Fatima: miracle, meteorological effect, UFO, optical illusion or mass hallucination?

Let me begin with a confession: I honestly don’t know what to make of the “miracle of the sun” that occurred in Fatima, Portugal, on October 13, 1917, and that was witnessed by a crowd of 70,000 people (although a few people in the crowd saw nothing) and also by people who were more than 10 kilometers away from Fatima at the time, as well as by sailors on a British ship off the coast of Portugal. On the other hand, no astronomical observatory recorded anything unusual at the time.

Rather than endorsing a particular point of view, I have decided to lay the facts before my readers, and let them draw their own conclusions.

Here are some good links, to get you started.

Neutral accounts of the visions and the “solar miracle” at Fatima:

Our Lady of Fatima (Wikipedia article: describes the visions leading up to the solar miracle). Generally balanced.

Miracle of the Sun (Wikipedia article). Discusses critical explanations of the miracle, and points out that people both in Fatima and the nearby town of Alburitel were expecting some kind of solar phenomenon to occur on October 13, 1917: some had even brought along special viewing glasses. Also, the solar miracle on October 13 was preceded by some bizarre celestial phenomena witnessed by bystanders at the preceding vision on September 13, including “a dimming of the sun to the point where the stars could be seen, and a rain resembling iridescent petals or snowflakes that disappeared before touching the ground.” In short: the “solar miracle” of October 13, 1917 didn’t come entirely as a bolt from the blue.

The Fatima Prophecies by Stephen Wagner, Paranormal Phenomena Expert. Updated April 10, 2016.

Catholic, pro-miracle accounts:

Meet the Witnesses of the Miracle of the Sun by John Haffert. Spring Grove, Pennsylvania: The American Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property, 1961. John M. Haffert is a co-founder of the Blue Army of Fatima. He interviewed dozens of witnesses of the solar miracle at Fatima, and carefully records their testimonies in his book.

The True Story of Fatima by Fr. John de Marchi. St. Paul, Minnesota: Catechetical Guild Educational Society, 1956. Fr. de Marchi is an acknowledged expert on Fatima, whose account is based on the testimony of the seers, members of their families, and other acquaintances.

The Sixth Apparition of Our Lady. A short article containing eyewitness recollections, from the EWTN Website Celebrating 100 years of Fatima. (Very well-produced and easy to navigate.)

The Apparitions at Fatima. A short account of the visions and the solar miracle.

Catholic attempts to rebut skeptical debunkings of the solar miracle at Fatima:

Debunking the Sun Miracle Skeptics by Mark Mallett, a Canadian Catholic evangelist and former TV reporter. The author’s tone is irenic, and he evaluates the evidence fairly. His blog is well worth having a look at.

Ten Greatest (And Hilarious) Scientific Explanations for Miracle at Fatima by Matthew Archbold. National Catholic Register. Blog article. March 27, 2011. Rather polemical and sarcastic in tone.

Why the solar miracle couldn’t have been a hallucination:

Richard Dawkins And The Miracle Of Sun by Donal Anthony Foley. The Wanderer, Saturday, November 5, 2016. Makes the telling point that it was seen by sailors on a passing ship, who knew nothing about the visions.

A Catholic account by a scientist-priest who thinks that the “miracle” was a natural meteorological phenomenon, but that the coincidence between the timing of this natural event and the vision can only have a supernatural explanation:

Miracle of the Sun and an Air Lens (Theory of Father Jaki) by Dr. Taylor Marshall. Blog article. “Fr Jaki suggests that an ‘air lens’ of ice crystals formed above the Cova in Portugual. This lens would explain how the sun ‘danced’ at Fatima, but not over the whole earth. Thus, it was a local phenomenon that was seen at the Cova, and by others who were not present with the three children of Fatima within a 40 mile radius.” An air lens would also explain how the muddy and wet ground at the site of the apparitions suddenly dried up, after the miracle.

God and the Sun at Fatima by Fr. Stanley Jaki. Real View Books, 1999. Reviewed by Martin Kottmeyer. See also the attached footnote by Joaquim Fernandes, Center for Transdisciplinary Study on Consciousness, University Fernando Pessoa, Porto, Portugal, who argues that on the contrary, it was a UFO.

A Catholic, “anti-miracle” account by a scientist who thinks it was an optical illusion:

Apparitions and Miracles of the Sun by Professor Auguste Meessen, Institute of Physics, Catholic Univeristy of Louvain, Belgium. Paper given at the International Forum in Porto, “Science, Religion and Conscience,” October 23-25, 2003. Excerpt:

“So-called “miracles of the sun” were observed, for instance, in Tilly-sur-Seuilles (France, 1901), Fatima (Portugal, 1917), Onkerzeele (Belgium, 1933), Bonate (Italy, 1944), Espis (France, 1946), Acquaviva Platani (Italy, 1950), Heroldsbach (Germany, 1949), Fehrbach (Germany, 1950), Kerezinen (France, 1953), San Damiano (Italy, 1965), Tre Fontane (Italy, 1982) and Kibeho (Rwanda, 1983). They have been described by many witnesses and from their reports we can extract the following characteristic features, appearing successively.

“· A grey disc seems to be placed between the sun and the observer, but a brilliant rim of the solar disc is still apparent…
· Beautiful colours appear after a few minutes on the whole surface of the solar disc, at its rim and in the surrounding sky. These colours are different, however, and they change in the course of time…
· The sun begins to ‘dance’. First, the solar disk rotates about its centre at a uniform and rather high velocity (about 1 turn/s). Then the rotation stops and starts again, but now it is opposite to the initial one. Suddenly, the solar disk seems to detach itself from the sky. It comes rapidly closer, with increasing size and brilliancy. This causes great panic, since people think that the end of the world has come, but the sun retreats. It moves backwards until it has again its initial appearance…
· Finally, after 10 or 15 minutes, the sun is ‘normal’ again: its luminosity is too strong to continue gazing at it. But after about another quarter of an hour, the prodigy can be repeated in the same way…

“…It is shown that the hypothesis of an extraterrestrial intervention is not sufficient to explain all observed facts, while this is possible in terms of natural, but very peculiar physiological processes. The proof results from personal experiments and reasoning, based on relevant scientific literature.

“…Dr. J.B. Walz, a university professor of theology, collected over 70 eye-witness reports of the ‘miracle of the sun’ that occurred in Heroldsbach [an ecclesiastically condemned apparition – VJT] on December 8, 1949. These documents disclose some individual differences in perception, including the fact that one person saw the sun approaching and receding three times, while most witnesses saw this only two times! The ‘coloured spheres’ that were usually perceived after the breathtaking ‘dance of the sun’ are simply after-images, but they were not recognized as such, since the context of these observations suggested a prodigious interpretation.

“…The general conclusion is that apparitions and miracles of the sun cannot be taken at face value. There are natural mechanisms that can explain them, but they are so unusual that we were not aware of them. Miracles of the sun result from neurophysiological processes in our eyes and visual cortex, while apparitions involve more complex processes in our mind’s brain. The seers are honest, but unconsciously, they put themselves in an altered state of consciousness. This is possible, since our brain allows for ‘dissociation’ and for ‘switching’ from one type of behaviour to another.”

Meessen’s own explanation of the miracle as an optical illusion is based on experiments which he performed on himself, while looking at the sun under carefully controlled conditions (so as not to damage his eyes). However, I should point out that Meessen’s exposure to the sun’s optical effects was fairly short in duration (30 seconds), whereas the solar miracle at Fatima lasted far longer (over 10 minutes) and didn’t damage any of the spectators’ eyes.

Catholic blogger Mark Mallett also points out: “Professor Meesen’s logic further falls apart by stating that the dancing effects of the sun were merely the result of retinal after-images. If that were the case, then the miracle of the sun witnessed at Fatima should be easily duplicated in your own backyard.”

However, Meessen does a good job of debunking the “UFO hypothesis”: he points out that had it been a UFO covering the sun, it could not have been seen 40 kilometers away. Also, at least some witnesses would have reported seeing a “partial eclipse,” but none ever did.

A paranormal explanation of the solar miracle at Fatima:

The First Alien Contact And UFO Sighting Of The 20th Century by Tob Williams. Blog article. April 10, 2011. Updated June 18, 2016.

The Fatima UFO hypothesis by Lon Strickler. February 11, 2012.

https://www.paranormalnews.com/article.aspx?id=1562

“Live Science” debunking of the solar miracle:

The Lady of Fátima & the Miracle of the Sun by Benjamin Radford. May 2, 2013. Ascribes the miracle to “an optical illusion caused by thousands of people looking up at the sky, hoping, expecting, and even praying for some sign from God,” which, “if you do it long enough, can give the illusion of the sun moving as the eye muscles tire.” Also suggests that mass hysteria and pareidolia can explain some features of the visions.

Skeptic Benjamin Radford on the Fátima Miracle by Dr. Stacy Trasancos. A response to Radford’s debunking. Points out that plenty of dispassionate observers at Fatima also reported seeing the sun move. Promotes Fr. Stanley L. Jaki’s carefully researched book on Fatima. Acknowledges that there may be a scientific explanation for what happened with the sun that day, but argues that this doesn’t explain the timing of the event, and why it coincided with the visions.

Virulently anti-Fatima accounts:

Solar Miracle of Fatima and
Fraud at Fatima. The author places too much reliance on discredited sources, such as Celestial Secrets: The Hidden History of the Fatima Incident by Portuguese UFOlogist Joachim Fernandes (critically reviewed here by Edmund Grant). The author also tries to argue, unconvincingly, that only half the people at Fatima actually witnessed the miracle, whereas in fact there were only a few people who saw nothing. See Jaki, Stanley L. (1999). God and the Sun at Fátima, Real View Books, pp. 170–171, 232, 272. The author is right in pointing out, however, that Lucia’s own published account of her visions at Fatima is highly retrospective (being written over 20 years after the event) and contains a lot of added material. Also, the seers didn’t all see the same thing: Lucia, for instance, saw Our Lady’s lips move while she was speaking, while Francisco (who saw Our Lady but never heard her speak), didn’t see Our Lady’s lips moving – a point acknowledged by Fr. de Marchi (see above). Finally, some of the prophecies associated with Fatima turned out to be false.

My own take:

Given the evidence that the solar miracle was witnessed by passing sailors and also seen at several different locations within a 40-kilometer radius of Fatima, I cannot simply dismiss it as a hallucination. Professor Meessen’s arguments (discussed above) appear to rule out the possibility that it was a UFO. The theory that it was an optical illusion founders on the fact that nobody reported any damage to their eyes, subsequent to the miracle. The hypothesis that it was a natural, local meteorological phenomenon sounds promising, but the fortuitous timing of the “miracle” (which coincided with the seers’ visions) would still point to supernatural intervention of some sort. Finally, if it was really a miracle, then one has to ask: what, exactly, was the miracle? After all, no law of Nature was broken: no-one seriously suggests that the Sun actually hurtled towards the Earth, as witnesses reported. The notion of God messing with people’s senses sounds pretty strange, too: why would He do that? On the other hand, the testimony of 70,000 witnesses is very impressive, and the event clearly meant something … but what? Beats me.

Over to you.

1,870 thoughts on “Fatima: miracle, meteorological effect, UFO, optical illusion or mass hallucination?

  1. Flint: Science has being doing exactly that for centuries.

    How do you know this?

    Flint: But not even the entire global enterprise of science can show you what you REFUSE to see.

    Can I can defeat science simply by denying it?
    Are you saying that science is worthless unless you have a particular worldview?

    How do you know you have the correct worldview? Please be specific

    peace

  2. Flint: The sort of knowledge we’re talking about is practical knowledge – that is, consistent with observation, consistent with relevant predictions, consistent with related bodies of knowledge, supported by empirical examination, and such.

    I’d agree and go a few steps further: (1) all knowledge is practical knowledge (in this rough sense); (2) the criteria for reliably distinguishing useful practical knowledge and useless practical knowledge are context-sensitive as well as historically contingent and culturally variable; (3) a causal explanation of practical knowledge in terms of biology and culture is pretty much all there is to do in epistemology that isn’t the spinning of idle wheels.

  3. Flint: Good thing that in your daily life, your revelation matches empirical reality so closely.

    That is the thing about revelation it always matches reality exactly. That is because it comes from the only person always in a position to know what reality actually is.

    Flint: ou can personally thank your god that his efforts are completely unnecessary.

    On the contrary his efforts and his revelation are the only way I can know anything.

    peace

  4. Kantian Naturalist: (1) all knowledge is practical knowledge (in this rough sense); (2) the criteria for reliably distinguishing useful practical knowledge and useless practical knowledge are context-sensitive as well as historically contingent and culturally variable; (3) a causal explanation of practical knowledge in terms of biology and culture is pretty much all there is to do in epistemology that isn’t the spinning of idle wheels.

    How do you know this???

    Here is where the rubber meets the road. If you don’t answer the question I will have to assume you have no answer.

    ———-What you say right now is very important to this discussion———–

    please take your time and think deeply

    peace

  5. fifthmonarchyman: How do you know this???

    By paying attention to the world around me, by reading widely in the history of philosophy and science, and by observing that every purported “foundation” has been refuted by someone else who also had a purported “foundation”.

    And above all by observing that the history of philosophy from Hegel to Sellars has indicated that the very idea of a “foundation” to knowledge relies on a conception of mindedness (esp of the role of concepts in thought) that is logically inconsistent and dialectically unstable.

  6. Flint: You are infallible because you SAY you’re infallible, and you can say it because it’s true.

    Who said anything about being infallible?

    Flint: Why bother to either think or learn, when your god crams you full of Truth without you making the slightest effort to do either one.

    God reveals. I ask questions and I listen.
    It’s a process in which both persons have an integral part.

    The same goes with any communication

    peace

  7. Kantian Naturalist: By paying attention to the world around me, by reading widely in the history of philosophy and science, and by observing that every purported “foundation” has been refuted by someone else who also had a purported “foundation”.

    How do you know this is the correct way to make such a determination?

    notice we still have not arrived at a foundation that can serve as justification for your knowledge.

    you know W by X
    you know X by Y

    ok

    How do you know Y???

    Please think deeply before you answer.

    peace

  8. Kantian Naturalist: all by observing that the history of philosophy from Hegel to Sellars has indicated that the very idea of a “foundation” to knowledge relies on a conception of mindedness (esp of the role of concepts in thought) that is logically inconsistent and dialectically unstable.

    Again how do you know this to be true???

    Don’t get frustrated here ‘———–this is important ———

    If you don’t answer the question I will have to assume you have no answer.

    peace

  9. fifthmonarchyman: Therefore revelation is a complete and solid foundation for knowledge.

    Parents reveal things to us. Teachers reveal things to us. If we can only know something by trial and error why do we need parents and teachers?

  10. Flint: Except my claim was not false.

    Yes, it is false.

    An axiom or postulate is a statement that is taken to be true, to serve as a premise or starting point for further reasoning and arguments.

    Axioms, like premises, can be challenged. They can be shown to be false. The fact that you cannot demonstrate that it is false does not mean it cannot be shown to be false.

    If people here want to challenge FMM they ought to do it without resorting to arguments that are based on false premises and faulty logic, especially given that those are the charges being leveled against FMM. If you don’t like it when you think fifth is doing it, don’t do it yourself, lol!

  11. fifthmonarchyman: That is the thing about revelation it always matches reality exactly. That is because it comes from the only person always in a position to know what reality actually is.

    I disagree with this and I also think what you say here contradicts what you have said elsewhere in the past. Can one person reveal something to another?

    If I reveal something to you, can I be mistaken?

  12. Kantian Naturalist: By paying attention to the world around me, by reading widely in the history of philosophy and science, and by observing that every purported “foundation” has been refuted by someone else who also had a purported “foundation”.

    Never seen a purported “foundation” refuted by someone else who had no foundation? Just asking. 😉

  13. Mung: Parents reveal things to us. Teachers reveal things to us. If we can only know something by trial and error why do we need parents and teachers?

    Much of what we learn from parents is what we learn from trial and error, guided by parents.

    Much of what we learn from teachers, we learn ourselves, guided by teachers. There’s very little revelation, and a great deal of work by the learner.

    Note: I’m a parent and teacher. I know this from experience.

    As I recall, it is “By their fruits ye shall know them”. It is not “by the beliefs that they prattle off, ye shall know them.”

  14. Neil Rickert: Much of what we learn from parents is what we learn from trial and error, guided by parents.

    Much of what we learn from teachers, we learn ourselves, guided by teachers. There’s very little revelation, and a great deal of work by the learner.

    Yes, parents and teachers also reveal to us how to learn and where to go to learn. Revelation is indispensable.

  15. Neil Rickert: Note: I’m a parent and teacher. I know this from experience.

    Have you tried parenting without revealing anything to your children, and how did that work out for them?

    Have you tried teaching without revealing anything to your students, and how did that work out for them?

  16. Mung: I disagree with this and I also think what you say here contradicts what you have said elsewhere in the past. Can one person reveal something to another?

    If I reveal something to you, can I be mistaken?

    Recall the definition of reveal—make (previously unknown or secret information) known to others.

    I would argue that false information is not in fact actual information but pseudo information.

    I would be interested in your opinion on the matter though.

    peace

  17. Neil Rickert: Much of what we learn from parents is what we learn from trial and error, guided by parents.

    Much of what we learn from teachers, we learn ourselves, guided by teachers.

    What you call guidance is just revealing by another name. You are guiding your students to the information you want to share with them.

    The students trial and error is the method you use to share the information.

    peace

  18. fifthmonarchyman: FMM—How do you know stuff?
    walto—-by X
    FMM—-how do you know X is is the proper way to know stuff?
    walto—-by Y
    FMM—-How do you know that??
    walto—–silence

    What exactly am I missing?

    Read my actual posts if you’d like to know instead of posting nonsense mischaracterizations. You’re missing the point.

  19. <

    blockquote cite=”comment-155753″>

    walto: Read my actual posts if you’d like to know instead of posting nonsense mischaracterizations. There are scores of them to choose from, since this has been asked (like a five year old) and answered countless times.You’re missing the point, which, in a word, is that one doesn’t have to know how or that one knows p in order to know p, anymore than one has to have built a hammer to use one. Truth, belief and justification are sufficient for knowledge. Nothing more is required.

    The suggestion that one needs to know how one knows p in order to know p is, obviously, a request for for a regress, when there is no actual regress. It’s the playing of a silly game that a five-year-old would likely enjoy.

    You can’t learn this simple fact, apparently, but that doesn’t make it any less the case.

  20. fifthmonarchyman: I would be interested in your opinion on the matter though.

    I think you may be right.

    Information philosopher Luciano Floridi defines semantic information:

    p qualifies as factual semantic information if and only if p is (constituted by) well-formed, meaningful, and veridical data.

    He writes, “false information is not a genuine type of information.”

    And also, if to reveal is to make known, then it sort of follows that revelation requires truth (given what most of us accept as knowledge).

    Can someone know that the moon is made of cheese? If not, then I suppose it’s not possible to have it revealed to them that the moon is made of cheese.

    ETA: I cannot reveal to someone else that the moon is made of cheese because I cannot know that the moon is made of cheese, because it is not true that the moon is made of cheese. Therefore, no one can receive by way of revelation the knowledge that the moon is made of cheese.

  21. Now, of course, it would be NICE to know how one knows that p; that is an epistemological question that intelligent people disagree about. But one need not know the answer to any epistemological question to know, e.g., one’s right foot from one’s left. For that, truth, belief and justification are sufficient.

    Try to finally learn this, Fifth, because, I will not play this stupid game with you anymore. This has been explained to you many times by many people. If you wish to learn you will. Continuing to try to explain this to you is simply yelling into one’s shoe.

  22. walto: You’re missing the point, which, in a word, is that one doesn’t have to know how or that one knows p in order to know p, anymore than one has to have built a hammer to use one.

    geeze

    you are the one missing the point. Not just a little bit but totally.

    I’m not claiming you don’t know things. Of course you know things. You know things precisely because God reveals things to you. This is true whether you know it or not

    Since you deny that it is the case that God has reveled things to you I’m asking how you know things.

    In other words I’m asking you to justify your knowledge.

    I not questioning whether you have knowledge or saying you don’t have knowledge if you don’t know how you know stuff, Not by a long shot

    I know I have repeatedly explained this to you. Have I been unclear??

    peace

  23. walto: Now, of course, it would be NICE to know how one knows that p; that is an epistemological question that intelligent people disagree about.

    Just to be clear.

    Are you actually affirming that you do not know how you know things?
    Finally !!!!!

    If you don’t know how you know things how can you possibly claim that knowledge is possible with out God?

    In fact

    How is your statement not a total concession to my position? Which is that no one has been able to show that knowledge is possible with out God

    peace

  24. walto: For that, truth, belief and justification are sufficient.

    Right and I’m simply asking for justification for knowledge in general and not a particular P

    It sounds like you are finally willing to concede that you don’t have that.

    But I’m sure you will think better of it in the morning 😉

    peace

  25. Kantian Naturalist: I don’t know that God exists, (…).

    The bible claims otherwise. So either you just lied to me or the bible spreads falsehoods about atheists. It’s as simple as that.

  26. PopoHummel: The bible claims otherwise. So either you just lied to me or the bible spreads falsehoods about atheists. It’s as simple as that.

    If you care about what the Bible says, that’s your business. I couldn’t care less.

  27. PopoHummel: the bible spreads falsehoods about atheists

    Well, that is in fact the case. According to the bible there is no atheist who does good. And I can think of at least one.

  28. Mung: I cannot reveal to someone else that the moon is made of cheese because I cannot know that the moon is made of cheese, because it is not true that the moon is made of cheese. Therefore, no one can receive by way of revelation the knowledge that the moon is made of cheese.

    exactly. I think we are now on the same page. Revelation is not possible with out truth (ie God)

    peace

  29. Neil Rickert: That puts walto way ahead of you.

    It’s not like I’m claiming to be superior to him in any way. In fact it’s just the opposite

    quote:

    What do you have that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you boast as if you did not receive it?
    (1Co 4:7b)

    and

    But God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the world, even things that are not, to bring to nothing things that are, so that no human being might boast in the presence of God. And because of him you are in Christ Jesus,——— who became to us wisdom from God,———– righteousness and sanctification and redemption, so that, as it is written, “Let the one who boasts, boast in the Lord.”
    (1Co 1:27-31)

    end quote:

    merry Christmas

    peace

  30. So silly. Fmm thinks one needs to understand how digestion works or either:

    1. Nobody can eat; or
    2. God must do our eating for us.

    It’s one of the dumbest arguments it’s possible to make with a straight face. That anyone could believe it, almost rises to the level of a Christmas Miracle!

  31. fifthmonarchyman,

    What you seem to have difficulty appreciating is that I don’t have any foundations for knowledge, because I don’t think there are any such things as foundations for knowledge. I think the very idea that knowledge requires a foundation is nothing but a colossal error. So whereas you want to say that only revelation can function as an appropriate foundation, I’m not offering an alternative foundation — I’m rejecting the very idea of foundations for knowledge entirely.

    The closest I can come to answering the kind of question that I think should not be asked is a causal explanation of what knowledge is: how to understand knowledge as being in part a biological fact (to be more precise a fact about actual and possible relations between endogenous neurocomputational processes and the structure of the domains of the world that are modeled by those processes) and in part a socio-historical achievement made possible by, among other things, a shared language.

    I know that nothing in this account would satisfy you. There’s nothing in this account that would give an answer to the question that you think must be asked. But my approach is to think that the question, “but what is the solid, absolute, and unquestionable foundation of all knowledge?” is simply a useless question that we’re better off not asking. There is no answer to that question which does not run afoul of The Myth of the Given.* (See also Ray Brassier’s lecture.)

    The podcast mostly focuses on the critique of empiricism, but they also discuss how the Myth of the Given also works rationalism. I also think it works against Thomism, Kantian idealism, logical positivism, and phenomenology. Even Hegel is not entirely spared!

  32. walto: It’s one of the dumbest arguments it’s possible to make with a straight face.

    You are still missing the point.

    I’m not making an argument at all.

    I’m not saying “You don’t have justification for knowledge therefore God exists.” nothing of the sort

    All I’m saying is that “you have not shown how knowledge is possible with out God.”

    nothing more.

    You have conceded that you don’t know how knowledge is possible.

    I do know how knowledge is possible, I don’t know it by argument I know it by revelation.

    Peace

  33. Kantian Naturalist: What you seem to have difficulty appreciating is that I don’t have any foundations for knowledge, because I don’t think there are any such things as foundations for knowledge.

    So you are just expressing an opinion. OK
    Everyone has opinions, I like the TV show Man in the High Castle.

    I mean no offense but, why is your opinion about epistemology ontologically different than mine about binge worthy television?

    I’m not really interested in your opinions I’m interested in if you have any justification for knowledge.

    Well do you?

    Peace

  34. fifthmonarchyman: So you are just expressing an opinion. OK
    Everyone has opinions, I like the TV show Man in the High Castle.

    I mean no offense but, why is your opinion about epistemology ontologically different than mine about binge worthy television?

    I’m not really interested in your opinions I’m interested in if you have any justification for knowledge.

    Well do you?

    Peace

    There are a lot of confusions here! Wow!

    Firstly, it’s simply not the case that knowledge collapses into mere opinion or preference if there’s no solid foundation for it. That’s simply a non sequitur. No argument for that claim has been put forth.

    Secondly, “a justification for knowledge” doesn’t make any sense. This goes to Walto’s point earlier. If I know X, then I am justified in believing X. I don’t need a further justification of the justification.*

    There’s a real danger of a regress of rules: if I need a rule in order to apply a rule, then I need a rule in order to apply the rule in order to apply the rule . . . but then what avoids the regress?

    Thirdly, “how is knowledge possible?” (the Kantian question) is really different from “what justifies knowledge?” (the Cartesian question). Those two questions are being treated as if they are the same, and they aren’t.

    The first question assumes that we know a good many truths about the world, and inquires into what must be the case in order for us to have the kind of knowledge that we manifestly do. Answering that question involves surveying the bounds of possible experience or intelligibility for beings with minds like ours and explicating the structure of knowledge. The relation of knowledge to epistemology is nothing more than the relation of an object-language to a meta-language.

    The second question puts it into question or doubt whether we really have any knowledge at all unless we can know what justifies all other knowledge-claims. Answering that question involves establishing some kind of rock-bottom foundation — something that can confer epistemic warrant on other claims without standing in need of any warrant for itself.

    To go back to the language analogy (but is it just an analogy?): the Kantian thinks of epistemology as explicating the metalanguage of the object-language in which knowledge-claims are made, whereas the Cartesian thinks of epistemology as discovering the most essential words in the language from which the whole rest of the language is composed.

    fifthmonarchyman: How do you know that?

    please be specific

    peace

    Because I can understand an argument.

    Assuming a standard JTB conception of knowledge. In fact I think that JTB approach is a really bad way of trying to understand what knowledge is.

  35. Kantian Naturalist: Because I can understand an argument.

    How do you know this?

    Don’t get frustrated this is important

    If you don’t answer I will have to assume you don’t have an answer

    Peace

  36. fifthmonarchyman: How do you know this?

    Don’t get frustrated this is important

    If you don’t answer I will have to assume you don’t have an answer

    Peace

    Are you asking, “how do I know that I can understand an argument?”

    Let me put it this way: the human ability to track and monitor its own inferences, and make explicit to ourselves the pattern of inferences that we are tracking, involves language and it involves being recognized as having accomplished this by other persons. We count as reasoners — even to ourselves — only through an iterated feedback loop of being treated as reasoners by others. It’s not a metaphysical fact but a social accomplishment.

    I know how to understand an argument because I’ve been taught to distinguish between concepts, track inferences, assess compatibility and incompatibility, etc. These are all inferential powers that arise in contexts where two or more complex cognitive systems must engage in successful joint action.

    I know that I can understand arguments because I have meta-cognitive awareness of my actually engaging in the social practice of arguing — of keeping track of the commitments and entitlements being made by myself and others (what Brandom calls ‘deontic scorekeeping’). And I can explain my ability to engage in deontic scorekeeping in terms of how I was trained up as a rational being by being taught a language.

    Also, please cut it out with the “If you don’t answer I will have to assume you don’t have an answer”. It’s childish.

  37. Kantian Naturalistthe human ability to track and monitor its own inferences, and make explicit to ourselves the pattern of inferences that we are tracking, involves language and it involves being recognized as having accomplished this by other persons. We count as reasoners — even to ourselves — only through an iterated feedback loop of being treated as reasoners by others.

    How do you know this??

    Tell you what. Why don’t we try something different to expedite things.

    Every time you want to make a claim stop and ask yourself “How do I know this?”

    Once you have that answer stop and ask yourself “How do I know this ?”

    Keep that up until you arrive at something solid that is not susceptible to that “How do I know?” question.

    Post that one thing then we can discuss it.

    If you don’t want to try that just wait awhile till after the festivities and we can get back to the old manual process.

    thanks

    peace

  38. fifthmonarchyman: How do you know this??

    Tell you what. Why don’t we try something different to expedite things.

    Every time you want to make a claim stop and ask yourself “How do I know this?”

    Once you have that answer stop and ask yourself “How do I know this ?”

    Keep that up until you arrive at something solid that is not susceptible to that “How do I know?” question.

    Post that one thing then we can discuss it.

    If you don’t want to try that just wait awhile till after the festivities and we can get back to the old manual process.

    thanks

    peace

    I don’t think that there is anything that can terminate that regress. But that’s not a deep insights into the nature of knowledge. It’s just a fact about the semantics of the word “know”, plus the recursion built into natural language.

  39. Kantian Naturalist: I don’t think that there is anything that can terminate that regress.

    Is this just an opinion?
    If so I would disagree very strongly,

    I don’t just think there is something that can terminate the regress…….. I know it

    peace

  40. Kantian Naturalist: I don’t think that there is anything that can terminate that regress. But that’s not a deep insights into the nature of knowledge. It’s just a fact about the semantics of the word “know”, plus the recursion built into natural language.

    Here’s a slightly different and better way of putting my thought here (stealing some important ideas from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and a few from Dewey’s The Quest For Certainty).

    The regress does terminate, but it doesn’t terminate at anything that counts as knowledge. It terminates at “certainty” (Gewissenheit). (Wittgenstein goes back and forth between Gewissenheit and Sicherheit, “security”.)

    “Certainty” or “security” is not an epistemic state but rather a pragmatic confidence that allows one to navigate the world with any degree of basic competence. To call pragmatic confidence into question is to generate total intellectual paralysis.

    Wittgenstein — along with Peirce and C. I. Lewis — holds that it only makes sense to talk about “knowledge” in contexts where doubt is also intelligible. It makes sense to ask “how do you know that the earth revolves around the sun?” because doubt here is intelligible. We know what kinds of inquiry we would need to engage in if we want to remove the doubt.

    But “how do you know you have a body?” or “how do you know your senses are reliable?” aren’t like that, because doubt here makes no sense. There’s no kind of inquiry that would remove the doubt.

  41. fifthmonarchyman: I don’t just think there is something that can terminate the regress…….. I know it

    And I don’t think that makes any sense, because the question “but how do you know that what you take to be revelation is in fact a genuine revelation?” can be asked here, too. Once you’ve started the epistemological regress it won’t terminate at anything that deserves to counted as knowledge at all.

  42. Kantian Naturalist: The regress does terminate, but it doesn’t terminate at anything that counts as knowledge. It terminates at “certainty”

    How do you know this?

    If it’s just an opinion I would disagree. Certainty is not necessary for knowledge and it’s not necessary to terminate the regress.

    Whether certainty is available is a different question all together. Maybe we can explore it sometime.

    peace

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