He raises the question in the New York Times Sunday Review:
I believe a major change in our perspective on consciousness may be necessary, a shift from a credulous and egocentric viewpoint to a skeptical and slightly disconcerting one: namely, that we don’t actually have inner feelings in the way most of us think we do…
How does the brain go beyond processing information to become subjectively aware of information? The answer is: It doesn’t. The brain has arrived at a conclusion that is not correct. When we introspect and seem to find that ghostly thing — awareness, consciousness, the way green looks or pain feels — our cognitive machinery is accessing internal models and those models are providing information that is wrong…
You might object that this is a paradox. If awareness is an erroneous impression, isn’t it still an impression? And isn’t an impression a form of awareness?
But the argument here is that there is no subjective impression; there is only information in a data-processing device. When we look at a red apple, the brain computes information about color. It also computes information about the self and about a (physically incoherent) property of subjective experience. The brain’s cognitive machinery accesses that interlinked information and derives several conclusions: There is a self, a me; there is a red thing nearby; there is such a thing as subjective experience; and I have an experience of that red thing. Cognition is captive to those internal models. Such a brain would inescapably conclude it has subjective experience.
I agree that our intuitions about consciousness are likely to be faulty, but I don’t think that Graziano has resolved the paradox he mentions. My brain models other people as having subjective experiences, but this obviously has no bearing on whether they really do, or don’t, have those experiences. Given that, why should the fact that my brain models me as having subjective experiences suddenly become magically relevant to the question of whether I really do, or don’t, have those experiences?
walto:
Neil:
walto and Neil,
You’re unwittingly contradicting yourselves. By your criteria, qualia are also impossible but not incoherent. If so, then Neil’s statement doesn’t apply to qualia:
In any case, to say that qualia are impossible or incoherent is to say that we cannot have them. It makes perfect sense.
Consciousness is not an idea (or at least a subject heading) that I hava any problem with, especially now I’m thinking of the concept as awareness (and sel-awareness, social awareness etc) Whether intuitively appealing seems irrelevant as there is meat in the sandwich.
Qualia appealing? Not to me,. I’d like someone to justify the idea as having some utility. All we know of the exterior world comes via sensory inputs. Graziano’s suggestion of a two-level organisation of how the brain presents edited highlights of the input to the “awareness centre” makes a lot of sense to me. Qualia not so much.
walto,
No, it’s merely redundant. To see this, look at the original phrase and two variants:
The latter two are equivalent, and each was created by eliminating a redundant word or phrase from the first.
I don’t think you are reading Graziano as he intends. For example he writes:
I’m puzzled by your “Arrow B can still emanate from the physical substrate that gives rise to the epiphenomena.” Not following this at all.
Alan,
There’s a ton of literature on the topic, if you Google it.
The SEP is usually a good source.
Here’s a paper from Mr. Hard Problem himself, David Chalmers:
Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia
Alan,
Well, keep in mind that epiphenomena are causally inert. If zombies are possible, then the epiphenoma can be separated from the physical processes producing them (at least in some possible worlds).
Note that a zombie, by definition, would insist that it has subjective awareness, and it would talk about the ineffability of “blueness” just as a non-zombie would. Thus a zombie would have the representation of awareness without the experience of awareness. Arrow B — the causal arrow — would have to emanate from the physical substrate, because there would be nothing else for it to emanate from!
My point is that if you dezombify the zombie by adding the epiphenomena back in, you don’t have to move Arrow B. You can leave it emanating from the physical substrate. The epiphenomena are then truly “off to the side” — determined by the physical substrate but having no causal influence over it.
Have you read it? Does it convince you that a quale is a useful concept or a logical set? He manages to use the word 118 times in the article but seems to take it for granted that it is a coherent idea.
You ask the impossible. I can’t grasp the concept of an epiphenomenon in the first place!
Huh? I won’t speak for Neil, but not by my criteria they ain’t. (Where did you get this new fib from? I haven’t given any “criteria” at all!)
Wow, that’s another classic you’ve got going there, boy!
Alan,
Oh, okay! It’s easiest to understand visually. Let me hunt for an appropriate illustration online.
It may be a while, though, because I have a couple of meetings this afternoon.
I want not to seem harsh about my earlier remark about it being easy to find mistakes in your posts. To be fair, that’s because you are (i) intellectually curious, (ii) somehow feel it necessary to have an opinion on every fucking thing in the universe, and (iii) will contort yourself into pretzels rather than admit you made even the simplest, most forgivable error about anything. That kind of combination is a cinch to result in a bundle of cuckoo remarks.
But it’s great you’re interested in everything, and, as I’ve said before, you’re a bright guy. These are more character than intellectual deficits, IMHO.
walto,
Well, nobody’s perfect.
ETA 🙂
walto,
I acknowledged, without hesitation, that my phrase was redundant — because it was — but not that it was confused, because it wasn’t.
Why is that not enough for you?
I’m not going to pretend to be mistaken about something merely to satisfy your odd appetites.
ETA: How about responding to my straighforward explanation?
keiths,
I wouldn’t want you to go to too much trouble. Wiki says
If this is a correct interpretation then I’m completely assured that epiphenomenalism is not useful in neuroscience. The idea that there is a mental state that is not in any way physical is akin to proposing ‘intelligent agency”.
If you insist.
Compare
Metaphysically possible
Metaphysically possible in excruciating pain
Possible in excruciating pain
Saying something confused twice isn’t just redundant. (It’s more better than that that!)
walto,
Btw, I’m guessing that’s not what Bruce meant when he said your remark was redundant rather than senseless. (I.e., there’s a better response to that charge than your folderol.). But whatever. Bruce can help you this time.
walto,
Your counterargument makes no sense. “Metaphysically possible” and “possible in excruciating pain” don’t mean the same thing, so your example isn’t analogous to mine.
“Metaphysically possible” and “possible in some worlds” aren’t confused, as you know perfectly well. They’re meaningful and equivalent.
Will you admit your own mistakes, or do you consider yourself exempt from the standard you impose on others?
Alan,
Of course it isn’t. Epiphenomena don’t have any testable consequences, so they can’t be important in scientific explanations. However, they can still be important in philosophical explanations.
It doesn’t have to be nonphysical. Google ‘property dualism’.
Oh, for christ’s sake, if “metaphysically possible” means the same thing as “possible” then if “metaphysically possible in some worlds” is confused (and, for the third time, it IS) then “possible in some worlds” is just as confused. (Well, admittedly, they both make as much sense as “possible in excruciating pain.”
Do you really think that kind of sophistry is effective? You should run for office or something. It would be a much better use of everyone’s time.
walto,
It doesn’t, and I haven’t claimed that it does. I’m saying that “metaphysically possible” means the same thing as “possible in some worlds”, which is true.
Slow down and think it through, walto.
The problem is–“Metaphysically possible” does NOT mean “possible in some worlds.” “Possible in some worlds” WOULD make sense if we were talking about say, physical possibility, but if we’re talking about metaphysical possibility it is just–well be generous, confused.
Anyhow, as I clearly cannot get you to understand this, I leave the job now to others.
walto,
It’s astonishing to me that a philosophy PhD doesn’t understand this — or is pretending not to understand this — but it isn’t the first time, so here goes:
walto:
David Chalmers:
The hole is only getting deeper, walto. Stop digging.
Do you really think that walto is going to be quaking in his boots because Chalmers disagrees with him?
I don’t disagree with Chalmers. That quotation is completely irrelevant to anything I’ve said. I ask again–would somebody please explain this business to keiths–or he’ll likely go on excerpting books he doesn’t understand all night. My point was really quite simple and actually is along the same lines as what Chalmers says there.
I’ll say this one LAST time. “P is metaphysically possible” means there is a possible world in which P obtains.
Now, someone PLEASE explain to keiths why “P is possible in some worlds” doesn’t make sense. [Keeping in mind that if you fail, he will likely go on yammering forever.]
ETA: I do agree with one thing keiths has written, however. There is a hole that is getting deeper. Wider too. Just plain bigger.
Can you guess where that hole is?
ETA: I shouldn’t have said Chalmers remark is “completely irrelevant” to my point, because it’s both consistent and even (very slightly) illuminates it. I meant to say it’s irrelevant to the suggestion that propositions can be metaphysically possible in some worlds.
Where the hell is Bruce? I’m pretty sure he gets this, based on his list of types of possibility and his redundancy remark.
Neil:
It isn’t just Chalmers, Neil. It’s philosophers everywhere.
Exactly. Pretty much everybody can understand this stuff except you.
BTW, while you’re floundering around for some other red herring to post, I just wanted to remind you that you were going to tell us where I gave my “criteria” for qualia. Something that apparently shows that I hold that the exemplification of qualia would be just like somebody being taller than a big guy but shorter than a little guy? Thanks. I know you were just about to get to that.
You said a mouthful there, bro.
walto:
“P is possible in some worlds” makes perfect sense. Not everything is possible in every world.
P cannot obtain in a possible world unless P is possible in that world.
I’m done discussing this with you, walto. I am here to talk about Graziano’s ideas, not to assuage your insecurities.
keiths
Not sure what happened to my previous (Blackberry) post, which I can’t edit here. But you’re making the same mistake above (and I’m not referring to the psych comment at the end, which is also off the wall).
I’m also not sure why you can’t understand that “P is possible in some worlds” doesn’t make sense (if we’re talking about metaphysical possibility on the standard possible worlds model), but it’s precisely because saying P is possible means nothing but that there is at least one possible world where P obtains.
It follows from this that
If P is possible, then for EVERY world W, P is possible in W: this is the case whether or not P happens to obtain in W.
Being metaphysically possible isn’t world-relative: it doesn’t itself obtain in this or that world. That’s why something being possible in some worlds is confused.
Anyhow, if you’re quitting this issue, that’s a good thing. If you had a friend here, he or she would have stuck a fork in you a long time ago.
walto,
I think you know exactly what happened to it, and so do I.
I had the foresight to save my browser window, precisely because your comment was obviously wrong and I thought there might be an “accident” that would delete your post. You met my low expectations.
Not only did you delete your comment, you actually posted the following comment — the one where you say “I don’t know what happened to my comment” — before you deleted the previous one. Oops.
Here is the photographic evidence.
I’m not sure you can sink any lower, walto, but I suspect you’ll give it your best shot.
Man , I want your tech skills! If I could have done that I wouldn’t have had to type that again!
Your philosophical abilities (and personality problems) not so much, though. Are we supposed to take from all that manufactured indignation above that you STILL can’t understand why all your posts on this topic have been confused?
You’re saying now that it’s not that you’ve been wrong, the real problem is that I secretly deleted a post for some reason (because, I guess, I don’t like to edit my posts or something)?
Bad faith is one thing, but really. There was nothing wrong with that deleted post–other than being a little laconic, as my Blackberry posts generally are. I mean, which post that I agree with is the real kicker in your view–the one that shows my Ph.D. wasn’t deserved!–the Chalmers excerpt or this Ollie North one? FWIW, they both seem to me simple and reasonable statements, consistent with my posts, but not with your own.
Anyhow, this “photographic evidence” smokescreen could be your best ever! I’d definitely hang on to that one! The main thing as always– the Prime Directive–is to never admit you might have made a mistake or were confused about something. Thread after thread after thread.
A while back, Alan F pointed out a PhD thesis by Amber Ross called Inconceivable Minds (PDF). Dennett was on her review committee. The background section has a nice overview of the issues which I decided to review for a refresher.
It reminded me why accepting the possibility of Zombie Worlds (ZWs) endangers physicalism. The standard argument goes like this:
Definition: a ZW is physically identical to our actual world, except that its inhabitants do not have phenomenal experience. Behavior is the same for ZW and our world, for example zombies talk as if they had such experiences.
1. ZWs are conceivable.
2. Hence, ZWs are possible.
3. Now, on our world, we have phenomenal experience.
4. But since our world is physically identical to ZW, something else, something non-physical, must be involved in our phenomenal experience.
5. Hence physicalism is false.
Physicalist philosophers take two approaches to countering this argument.
A PRIORI physicalists argue that premise 1 is false: ZWs are inconceivable. They argue, eg, that it is incoherent for zombies to talk about seeming phenomenal experience without actually having such experience. Dennett appears to take the position that zombies are inconceivable.(“I am pretty sure that the philosophers zombie is conceptually incoherent”, p 290 IP). The position is called a priori because it is presumed that eventually some conceptual, a priori analysis will reveal why some people have the illusion that zombies conceivable.
A POSTERIORI physicalists argue that premise 1 does NOT entail premise 2, ie conceivability does not entail possibility. They provide a counter-example to disprove entailment. That counter example uses Kripke’s idea of rigid designators. For example, applied to water and H2O: it was conceivable that water was not identical to H2O, but once we have found a posteriori that it is, then that identity becomes necessary, ie true in all possible worlds. That is an counter-example showing conceivability does NOT imply possibility, and hence shows the above argument is false.
Chalmers has a counter argument to that use of Kripke which Ross accepts, at least for the purpose of her thesis. Instead, she concentrates on providing a detailed defense of the claim that zombies are inconceivable.
Note: I actually added premise 3 (we are not zombies in our actual world); it does not appear in her summary. It’s there because I think Keith might be considering denying that premise, ie to say that we ARE in fact zombies. That would break the argument too. Although you might be able to start again by assuming non-zombie worlds were conceivable, hence possible, hence there is something non-physical about phenomenal experience.
As a matter of personal time management, I have decided to stop reading and posting at TSZ before noon (EST) each day and to not look again until the next day.
At least, I will try to do that.
Dreaming and consciousness is discussed in philosophy. There is no general agreement, I think, on whether it should be considered conscious in the same sense as being awake. (News flash: philosophers disagree! (insert smiley here)).
I agree with below SEP quote that there is a continuum involved. It is best to start by trying to understand the simplest, most uncontroversial cases, ie uninjured, awake brains.
How to tell if I am awake versus in a dream discussions probably would fall more under the brain-in-a-vat discussions.
From SEP on dreaming as being conscious:
Much ado about nothing, as far as I can tell.
I assume (perhaps wrongly) that walto’s comment about the blackberry post was about it appearing in large type and bold. He seems to have managed to edit out the content, leaving an empty post. But his following post says the same thing though slightly reworded.
As I said before, I’m not sure what happened. I’ve mentioned a couple of times that, tho I use the same log-in info, when I post on my phone, I don’t get the edit link on my computer for that post. So, once on my bigger box, I intended to cut and paste, instead of edit, but I the content was gone. Maybe I deleted it on my phone inadvertantly. I was going to request deletion from the moderators since the post was empty, but I thought that would be confusing, as I referred to it in my computer follow-up.
Anyhow, as you say, what the hell’s the difference. Keiths’ righteous indignation and insults are an obvious smokescreen in support of his Prime Directive–set forth above.
BruceS,
FWIW, you don’t have to be a physicalist to doubt that possibility is entailed by conceivability. There are a ton of papers on that alleged entailment. I’ll give the cite for what’s probably the most influential one when I get to my office.(I’m on the train now, and I can’t remember the guy’s name.)
What puzzles me is how the hell people can use smartphones to comment.
I won’t even use my iPad for anything that involves typing.
OK, the guy is Stephen Yablo, and the paper is here:
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mit.edu%2F~yablo%2Fisconposs.pdf&ei=gl9KVPf_ArW1sQTG0IKoDQ&usg=AFQjCNF8Hf2sfET12ugwBuWVnm0yZCL_eQ&sig2=_yaUH8bmDh3PuT2LgTMlSg&bvm=bv.77880786,d.cWc
walto,
I repeat:
You got caught lying, and you got caught deleting your own comment.
I honestly don’t know what the hell you are talking about. Why in the world would anybody lie about something like that?
Are you well?
As for the comment you deleted:
The error is obvious, even without your emphatic bold type. The laws of physics could differ between two worlds, for example, rendering something possible in one but impossible in the other. That was Chalmers’ point, though it appears to have escaped you.
Do you have a friend who can take you aside and advise you to stop lying, stop deleting your comments, and start admitting your mistakes?
I know: it’s even one degree sillier than commenting on these sites at all. And my Blackberry (Torch, I think it’s called), is not great. It’s really hard/slow to edit posts on this site.
I think it’s weird/interesting that keiths could see content in that post after I couldn’t find anything in it either on my phone or on my computer–and I wanted to–so I wouldn’t have to retype the whole thing. But it looked like a blank post to me. Probably somebody with some tech smarts could explain all this, but as it makes no difference to anything (except keiths’ weird claim that I’m Ollie North and deleted some remark I agree with to trick people) I guess I don’t care too much.
But yeah, you’re right. Why the hell do I bother?
Yes, the same problem here.
Reading on a smart phone is tolerable, though not my preferred way of reading. But trying to type into those small fake keyboards – it’s hard enough for a short text message.
Yeah, that’s wrong. As I wrote in an earlier post, which you can repost here if you want to take the time and trouble–your remark about something being possible in some worlds ONLY makes sense if you are not talking about metaphysical possibility. But….alas, you claimed about a dozen times that you were talking about metaphysical possibility throughout. It was a redundancy only! you insisted.
I do hope you’ll continue this, in spite of it being a little like pounding a five-year-old.