In a recent UD post, Gil has been more specific than he often is, so I thought I would respond here:
The resolution of the debate about the creative powers of natural selection is dead simple and utterly trivial to figure out.
- Natural selection throws stuff out. Throwing stuff out has no creative power.
- Existing biological information, mixed and matched, can be filtered by natural selection, as in sexual reproduction, but nothing inherently new is created.
- Random errors can produce survivability quotients, but only in circumstances in which overall functional degradation supports survival in a pathological environment (e.g., bacterial antibiotic resistance), and only given massive probabilistic resources and a few trivial mutational events capable of producing the survival advantage.
- Random errors are inherently entropic, and the more complex a functionally-integrated system becomes, the more destructive random errors become. Anyone with any experience in even the most elementary engineering enterprise knows this.
To his first, I cite this:
To the second, I say: why not? Every mutation is something new, and that can be “mixed and matched” as well as “existing information”.
To the third, I say: this is simply not the case.
To the fourth, I say: this assertion assumes that the biological landscape is as rugged as the engineering landscape. It clearly is not. Engineered artefacts are usually highly vulnerable to slightly alterations – A stuck screw can render an entire motorcycle worthless, as Robert Pirsig noted. This is not the case with biological organisms, which countless slight variants are perfectly viable, as is evidenced by the fact that although all children (including even monozygotic twins) are unique, most are viable.
Therefore this:
Yet, we are expected by Darwinists to believe that throwing a sufficient number of monkey wrenches into the complex machinery of living systems, over a long enough period of time, can turn a microbe into Mozart.
Is not unreasonable at all 🙂
“I do not find the inference that mind can arise from purely material processes to be credible.”
BUT, if it could arise from purely material processes, it would nonetheless do everything you mention – have self-awareness, perform logical processes, be aware of the rest of your body,etc. So really, what difference does it really make whether or not you can conceive of mind as being what the brain does for a living? Nothing really changes whether you find it credible or not.
@Flint:
I’m all for observational evidence. But of course it does not follow that what has not been empirically observed is therefore somehow false, or impossible, or non-existent. Nor does the fact that a physical phenomenon has been repeated and empirically observed a zillion times necessarily imply that it will happen the same way the zillion-and-first time. (It’s a good working assumption, though.) Such is the inductive problem of science.
In severe cases, they look at objects and they SEE purpose, as though it were an attribute of the object like color or mass.
Would you say the following is a fair statement? “Where purpose is clearly indicated in the origin of an object, that purpose is often, if not always, inherent in the essential attributes of the artifact in question.” (For example, the common claw hammer is shaped the way it is for a reason. In order to achieve the purpose for which it was created, it is configured the way that it is. Its purpose shaped its design, and hence some of its essential attributes.)
…assume no purpose unless some immediate, proximate purpose can be established. And do not extend that purpose beyond the immediate without solid evidential reason.
On Easter Island in Chilean Polynesia there are what appear to be large human figures as if sculpted by intelligent agents at some time in the relatively distant past. Do you detect purpose in those artifacts?
How do you know that Flint?
Nothing really changes whether you find it credible or not.
If our intelligence arose from purely material processes, as opposed to some intelligently purposeful source, it seems to me that everything changes. Materialism, followed to its logical conclusions, must ultimately destroy all logic, rationality, meaning, and purpose. It is truly self-defeating, self-swallowing, and logically suicidal. Intelligently purposeful origins, on the other hand, leave the door wide open for logic, rationality, and meaning.
BTW, do you find yourself in agreement with, or at least sympathetic to, Bertrand Russell’s worship, quoted above?
Kent_D:
I’ll answer your questions as well as I can.
———
Yes, I’ll go along with all of that. But if something has happened the same way so many times without exception, I would base my expectation about the next instance on more than statistical extrapolation. I would suspect there would be some underlying reason, not to hard to find.
As for absence of evidence not being evidence of absence, this is a limited aphorism. Sometimes not only is there no evidence of X, but the sum of all evidence available PRECLUDES X. There’s a difference between proving there are no unicorns, and proving there are no unicorns in the closet.
In general, no, I wouldn’t agree with this as it stands. In fact I would say that without background knowledge there is no such thing as “purpose clearly indicated in the origin of an object.” Purpose is not an attribute of an object, but rather objects and purposes are attributes of intent, and the intent lies outside the object itself.
But none of those attributes would makes sense unless you already knew a good deal about carpentry, about nails, about the process that hammers are part of. That’s my point. If you knew nothing about carpentry, had never heard of a hammer, and you saw one hanging on my wall along with various other abstract sculptures, would you “see” the “purpose” of the claws, or would you see just another sculpture?
Of course, although I don’t know what the purpose may have been. So I can presume a proximate purpose – to build large sculptures in the rough image of stylized human heads. But I can’t assume purpose beyond this without further information. Were these hobbies? Punishments for wrongdoers? Religious symbols? Art for the sake of art? Something so culturally dependent it’s outside my experience altogether? I refuse to project.
In general, intentions and purposes produce actions and objects, but the intentions and purposes cannot be reliably derived from the objects without knowledge unavailable in the objects themselves. Larger purposes can be determined from larger knowledge bases, but the default is that there ARE no larger purposes pending acquisition of that knowledge.
Huh? I don’t follow how this means anything! Consciousness, minds, are what the brain does for a living. Nothing magical, supernatural, or particularly mystical about it. Complex, to be sure. But I have seen some astoundingly complex software doing amazing things, with no need for more than the hardware it runs on.
In any case, my point was that you might be right and you might be wrong, and reality doesn’t care. It is what it is. Your concepts might change radically depending on what you believe, but so what?
@Flint:
Does a computer have self-awareness? Sure, it can be programmed to “reflect” on itself — to query its own internal states, and act upon them. But does it really have a sense of identity, a sense of self, an awareness of “I-ness”, in the same way that you and I do? Or is it merely a consciousless, mindless slave of the intelligences that designed it?
This question has a lot of assumptions that need to be decoded. “Self-awareness” is what our consciousness looks like to itself. Do cats share it? I can’t know. Can computers share it? At what point does a computer simulation of self-awareness cross some invisible magical line and become “real” self-awareness? We lack a suitable operational definitiion.
As for being a slave of its designers, this reminds me of the computer nerd joke that computers are dumber than people but smarter than programmers! Certainly computers have been programmed to solve problems people can’t solve. So you can’t say the “answer was programmed in” when the answer was not known. And some very sophisticated programs modify themselves according to sets of rules they also modify. The results are completely unpredictable. So-called genetic algorithms are notorious for finding “beneficial mutations” the programmers never intended, which often end up undermining the entire simulation. These can be damn clever!
So anyway, I don’t think computers have or will EVER have human-style self-awareness, but I do expect that they will someday have their own flavor of self-awareness. Which might be accelerated if quantum computing becomes a commercial reality.
Sometimes not only is there no evidence of X, but the sum of all evidence available PRECLUDES X.
Do you mean necessarily precludes X; i.e. X is absolutely impossible given all available evidence? Or do you mean that X is merely statistically improbable?
There’s a difference between proving there are no unicorns, and proving there are no unicorns in the closet.
So in this example, which proposition does X represent? “Some unicorns exist.” or “There are some unicorns in the closet.” I can understand how we might empirically preclude the latter proposition, but not the former, which would require universal knowledge.
Does a computer have self-awareness? Sure, it can be programmed to “reflect” on itself — to query its own internal states, and act upon them. But does it really have a sense of identity, a sense of self, an awareness of “I-ness”, in the same way that you and I do? Or is it merely a consciousless, mindless slave of the intelligences that designed it?
Depends on the situation. Known evidence can make some things impossible (if you see four aces face-up, you know you won’t draw an ace). Other things become statistically very unlikely
Yes, that’s my point. I think of those geometrical proofs I did in high school, where the best approach was to assume the theorem was true, and show how that leads to a contradiction. So while “you can’t prove me wrong” is not positive support for any proposition, sometimes you can say “assume you’re right. What might we be most likely to observe in that case? And if we find that what we DO observe is entirely different from what we SHOULD observe if the proposition is true, then while we can’t disprove it, we can certainly doubt it.
“”I do not find the inference that mind can arise from purely material processes to be credible.”
What other “processes” are there?
Magic. Duh!
If this were true, then Atheists would be measurably less moral, logical, and sane as a matter course. However there is no evidence that this is even remotely true. The reason is simple. Most human beings have an innate sympathy and empathy for others. In fact, many higher mammals share lesser versions of the same traits. Furthermore, many (most?) atheists have a logical-bend to their character, often educated with advanced degrees in the math, sciences, and the like.
For example, Bertrand Russell was famous for his intellectual achievements and his humanist causes.
Since you mention “logical conclusions”, I presume that you actually have a logical argument for this. Can you present that logic? (Hmm, maybe it should be in a new thread, instead of taking this off-topic).
In my opinion, no it doesn’t. But I don’t claim to be able to prove that.
The trouble with a computer, is that it has the wrong design to be conscious. Hmm, actually, I suspect that anything designed won’t be conscious. You will only get consciousness in evolved things.
Yes, I think that is probably why only evolved things can be conscious.
@rhampton7:
If this were true, then Atheists would be measurably less moral, logical, and sane as a matter course. However there is no evidence that this is even remotely true.
I do not believe that atheists are any more prone to immorality (in the general sense) than theists are. Nor do I believe that they are any less logical, or any less sane. But I do believe that, in spite of their theory (that materialism is compatible with logic, rationality, etc.) most atheists refuse in practice to operate on the inevitable logical conclusions of their belief. Atheism, if its implications are fully realized, must lead to something like nihilism or solipcism.
I did not intend to marginalize Russell, and I meant him no disrespect. He was an intellectual giant — but even intellectual giants are capable of foolish errors in their thought. My point in quoting “A Free Man’s Worship” was to demonstrate that Russell himself clearly acknowledged a powerful unresolved tension in his own world view. (Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say, between his perception of the universe, and his perception of his own nature.) “Omnipotent matter”, “unconsious power”, “relentless chance”, “wanton tyranny”, “empire of chance” vs. “lofty thoughts”, worship at self-made shrines, a free mind, the attempt “to sustain alone…the world that his own ideals have fashioned“. This is the stuff of atheism. Russell saw the tension, and felt it. But he embraced rationality, on a certain level, and refused to take his view of the universe to its logical conclusions. And that increased the tension all the more.
@Shalom:
Do you consider an algorithm, for example, to be a material process?
Kent,
I’m trying a different way to show the flow in this response. I hope it’s somewhat clear.
Patrick: Do you have any empirical evidence for the existence of such a thing?
Kent: If my making decisions counts as empiricial evidence, then I do.
How, exactly? What empirical evidence do you have that anything other than your physical brain is involved in decision making?
Patrick: What evidence do you have that such an interaction is taking place?
Kent: The facts that I think rationally, that I have self-awareness, and that I communicate meaningfully as an exercise of free will are all evidence (on the assumption that I have a spirit) that there is a mechanism by which my spirit can interact with the physical component of myself.
Unless and until you present empirical evidence for the existence of this “spirit”, it cannot be used to support your claim. What I was asking for is empirical evidence that anything other than physical processes are taking place within your brain and a testable hypothesis of how something “immaterial” could interact with the material world.
Kent: I do not find the inference that mind can arise from purely material processes to be credible.
Argument from personal incredulity, while evidently well respected in ID circles, is a logical fallacy.
Well, here’s the definition as I’ve been using it:
“Come into being” is closer to how I’m using the term.
No argument here – an “event” is something that happens as you say. “Property” in this case is a characteristic of something. “Occurrence” is a single action in a chain of events or stochastic process or system.
I certainly don’t find that the term “deterministically” to be accurately used to reflect the emergence of said properties. “Deterministic” relates to the predictability of the outcome of a series of events based on the accuracy of knowing specific causality. Emergent properties are not predictable in that sense and in fact, given a serious of elements that do not come together in nature often or that have never been seen in a compound, no one would be able to predict what properties said compound would exhibit. So I would say no, the properties do not emerge deterministically.
No. It’s a product of purpose.
Hopefully what I’ve added will help, but I don’t mind elaborating more in discussion.
Just curious Kent, but do you have any guesses, opinion on, or particular belief about how this immaterial “spirit” interacts with the physical aspects of your physiology? For example, how does this “spirit” of yours interact with your nervous system? If one gets a disease like…say…Parkinson’s or Alzheimer’s, does the disease affect the “spirit” at all or just the physical body? In either case, how can you tell? Is there any way or reason to ever medically treat the this “spirit”?
Materialists cannot even so much as act as if materialism is true any more than a determinist can act as if determinism is true. The nature of purposeful behavior, thought and argument demands fundamental premises that materialism simply cannot provide – like free will and purpose.
While materialists can employ those words, those words are nothing without the epistemological and ontological meaning necessary.
Kent, I’m having a tough time reconciling the two claims above. While they do not directly contradict one another, taken together they weaken the conviction of both statements. It strikes me that anyone who truly believed the second item would automatically admit that all inferences are credible.
It seems to me that you are selectively dismissing some inferences on the similar grounds for which you accept other inferences. That doesn’t seem like a very well-thought-out position or one with much conviction.
Because a subset of what is real is amenable to consensual, empirical study and description doesn’t mean that all things that are real must be amenable to that methodology.
Being designed and being evolved are not mutually contradictory.
I would dispute that you can’t design consciousness into an entity. It would be extremely hard, and hasn’t been done yet, but that doesn’t mean it’s impossible in principle.
Conscious computers are plausible, it seems to me. Eventually.
Once again, William, you’re making a sweeping claim that you can’t support.
You have not demonstrated that material causes can’t lead to free will and purpose, you’ve only opined it. Repeatedly. And you’ve ignored the many who have pointed out the flaws in your claims: I won’t even call them arguments.
Repeating a meaningless claim ad infinitum doesn’t make it more credible.
Yeah, you’ve been through an entire thread trying to present this as a coherent worldview. Unfortunately it started falling apart when it became clear that *things that are real* cannot mean *things that actually happen* in your worldview. You conspicuously left the discussion when it came to the question what you may possibly mean by *real*, then.
But if it’s not amenable to empirical study, the only thing it IS amenable to is your personal desires and fears.
William discovers the problem of induction. Great! Now apply it to your own philosophical muddle. And then use that on your ‘god belief’ thread.
I was going to ask the same thing. Kent, if you get a chance, an elaboration on your claim with some substantiation would be great. Thanks!
@Patrick:
Argument from personal incredulity, while evidently well respected in ID circles, is a logical fallacy.
I am glad at least that we agree on the validity of logic; that agreement gives us some common ground for discussion.
Perhaps I haven’t made myself clear. I wrote, “I do not find the inference that mind can arise from purely material processes to be credible.” In so writing, I was not marshaling an argument, but rather stating a fact: I don’t believe that material processes can give rise to mind; I’ve not seen compelling evidence that this might be the case. I don’t expect my belief, as such, to be compelling to anybody as an argument.
For clarity, let me state my belief again as Premise A: “Mind cannot arise from purely material processes.” Or, stated a different way: “Matter + energy + time + chance cannot produce mind/intelligence.”
I further believe Premise B: “I make meaningful decisions.” Equivalently, “I choose intelligently and freely; my choices are significant.”
And Premise C: “Only minds can choose.” Or, “Only intelligences are capable of volition.”
Assuming the validity of Premises A, B, and C, Conclusion D follows necessarily: “My own decisions are not the results of purely material processes.” Then Conclusion E must also follow: “An immaterial entity, namely mind (or spirit, or intelligence, or whatever you want to call it) must necessarily be involved in my decision-making process.”
Again, I don’t expect these conclusions to be compelling to anyone, and I don’t present them as part of an argument. Many people obviously disagree with one or more of my premises. But, assuming the truth of the premises, it seems to me that my logic, as far as it goes, is valid and consistent. Note further that there is nothing in my conclusions that is inimical to reason, or to rationality, or to logic.
By contrast, the same cannot be said for atheism/materialism: Assuming the truth of atheistic premises, the conclusions that follow necessarily from those premises ultimately destroy some of the premises themselves.
You will recall that several comments leading up to this present comment were queries like, “What do you believe…” or “How do you think…”. The above paragraphs may help you understand where I’m coming from.
More later…and thanks for your thoughtful response, Patrick. (Thanks also to several other thoughtful respondents whose remarks I simply haven’t had time to address.)
@Robin:
It strikes me that anyone who truly believed the second item would automatically admit that all inferences are credible.
As you know, some inferences are necessary inferences; others are not. By “necessary” inference, I don’t mean a “statistically probable” inference, or an inference “to the best explanation”; I mean an inference which must follow inevitably from the premises — i.e. there is absolutely no possibility that the conclusion could be otherwise. (To me, “conclusion” and “inference” are equivalent terms.)
Then there is the distinction between formally valid conclusions and credible conclusions. A conclusion may be perfectly valid from the standpoint of formal logic, assuming the truth of the premises, yet it may be totally incredible.
Some inferences are “stronger” than others; some conclusions are more credible than others. But to question a conclusion is not tantamount to questioning the laws of logic. If I assume the laws of logic to be valid (which in fact I do), and I question a conclusion, I do it for one of two reasons:
(1) I believe that a logical fallacy has been committed, or
(2) I disagree with one or more of the premises.
For the record, if I make a logical error, I want to hear about it. (Of course I’m preaching to the choir; participants in TSZ discussions don’t seem to have any inhibitions along those lines. ha ha)
It seems to me that you are selectively dismissing some inferences on the similar grounds for which you accept other inferences.
What specifically did you have in mind?
I guarantee that you won’t make a logical error if you never do any logic.
Thus far you have made a lot of claims about what is or is not logical. We have yet to see any actual logic. How about providing some.
Kent,
You wrote “Assuming the validity of Premises A, B, and C, Conclusion D follows necessarily….”
I can only respond with the words of a more eloquent man:
“That which can be asserted without evidence, can be dismissed without evidence.”
— Christopher Hitchens
Should you choose to provide some support for your beliefs, I will be happy to rejoin the discussion.
An algorithm is a process?
Please describe a non-material process.
Exactly Patrick and that is why your position is so easily dismissed.
@Patrick:
That which can be asserted without evidence, can be dismissed without evidence. (Christopher Hitchens)
I don’t know what the context of Hitchens’ remark was, or if he added any qualifications to it. Taken alone, absent a context, Hitchens’ assertion is itself dismissable, by his own rule, because he makes the assertion without producing corresponding evidence.
That niggling point aside, Hitchens’ statement seems patently false on other grounds. Many assertions are made without evidence, including the axioms that undergird mathematical systems and the scientific method. An interesting question is, What kind of assertions ought we expect to be supported by evidence, and why?
Maybe we should all honor the mathematician’s toast: Here’s to pure math. May it never be of any use to anyone! But interestingly, there is a subfield of philosophy concerned with trying to understand why pure math HAS found so many practical uses in the Real World ™, and why it tends to describe reality so well. Might be worth looking into.
But anyway, the sort of assertions that should be supported by evidence, are assertions capable of being tested empirically. Yes, we understand that the state of the art prevents some intrinsically testable assertions from being tested today. But claims of gods are intrinsically NOT testable, because gods are defined as lying “outside” observable limits, whatever that means (if anything).
Gil Dodgen’s claims are all subject to testing, all have been tested very thoroughly, and all have been found to be false. As the statue of David shows, sometimes in-your-face stupid false.
Now, I suppose the argument could be made that if a claim is inherently not testable, that means there can be no operational definitions of what is being indicated by the claim, which in turn renders the claim meaningless. But this doesn’t seem to deter those for whom the very concept of evidence is incomprehensible.
Kent,
Patrick: That which can be asserted without evidence, can be dismissed without evidence. (Christopher Hitchens)
Kent: I don’t know what the context of Hitchens’ remark was, or if he added any qualifications to it. Taken alone, absent a context, Hitchens’ assertion is itself dismissable, by his own rule, because he makes the assertion without producing corresponding evidence.
Kent: That niggling point aside, Hitchens’ statement seems patently false on other grounds. Many assertions are made without evidence, including the axioms that undergird mathematical systems and the scientific method. An interesting question is, What kind of assertions ought we expect to be supported by evidence, and why?
The answer to that question is indeed interesting because it demonstrates why your claim that Hitchen’s statement is flawed is itself unsupported. The basic problem is that you are committing a category error. Rules of logic and mathematical axioms are not the same types of concepts as entities and processes that (are purported to) exist in reality.
So, to get back to the core topic:
Patrick-
Try leading by example. It is a waste of time trying to discuss evidence with you because you do not seem to understand what evidence is.
LoL! As the statue of David shows, stupid people will try to use anything as an example if they think it supports their tripe.
And stop talking about testing as it is obvious your position cannot be tested.
These to opposing claims come to mind:
Vs
I can’t find any marked difference in the premises that support these two inferences, yet you categorically dismiss the former and categorically embrace the latter. This strikes me as cherry picking.
I notice Gil Dodgen is back at UD declaring evolutionary biology to be “transparently ludicrous”. I guess he learned his lesson over here – never say anything stupid where people who know better are allowed to respond!
Speaking of logical fallacies… The example of Michaelangelo’s David is hardly a refutation of Gil’s argument. Yes, his statement is terse, and incomplete, but the idea behind it is worth looking at.
Consider a slab of granite, and a natural process that removes anywhere from 0.1 g to 1 kg of stone at a time. How many multiverses will it take to produce a David?
We have a David because of the very non-natural process of removal that went into it.
The process proceeded with the goal in mind; it was not, for the most part, the result of any local gradient in fitness, except in the most coarse sense, and in fact it’s production using natural erosional forces would have to go against the flow, so to speak, leaving many edges and projections that would normally be removed, while creating voids that would naturally have been protected. Intelligence creates objects by making choices with a goal in mind. Natural selection must begin with variation, and depends on local fitness gradients to guide the selection. The two are hardly equivalent.
Michaelangelo began with a single slab of granite. How many slabs would natural forces require, even if you could devise a fitness gradient to get you there?
And calling someone stupid for highlighting the difference between the two processes is hardly enlightening. The sword cuts both ways.
SCheesman,
The statue is in response to the above.
Do you agree, there is less stuff after the statue is completed?
Do you agree with Gil that “natural selection throws stuff out”?
Toronto
Do not argue like a child. If you wish to debate the bald, simplistic understanding of Gil’s basic assertion, then I grant you that small victory. I agree with you absolutely on both points. Gil is wrong, wrong, wrong!
“No Man is an Island” said John Donne. By the standards of this argument, JD is a fool, for this is a fact than anyone can divine. I know you can do much better than that.
Perhaps you can begin by explaining what Gil is trying to convey. If you can do that, then we might have the basis for a discussion. Is it not the first duty of debate to first understand the full implications of your opponent’s arguement, as most charitably presented?
Maybe not for you.
SCheesman,
If anything, it was Gil’s assertion that was childish.
The second thing wrong with your argument is that nature has the intention of producing any specific object at all.
SCheesman,
Do you believe that it is the claim of evolutionists, that evolution is a completely random process?
You continue to make my point for me. I thank you.
This is called diversion. Let’s see if you can explain the point Gil was trying to make.