In a recent comment, Vincent writes that
However, I would argue that if we believe in human freedom, then that freedom has to include the freedom to bind oneself to a particular vision of humans’ ultimate good – whether it be one that includes God as its core or one which excludes God as a hindrance to unfettered liberty.
I’m very interested in theories of freedom and this idea of atheism as somehow involving “unfettered liberty.”
For the most part, when we talk about theism and naturalism, we focus on the epistemological side of the question: what counts as evidence for or against a position, the best explanation of the available data, and so on. Clearly such discussions have their place.
But I also think that the exclusive focus on epistemology is problematic, since it inclines us to neglect the “passional” (William James’s term) side of our natures. Why do we want theism or naturalism to be true, what motivates us to affirm or deny. If you will, “man cannot live by reason alone.”
It’s reasonably clear that the affective aversion to naturalism amongst theists arises from an anxiety that naturalism causes (not entails!) nihilism. So we must believe in God to avoid the threat of meaninglessness. (Some theists are less than clear whether the relation between naturalism and nihilism is causal or logical, but we can get into that in the discussion.)
Here I want to pick up on the suggestion that atheists want atheism to be true because they desire “unfettered liberty.” One sees this claim made quite often (it’s a reliable trope at Uncommon Descent, for example) and it needs to be examined closely.
To do this, I want to look at theories of freedom: what does it means to be free?
In the classical liberal tradition that runs (roughly) from John Locke to Bob Nozick, freedom is non-intervention: one is free to the extent that others cannot prevent you from doing what you want, or might want to do if given the option.
There is another conception of freedom, freedom as non-domination, that some theorists (including myself) find more compelling. On this approach, known as republicanism, one is free to the extent that one is not subject to the arbitrary or uncontrolled power of a master, regardless of how benign his intentions.
Consider this analogy. Suppose my boss is prone to micromanage her office. Some employees end up being interfered with because they don’t do things her way. I, on the other hand, turn out to be very good at anticipating how she wants things done. I adjust my behavior to meet her expectations. As a consequence, I’m interfered with less than my co-workers are. Does this mean that I am more free than they are?
On the freedom as non-interference conception, we would have to say “yes”. But this is counter-intuitive: we’re all equally under the dominating authority of our employer, and I’m just better at accommodating myself to her. I might be better off — say, more content, less disgruntled — than my co-workers who are constantly being micromanaged. But surely I’m not more free than they are!
We can now distinguish between liberal atheism and republican atheism. A liberal atheist doesn’t want there to be a God because she doesn’t want there be anything like the God of theism to get in the way of satisfying her desires. By contrast, a republican atheist doesn’t want there to be a God because she doesn’t want there be anything like the God of theism to have power over her.
In short, it’s not necessarily that the atheist wants “unfettered liberty”, in the sense of being able to do satisfy her desires, whatever those desires happen to be. If she is a republican atheist, what she wants is to not be under the power of any one else, not even God, and certainly not those who appeal to religious language to legitimize their domination. (There is a nice question here as to how religions become ideologies.)
One final thought: in further development of the republican tradition beginning with Hegel, the only stable alternative to domination is mutual recognition. There is a theological tradition on which the existence of God — or the belief in God — is necessary for mutual recognition between human beings. Martin Buber, in his short and extraordinary I and Thou, articulates this approach quite well. I mention this because there’s indeed a crucial question here as to whether religion is necessarily dominating, or if religion can be part of the struggle for recognition in resistance to domination. Within American religious/political thought, Martin Luther King is perhaps most clear about the capacity of religious discourse to articulate the struggle for mutual recognition in resistance to domination; see his Letter from a Birmingham Jail (PDF).
Intellectually, not having a God is a way to avoid “unfettered freedom” in thinking. We’re stuck thinking through the limitations of reality, rather than appealing to a God who might just do anything.
It’s the “unfettered freedom” of ID that keeps it from looking for meaningful explanations for life.
I’m not seeking for the license that an unlimited God allows people to avoid the work of thinking.
Glen Davidson
KN,
Your quotation of Vincent is misleading. He isn’t speaking of atheism, but rather of voluntary separation from God after death. Here’s the full quote:
I must admit, it had never occurred to me to either want or NOT want any god(s). I’m equally indifferent to UFOs, leprechauns, and the like. It’s only when the figments of others’ imaginations lead them to construct unnecessary hurdles that it matters.
We have for example, over time, constructed various classes of victimless crimes, most especially including those classes for which the “victim” is some religion-addled sense of social well-being. In general, those who DO want there to be any god(s), when you peek under the hood, are (usually indirectly) using this as a vehicle to impose their preferences on others.
But my desire not to be arbitrarily constrained by those preferences has nothing to do with wanting or not wanting any gods, and everything to do with a social quid pro quo, the golden rule. Apparently, gods hate this rule.
God didn’t invent the concept of freedom.
God makes the laws and we must obey.
If we reject HIS laws then obeying anyones laws is entirely based on contract.
Therefore to be free of any contract is to be free indeed.
Its impossible for humans to live , alone or in groups, with freedom.
Otherwise one could imprison Martin luther King at will!!
Freedom is a invention to just say we are free from MANS rules IF they disobey Gods rules. THEN we being free from men anyways means all human interaction is based on contract.
Thats Locke’s equation.
We are originally free , from other men, but give up that freedom ito a government for same government to protect our freedoms etc that we itemize.
Is anyone here by chance actually rather promoting ‘Jewish atheism’, a contradiction in terms if there ever was one? One can attempt to keep scholarly distance and make it impersonal as much as one musters. Still, the extra-naturalistic reality of the topic of faith, even the author’s disenchanted fideistic atheism, seems to require more integrity and reflexivity than the merely academic question: John 18:33-39.
KN,
Besides misconstruing Vincent’s quote, you’re also defending an irrational view.
You write:
Both of those positions are irrational. A rational atheism would be based on evidence and reason, not on desire.
I don’t see a problem there. Not wanting something to exist doesn’t mean that’s the reason why one believes it doesn’t exist.
My problem with Vincent’s argument:
is that he seems to imply that the alternative to God is “do whatever the fuck you want”.
As for the distinction between liberal atheism and republican atheism, KN’s post is super informative, as always. Of course I would join him in saying that I’d rather not want a dominant God to exist because I wouldn’t want to be ruled by a tyrant like that, not because I’d like to do as I please.
This isn’t about any God anyway. The kind of God you choose to believe in reflects on your own character. Those who believe in a vindictive God who will punish unbelievers for eternity for not worshiping Him are simply fantasizing with a God made in their own image.
I don’t understand this. Can’t the boss “prevent me from doing what I want” even if she doesn’t (because I’ve kind of sussed out her M.O.)? I.e., if you’ve got the definition of the Locke/Nozick conception of freedom right (and I don’t think you do, quite), then the result would seem to be the same as described as the “non-domination” approach.
Hi keiths,
Thanks for speaking up on my behalf, our immense philosophical differences notwithstanding.
I think Kantian Naturalist’s distinction between liberal and republican atheists is a useful one. When I wrote about “unfettered liberty,” I had something closer to “freedom from domination” in mind, but as you rightly point out, a vision of human good which excludes God as a hindrance to unfettered liberty needs to be based on evidence, in order to pass muster as rational. In any case, I am certainly not arguing that the only alternative to theism is “do whatever the f*** you want,” as dazz supposes.
What I would question is the assumption made by many atheists, that if God exists, then the only possible relationship He can have towards us is that of Dominator (or Master) to subject. The Judeo-Christian view is that God is our Father. That, of course, is a view which needs to be argued for. But it is a tenable option. Thus I would agree with Kantian Naturalist’s point, in his final paragraph, that “there’s indeed a crucial question here as to whether religion is necessarily dominating, or if religion can be part of the struggle for recognition in resistance to domination.” In the end, it all depends on one’s vision of God.
The real question at stake here is whether God has any duties towards us. If you think He doesn’t, then domination remains a live option. But if you think that God, in choosing to become our Father, has voluntarily accepted the responsibilities of a father, then you will arrive at a very different conclusion. On the latter view, we can no longer say that human beings are of merely instrumental importance, from God’s point of view. Human beings matter in and of themselves.
Parsimony argues that the vindictive god is a story told by priests and kings to control and manipulate the masses. All the Abrahamic religions, and most other religions are about one class of people controlling another.
You can track the evolution of religious communities by how far they have come toward using more subtle forms of behavior management, such as disapproval and shunning.
Interesting. Apparently some views need to “be based on evidence, in order to pass muster as rational”, while yours “needs to be argued for”
Why is that?
Physics versus metaphysics. It’s roughly the same as physics versus math. You don’t detect and observe things in math, do you? You deduce. A crucial distinction that materialists love to ignore.
The premises of metaphysics, world views, theologies and ideologies are not based on physics. At all. They bear a connection with physics only if they intend to explain physics. Otherwise there’s no necessary connection at all.
It’s all about who calls “Metaphysics” first.
Glen Davidson
What I’m asking Vincent is why “visions of human good” that don’t include god must be based on evidence, while visions of human good grounded on God can simply be argued for. There seems to be a double standard there
If so, then there’s no way to help him out of it.
But look what he actually said, “I would argue that if we believe in human freedom, then that freedom has to include the freedom to bind oneself to a particular vision of humans’ ultimate good…” Looks to be more about freedom rather than visions of human good. Concentrate on the important stuff, not the unimportant.
The problem with that quote of Vincent’s is that human freedom is not the starting point in any sort of religious system. It’s the end point, if the system is about freedom at all. Prior to the end point there’s bondage of will, not freedom. Libertarian free will is only so-called free will, because it’s incapable of discerning, wanting and choosing that which is truly good.
The way Petit explicates this (based on what I’ve read about his view) is that in a liberal theory of freedom, it’s just a contingent fact of the matter whether I end up being interfered with, whereas on the republican theory of freedom, it’s a question of what structural imbalances of power are at work such that I end up being dominated, and if so, by what.
Vincent raises an interesting point about how to locate relations of care and dependence within a republican political theory. If God is a father (and/or mother), then He would have relations to us that involve authority over us but not domination. Obviously this is not say that parents cannot dominate their children! But it is to say that being a good parent involves nurturing and caring, directed towards the goal of producing a person capable of self-control and some degree of conformity to prevailing social norms, and doing that can involve a kind of authority.
The question would then be, what kinds of authority are permissible within a republican political theory, in which domination is what must be avoided? Under what conditions does authority become domination?
My rough take on this question — in complete ignorance of what’s been written about it — is that authority can avoid becoming domination if the purpose of that authority is to eventually undermine itself. Education is a good example of this. The goal of the teacher is to turn the student into someone who is no longer under the teacher’s authority. The successful exercise of that authority will bring that authority to an end. And I think the same is true of being a good parent: I think that one of the indices of having been a good parent is that you’re good friends with your adult children.
So now we can pose the question as, does God exercise his authority over us such as to end that authority? Can we be friends with God? Can our relation with God become one of mutual acknowledgement and respect? Or is that not possible in light of God’s utter transcendence and otherness?
dazz,
Here’s the problem. KN writes:
If we’re rational, those sets differ. Why we want God to exist (or not to exist) is distinct from what motivates us to affirm or deny his existence.
The first set of reasons is the answer to the question “Why would I be happier in a world where God exists (or doesn’t)?”
The second set, if we’re rational, is the answer to the question “Why do I think God exists (or doesn’t)?”
keiths,
I’m not sure reason is intrinsically motivating, to be honest.
As in, I’m not sure that simply accepting that X is supported by evidence than Y is sufficient to generate belief that X. I think that Hume might be right here, in holding that there has to be an emotional dimension here to generate belief, and that reasoning itself is not intrinsically motivating.
I don’t know if Hume is right or not. I just think it’s a view worth taking very seriously.
OK, understood.
I’ll add that I wouldn’t want there to be a God that is like a father and never shows up, never does squat, and doesn’t seem to give a rat’s ass for his “kids”. That’s not what I would call a good father anyway. If he did some of what a good father is supposed to do, I might actually have evidence of his existence, and no reason to disbelieve, perhaps would even like the fact that he existed
KN,
Rational people are motivated to align their beliefs with reason and evidence. Whether reason is intrinsically motivating is beside the point.
dazz,
Or punishes his “kids” forever, with no hope of a reprieve. Hence my latest OP.
The love of a supposedly perfect God should put our mere human love to shame. Instead, it’s the other way around.
walto, to KN:
That’s right.
KN is inadvertently shifting between “can prevent” and “does prevent”, sometimes within a single sentence, as here:
Vincent:
That’s what’s behind my parable on the problem of evil:
I do wonder how anyone looking at our universe could think that we matter. The closest we get to mattering is being made of it.
This seems to be assuming that there is no emotional dimension to reasoning. And I doubt that.
:God so loved the world” that He endured Mel Gibson’s Passion, the ultimate torture/snuff flick.
But can’t be bothered to forgive the strays that piddle on his epistemology.
As for the strays “choosing” their fate, it wouldn’t be called hell if they liked it. It’s a bit like the birds that peck out their own feathers for unknown reasons, or people who scratch themselves raw.
Hell make no sense at all except as the invention of priests trying to scare people into obedience.
keiths,
And in another house a young woman is annoyed by a mosquito bite, and her brother doesn’t like his haircut.
And God does nothing. How do we account for this evil.
phoodoo,
Yes, because in your desperation to defend your God, you’ll stoop to equating rapes and beatings with mosquito bites and bad haircuts.
Theism can really fuck up a person’s mind.
So to you, only beatings and rape are evil, being uncomfortable or unhappy aren’t.
Should people be satisfied with your version of an evilless world?
Do you consider yourself a deep thinker keiths?
Maybe he thinks it’s okay because it’s only “temporary and local.”
Hi keiths,
You ask:
Of course not, if that were there were no other evidence available for the father’s existence. In the case of theism, the arbitrary contingency of the cosmos, the existence of fine-tuning and the universality of mathematical beauty are just some of the reasons pointing to its having had a wise Maker.
The real question is whether the Maker of the cosmos cares about us personally. The existence of gratuitous suffering certainly constitutes strong prima facie evidence that He does not.
I can understand someone stopping at this point, and refusing to commit to a personal Deity, especially after an event like the Holocaust. What, for me, swings the evidence the other way?
I have written previously about the evidence for miracles, but let’s put those to one side. It is an amazing fact of life that people living in the most terrible squalor are still capable of experiencing beauty, on an everyday basis. In a godless cosmos, however, I would not expect to find any sentient creatures, but only smart ones. And if there were any sentient creatures, I would not expect them to be able to see beauty everywhere in the cosmos; instead, I would expect them to find the universe mostly drab and/or ugly. So if you were to ask me what convinces me that the world is the product of a benevolent Deity, I would simply say: the vision splendid. Despite my (slowly) failing eyesight, I am continually amazed at the fact that I can see and enjoy the sight of anything at all. Ditto for music.
So if I had to answer the child’s question, I would simply say: “I have no idea why your father isn’t doing anything to help you, and I have no idea why he’s staying away for so long. But I do know that life is, on balance, good. Think about that, and ask yourself why.”
Why?
Why?
Glen Davidson
It’s reasonably clear that the affective aversion to naturalism amongst theists arises from an anxiety that naturalism causes (not entails!) nihilism. So we must believe in God to avoid the threat of meaninglessness. (Some theists are less than clear whether the relation between naturalism and nihilism is causal or logical, but we can get into that in the discussion.)
Well is not an axiety but a “fact” that if mataphysical naturalism is true we are only a meaningless product of the phisycal law by chance without any goal.
If she is a republican atheist, what she wants is to not be under the power of any one else, not even God, and certainly not those who appeal to religious language to legitimize their domination.
It is not only matter what they want, but what they can as form them their no should.
???
Quoting the OP:
I certainly don’t want to be under the dominion of some religious sect just because they are in a majority and able to pass laws on blasphemy and other “moral” strictures. On the other hand, taking the US as a country where the majority appear to hold some sort of generally Christian belief (71% according to Pew), developing and consolidating properly secular educational, political and legal institutions might be a more worthwhile approach than bashing other people’s beliefs.
I’ve been reading (again) Ara Norenzayan’s Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict*. He presents a convincing argument in chapter 10 that secularism grows naturally out of religious tolerance and leads to a fading away of religious belief, citing Europe and Scandinavia as examples.
* available at Amazon
I’ve always assumed it’s unwise to replay the tape and bet against the team that won. What kind of reasoning argues that what is is unlikely?
I’m with Petrushka here. We ARE sentient creatures living in a godless cosmos, where we DO find beauty everywhere. Why would anyone “not expect” what we observe directly? Now, I would expect that person to find “god” in whatever cosmos he happens to inhabit, regardless of whether there are any to be found.
I’m just arguing from what seems most likely.
Prior to the invention of science, theism seemed like the best bet. There were things that could not be explained, despite centuries of examination and thought.
There are still lots of unexplained things. The origin of life being one of them.
The difference is we have 400 years of examples of phenomena yielding to persistent, systematic theorizing and testing.
We do not know that every question can be answered by science. We have good reason to believe there are very hard questions that will not be answered in any foreseeable future.
But the trend for the last few centuries is that we cn nibble away at even the toughest questions and make progress.
That’s the bet. That seems to be what theists see as the arrogance of science and materialism, the assumption that any phenomenon can be examined by science.
That would be true even if God exists and created all life.
I’m a nihilist. A metaphysical existential and moral nihilist. I don’t believe there is any objective meaning to life. Because “meaning” is an idea in the minds of sentient beings, that they hold ABOUT other entities. No more, no less.
So there wouldn’t be any objective meaning or purpose to life even if God existed and created us. Then all you could say is that it is God’s opinion that we should do X. Or you could say God intended something for us when it created us. But that would just be God’s subjective opinion. An idea God has in it’s mind. About us. Not a property of us that is somehow intrinsic to us.
Why? Because meaning is not a property of objects or things. You can’t find meaning inside things. There is no “meaning particle”, no “meaning essence” or anything of that sort. Yes, even if God existed and created us and told us emphatically why it did so and what it intended, I would still be a moral and existential nihilist.
Because the concept of “objective meaning/purpose” is an illusion. In fact I can scarcely fathom why anyone ever came up with the idea in the firs place. There is not and there cannot be such a thing. Under any circumstance. The very concept of “objective meaning/purpose” is absolutely incoherent to me.
Why? Because meaning and purpose is just ideas about what we, or other sentient beings, intend with something. They’re thoughts in our minds. They’re not properties of objects. It is only an idea. It only exists in your head. It doesn’t exist anywhere but as thoughts in your mind. Whether that mind is your brain and is made of atoms, or it is some sort of immaterial soul. It doesn’t matter.
If I create a hammer, I might intend to use it to hammer nails in with. But is that a property of the hammer? No. It is nowhere in the hammer. You can’t find that intention anywhere in the hammer. The hammer does not have an INTRINSIC purpose somehow infused in it.
The idea of meaning and purpose “of the hammer” is a complete misconception. The hammer doesn’t have purpose or meaning. I have thoughts ABOUT the hammer. But those thoughts are a property of ME, of my mind, not the hammmer itself. And hammers can be used for other things than hammer nails with.
It doesn’t matter what I originally intended for the hammer when I created it, that does not somehow alter the fact that hammers (can) have other uses. Or none at all. Or that other people might intend differently for the hammer. Heck, maybe someone else thinks the hammer is pretty and just wants to look at it. To this person, the hammer might be a work of art. To a third person a sex toy. To yet another, a weapon. Or music instrument.
Now replace me with God, and the hammer with mankind. The same would be true. There would still not be any objective property of mankind that you could call meaning or purpose. Then it is just God that has ideas ABOUT mankind. It would still only exist as an idea in God’s mind. And any person could simply have entirely different ideas about themselves and their “purpose”.
Now you might object that if God intended something with us, when he created us, then that is all that is necessary for there to be an objective purpose to life. If that is what you mean by objective purpose and meaning, then there can ALSO be objective purpose and meaning without God. Because then I can simply have my own intention and purpose (as the hammer example illustrate). I can make my own purpose and meaning, then. I don’t need to have created myself, to have INTENTIONS about myself. Just like with the hammer, another person can intend for the hammer to be an instrument, or work of art.
So if the idea of meaning and purpose just need to exist as ideas in God’s mind, then they can also exist as ideas in MY mind.
So I’m sorry to inform you, in either case, God is not a solution or a superior alternative to the problem of nihilism.
This is a candidate for the TSZ Archives of rebuttals to common theistic claims. Very nicely written.
Ok, then you have o agree that everything KN said in the post is meaningless.
That is partially wrong, the hammer fits the properties for hammer nails and not for sewing fabrics. When you build a hammer, if you are intelligent. you give to the hammer properties according to the scope.
True, but then you have two purpose for yourselve, the purpose for which you have been created and your own purpose. Your own purpose is thought by you the subject, so is a subjective purpose, the purpose of your creator is an objective purose because he puts in you, the object, the properties for the purpose. The point is if they match or not.
If she is a republican atheist, what she wants is to not be under the power of any one else, not even God, and certainly not those who appeal to religious language to legitimize their domination.
It is not only matter what she wants, but what she can as for them (aheist) there is no should.
Rumraket,
I think you’d have a hard time fully explaining the existence of hammers without bringing in intent and purpose. If that’s not “objective,” well, I doubt that anything really manages to avoid “subjectivity” anyway. It’s still true that if I have a room in my basement it means little in court, unless the evidence indicates that the purpose of the room is to keep the bodies of dead hookers frozen indefinitely. Then if I have a dead hooker, even if nothing’s been put into the room, it’s all the worse for me because it appears that I intended to have more dead hookers in my collection.
One can, of course, have a purpose or goal or aim that is quite different from that of God–if there were a God who made us for a purpose. But the point of God having a “purpose” for us could have enormous ramifications, if, say, the purpose was to prepare us for immortal life. Which is typically an important part of theists’ concern about God’s purposes. Obviously we might be meat robots either way, but if God has some happier purpose for us than feeding worms with our dead bodies, it is potentially a serious difference.
But if I really were convinced that there is a God with a purpose for us that extends well beyond this life, that there might be something more than physics involved in our lives would seem significantly more plausible than it does now. To be sure, if we still have no more evidence of a “soul” than we do presently, I don’t think I have much reason to be convinced of this. I think I’d be more inclined to look for evidence that there’s a soul, however.
Glen Davidson
As I understood vjt, he was attempting (if overstating…) a Bayesian argument. He was comparing two alternative explanations for the existence of the universe, given its “arbitrary contingency of the cosmos, the existence of fine-tuning and the universality of mathematical beauty”:
One explanation (“T”) is a tri-omni God, such as the one the Christians worship. The alternative explanation (“D”) is a creator who is either indifferent to, or unaware of, our existence. Any creator with a strict policy of non-intervention would also appear D-like.
Insofar as vjt claims that
I would agree with him. The “I would not expect to find…” language is an overstatement, IMO. Anyway, beauty is evidence in favor of the existence of an interventionist God. Just rather weak evidence.
The problem with this evidentiary argument is that
thereby rendering the Great Green Arkleseizure a more likely explanation.
DNA_Jock,
The trouble with vjt’s whole line is that there isn’t the first reason to believe that some intelligence would want to produce anything that appreciates beauty, or is sentient. We don’t do that, and it’s hard to see why we’d want to, other than perhaps just investigating the whole matter (morally dubious though it may be).
That natural selection, etc., might evolve beings that appreciate beauty, given that it tends to connote rationality, safety, and the kind of abundance that provide opportunities to us seems quite likely. I can’t say that God making life that appreciates beauty is at all likely, or indeed, that it is not, assuming that there is a God. How would anyone know?
Appreciation of beauty makes sense if evolution occurred. I can’t say the same for “God,” let alone find any evidence of God.
Glen Davidson
Hi GlenDavidson,
I’d just like to make a very quick point, as you seem to be misconstruing my argument. Let D stand for the proposition that a Deity of some sort (possibly, an indifferent one) exists. Let P stand for the proposition that a benevolent personal Deity exists. Let S stand for the proposition that sentient beings exist, and B stand for the proposition that beings who can appreciate beauty (including “mathematical beauty”) exist. [Incidentally, the only kind of beauty one would expect sentient beings to appreciate, from an evolutionary standpoint, is sexual beauty. That’s not part of my argument.]
I am not arguing that Pr(S|P) is high or that Pr(B|P) is high. Not being God, I don’t know that.
Rather, I am arguing that Pr(S|P) >> Pr(S|not-P) and that Pr(B|P) >> Pr(B|not-P).
Of course, that’s not enough by itself.
Using Bayes’ Theorem, I also need to show that Pr(S|P)/Pr(S|not-P) >> Pr(not-P)/Pr(P), and likewise that Pr(B|P)/Pr(B|not-P) >> Pr(not-P)/Pr(P).
But if I have independent reasons for believing in D (contingency, fine-tuning etc.) then I could argue that since D is true, and since Pr(P|D) is not astronomically low (since there’s no strong reason why a Deity could not be personal), then neither is Pr(not-P)/Pr(P). But since I regard Pr(S|not-P) and Pr(B|not-P) as astronomically low, and since I also regard Pr(S|P) and Pr(B|P) as possibly low but not astronomically low, then I can argue that it is indeed the case that
Pr(S|P)/Pr(S|not-P) >> Pr(not-P)/Pr(P), and that
Pr(B|P)/Pr(B|not-P) >> Pr(not-P)/Pr(P).
However, DNA_Jock objects that I’ve overlooked some contrary evidence, since it’s also true that Pr(E|not-P) >> Pr(E|P), where E is the proposition that gratuitous suffering exists.
My reply is that while Pr(E|not-P)/Pr(E|P) is high,
Pr(S|P)/Pr(S|not-P) and Pr(B|P)/Pr(B|not-P) are much, much higher.
How would I justify this intuition? (1) Beauty (especially mathematical beauty) is an all-pervasive feature of the cosmos, whereas gratuitous suffering is a local feature, being confined to certain kinds of organisms living on planet Earth. (2) Beauty (especially mathematical beauty) is a permanent feature of the cosmos, whereas gratuitous suffering may turn out to be temporary.
I’ll stop there. I’m sure you can see where I’m going.
One can easily explain in evolutionary terms why pattern-seeking and pattern-completing cognitive systems would be complemented with motivational systems such that pattern resolution would be accompanied by a feeling of reward.
What’s really puzzling about human beings is that we have recognize aesthetic value in things that aren’t beautiful at all, such as atonal music, perceptually challenging visual art (such as Guernica).
Yes, that’s one of the problems. What justification do you have for that?
Another unwarranted assumption, whether part of the “argument” or not.
Glen Davidson
And you would be fairly obviously wrong.
Pr(S|P)/Pr(S|not-P) may be slightly greater than 1, but Pr(E|not-P)/Pr(E|P) is extremely high.
If ubiquity were relevant, then you just deep-sixed your sentience argument. Given that “the universe is trying to kill us”, the alleged ubiquity of “mathematical beauty” seems pretty poor support for your tri-omni God: the low density of sentient beings able to appreciate the beauty smacks of incompetence.