post on it? That was funny – but was it moral?
I start typing.
But then I give up.
heh. You are absolved.
Perhaps one of you could do an OP explaining what you think is wrong with the concept of a “brain state”. It seems perfectly valid and useful to me.
I’m sure there are people who abuse the concept, but that’s true of practically any concept. Such abuse isn’t a reason to abandon the concept altogether.
Erik,
Good grief! Perhaps you could examine the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the ‘definition of morality’. Nowhere does it claim (as you seem to be doing) that non-religious views of morality are not views of morality. Indeed, it goes close to arguing the opposite. Religions differ too much for many purposes of analysis. Nor does it claim that games and etiquette ARE (or ARE NOT) properly part of the arena of discourse. Authors vary on this point. Some of them dead 200+ years and still well regarded.
Of course, you aren’t obliged to take any notice of a reasonably well-respected philosophical source. Nor of me. But I do wonder why anyone would trouble to invite me to expand on my viewpoint and then dismiss it with an airy wave of the hand for some definitional reason. “You don’t have a viewpoint!”. You already knew I didn’t, ‘cos I’m a goddamned dirty atheist!
Here’s an easier task for you: Back up with a quote that I presented a religious view of morality.
As for your view of morality, you said that cheating in a game was morally irrelevant. If so, then I may break some rules from your point of view, but it should be irrelevant and you have nothing to complain about. Whereas from my point of view you have not yet defined the game so there could be a chance to break its rules.
Elizabeth,
Do you have a definition of good Lizzie?
Erik,
You claim to have a morality that includes playing by the rules. The site rules and goals are very clear hear. I look forward to you finally playing by them.
KN said:
Depends on the monkey and cat, and what is operationally driving that monkey or cat. I think most cats and monkeys and all other animals including humans, however, are biological automatons incapable of any reason, thinking or intentionality per se. To use gaming terms, they are NPCs.
Well, IMO the difference between NPCs and PCs (non-player characters and player-characters) is the ability to employ individuated, uncaused agency and mindfully access, understand and conceptually utilize absolutes.
I think that this is an example of taking an argument that actually resides in one domain (philosophy or spirituality) and attempting to argue it in another domain (scientific literalism/reductionism) because in that 2nd domain (or language) the argument is framed and contextualized in a way that is favorable to that person’s ideological predilections. This is why atheistic physicalists (or those who lean that way) want to turn every argument into one about scientific evidence. Arguments framed by methodological physicalism will certainly favor physicalist conclusions.
From my perspective, there are generally (for this conversation) only two kinds of living beings; biological automatons and embodied souls, whether they are human or not. BA’s may have some capacity to produce output that coincides with logic, but it is not intentional. They might behave in a way that coincides with morality, but they are not truly moral.
I also think that morality is not regulated to human beings, but is regulated to embodied souls. Otherwise, what we’re really talking about is programmed behaviors acted out by biological automatons, which, as far as I’m concerned, isn’t a morality worth worrying about.
Morality is exclusive to embodied souls with acausal agency, KN, or else what you are referring to is not “morality” at all, but rather “a set of haphazardly generated brain states causally related to interpersonal interactions that describe some behaviors of social animals”.
Calling the latter ‘morality” is like calling the choices of a biological automaton “free will”; you are taking the subject matter into another conversational domain in order to re-frame it entirely as something else – which is fine, but the problem is that then we are not talking about the same thing.
When I debate morality, I am not talking about behaviors that guide the interpersonal behaviors of social animals towards some definition of “prosperity”. We can run a computer simulation that accomplishes that; are the SIMS then engaged in “moral behavior”? If you say yes, then we are debating two entirely different things.
In my world, there are moral things you do, and must do, even if it is harmful to the social structure and prosperity of the group around you. Morality supercedes and overrides any game theory social engineering towards some defined idea of success. IOW, the success or prosperity of the group is secondary to an individual following their conscience.
KN,
I think we are in two entirely different categorical realms. You seem to think that morality is a commodity that lies within the category of “biological creatures that are social animals”, while I think that morality instead lies within the category of “spiritual beings”. For me, morality has nothing whatsoever to do with aiding and abetting the societies of biological creatures; if it does so, it only does so incidentally. For me, morality refers to spiritual matters or else it’s not worth caring about.
Erik,
You and I actually agree about the morality of playing by the rules. Since the rules here are pretty clear, I look forward to you following them.
For example?
Erik,
You have selected but one part of my reasons for referencing the wider SEP discussion. If you aren’t offering a religious view of morality, I cheerfully retract that part. Provisionally, at least, because I’m betting you’re either a Divine Command or a Natural Law moralist, and have no truck with atheist morality. But your own words could clear that one up.
Perhaps you could explain, better than you have, why you have a view of morality and I don’t.
I don’t think it irrelevant; I am happy to include or exclude it as preferred. I was talking from a descriptive point of view. Some moralities do, some don’t. I actually said, parenthetically, ‘no-one likes a cheat’, a hint I could have made more explicit that one may or may not include games as desired.
Nonetheless, to dismiss the entirety of my moral views because I was perceived to give the ‘wrong’ answer on that question seems less than generous.
But you seem to feel justified because ‘it’s a game’ and ‘it’s not immoral to cheat in games, according to this atheist’. Is that a fair summary?
A slippery morality, I feel, that depends upon the other person’s worldview as to whether it is or is not moral to do X with regard to them (assuming they don’t actually enjoy X). Certainly one I would be interested to know Objective Morality Central’s view on.
It seems, ad absurdum, that some theists would deny atheists any say on anything, because they reputedly believe ‘it’s all just physico-chemical processes’. Someone slaps you in the chops with a wet haddock, ‘it’s all just physico-chemical processes’. Someone nicks your parking spot, ‘it’s all just physico-chemical processes’. The referee makes an incorrect decision and costs your team the game, ‘it’s all just physico-chemical processes’. The referee makes an incorrect decision and costs someone else‘s team the game, ‘it’s all just physico-chemical processes’.
Apparently, to salvage the ‘logic’ of justifiable irritation, one must believe that, somewhere, even those swinging haddock are being noted and counted.
Yes. A good Lizzie is one that avoids harming others and tries to increase their contentedness.
Elizabeth,
I see, that is what a good Lizzie is. And that is basically a description of what pleases you, yes?
You were however talking about if we can know if a God is good. Either you have just answered your question, or else we need to know what is good, outside of what it means for you to be good.
It’s derived from the principles I laid out in the OP. A good Lizzie may not be what pleases me immediately. For instance, if I am hungry, but I give my lunch to someone who is hungrier, I might get pretty horribly hungry.
Well, I provided one possible answer to the question.
What is your method for knowing what is good?
Elizabeth,
I can’t even understand what you mean by good for yourself, little yet what is good in something else.
So is it good to give your lunch to someone else who is hungry or not?
Elizabeth,
You have not given any method for knowing what is good. You simply said when you think you are being good, which is of course irrelevant to the question really.
How’s that working for you?
Exactly! You don’t seem to know…that’s the point.
Robin said:
I’ve answered this many times now. It’s working great, or I would change my view.
Then I don’t understand what point you are referring to.
I did discuss this in a post at my blog.
That’s exactly what’s wrong with it.
It encourages people to believe that they are saying something significant and important, when they really aren’t saying anything at all.
William J. Murray,
I think you are right that we are not talking about the same thing, but the distance between our views is even greater than you seem to realize. I’ll restrict myself to two quick comments:
(1) The distinction between “biological automata” and “embodied souls” — in which the latter alone have “individuated, uncaused agency and mindfully access, understand and conceptually utilize absolutes” is itself, by my lights, a version of dualism which I categorically reject. It is not that, in denying that there are embodied souls, I thereby affirm that there are only biological automata.
Rather, I deny both — I don’t think that there are biological automata or embodied souls. I don’t think that animals are biological automata and I don’t think that persons are embodied souls. Being anti-dualist means rejecting the dichotomy itself, not reducing everything to one half of the dichotomy. There are several reasons why I deny that I’m a physicalist, but among them is that physicalism as a category retains the spirit/matter dichotomy, whereas I, as an anti-dualist, reject that dichotomy itself
(2) I am certainly not a scientific reductionist, in the sense of “scientific reductionism” used by professional analytic philosophers, but I do think that scientific explanations of causal processes are relevant to resolving metaphysical and epistemological problems. This is probably the deepest source of conflict between our views. On my view, the human mind is capable of generating endless speculations about reality and will be easily satisfied by any explanation that seems just-good-enough. But if we want to know what is real and true, then we need some way of testing our explanations to figure out which ones are correct. Over the course of millennia of inquiry, we’ve developed science as a way of doing precisely that. Without taking science into account, we have no way of determining which of our explanations are anywhere close to the truth.
Convinced/converted many BAs have you? Why do I doubt that you actual have any real idea how well your concepts work…
Why am I not surprised? And thanks for yet again proving my point.
Seen any ghosts today?
Richardthughes,
I see Phoodoo had a bit or a rant that went to Guano. Phoodoo, you might want to learn the differences between abstracts, articles, etc.
But we do have theories of brain. They’re crude, sometimes more or less heuristic, but they’re of value for at least discussing what’s going on.
People misuse such terms, yet what else are we to call “depression” other than a “brain state” or some equivalent? Epileptic states are certainly something of which to be concerned.
I know that “brain state” is a rather loose term. I certainly don’t see that it is meaningless, however.
Glen Davidson
Oh, that’s nice, it dehumanizes the “other,” leaving you among the special ones. So long as it works for you…
Not really leading you to any insights beyond that of your elevated state, is it? What more could you want, though?
Glen Davidson
The problem is the implied equivalency to computer states.
I think it is more useful to think of brains as having a structure that changes over time as a result of learning. (and trauma and psychoactive drugs and such)
I do not think this is equivalent to programming.
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v421/n6925/abs/nature01374.html
You can tell them that they’re wrong to write of “brain states.” It won’t change anything, as it makes perfect sense with respect to what they’re saying.
Glen Davidson
I don’t know of any implied equivalency to computer states. That wouldn’t have occurred to me, in fact.
Yet nerve activities may also change in recognizable patterns over a much shorter period of time. For instance, during sleep, and even within sleep, say, to REM sleep.
Not much in the brain is really equivalent to computers, except in the broadest sense. “Memory” exists in both, but really, it’s “computer memory” in machines, as it’s very different from what we have.
Glen Davidson
Pattern of behavior would be preferable to state.
I would say the majority of interested people have been taught, through popular science writing and through movies, that brains are equivalent to computers, and that such patterns of activity as memories can be transferred to computers or to other people.
Lots of terms make sense when used in a narrowly defined technical presentation, but get puffed up and useless in popular or non-technical writing.
I think I should become like God. I think trying to live your life following a set of moral rules will get you exactly nowhere, so no, I would not wish that on you or anyone else. I thought you understood Christianity.
That depends. For a Christian that’s like asking what if Jesus was never raised from the dead. And I think you know the answer to that one.
Love would be no better or worse than eating.
And he knows this with absolute certainty!
I sure the bottom of your bridge is warmed by your glee, but:
1) He didn’t claim that
2) One is clearly meta, one isn’t.
If this is the case, why deny the existence of objective moral values? What’s the point?