Evidence for the Resurrection: Why reasonable people might differ, and why believers aren’t crazy

Easter is approaching, but skeptic John Loftus doesn’t believe in the Resurrection of Jesus. What’s more, he thinks you’re delusional if you do. I happen to believe in the Resurrection, but I freely admit that I might be mistaken. I think Loftus is wrong, and his case against the Resurrection is statistically flawed; however, I don’t think he’s delusional. In today’s post, I’d like to summarize the key issues at stake here, before going on to explain why I think reasonable people might disagree on the weight of the evidence for the Resurrection.

The following quotes convey the tenor of Loftus’ views on the evidence for the Resurrection:

What we have at best are second-hand testimonies filtered through the gospel writers. With the possible exception of Paul who claimed to have experienced the resurrected Jesus in what is surely a visionary experience (so we read in Acts 26:19, cf. II Cor. 12:1-6; Rev. 1:10-3:21–although he didn’t actually see Jesus, Acts 9:4-8; 22:7-11; 26:13-14), everything we’re told comes from someone who was not an eyewitness. This is hearsay evidence, at best. [Here.]

The Jews of Jesus’ day believed in Yahweh and that he does miracles, and they knew their Old Testament prophecies, and yet the overwhelming numbers of them did not believe Jesus was raised from the dead by Yahweh. So Christianity didn’t take root in the Jewish homeland but had to reach out to the Greco-Roman world for converts. Why should we believe if they were there and didn’t? [Here.]

…[F]or [Christian apologist Mike] Licona to think he can defend the resurrection of Jesus historically is delusional on a grand scale.[Here.]

My natural explanation is that the early disciples were visionaries, that is, they believed God was speaking to them in dreams, trances, and thoughts that burst into their heads throughout the day. Having their hopes utterly dashed upon the crucifixion of Jesus they began having visions that Jesus arose from the dead. [Here.]

My natural explanation [additionally] requires … one liar for Jesus, and I think this liar is the author of Mark, the first gospel. He invented the empty tomb sequence. That’s it. [Here.]

Loftus is not a dogmatic skeptic; he allows that he can imagine evidence which would convince him that Christianity is true. However, it is his contention that the evidence of the New Testament falls far short of this standard. The problem, to put it briefly, is that evidence for the authenticity of a second-hand report of a miracle does not constitute evidence that the miraculous event described in the report actually occurred. This evidential gap is known as Lessing’s ugly broad ditch, after the 18th century German critic, Gotthold Lessing (1729-1781), who first pointed it out.

In this post, I will not be attempting to demonstrate that the Resurrection actually occurred. Rather, my aim will be to outline the process of reasoning whereby someone might conclude that it probably occurred, while acknowledging that he/she may be wrong. I’ll also endeavor to explain how another person, following the same procedure as the tentative believer, might arrive at a contrary conclusion, which would make it irrational for him/her to espouse a belief in the Resurrection.

The key facts required to establish the Resurrection

Before I begin, I’m going to make a short list of key facts, whose truth needs to be established by anyone mounting a serious case for the Resurrection.

Key facts:
1. The man known as Jesus Christ was a real person, who lived in 1st-century Palestine.
2. Jesus was crucified and died.
3. Jesus’ disciples collectively saw a non-ghostly apparition of Jesus, after his death.
N.B. By a “non-ghostly” apparition, I mean: a multi-sensory [i.e. visual, auditory and possibly tactile] apparition, which led the disciples to believe Jesus was alive again. I don’t mean that Jesus necessarily ate fish, or had a gaping hole in his side: many Biblical scholars now think that these details may have been added to the Gospels of Luke and John for polemical reasons. Are they right? I don’t know.

Readers will note that none of the key facts listed above makes any mention of the empty tomb. My reason for this omission is that St. Paul’s account in 1 Corinthians 15, which is the only eyewitness report, makes no explicit mention of Jesus’ empty tomb, although it seems to imply this fact when it says that Jesus was buried and raised. I won’t be relying on the Gospel accounts here, as they are probably not eyewitness accounts: most scholars date them to between 70 and 110 A.D. By the same token, I won’t be relying on the accounts of St. Paul’s encounter with Jesus in the Acts of the Apostles, which some scholars date as late as 110-140 A.D. St. Paul simply says of his experience: “last of all he appeared to me also.” That makes him an eyewitness.

It will be apparent to readers who are familiar with debates regarding the resurrection that my list of “key facts” is more modest than Dr. Willam Lane Craig’s list of minimal facts which he frequently invokes when he is debating the subject. Craig assumes that Jesus was buried in a tomb by Joseph of Arimathea, and that the following Sunday, his tomb was found empty by a group of women followers of Jesus. I make neither of these assumptions, although I happen to think he is right on both. For those who are inclined to doubt, Dr. Craig’s article, The Historicity of the Empty Tomb of Jesus, is well worth reading.

Two types of skepticism

I propose to distinguish between two kinds of skepticism: Type A and Type B. Type A skepticism casts doubt on people’s claims to have had an extraordinary experience, while Type B skepticism questions whether a miraculous explanation of this extraordinary experience is the best one. In the case of the Resurrection, Type A skepticism seeks to undermine one or more of the key facts listed above, whereas Type B skepticism doesn’t question the key facts, but looks for a non-miraculous explanation of those key facts.

Carl Sagan’s maxim that “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proofs” is often quoted when the subject of miracles comes up. But we must be careful not to confuse extraordinary claims with extraordinary experiences: the former relate to objectively real occurrences, while the latter relate to subjective experiences. There is nothing improbable about someone’s having an extraordinary experience. People have bizarre experiences quite often: most of us have had one, or know someone who has had one. However, extraordinary occurrences are by definition rare: their prior probability is very, very low.

The distinction I have made above is a vital one. The key facts listed above imply that Jesus’ disciples had an extraordinary experience, but as we’ve seen, there’s nothing improbable about that.

On the other hand, the prior probability of an actual extraordinary occurrence (such as the Resurrection) is extremely low. So even if we can show that Jesus’ disciples had an extraordinary experience which persuaded them that he had risen again, one still needs to show that the posterior probability of all proposed non-miraculous explanations of this experience is less than the posterior probability of a miracle, given this extraordinary experience, before one is permitted to conclude that the miraculous explanation is warranted. And even then, one is still not home free, because it makes no sense to posit a miracle unless one has independent grounds for believing that there is a God, or at the very least, that there is a small but significant likelihood that God exists.

To sum up, in order for belief in Jesus’ Resurrection to be reasonable, what one has to show is that:
(i) the total probability of the various Type A skeptical explanations listed below is less than 50%; and
(ii) given the key facts listed above, and given also that there is a reasonable likelihood that a supernatural Deity exists Who is at least able to resurrect a dead human being, if He chooses to do so, then the total [posterior] probability of the various Type B skeptical explanations listed below is far less than the posterior probability that Jesus was miraculously raised.

What’s wrong with Loftus’ argument, in a nutshell

Basically, there are two errors in John Loftus’ case against the Resurrection: first, he overlooks the fact that the probabilities of the various Type B skeptical explanations are posterior probabilities, rather than prior probabilities; and second, he thinks that because the prior probability of a resurrection is very small, any Type A skeptical explanation whose prior probability is greater than that of the Resurrection of Jesus is a more likely explanation of whatever took place. The following excerpt from a 2012 post by Loftus illustrates these errors (emphases mine – VJT):

In what follows I’ll offer a very brief natural explanation of the claim that Jesus resurrected. Compare it with the claim he physically arose from the dead. You cannot say my natural explanation lacks plausibility because I already admit that it does. As I said, incredible things happen all of the time. What you need to say is that my natural explanation is MORE implausible than the claim that Jesus physically arose from the dead, and you simply cannot do that.

As it happens, I’d estimate the probability of Loftus’ preferred explanation for the Resurrection of Jesus to be about 10%. That’s much higher than the prior probability that God would resurrect a man from the dead, even if you assume that there is a God. However, I also believe that there’s a 2/3 3/5 probability (roughly) that Jesus’ disciples had an experience of what they thought was the risen Jesus. If they had such an experience, and if there is a God Who is capable of raising the dead, then I think it’s easy to show that the posterior probability of the Resurrection, in the light of these facts, is very high.

Type A skeptical hypotheses regarding the Resurrection

The following is a fairly exhaustive list of skeptical hypotheses that might be forward, if one wishes to contest the “key facts” listed above.

1. Jesus didn’t exist: he was a fictional person.

2. Jesus existed, but he didn’t die on the cross: either (i) he fell into a swoon on the cross, or (ii) it was actually a look-alike who was crucified in his place.

3(a) The fraud hypothesis: Jesus’ disciples didn’t really see an apparition of Jesus; their story that they had seen him was a total lie. For thirty years, they got away with their lie and attracted quite a following, prior to their execution during the reign of the Emperor Nero. (James the Apostle died somewhat earlier, in 44 A.D.)

3(b) Jesus’ disciples saw what they thought was Jesus’ ghost, but much later on, Christians claimed that the disciples had actually seen (and touched) Jesus’ risen body – either (i) because of deliberate fraud on the part of some individual (possibly St. Mark, in John Loftus’ opinion) who first spread the story of an empty tomb, or (ii) because Jesus’ body had already been stolen by persons unknown, which led Christians to believe Jesus’ body had been raised, or (iii) because the body had disappeared as a result of some natural event (e.g. a local earthquake that swallowed it up), or (iv) because a later generation of Christians (living after the fall of Jerusalem) was no longer able to locate Jesus’ body (or his tomb), which led them to speculate that Jesus had in fact been resurrected from the dead.

3(c) Jesus’ disciples initially thought they had seen Jesus’ ghost, but shortly afterwards, they came to believe that what they had seen was a non-ghostly apparition of Jesus’ resurrected body – either (i) because of the unexpected discovery that Jesus’ tomb was empty or (ii) because of the mis-identification of Jesus’ tomb with another empty tomb nearby.

3(d) Jesus’ disciples experienced individual (rather than collective) non-ghostly apparitions of Jesus, on separate occasions, which convinced each of them that he had risen, and which made them willing to be martyred for their faith in that fact.

[UPDATE: New hypothesis added.]

3(e) Jesus’ disciples experienced a collective non-ghostly apparition of Jesus, which they all saw, but only one of the disciples (probably Peter) actually heard the voice of Jesus. It may have been because Peter was able to talk to Jesus that they were convinced that he was not a ghost; alternatively, it may have been because Jesus was not only visible and audible (to Peter) but also radiant in appearance that the apostles concluded he had risen from the dead.

Type B skeptical hypotheses

Supposing that one grants the key facts listed above, I can think of only two skeptical hypotheses by which one might seek to explain away the disciples’ non-ghostly post-mortem apparition of Jesus, without having recourse to a miracle. Either it was a purely subjective experience (i.e. a collective hallucination), or it was an illusion, created by mind control techniques.

4. Jesus’ disciples had an apparition of Jesus after his death which was so vivid that they came to believe that what they had seen was no ghost, but a resurrected human being. In reality, however, their experience was a collective hallucination, caused by either (i) the grief they were experiencing in the wake of Jesus’ death or (ii) Jesus hypnotizing them before he died and implanting the idea that he would rise on the third day.

5. Jesus’ disciples had a collective non-ghostly apparition of Jesus after his death, but in reality, either (i) aliens or (ii) supernatural beings (demons) were controlling their minds and making them see things that weren’t objectively real.

The Resurrection: Varieties of skepticism

Broadly speaking, there are resurrection-skeptics who believe in a God Who is capable of working miracles, and then there are resurrection-skeptics who have no particular religious beliefs.

Resurrection-skeptics who believe in a God Who can work miracles disagree with the claim that the total probability of the various Type A skeptical explanations listed above is less than 50%. For their part, Jews have traditionally favored explanation 3(a) [fraud], while Muslims favor explanation 2(ii) [a look-alike died in Jesus’ place]. Personally, I find the Muslim explanation wildly implausible: try as I might, I simply cannot imagine anyone volunteering to die in Jesus’ place, and managing to fool the Romans, the Jews, and (presumably) Jesus’ family and friends into believing that he was Jesus. The mind boggles. The fraud hypothesis was put forward by the Jews back in the first century. In the second century, St. Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho (c. 160 A.D.) records a Jewish skeptic asserting that Jesus’ disciples “stole him by night from the tomb, where he was laid when unfastened from the cross, and now deceive men by asserting that he has risen from the dead and ascended to heaven” (chapter 108). I have to say that I regard this explanation as a much more sensible one. If I had nothing but the Gospel accounts of the Resurrection available to me, I might be persuaded by it, but for my part, I find it impossible to read the letters of St. Paul to the Corinthians without becoming convinced of their author’s obvious sincerity. The man wasn’t lying when he said that Jesus appeared to him.

Non-religious skeptics who deny the Resurrection fall into different categories: there are both Type A skeptics and Type B skeptics. Among the Type A skeptics, there are a few Jesus-mythers (G.A. Wells, Earl Doherty, Robert Price, Richard Carrier) favor hypothesis 1, while swoon-theorists such as Barbara Thiering and the authors of the best-seller, Holy Blood, Holy Grail, favor hypothesis 2(i). However, most skeptics tend to either favor the Type A hypothesis 3(b) [the disciples saw a ghostly apparition; later Christians made up the resurrection – this is Loftus’ proposal] or the Type B hypothesis 4 [Jesus’ disciples had a collective hallucination, which was so vivid that it caused them to believe that Jesus had been raised from the dead]. Hypothesis 3(c) has few proponents, and I don’t know anyone who advocates hypotheses 3(d) or 5.

My personal evaluation of skeptical explanations for the Resurrection

Reasonable people may disagree in their estimates of the probabilities for the various skeptical hypotheses listed above. However, my own estimates of the probabilities of these hypotheses are as follows:

Type A skeptical hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 – Jesus never existed. Probability: 1%.
Pro: There’s no contemporaneous pagan or Jewish attestation for the amazing miracles Jesus supposedly worked (healing the sick, raising the dead, feeding the 5,000), which is puzzling. Also, certain aspects of Jesus’ life (e.g. the virgin birth, dying & rising again) are said to have mythological parallels.
Con: No reputable New Testament historian doubts the existence of Jesus. Professor Graeme Clarke of the Australian National University has publicly declared: “Frankly, I know of no ancient historian or biblical historian who would have a twinge of doubt about the existence of a Jesus Christ – the documentary evidence is simply overwhelming.” Indeed, there is pretty good attestation for Jesus’ existence from Josephus (Antiquities, book XX) and Tacitus. Miracle-workers were a dime a dozen in the Roman Empire; one living in far-away Palestine wouldn’t have attracted any comment. The mythological parallels with Jesus’ life are grossly exaggerated. In any case, the question of whether Jesus existed and whether most of the stories about him are true are distinct questions. Perhaps there was a small kernel of truth behind the stories: Jesus healed some sick people.

Hypothesis 2 – Jesus didn’t actually die from crucifixion. Either (i) he fell into a swoon on the cross, or (ii) a look-alike was crucified in his place. Probability: 1%.
Pro: (i) Some individuals were known to survive as long as three days on the cross. Jesus’ death after just a few hours sounds suspicious. (ii) Some of Jesus’ disciples appear not to have recognized him, when they saw him after he was supposedly crucified.
Con: (i) Jesus was flogged, and pierced in the side, if we can believe St. John’s account. That would have hastened his death. But even if Jesus had survived crucifixion, he would have been severely weakened by the experience, and his subsequent apparition to his disciples would have alarmed rather than energized them. (ii) What sane person would volunteer to take Jesus’ place on the cross? Also, wouldn’t someone standing by the foot of the cross have noticed that it wasn’t Jesus hanging on the cross? Finally, the appearance of a risen Jesus who didn’t bear any of the marks of crucifixion would surely have made the disciples wonder if he really was the same person as the man who died on the cross.

Hypothesis 3(a) – fraud. Probability: 10%.
Pro: The perils of being a Christian apostle in the first century have been greatly exaggerated. The apostles Peter and Paul, and James brother of the Lord, lived for 30 years before being martyred, and even the apostle James lived for 11 years. During that time, the apostles would have been highly respected figures. Maybe they were motivated by a desire for fame and/or money. And maybe the apostles were killed for political rather than religious reasons, or for religious reasons that were not specifically related to their having seen the risen Jesus. We don’t know for sure that they were martyred for their belief in Jesus’ Resurrection.
Con: The fact remains that some apostles were put to death, and as far as we can tell it was for their testimony to the Resurrection. St. Clement of Rome, in his (first and only) Epistle to the Corinthians (Chapter 5), written c. 80–98, reminds his readers of Saints Peter and Paul’s martyrdom: “Through jealousy and envy the greatest and most just pillars of the Church were persecuted, and came even unto death. Let us place before our eyes the good Apostles. Peter, through unjust envy, endured not one or two but many labours, and at last, having delivered his testimony, departed unto the place of glory due to him. Through envy Paul, too, showed by example the prize that is given to patience: seven times was he cast into chains; he was banished; he was stoned; having become a herald, both in the East and in the West, he obtained the noble renown due to his faith; and having preached righteousness to the whole world, and having come to the extremity of the West, and having borne witness before rulers, he departed at length out of the world, and went to the holy place, having become the greatest example of patience.” Additionally, there is no doubting St. Paul’s obvious sincerity when he writes in 2 Corinthians 11:24-27:

Five times I received from the Jews the forty lashes minus one. Three times I was beaten with rods, once I was pelted with stones, three times I was shipwrecked, I spent a night and a day in the open sea, I have been constantly on the move. I have been in danger from rivers, in danger from bandits, in danger from my fellow Jews, in danger from Gentiles; in danger in the city, in danger in the country, in danger at sea; and in danger from false believers. I have labored and toiled and have often gone without sleep; I have known hunger and thirst and have often gone without food; I have been cold and naked.

There is little doubt among scholars that Paul is the author of this letter.

Hypothesis 3(b) – the disciples saw what they thought was Jesus’ ghost. Probability: 10%.
Pro: St. Paul writes that “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God,” and it seems that his own experience of Jesus was just a vision. He never claims to have touched Jesus.
Con: St. Paul speaks of Jesus as the first person to be raised from the dead: he is “the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep.” If being raised simply means “being seen in a vision after one’s death,” this would make no sense. Post-mortem visions were common in the ancient world. Jesus wasn’t the first to be seen in this way. Nor would it account for St. Paul’s assertion that the resurrection of other human beings would not take place until the end of the world – “in a flash, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet.” If a post-mortem appearance by a ghost counts as a resurrection, then many people are raised shortly after their death, and will not have to wait until the Last Day.

Hypothesis 3(c) – the discovery of the empty tomb tricked the disciples into thinking their visions of Jesus’ ghost were really visions of a resurrected Jesus. Probability: 10-15%.
Pro: It’s easy to imagine that people who’d had a post-mortem vision of Jesus might think it was something more than that, if they subsequently found his tomb empty. They might think he really had risen from the dead, after all.
Con: Despite its ingenuity, this hypothesis is at odds with all of the accounts of the Resurrection. In the Gospel narratives, the discovery of the empty tomb occurs before the appearances of Jesus, while in St. Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians, there’s no explicit mention of the tomb being found empty, and no suggestion that its discovery led to a belief in the Resurrection.

Hypothesis 3(d) – the disciples saw the risen Jesus individually, but never collectively. Probability: 3%.
Pro: It’s easy to imagine that over the course of time, the apostles’ individual post-mortem apparitions of Jesus were conflated into one big apparition, especially when many of them were being martyred for their faith in the Resurrection.
Con: The hypothesis assumes that the apostles (including St. Paul) were passionately sincere about their belief that Jesus had appeared to each of them, but that during their lifetimes, they did nothing to stop a lie being propagated: that they had seen him together. St. Paul himself propagates this statement in 1 Corinthians 15 when he says that Jesus appeared “to the Twelve”: are we to presume he was lying?

[UPDATE]

Hypothesis 3(e) – the disciples saw the risen Jesus collectively, but only Peter [and maybe James] were able to talk to Jesus and hear him speak. That may have been what convinced the others that Jesus was not a ghost; alternatively, it may have been because Jesus looked radiant. Probability: 10%.
Pro: There have been apparitions in which all of the seers experienced a vision, but only one seer was able to talk to the person seen – e.g. Fatima, where only Lucia was able to talk to Our Lady. (Jacinta heard her, while Francisco saw her but did not hear her, and did not see her lips move.) The hypothesis would also explain the pre-eminence of Peter [and James] in the early Church, since those who could actually hear the risen Jesus’ message would have been accorded special status.
Con: Seeing and hearing alone would not make a vision non-ghostly. Think of the Biblical story of Saul and the witch of Endor. The ghostly apparition frightened the witch, and even though Saul was able to communicate with the spirit of Samuel, that did not stop him from thinking it was a ghost. Appearing radiant doesn’t seem to have been enough either; in the Biblical story of the Transfiguration (Matthew 17, Mark 9) it is interesting to note that even though Moses and Elijah were visible, radiant and heard conversing with Jesus, the apostles did not conclude that Moses and Elijah were risen from the dead. On the contrary, the early Christians expressly affirmed that Jesus was the first individual to have risen from the dead (1 Corinthians 15:20). [Please note that it does not matter for our purposes if the Transfiguration actually occurred; what matters is what the episode shows about Jewish belief in the resurrection in the 1st century A.D. Evidently, being radiant, visible and audible did not equate to being resurrected.] Finally, it is worth pointing out that St. Paul also claimed to have spoken to the risen Jesus – see Galatians 1:12, 2:2.

Total probability of Type A skeptical hypotheses: 35-40%. 45-50%.

Type B skeptical hypotheses:

Let me begin by saying that if one has prior reasons for believing that the existence of God is astronomically unlikely, then the evidence for the Resurrection won’t be powerful enough to overcome that degree of skepticism. (John Loftus is one such skeptic.) If, on the other hand, one believes that the existence of God is likely (as I do), or even rather unlikely but not astronomically unlikely (let’s say that there’s a one-in-a-million chance that God exists), then the arguments below will possess some evidential force. I have explained elsewhere why I believe that scientific knowledge presupposes the existence of God, so I won’t say anything more about the subject here. I would also like to commend, in passing, Professor Paul Herrick’s 2009 essay, Job Opening: Creator of the Universe—A Reply to Keith Parsons.

Hypothesis 4 – collective hallucination. Posterior Probability: Astronomically low (less than 10^-33).
Pro: Collective visions have been known to occur in which the seers claim to have seen and heard much the same thing (e.g. the Catholic visions at Fatima and Medjugorje). And if we look at the history of Mormonism, we find that three witnesses testified that they had seen an angel hand Joseph Smith some golden plates.
Con: There has been no authenticated psychological study of a collective vision where the seers all saw and heard pretty much the same thing. It stands to reason that after having had the experience of seeing Jesus alive again after his death, the apostles would have cross-checked their reports, to see if they were in agreement about what they saw, before accepting the veracity of such an extraordinary miracle as a resurrection from the dead. If we very generously calculate the odds of one of Jesus’ apostles having a non-ghostly apparition of Jesus on some occasion as 10^-3, the odds of all eleven of them (Judas was dead) seeing and hearing substantially the same thing at the same time are: (10^-3)^11, or 10^-33. [See here for a more detailed explanation by Drs. Tim and Lydia McGrew.] And for a longer message delivered by the risen Jesus, (10^-3)^11 would be far too generous.
Re Catholic visions: it turns out that the Medjugorje seers didn’t all hear the same thing: they got different messages. Additionally, there is good reason to suppose that they were lying, on at least some occasions (see also here). The Fatima seers, on the other hand, were undoubtedly sincere, but only two of them heard Our Lady and saw her lips move; the other visionary, Francisco, didn’t hear her and didn’t see her lips move. Of the two seers who heard Our Lady, Jacinta never spoke to her and was never directly addressed by Our Lady; only Lucia spoke to Our Lady. The parallel with the Resurrection is therefore a poor one. [See also my post, Fatima: miracle, meteorological effect, UFO, optical illusion or mass hallucination?]
Re Mormon visions: each of the three witnesses who saw the angel hand Smith the golden plates had experienced visions on previous occasions. Also, the angel who handed Smith the plates did not speak, whereas Jesus’ disciples spoke with him on multiple occasions. Not a very good parallel.

Hypothesis 5 – alien or demonic mind control. Posterior Probability: Far less likely than the Resurrection.
Pro: An advanced race of aliens could easily trick us into believing in a resurrection-style miracle, if they wanted to. And if demons are real, then they could, too.
Con: The key word here is “if.” While this hypothesis is possible, we have absolutely no reason to believe that aliens or demons would bother to trick people in this way. The straightforward interpretation of the events – namely, that they actually happened – is far more likely.

That leaves us with the hypothesis of a miracle.

Resurrection hypothesis – Jesus was miraculously raised from the dead. Posterior Probability: Well in excess of 10^-11. Arguably close to 1.
Rationale: The number of human individuals who have ever lived is around 10^11, and well over 90% of these have lived during the past 2,000 years. Given the existence of a supernatural Creator Who can raise the dead, then in the absence of any other information, the prior probability of any individual being raised from the dead is 1 in 10^11, by Laplace’s Sunrise argument. Given the evidence listed in the key facts above (a death, and a post-mortem apparition with many witnesses substantially agreeing about what they saw and heard), the posterior probability of a resurrection is much higher. But even if it were only 10^-11, that’s still much higher than 10^-33, as in hypothesis 4.

Conclusion

Since my estimate of the total probability of the various Type A skeptical explanations is less than 50%, and since the posterior probability of the Resurrection is much greater than that of the various Type B explanations, belief in the Resurrection is rational, from my perspective.

Based on the evidence, I estimate that there’s about a 60-65% 55-60% chance that Jesus rose from the dead. That means I accept that there’s a 35-40% 45-50% chance that my Christian faith is wrong.

However, I can understand why someone might rate the probabilities of hypotheses 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) at 20% each, instead of 10%. For such a person, belief in the Resurrection would be irrational, since the total probability of the Type A skeptical hypotheses would exceed 50%.

Summing up: a strong case can be made for the reality of Jesus’ Resurrection. However, a responsible historian would not be justified in asserting that Jesus’ Resurrection is historically certain. As we’ve seen, such a conclusion depends, at the very least, on the claim that there is a significant likelihood that there exists a supernatural Being Who is capable of working miracles, which is something the historian cannot prove. In addition, estimates of the probabilities of rival hypotheses will vary from person to person, and there seems to be no way of deciding whose estimate is the most rational one.

What do readers think? How would you estimate the likelihood of the Resurrection?

Recommended Reading

“Did Jesus Rise From The Dead?” Online debate: Jonathan McLatchie (a Christian apologist) vs Michael Alter (a Jewish writer who is currently studying the Torah with Orthodox Jews, as well as with non-Orthodox Jews). Originally aired on the show, Unbelievable, hosted by Justin Brierley, on March 26th 2016.
The Resurrection: A Critical Inquiry by Michael Alter. Xlibris, 2015. Meticulously researched, by all accounts. (I haven’t read it yet.) Probably the best skeptical book on the Resurrection available.
The Resurrection of Jesus by Dr. William Lane Craig.
The Historicity of the Empty Tomb of Jesus by Dr. William Lane Craig.
The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth by Drs. Tim and Lydia McGrew.
The odds form of Bayes’s Theorem [Updated] by Dr. Lydia McGrew. Extra Thoughts, January 6, 2011.
My Rebuttal to the McGrews – Rewritten by Jeffrey Amos Heavener. May 13, 2011.
Alternate Critical Theories to the Resurrection by Dr. John Weldon. The John Ankerberg Show, 2004.
Origen, Contra Celsum, Book II. Chapters 57-70 provide an excellent historical summary of pagan arguments against the Resurrection of Jesus in the late second century, and Origen’s rebuttal of those arguments in the mid-third century.
Good and bad skepticism: Carl Sagan on extraordinary claims by Vincent Torley. Uncommon Descent post, March 15, 2015.
Cavin and Colombetti, miracle-debunkers, or: Can a Transcendent Designer manipulate the cosmos? by Vincent Torley. Uncommon Descent post, December 1, 2013.
Hyper-skepticism and “My way or the highway”: Feser’s extraordinary post by Vincent Torley. Uncommon Descent post, July 29, 2014.
Is the Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Better Than Mohammed’s Miracles? by John Loftus. Debunking Christianity, March 6, 2012.
Oprah Winfrey’s Half-Sister and The Odds of The Resurrection of Jesus by John Loftus. Debunking Christianity, January 21, 2012.
A New Explanation of the Resurrection of Jesus: The Result of Mourning by Gerd Lüdemann, Emeritus Professor of the History and Literature of Early Christianity, Georg-August-University of Göttingen. April 2012.
Michael Licona’s Book is Delusional on a Grand Scale by John Loftus. Debunking Christianity, July 22, 2011.
Dr. John Dickson To Me: “You are the ‘Donald Trump’ of pop-atheism” by John Loftus. Debunking Christianity, April 2, 2017.

1,014 thoughts on “Evidence for the Resurrection: Why reasonable people might differ, and why believers aren’t crazy

  1. fifthmonarchyman: Are you kidding me?

    The swoon theory is an 18th century fantasy that was discredited long ago. I first heard about it in the eight grade.

    look at what some of the most notorious anti-christian scholars have to say about it

    quote:

    Atheist New Testament scholar Gerd Lüdemann declares that “Jesus’ death as a consequence of crucifixion is indisputable.” John Dominic Crossan, of the notoriously liberal Jesus Seminar, says that there is not the “slightest doubt about the fact of Jesus’ crucifixion under Pontius Pilate.” Marcus Borg states that Jesus’ execution is the “most certain fact about the historical Jesus.” Pinchas Lapide, a Jewish scholar, concludes that Jesus’ death by crucifixion is “historically certain.” According to Bart Ehrman, “One of the most certain facts of history is that Jesus was crucified on orders of the Roman prefect of Judea, Pontius Pilate.”

    end quote:

    http://www.acts17.net/2014/04/apparent-death-theory-did-jesus-survive.html

    When you can’t even convince Bart Ehrman I would not expect to convince someone like me.

    peace

    Believe me, I have no more expectation of ‘convincing you’ than of convincing my cat.

  2. walto: “One of the most certain facts of history is that Jesus was crucified on orders of the Roman prefect of Judea, Pontius Pilate.”

    Btw, who denied he was crucified (I mean other than patrick)?

  3. Kantian Naturalist: The EAAN is valid, but it is unsound. It relies on false premises.

    Which premises of it are false?

    keiths gave his best to dismantle the argument. Why didn’t you try?

  4. petrushka:
    Not playing in Pakistan, I assume.

    That’s actually discussed in the play. The family has immigrated from Pakistan and the father asks, ‘How will we ever be able to go back there now?,

  5. walto: Believe me, I have no more expectation of ‘convincing you’ than of convincing my cat.

    and I feel the same way about you. People just don’t change their mind about something so central to their existence. No amount of evidence will cause you to abandon who you are.

    That is why I’m much more interested in looking at entire worldviews than individual beliefs.

    I want to know if particular worldviews are internally consistent and sufficient. Now that is an interesting enterprise that we all might agree on.

    peace

  6. walto: Btw, who denied he was crucified (I mean other than patrick)?

    Now that is some top notch word weaseling.

    It’s the equivalent to saying “I don’t deny Timothy McVeigh was executed by lethal injection he just did not die”

    LOL

    peace

  7. fifthmonarchyman: Now that is some top notch word weaseling.

    It’s the equivalent to saying “I don’t deny Timothy McVeigh was executed by lethal injection he just did not die”

    LOL

    peace

    I interrupt your giggling to note that I hope you’re not serious. It’s pretty well known that lots of people who where crucified did not die.

  8. fifthmonarchyman: and I feel the same way about you. People just don’t change their mind about something so central to their existence. No amount of evidence will cause you to abandon who you are.

    That is why I’m much more interested in looking at entire worldviews than individual beliefs.

    I want to know if particular worldviews are internally consistent and sufficient. Now that is an interesting enterprise that we all might agree on.

    peace

    FWIW, I completely reject the view that your God-obsessed view is no different from a non-God-obsessed view, that it’s just a different worldview that somebody might with just as good reason believe. (Of course you also think you have BETTER reason for your God obsession.) Both of those are false. Saying “I really have no idea what the cause of the universe is” is not tantamount to saying “I know the universe was created by the Christian God.”

  9. GlenDavidson: A claim (no matter how much you claim otherwise) that would be laughed out of court for being so vacuous.

    Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.

    Glen Davidson

    I’ve got another one for him. Jesus was actually constructed out of sentient jello on Klontarpticon 9g. Where’s the falsification? I haven’t seen it!

  10. walto: FWIW, I completely reject the view that your God-obsessed view is no different from a non-God-obsessed view, that it’s just a different worldview that somebody might with just as good reason believe.

    I know you do.
    That is because you assume that atheism is the default.

    You do that despite the scientific evidence that theism is the hardwired starting point we all share.

    like I said evidence like that is just not an obstacle when you are defending something so central to your worldview

    peace

  11. walto: It’s pretty well known that lots of people who where crucified did not die.

    really??

    quote:

    There is an ancient record of one person who survived a crucifixion that was intended to be lethal, but that was interrupted. Josephus recounts: “I saw many captives crucified, and remembered three of them as my former acquaintance. I was very sorry at this in my mind, and went with tears in my eyes to Titus, and told him of them; so he immediately commanded them to be taken down, and to have the greatest care taken of them, in order to their recovery; yet two of them died under the physician’s hands, while the third recovered.” Josephus gives no details of the method or duration of the crucifixion of his three friends before their reprieve.

    end quote

    from here

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crucifixion

    peace

  12. GlenDavidson: A claim (no matter how much you claim otherwise) that would be laughed out of court for being so vacuous.

    Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.

    What does Hitchens’s razor have to do with the hypothesis that human cognitive faculties are not sufficient to ground knowledge?

    peace

  13. fifthmonarchyman: You do that despite the scientific evidence that theism is the hardwired starting point we all share.

    Which scientific evidence is that?

    like I said evidence like that is not an obstacle when we are defending something so central to our worldview

    When you are defending your worldview.

  14. Neil Rickert: April fools day was two weeks ago.

    It’s comments like this from my “skeptical” favorites that keep me commenting on topics like this. It’s like there is an obsession or something

    If you all would ignore this sort of topic so would I

    peace

  15. newton: When you are defending your worldview.

    Cool
    I would love to have a conversation about it.

    In what way do you think Christianity is inconsistent or insufficient to account for the reality we see?

    peace

  16. GlenDavidson: Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.

    I like Latin too.

    I’m not sure how it’s relevant

    Do you actually need evidence that human cognitive faculties are prone to error at times?

    peace

  17. walto: If we’re going to go the battling links route instead of you bothering to read the two books I suggested, I’ll respond with this:

    That link gave multiple contradictory speculations which one are you going to argue and how would you go about debunking the others?

    peace

  18. GlenDavidson: Do you actually need to be told what a stupid response that is?

    Apparently I do as I have no clue what you are getting at.
    This happens a lot when it comes to my deciphering your comments. I apologize

    please don’t get angry and start with the inevitable profanity 😉

    peace

  19. newton,

    Maybe not, but for fmm, those kind of articles pass for a holy grail. One thing he will never admit is that what he has is a religion, a faith–not a good scientific theory or philosophical argument.

  20. newton: Sorry neither is scientific evidence we are hard wired for theism

    What would qualify in your opinion?
    Are you claiming that humans are naturally atheists?

    peace

  21. fifthmonarchyman: Cool
    I would love to have a conversation about it.

    In what way do you think Christianity is inconsistent or insufficient to account for the reality we see?

    peace

    Like you say , there is no evidence that would convince you otherwise.

  22. newton: Like you say , there is no evidence that would convince you otherwise.

    quote:

    A team of psychology researchers has found that, despite years of scientific training, even professional chemists, geologists, and physicists from major universities such as Harvard, MIT, and Yale cannot escape a deep-seated belief that natural phenomena exist for a purpose.

    end quote:

    Are you claiming that this is not saying that humans can not escape a a deep-seated belief that natural phenomena exist for a purpose?

    If so what do you think those words are actually saying?

    peace

  23. fifthmonarchyman: What would qualify in your opinion?
    Are you claiming that humans are naturally atheists?

    peace

    Are you claiming there are only atheists and theists?

  24. walto: False dichotomy.

    Is not the alleged dichotomy you claimed between default atheism and “God obsessed” worldviews that needed evidence?

    peace

  25. newton: Are you claiming there are only atheists and theists?

    Right. It’s a false dichotomy. (Also, even if there WERE only atheists and theists, nothing would follow about hard-wiring anyhow.)

  26. fifthmonarchyman: Is not the alleged dichotomy you claimed between default atheism and “God obsessed” worldviews that needed evidence?

    peace

    No, just more confusion on your part. I didn’t say anything about “default atheism.” I said saying one KNOWS the xtian pic is true is NOT tantamount to saying one doesn’t know squat.

  27. fifthmonarchyman: A team of psychology researchers has found that, despite years of scientific training, even professional chemists, geologists, and physicists from major universities such as Harvard, MIT, and Yale cannot escape a deep-seated belief that natural phenomena exist for a purpose.

    I read the study, fifth. Now make the argument that means they are hardwired for theism

  28. fifthmonarchyman: Theism: belief in the existence of a god or gods (opposed to atheism ).
    http://www.dictionary.com/browse/theist

    atheism:the doctrine or belief that there is no God.

    Another confusion. Those are just two beliefs. Even if those two contradict each other someone might have a third belief (like God exists on Wednesdays only), or no relevant belief at all.

  29. OK, I’m done with this barrage of silliness for awhile. Going to the beach (it’s going to be almost 90 in Boston today….)

  30. Erik: Which premises of it are false?

    keiths gave his best to dismantle the argument. Why didn’t you try?

    Keiths was looking at Plantinga’s free will defense about the problem of evil. I don’t care about that.

    I do care about the EAAN (evolutionary argument against naturalism), which is basically the old argument from reason rephrased in terms of Bayes’ theorem.

    There are quite a few problems with the EAAN, but the most central one (to my mind) is that Plantinga assumes that naturalism is committed to thinking of semantic content as epiphenomenal or causally inefficacious. And that’s a serious error, because there’s no reason why naturalists need to believe that semantic content cannot be causally efficacious.

    Plantinga might be right that if semantic content were not causally efficacious, then it could not be a target of selection. But he mistakenly assumes that naturalists cannot treat semantic content as causally efficacious. And only with that assumption does the rest of the EAAN go through.

  31. newton: Sorry neither is scientific evidence we are hard wired for theism

    Agreed.

    The ubiquity of teleological thinking is an interesting and important fact about human cognition, but it’s not evidence for either theism or atheism.

    Likewise, the diversity of human religions doesn’t tell us anything at all about which of those religions are true, if any of them are.

    The fact that religion is a near-universal of human society is a really interesting fact about human cognition and social psychology. It doesn’t tell us that theism is true, and it’s a case of argument ad populum to think otherwise.

    And just so we’re clear, that’s a fallacy.

  32. Kantian Naturalist: There are quite a few problems with the EAAN, but the most central one (to my mind) is that Plantinga assumes that naturalism is committed to thinking of semantic content as epiphenomenal or causally inefficacious. And that’s a serious error, because there’s no reason why naturalists need to believe that semantic content cannot be causally efficacious.

    “No reason” is no reason why EAAN should be false.

    The question becomes: What semantic theory do naturalists have, if not the one assumed by Plantinga? I haven’t seen anybody object to EAAN on the grounds you do. I have only seen silent dismissal.

  33. Erik: “No reason” is no reason why EAAN should be false.

    Actually, it kind of is. The EAAN requires that naturalists cannot treat semantic content as causally efficacious, which would mean that semantic content cannot be a target of selection. Therefore, if naturalists can coherently treat semantic content as causally efficacious, then the EAAN doesn’t work.

    The question becomes: What semantic theory do naturalists have, if not the one assumed by Plantinga? I haven’t seen anybody object to EAAN on the grounds you do. I have only seen silent dismissal.

    There’s no consensus, but Paul Churchland has developed a theory he calls “state space semantics,” and he uses it to respond to Plantinga. See his Is Evolutionary Naturalism Epistemologically Self-Defeating? (2009). Plantinga has a response to Churchland in the same issue. I found Plantinga’s response to be dismissive and in fact vacuous, because he relies on intuitions about necessity and possibility rather than engaging with Churchland’s empirical claims about the actual world.

    There’s also this rather interesting paper, Plantinga’s Innocent Assumption: Self-Defeating Naturalism, and Churchland’s Response.

  34. Here is another description of the experiment:

    In Study 1, physical scientists from top-ranked American universities judged explanations as true or false, either at speed or without time restriction. Like undergraduates and age-matched community participants, scientists demonstrated increased acceptance of unwarranted teleological explanations under speed despite maintaining high accuracy on control items. Scientists’ overall endorsement of inaccurate teleological explanation was lower than comparison groups, however. In Study 2, we explored this further and found that the teleological tendencies of professional scientists did not differ from those of humanities scholars. Thus, although extended education appears to produce an overall reduction in inaccurate teleological explanation, specialization as a scientist does not, in itself, additionally ameliorate scientifically inaccurate purpose-based theories about the natural world. A religion-consistent default cognitive bias toward teleological explanation tenaciously persists and may have subtle but profound consequences for scientific progress.

  35. Kantian Naturalist: Therefore, if naturalists can coherently treat semantic content as causally efficacious, then the EAAN doesn’t work.

    If…

    Kantian Naturalist: There’s no consensus, but Paul Churchland has developed a theory he calls “state space semantics,” and he uses it to respond to Plantinga. See his Is Evolutionary Naturalism Epistemologically Self-Defeating? (2009). Plantinga has a response to Churchland in the same issue. I found Plantinga’s response to be dismissive and in fact vacuous, because he relies on intuitions about necessity and possibility rather than engaging with Churchland’s empirical claims about the actual world.

    From what I can gather from the abstract, Churchland denies that rational warrant requires truth. To this Plantinga could simply respond: QED.

    Deny truth and you are proving Plantinga’s point.

  36. Erik,

    The abstract is misleading. I’d post the article as an embedded PDF — I have it on my computer — but I can’t figure out how the Upload File works.

    Churchland makes two important points: one about the sources of epistemic warrant for scientific theories, and one about what a naturalistic theory of cognition says about the likelihood of accurate representations in evolved cognitive systems.

    On the second, here’s how he puts it:
    —————————————————————–
    I begin by inviting the reader to consider a broader conception of representation, and of successful representation, than that embodied in the familiar framework of broadly sentence-like representations, and of their truth. There are many motives for broadening our conception here, but the most immediately relevant in the present context is that the vast majority of biological creatures throughout the long history of life on Earth have had no capacity whatever for expressing or manipulating representational vehicles even remotely like sentences, and hence no capacity for ever achieving the peculiarly sentential virtue of truth. They have been using other representational schemes entirely, schemes that display dimensions of success and failure quite different from the familiar dichotomy of truth vs. falsity.

    Cognitive Neurobiology has already given us an opening grip on what those more primitive, pre-linguaformal schemes of representation consist in, and of how they can embody information about any creature’s immediate sensory and practical environment. The suggestion, currently under vigorous development, is that, in response to the ongoing statistical profiles of their complex sensory inputs, nervous systems (even very simple ones) typically develop a high-dimensional map of the difference-and-similarity structure of the abstract features typically instanced in and encountered in their sensory environments. The development of such maps is typically achieved by post-natal processes such as Hebbian learning, which has long been known to sculpt any creature’s synaptic connections, and hence its acquired internal maps of feature-spaces, in accordance with the fine-grained statistical structures of the creature’s sensory inputs.

    The take-home point for the present discussion is that the dominant scheme of representation in biological creatures generally, from the Ordovician to the present, is the internal map of a range of possible types of sensorily accessible environmental features. Not a sentence, or a system of them, but a map. Now a map, of course, achieves its representational successes by displaying some sort of homomorphism between its own internal structure and the structure of the objective domain that it purports to portray.

    And unlike the strictly binary nature of sentential success (a sentence is either truth or it’s false), maps can display many different degrees of success and failure, and can do so in many distinct dimensions of possible ‘faithfulness,’ some of which will be relevant to the creature’s practical (and reproductive) success, and many of which will not.

    —————————————————————

    In short, a naturalist can happily say that we have good reasons based on evolutionary theory and cognitive science for thinking that most organisms will tend to have generally reliable cognitive abilities for accurately representing — subject to a variety of ecological, evolutionary, and developmental constraints — the features of their environments that are relevant to satisfying their species-specific needs. In short, animals will tend to be pretty good at constructing maps of what Gibson calls their “affordances”.

    What is missing from Churchland’s account is a serious account of how one can get from merely Gibsonian creatures — creatures that are pretty good at navigating their affordances by way of mostly accurate, generally reliable maps or models of those affordances — to genuinely Brandomian creatures — creatures that are pretty good at playing the game of giving and asking for reasons and able to revise their beliefs in light of what is most likely true.

    In short, what’s missing is an account of the evolution of language and how language transforms cognition, such that we are able to reason together and improve our cognitive grip on the world through mutual criticism and correction.

  37. Kantian Naturalist: What is missing from Churchland’s account is a serious account of how one can get from merely Gibsonian creatures — creatures that are pretty good at navigating their affordances by way of mostly accurate, generally reliable maps or models of those affordances — to genuinely Brandomian creatures — creatures that are pretty good at playing the game of giving and asking for reasons and able to revise their beliefs in light of what is most likely true.

    So we are agreed.

    Plantinga’s EAAN (in my view) makes the point that naturalism’s truth-value is low/unlikely, if we evolve by evolutionary mechanism as proposed by naturalism.

    My own personal hypothesis is much stronger: Naturalism/physicalism does not and cannot have any sensible theory of truth, probably not even a theory of semantics.

  38. Erik: So we are agreed.

    We might be agreed on the claim that Churchland himself doesn’t have that account. But just because he’s missing it, it doesn’t follow that one isn’t available to naturalism.

    As I see it, the missing account follows quite straightforwardly from putting Tomasello’s work on collective intentionality into a more neurobiological model. That’s what my next book will be about. I plan on starting it this summer.

  39. Kantian Naturalist: But just because he’s missing it, it doesn’t follow that one isn’t available to naturalism.

    Now the only thing is to find one. Right? Until then there is none. Or “the probability is low” exactly as Plantinga says.

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