Hard or Impossible? Neil Rickert’s attempt to ‘explain consciousness.’

Neil Rickert was at it again attempting to ‘explain consciousness’ over at PS at the imperative-phrased invitation of Joshua Swamidass to: “Tell me how you think consciousness evolved.” https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/rickerts-ideas-on-consciousness/3684/

Neil had written this: “What it really boils down to, is that there is no such thing as metaphysical truth. There is only conventional truth. And different social groups will disagree over their social conventions.”

TSZ poster BruceS answered Neil’s challenge and addressed part of its background assumptions: “Another fan of Rorty-style pragmatism… Seems to be a cult among TSZ moderators.” So perhaps this is worth discussing here as well (though obviously the lone religious theist moderator at TSZ Mung was forgotten in BruceS’s comment).

I too reject the notion that “there is only conventional truth,” a view, however, that this site’s founder Elizabeth Liddle also seemed to hold. In the fields I have studied, this is a view held largely by social constructivists, which is often turned into a kind of ‘sociologism’ – the ideology that holds all things can be explained by appeal to societies or groups alone. This view, however, unfortunately comes at the cost of other ‘truths’.

Thus, I respectfully disagree with Neil and believe that the claim “there is no such thing as metaphysical truth” is just his own convenient fiction. It would seem that he has taken a massive detour away from ‘metaphysical truth’ and is now trying to ‘explain’ something that cannot actually be explained. Additionally, it appears that this detour has had to do largely with an attempt to create a ‘religion substitute,’ along the lines of Daniel Dennett’s evolutionistic-atheist worldview.

Rickert tells: “I was a deeply committed Christian for part of my life. But I came to doubt that, long before I started to study human cognition.” https://discourse.peacefulscience.org/t/rickerts-ideas-on-consciousness/3684/4 It thus seems that it was instead a reaction against YECism that had an important role in Neil leaving whatever Christian community he had been ‘deeply committed’ to, prior to taking up a pastime study of human cognition. If not for YECists, he might still believe in metaphysical truth & a Creator who loves us – all people – even Neil.

Rickert writes about his, “study of consciousness, where I have to look at how people make conscious assessments of what is true.” He admits that he holds “a view which many people – perhaps most people – will see as wrong. That’s why it is difficult to explain consciousness.” Yet, this makes the mistake of suggesting that it is merely other peoples’ fault why he can’t ‘explain consciousness,’ rather than taking responsibility for his inability or lack of success to convince others about how ‘consciousness evolved’ (implied: naturalistically, without need, use or role for a supernatural Creator) on himself. Maybe ‘consciousness’ simply can’t be ‘explained’ and hence there is little value in trying to do so (unless or even if one is trained as a PhD in the field and has made it their life’s passion). Otherwise, I don’t understand the ‘that’s why’ implied in Neil’s assessment of the professed difficulty of ‘explaining consciousness.’

I find the rejection of YECism dilemma fascinating and surely relevant for the TSZ community, most of whom reject YECism. It is not one commonly faced where I grew up, so please excuse if my questions come across as ignorant or insensitive. However, I did personally face and had to grapple with the ideology of YECism as told to me by a person who I highly respect still to this day and who has become a very successful practitioner in his chosen field of study & expertise (non-academic), which has nothing to do with the age of the earth. I even thought YECism had some glimpse of merit for a time, before realising that what had to be ignored and discounted in order to remain a YECist displayed errors too voluminous to seriously entertain.

Does rejection of YECism lead some people into a crisis of faith? How do we face or encounter YECists as still respectable and worthy human beings even though we wholeheartedly disagree with the ideology that they have embraced (as part of their consciousness)? I believe Neil is right to wonder about these things. And I believe it would be wrong to act unjustly towards or to treat people in an inhumane way simply because they hold an ideology that is damaging usually to no one other than themselves and their local religious community, as if I held any power as ultimate judge over the care for their souls by demanding that they turn away from ideological YECism.

“We can, of course, sit back smugly knowing that we are right and that the YECs are wrong.  But, at the same time, the YECs can sit back smugly knowing that they are right and that we are wrong.” … “People do not like explanations of what they already take for granted.  They don’t believe that an explanation is needed, since they already take it for granted.  And, if pointing out that what they take for granted depends, in part, on social conventions, then they are likely to see that as questioning what they take for granted. / This is why it is hard to explain consciousness.” – Neil Rickert https://nwrickert.wordpress.com/2019/02/21/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness/

My concern with the social constructivist and ‘social convention’ approach to ‘truth’ is that it places the utmost difficulty on the doorsteps of other people, rather than accepting responsibility on one’s own doorstep by insisting that one *can* ‘explain consciousness.’ It is surely unfortunate, however, because Neil may not have had to face this dilemma in a different Christian community, given that YECists constitute a rather large minority view among Christians worldwide (despite what R. Byers says). Indeed, most Christians don’t get upset with each other about ‘evolution’ or ‘consciousness’ as they go about their regular lives of prayer and worship and aren’t upset by it in their beliefs or relationships with others at their local churches.

Another option, one that Rickert might like to consider, is that consciousness is something that can’t actually be explained, certainly not ‘scientifically’. It may even be a God-given reflection of human beings as ‘ensouled’ creatures. Consciousness may thus simply be always something greater than what can be grasped by highly limited, finite human minds, rather than a temptation toward trying to become god-like in our self-understanding; a topic not meant for full comprehension. At some point, Muslims, Christians, Jews, Bahai’s and others must simply admit we don’t have all of the answers and consciousness, as well as some ‘metaphysical truths,’ are surely strong candidates for such an admission.

Leaving the Church because one can’t understand/explain why YECists couldn’t change their minds when faced with a huge amount of ‘strictly scientific’ evidence for an ‘old earth’ may indeed be felt by some as a very difficult but necessary situation to face. It is not one that perplexes me and I have never faced any pressure from a religious person inside a ‘house of worship’ to adopt their hypothesis about the age of the Earth. I have been calmly told about their views, but never with insistence. There is help, however, for those who have experienced pressure or insistence. Indeed, this is precisely what the BioLogos Foundation was built to encounter, as it is made up largely of former YECists who didn’t turn away from religious faith but found a way to embrace theology without accepting YECism, i.e. while rejecting YECist ideology.

Please consider this as an attempt at understanding and simply offering an answer to Rickert’s dilemma, rather than at dictating any particular solution to the problem. As it involves his own personal history that he has volunteered on the internet on this extremely sensitive topic, I certainly do not wish to put any words in Neil’s mouth or to misrepresent him or his view. I do not wish to ‘out’ his thoughts or character about anything he wishes to keep private. Please do forgive my inability to ‘explain’ these things more clearly, as I’m just trying to understand what if any link there might be between rejecting ‘metaphysical truth,’ trying to ‘explain consciousness’ and leaving a church due to what might appear as YECist fanaticism and refusal to accept scientific knowledge about the Earth, creatures and people on it.

474 thoughts on “Hard or Impossible? Neil Rickert’s attempt to ‘explain consciousness.’

  1. Neil,

    As if “meaning conventions as part of language” weren’t linguistic conventions.

    The heliocentric and geocentric models can both be expressed in English, using English’s meaning conventions, but that obviously doesn’t mean that both are true.

    Truth is not dictated by meaning conventions, and it is not synonymous with utility.

  2. petrushka,

    Overuse of the verb to be and its tenses results in nebulous statements that fail to communicate.

    Overuse isn’t the problem, but misuse is. And that’s true for thousands of words, not just forms of the verb “to be”.

    The example I gave earlier…

    The number 5 is an integer.

    …isn’t nebulous and does not fail to communicate.

    Not picking on anyone; just looking at the first paragraph of the OP:

    What it really boils down to, is that there is no such thing as metaphysical truth. There is only conventional truth.

    Guaranteed to lead to unproductive discussions.

    I don’t see why you’re blaming the word “is”. You can rewrite that paragraph to avoid “is”…

    Here’s what it really boils down to: Metaphysical truth doesn’t exist; conventional truth does.

    …but the meaning doesn’t change or become more precise.

    As for “true”, “false”, “right”, and “wrong”, a failure to use them can result in statements that are nebulous and fail to communicate. If someone asks…

    You’re scheduled to come in at 10:30 tomorrow, right?

    …it does not help matters if you respond:

    I wouldn’t say “right”, but I find it useful to believe that.

  3. keiths:
    petrushka,
    Overuse isn’t the problem, but misuse is.And that’s true for thousands of words, not just forms of the verb “to be”.
    The example I gave earlier…
    …isn’t nebulous and does not fail to communicate.
    Guaranteed to lead to unproductive discussions.

    I don’t see why you’re blaming the word “is”.You can rewrite that paragraph to avoid “is”…
    …but the meaning doesn’t change or become more precise.
    As for “true”, “false”, “right”, and “wrong”, a failure to use them can result int statements that are nebulous and fail to communicate.If someone asks…
    …it does not help matters if you respond:

    Exist be?

    Hmmm. Perhaps the problem lies in something besides the specific word.

  4. KN, to Bruce:

    Millikan, to her credit, recognizes the importance of the distinction and drops the formal or logical correspondence relation. This allows her to focus on the material or natural correspondence relation in her theory of the causal factors that allow signs or states to function as representations. In her version of teleosemantics, this means having been brought about as a result of past natural selection.

    That’s actually a flaw in Millikan’s thinking. States can function as representations even if they lack what Millikan would consider the appropriate causal history.

    Swampman might be assembled by a bolt of lightning, not a long process of evolution, but that doesn’t mean he can’t hold true beliefs. It also doesn’t mean that his neural states can’t function as representations.

    Bruce and I had a related discussion a few years ago, in which Bruce claimed that Swampman, moments after his creation, wouldn’t understand English despite being perfectly fluent in it.

    My response:

    The phrase “understands English”, by contrast, is a description of a capability, not a history. You obviously disagree, but in so insisting, you do extreme violence to the widely accepted meaning of the phrase.

    Consider this scenario:

    Swampman is zapped into existence. You immediately say to him, “Tell us about Lassie.” He launches into a long disquisition on the TV show and its titular character. He explains that she is a dog, a collie to be specific, and a loyal companion to Timmy. He may even mention, as is incorrectly but widely believed, that she fetches help when Timmy falls down a well.

    All of this indicates that he understands English. Not only does his behavior so indicate, but his subjective experiences do, too. For example, when he hears the name Lassie, he forms a mental picture of her, complete with long hair and snout.

    Yet according to you, Swampman doesn’t understand the question, he doesn’t understand English, and he doesn’t understand the detailed answer that he gives. He doesn’t know what “Lassie” refers to, and he isn’t able to picture her in his mind.

    Why? Simply because he lacks the history that you claim is a prerequisite.

    It’s a bizarre position, and it isn’t what people mean when they say that someone “understands English”.

  5. Neil Rickert: And now, after three attempts, you seem quite incapable of telling what was meant

    First, I explained only once and it’s not worth explaining any more than that.

    You said, “”Closer” implies a comparison” and I explained what was being compared. You playing dumb after that is just dumb.

    If I were like you, I could have said in response, “What do you mean by “”comparison”?” and so on about every word you say, and then accuse you of being incapable of telling what you mean. It’s a stupid game, a form of patricking.

  6. petrushka: I don’t define scientific progress as anything objective, like TRVTH. I would define it in terms of utility. Incorporating both commercial utility and intellectual utility: whether a concept or model opens doors and suggests research.

    This paragraph suggests to me that you DO have a concept of truth and that it is not identical to scientific progress, because it is what you call “objective” while scientific progress is more of a utility concept and not “objective.”

    That’s a correspondence theory of truth, combined with a fallibalistic view of science. I agree.

  7. FWIW, I generally agree with keiths’ positions in this thread, although I think he may have given up a bit much on the God’s Eye View business. The concept of truth doesn’t require any view at all.

    It is humorous to me–as it always is when this subject comes up–how those who say they don’t believe in truth are so quick to tell others that they’re wrong.

  8. Kantian Naturalist: But as you rightly point out, this means that there is not a single unique correspondence relation, and so I should not speak of the correspondence relation but rather of indefinitely many correspondence relations, each realized in a distinct form of animal life

    Thanks KN.

    FWIW, by the 2015 book “The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam”, Putnam had moved away from his earlier position and mostly accepted the MR that Maudlin expresses in an essay in that book, an essay which includes a critique of the MTA. I will not attempt to rehearse their arguments or Putnam’s one exception to accepting Maudlin view of MR. Putnam calls his approach “sophisticated realism”.

    I’ll have to think more about the MTA and Millikan’s ideas to respond to the relationship you point out.

    On teleosemantics in general, the latest books from Garson on Biological Functions and Shea on Representation both take pluralistic approaches to the current-function versus evolutionary history split in teleosemantics that we had an exchange about on another thread. They try to combine the best of the two approaches that we differed on there.

    I agree that the causal connections are involved in the correspondences involved in perception/actual mental representations. But I think there are two notions of causality that need to be separated: (1) the causal connections between those mental representations and the world, as mediated by perception/action, and (2) the causal connections in the world itself that the content of those representations models (ie that the structure of the representation is homomorphic to, at least in PP theories).

    Have you ever explored using the linguistic ideas of Jackendoff or of Evans (“Crucible of Language”) to serve as an intermediary between neuroscientific and social accounts of intentionality?

  9. walto:

    That’s a correspondence theory of truth, combined with a fallibalistic view of science. I agree.

    Any reference for details on the notion of truth you subscribe to? I think at one point you admired Haack’s epistemology; does that extend to her ideas on truth?

    ETA: My “God’s-eye view” stuff was an (unchecked) recollection of Putnam’s 80s characterization of MR, which included correspondence truth to a single correct description of the world, at least as I recalled it when I wrote that.

  10. walto: It is humorous to me–as it always is when this subject comes up–how those who say they don’t believe in truth are so quick to tell others that they’re wrong.

    I think you are wrong about that, walto. Being wrong is just being inaccurate with a proposition. Pursuit of some idealistic “Truth”* is looking for the unicorn.

    ETA see below (H/T Petrushka)

  11. walto: This paragraph suggests to me that you DO have a concept of truth

    Lowercase truth. I bet my life everyday on ordinary notions of truth.

  12. Physics provides an example of a POV quite different from ordinary experience. In terms of objects and interactions.

    We cannot escape everyday Newtonian physics, with its billiard balls, and invisible forces. We cannot live safely without assuming the existence of objects, space, time, interactions.

    But Newton, Einstein and Bohr, et al, do not provide a complete picture of what we mean by existing. Or interacting.

    But physics does provide a useful and productive way of studying how things work, from our perspective, at least.

    Metaphysics, from my POV, resembles peeing in a dream. You wake up from a discussion, and you still have to pee.

  13. BruceS: Any reference for details onthe notion of truth you subscribe to?I think at one point you admired Haack’s epistemology; does that extend to her ideas on truth?

    Tarski. I haven’t read much Haack and I didn’t know she’d written anything on truth. FWIW, I kind of liked Gerald Vision’s book on truth–though it didn’t get great reviews.

  14. petrushka: Lowercase truth. Ibet my life everyday on ordinary notions of truth.

    Lower, Shmower. There’s either such a thing as (objective) truth or there isn’t. Your post said there isn’t but entailed that there is. Where I come from, that’s a contradiction.

  15. Alan Fox: I think you are wrong about that, walto. Being wrong is just being inaccurate with a proposition.

    Hahaha. Gotcha.

  16. petrushka: Metaphysics, from my POV, resembles peeing in a dream. You wake up from a discussion, and you still have to pee.

    You should drop that POV, before you get any damper.

  17. walto: There’s either such a thing as (objective) truth or there isn’t.

    Wrong again! There are only more or less accurate propositions. (I am still joking but where’s the fun in having to explain?)

  18. Bruce, to KN:

    But I think there are two notions of causality that need to be separated: (1) the causal connections between those mental representations and the world, as mediated by perception/action, and (2) the causal connections in the world itself that the content of those representations models (ie that the structure of the representation is homomorphic to, at least in PP theories).

    There is a third notion, mentioned by KN in reference to Millikan, involving the causal connection between the evolutionary history of an organism and the representations it produces.

    What the Swampman/Lassie example shows is that Swampman can represent the world, including the causal connections in your category 2, despite lacking an evolutionary history (category 3) or a history of interaction with the world (category 1).

    He can also understand and speak English, despite lacking category 1 and category 3 causal histories.

  19. walto,

    It is humorous to me–as it always is when this subject comes up–how those who say they don’t believe in truth are so quick to tell others that they’re wrong.

    Alan:

    I think you are wrong about that, walto. Being wrong is just being inaccurate with a proposition. Pursuit of some idealistic “Truth”* is looking for the unicorn.

    walto:

    Hahaha. Gotcha.

    Poor Alan. Besides the obvious foot-shot, he doesn’t recognize that ‘accurate’ and ‘inaccurate’ are relative to a standard of truth. ‘Steve was at the party’ is accurate if the statement ‘Steve was at the party’ is true — that is, if Steve was in fact at the party.

  20. walto,

    FWIW, I generally agree with keiths’ positions in this thread, although I think he may have given up a bit much on the God’s Eye View business. The concept of truth doesn’t require any view at all.

    I actually don’t think that truth requires a God’s eye view. I was just debunking Neil’s odd notion that to invoke a God’s eye view, for the sake of argument, meant that one was actually a theist.

  21. keiths:
    Bruce, to KN:

    There is a third notion, mentioned by KN in reference to Millikan, involving the causal connection between the evolutionary history of an organism and the representations it produces.

    What the Swampman/Lassie example shows is that Swampman can represent the world, i

    There are many extant replies to Swampman as a critique of teleosemantics, eg in SEP or Dennett or Millikan’s site or the Shea book i mentioned, if you are interested in researching the issue. I am not saying there are knock down replies, only that the teleo semantic approach is viable. There are also pros and cons analyses for the functional analysis versus the historical analysis of function and meaning in the books.

    Plus KN and I had a back and forth in an earlier thread (where I supported the functional ideas for picking our misrepresentations as it turned out). I am sure you can locate if with your magic google searches. There was a reference to a Piccinini paper in that exchange if that helps with the search.

    You and I have had back and forths about language meaning, externalism, functional versus historical context, and I don’;t have anything to add to those and what is in those books.

  22. Alan Fox: Wrong again!There are only more or less accurate propositions. (I am still joking but where’s the fun in having to explain?

    Let me ask you again, is the claim that there there are only more or less accurate propositions only more or less accurate in your opinion–or is it, you know, true?

    (And what is the claim that it is only more or less accurate that propositions are only more or less accurate even supposed to mean? I note that the more accurate the meta-claim is, the less accurate it seems like the original claim will be.)

  23. walto: Let me ask you again, is the claim that there there are only more or less accurate propositions only more or less accurate in your opinion–or is it, you know, true?

    I think so, depending what you mean by true. Fairly accurate at least.

    (And what is the claim that it is only more or less true that propositions are only more or less accurate even supposed to mean?)

    Take “snow is white”. Is that true? I think it’s less accurate than “precipitation below 0°C reflects light at all wavelengths in the visible spectrum”. Could be wrong, though.

  24. keiths: ‘Steve was at the party’ is accurate if the statement ‘Steve was at the party’ is true — that is, if Steve was in fact at the party.

    Time-dependent, though, unless the party never ends.

  25. It’s fairly accurate that you’re fairly confused about this, Alan.

    It doesn’t matter whether it’s true that snow is white or not quite true. What matters is that if “snow is white” is true, then snow is white. If, as you think, every sentence in English is a little vague, so be it.The claim that every sentence in English is vague is not a theory of truth.

  26. Alan Fox: Time-dependent, though, unless the party never ends.

    I think I’ve told you before to look up “indexicals.” (Also, to maybe not post so much.)

  27. petrushka, now:

    Lowercase truth. I bet my life everyday on ordinary notions of truth.

    petrushka, earlier:

    I simply don’t think true and objective mean what we want them to mean.

    ‘True’ does mean what we want it to mean, and that’s why you can bet your life on it.

    “It’s dangerous to walk in front of a speeding bus” is true, because it is in fact dangerous to do so. “It’s (relatively) safe to walk in front of a parked car” is also true, because it is in fact relatively safe to do so.

    That’s what people want ‘true’ to mean, and it works just fine.

  28. walto:

    It’s fairly accurate that you’re fairly confused about this, Alan.

    It doesn’t matter whether it’s true that snow is white or not quite true. What matters is that if “snow is white” is true, then snow is white. If, as you think, every sentence in English is a little vague, so be it.The claim that every sentence in English is vague is not a theory of truth.

    Succinctly put, and quite accurate true.

  29. Shall we play again with the Star Trek transporter.

    Joe is vaporized at point X and and a replica constructed at point Y.

    Did Y-Joe attend the party that X-Joe did?

    Aside from not believing such transporters are possible, I find them amusing.

    If they are possible, we can have a discussion of Last Thursdayism.

  30. petrushka,

    The question “Was Steve at the party?” assumes a shared understanding of whom the name “Steve” refers to.

    Your Joe example is no different.

  31. Bruce,

    Along the lines of my Swampman/Lassie example:

    Swampman is zapped into existence, and you ask him to pick up a rock and throw it at the nearest tree. He leans over, picks up a rock, and throws it at what is in fact the nearest tree. It is downright perverse to insist that he doesn’t understand English and doesn’t know what ‘pick up’, ‘rock’, ‘throw’, ‘nearest’, and ‘tree’ mean, or that he doesn’t possess representations of those concepts.

    If you know of any credible arguments in favor of that perverse notion, I’d be interested in seeing one (or a quotation or a paraphrase).

  32. keiths,

    The guy probably most famous for attacking that notion of meaning was Putnam, in Reason, Truth and History.

    ETA: I mean supporting the “perverse notion” and attacking the common sense one you’re using.

  33. keiths:
    petrushka,
    The question “Was Steve at the party?” assumes a shared understanding of whom the name “Steve” refers to.
    Your Joe example is no different.

    Now do Joe in a Matrix.

  34. walto,

    The guy probably most famous for attacking that notion of meaning was Putnam, in Reason, Truth and History.

    I’m just hoping that Bruce (or anyone) will quote or paraphrase such an argument and show why it is effective against my Swampman examples.

  35. petrushka: I bet my life everyday on ordinary notions of truth.

    I don’t have a problem with the ordinary use of “true” in ordinary conversation.

    People disagree a lot. But they can be disagreeing about lots of things (including meaning, memories, etc).

  36. keiths:

    The question “Was Steve at the party?” assumes a shared understanding of whom the name “Steve” refers to.

    Your Joe example is no different.

    petrushka:

    Now do Joe in a Matrix.

    Same thing: The question assumes a shared understanding of what “at the party” means. To normal English speakers, it means that Joe was physically present; that is, his body was at the site of the party. If the party was in Des Moines but Joe was in Tokyo, the response might be “No, Joe wasn’t at the party, but he Skyped in from Tokyo.”

    If we are all in the Matrix, and the site of the party doesn’t actually exist, then no one was physically present at the site of the party. In that case the belief “I was at the party” is false for everyone, including those who think they were there.

  37. keiths:
    walto,

    I’m just hoping that Bruce (or anyone) will quote or paraphrase such an argument and show why it is effective against my Swampman examples.

    I found this summary here: https://www.revolvy.com/page/Hilary-Putnam

    One of Putnam’s contributions to philosophy of language is his claim that “meaning just ain’t in the head”. His views on meaning, first laid out in Meaning and Reference (1973), then in The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ (1975), use his famous “Twin Earth” thought experiment to illustrate that the meaning of terms are determined by factors outside the mind.

    Twin Earth shows this, according to Putnam, since on Twin Earth everything is identical to Earth, except that its lakes, rivers and oceans are filled with XYZ whereas those of earth are filled with HO. Consequently, when an earthling, Fredrick, uses the Earth-English word “water”, it has a different meaning from the Twin Earth-English word “water” when used by his physically identical twin, Frodrick, on Twin Earth. Since Fredrick and Frodrick are physically indistinguishable when they utter their respective words, and since their words have different meanings, meaning cannot be determined solely by what is in their heads. This led Putnam to adopt a version of semantic externalism with regard to meaning and mental content.[13][41] The late philosopher of mind and language Donald Davidson, despite his many differences of opinion with Putnam, wrote that semantic externalism constituted an “anti-subjectivist revolution” in philosophers’ way of seeing the world. Since the time of Descartes, philosophers had been concerned with proving knowledge from the basis of subjective experience. Thanks to Saul Kripke, Putnam, Tyler Burge and others, Davidson said, philosophy could now take the objective realm for granted and start questioning the alleged “truths” of subjective experience.[48]

    Theory of meaning
    Putnam, along with Saul Kripke, Keith Donnellan, and others, contributed to what is known as the causal theory of reference.[6] In particular, Putnam maintained in The Meaning of “Meaning” that the objects referred to by natural kind terms—such as tiger, water, and tree—are the principal elements of the meaning of such terms. There is a linguistic division of labor, analogous to Adam Smith’s economic division of labor, according to which such terms have their references fixed by the “experts” in the particular field of science to which the terms belong. So, for example, the reference of the term “lion” is fixed by the community of zoologists, the reference of the term “elm tree” is fixed by the community of botanists, and the reference of the term “table salt” is fixed as “NaCl” by chemists. These referents are considered rigid designators in the Kripkean sense and are disseminated outward to the linguistic community.[41]

    Putnam specifies a finite sequence of elements (a vector) for the description of the meaning of every term in the language. Such a vector consists of four components:

    the object to which the term refers, e.g., the object individuated by the chemical formula HO;
    a set of typical descriptions of the term, referred to as “the stereotype”, e.g., “transparent”, “colorless”, and “hydrating”;
    the semantic indicators that place the object into a general category, e.g., “natural kind” and “liquid”;
    the syntactic indicators, e.g., “concrete noun” and “mass noun”.
    Such a “meaning-vector” provides a description of the reference and use of an expression within a particular linguistic community. It provides the conditions for its correct usage and makes it possible to judge whether a single speaker attributes the appropriate meaning to that expression or whether its use has changed enough to cause a difference in its meaning. According to Putnam, it is legitimate to speak of a change in the meaning of an expression only if the reference of the term, and not its stereotype, has changed. However, since there is no possible algorithm that can determine which aspect—the stereotype or the reference—has changed in a particular case, it is necessary to consider the usage of other expressions of the language.[41] Since there is no limit to the number of such expressions which must be considered, Putnam embraced a form of semantic holism.[49]

  38. What would an instantaneous snapshot of an atom look lke.

    Disregard the problem of light, and provide the snapshot as coordinates.

  39. petrushka:
    What would an instantaneous snapshot of an atom look lke.

    Yo mama? (If that’s not what you were going for, can I have two more guesses?)

  40. Neil Rickert: I don’t have a problem with the ordinary use of “true” in ordinary conversation.

    Fortunately for all concerned, the ordinary use of ‘true’ is the correct use of ‘true.’. The corresponding-with-reality use.

  41. walto: Fortunately for all concerned, the ordinary use of ‘true’ is the correct use of ‘true.’. The corresponding-with-reality use.

    At last a definition that makes sense. Modelling reality. 😤😵😞😒😍😰

  42. petrushka,

    What would an instantaneous snapshot of an atom look lke.

    Disregard the problem of light, and provide the snapshot as coordinates.

    Instead of asking odd, disjointed questions, why not make an actual argument?

    I’ve argued that ‘true’ means what we want it to mean, and that the following two statements are true:

    It’s dangerous to walk in front of a speeding bus.

    And:

    It’s (relatively) safe to walk in front of a parked car.

    They are true because it is in fact dangerous to walk in front of a speeding bus, and it is in fact relatively safe to walk in front of a parked car.

    Do you disagree? If so, what is your counterargument?

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