http://mashable.com/2016/06/02/elon-musk-simulated-reality/#sdLXHm2_jsqB
2,657 thoughts on “Elon Musk Thinks Evolution is Bullshit.”
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The Skeptical Zone
"I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken."
walto,
It depends on the definition you use.
The wikipedia article on perception defines it thus:
By that definition, what’s going on with the vatters is perception, but the environment is being misrepresented due to the misleading nature of the sensory information.
It’s the inverse position of FMM.
FMM and Keiths agree that we must eliminate the logical possibility of error in order to know anything. FMM thinks we can only eliminate the logical possibility of error if we assume that God exists, ergo we must first assume that God exists in order to know anything at all. Keiths thinks that we cannot eliminate the logical possibility of error, ergo we don’t actually know anything.
As the old joke goes, one philosopher’s modus ponens is another philosopher’s modus tollens.
KN,
Please slow down and think about this.
The Cartesian skeptic does not claim that perception is generally unreliable.
With that in mind, take another look at my comment:
Only if we were asserting the unreliability of the senses would we need reasons to believe that were living in one of those worlds.
That isn’t what Cartesian skepticism asserts.
KN,
No, that isn’t my position at all. Absolute certainty is not a precondition of knowledge.
So what do you claim it does assert?
Read the comment, Alan. It’s in there.
See my reply to Walt.
If the Cartesian skeptic asserts that the senses are unreliable, then she needs to give a reason why we should think so.
If the Cartesian skeptic asserts that the senses could be unreliable, based entirely on conceivabilities, the claim is simply not very interesting. (It’s also possible that Elon Musk is a poodle.)
I emailed it to you.
I also uploaded a copy to dropbox in case anyone else is interested. If dropbox link does not work, and you want a copy, message me with your email address.
Make sure you check out note 16 (end of document) when you come to it.
Dropbox link is
https://www.dropbox.com/s/p5v7na9cfvrdndm/BIV%20Material%20from%20Khlentzos.pdf?dl=0
KN,
No, you’re disputing (2), not defending it.
Anyway, here’s what you’re missing. I do not think that you dispute (1); to the contrary, I’m sure you agree with it. I brought up illusions to show that the following statement of yours is incorrect:
My point is that even without considering Cartesian skepticism, there is enough “causal slippage” to raise questions about the veridicality of the senses. The slippage is there, and it causes illusions. The only question is whether the kind of severe slippage required by the Cartesian scenarios is possible.
Your only argument against the possibility of severe slippage is a circular argument, as you concede.
I addressed this already. Please read my comment again.
No, and again, I’ve already addressed this:
You are claiming that we must embrace your admittedly circular argument because otherwise bad things will happen. But those bad things don’t happen, so they cannot force us to accept the circularity. We can do the wiser thing and accept the non-circular skeptical argument.
My understanding of Descartes’s argument in the First Meditation is that perception is unreliable because sensory evidence alone does not permit us to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical perceptual states. He does admit that we can indeed make that distinction (in the last paragraph of the Sixth Meditation) — but to do so, we must use our intellect. Thus he has to show that the intellect is reliable. And that’s where he gets into trouble.
Thus far we have several different versions of the claim “the senses are not veridical”:
1. The senses are not veridical because we sometimes have non-veridical sensory episodes, such as dreams, illusions, and hallucinations.
2. The senses are not veridical because we sometimes have non-veridical sensory episodes, such as dreams, illusions, and hallucinations AND we cannot distinguish between veridical and non-veridical sensory episodes on the basis of sensory evidence (on pain of circularity).
3. The senses are not veridical because we sometimes have non-veridical sensory episodes, such as dreams, illusions, and hallucinations AND we cannot distinguish between veridical and non-veridical sensory episodes at all.
4. The senses are not veridical because we sometimes have non-veridical sensory episodes, such as dreams, illusions, and hallucinations AND although we can and do we distinguish between veridical and non-veridical sensory episodes at all, we can never be absolutely certain that we have done so correctly, because of conceivable scenarios in which none of our perceptions are veridical.
If keiths is arguing for (4), I don’t see why that’s an interesting-enough claim to be worth holding. It looks trivially true and without consequence.
KN,
Haven’t you ever studied Cartesian skepticism? It has never asserted that the senses are unreliable — not even in Descartes’ original formulation. Descartes simply noted that it was possible that he was being deceived by an evil demon.
As for it being uninteresting, are you kidding? What could be more interesting philosophically than the possibility that the world is nothing like what we take it to be?
That’s why so much ink has been spilled on the topic, and it’s why entire popular movies (like The Matrix and Inception) are predicated on the possible disconnects between perception and reality.
It’s extremely interesting!
What is important to my argument is whether my phrase “with all terms taken relative to their vat world.” does the work I think it does. As always, I am assuming externalist semantics (better phrase than my above “causal reference”). The uploaded paper defines what I mean by “externalist semantics”.
The BIVs form a linguistic community. The world their language refers to is the patterns of information in the computer through which they all interact. In particular, in vattish, “veridical perception” refers to correctly “perceiving” that pattern (scare quotes because “perceiving” is in vattish but the sentence is otherwise English)..
Now it is true that we understand their world is embedded in another world, our world of ordinary objects (assuming we are not BIVs). But that is irrelevant to evaluating the references of their words (including “perception”) and the objects they perceive. In fact, that last sentence is imprecise in mixing English and vattish. But if you understand why that is, you understand my point.
As a suggestive analogy, our world is as irrelevant to their linguistic community and their perception as Kant’s noumenal world is to ours. I’m providing this as a suggestive analogy, not as an explicit equating of the situations.
So for
“Envatted brains have eyes” iff envatted brains have eyes
I think the bi-conditional is true because both sides of the iff are true. But only if you recognize that if the left hand side names a vattish sentence, then the right hand side must be understood in vattish. Since we are speaking English, not vattish, to do that properly requires a vattish-English dictionary. The uploaded paper explains that better than I can.
As I said, I think Putnam agrees with me and makes these points in his paper. But Khlentzos details things much more explicitly starting on page 200, in the paragraph starting “However”.
The intellectual waters get pretty deep quickly after that, for me anyway, so if I have it wrong, I’d be interested in why.
BTW, the author of the paper is a metaphysical realist, though he does not accept Putnam’s characterization of what that entails. So the paper is aimed at showing Putnam’s BIV argument is false. The material relevant to my points comes up as part of doing that.
KN,
You’re falling into the same trap again. Descartes doesn’t assert that the senses aren’t generally reliable. They might very well be telling us the truth. All he is saying, at that point in his argument, is that we can’t know that they are reliable.
KN,
Fer cryin’ out loud, KN! I am not arguing that the senses are not veridical.
How many times do I have to repeat that?
Cartesian skepticism does not claim that perception isn’t veridical.
As someone who teaches philosophy, you really need to understand this.
I did not notice this post before (I’m ignoring the other conversations on the thread).
Your last sentences is exactly right, I think. If we are BIVs, we cannot contemplate we are BIVs (with the English meaning of “BIV”). I understand that as the point of Putnam’s paper.
So an MR who is a semantic externalist cannot coherently state Cartesian skepticism with “I could be a BIV”. So something is wrong with MR, at least as Putnam defines it.
That is my understanding of Putnam and of K’s initial gloss on the argument at the start of the paper.
Bruce:
Which one?
I understand the issue perfectly well.
The problem here is that you take veridically to be an ontological concept — is there an actual relation of correspondence between the object and the sensations of it? (You refuse to use “sense-datum” but clearly “sensory information” won’t work for your view at all.)
Whereas I, along with everyone who works on this stuff professionally, takes “veridically” to be an epistemological concept: the senses are veridical only if we can distinguish between sensory episodes that correspond to reality and those that do not.
That makes it a question of knowledge, not just reality. Do have such a criterion whereby that distinction can be made? Is the criterion itself reliable? What justifies the criterion itself?
KN,
No, because if you did understand it, you wouldn’t make statements like this…
…and you wouldn’t keep claiming that I am arguing for the non-veridicality of perception.
Cartesian skepticism is an important concept for a philosopher to understand. Please study it, for the sake of your students if no one else.
KN,
To use walto’s example, suppose I perceive a cow in front of me. The perception is veridical if there is, in reality, a cow in front of me. Do you disagree?
Of course. That’s why I summarized Cartesian skepticism this way:
KN:
Sure it does. Sensory information flows into the brain, the brain processes it, and the result is a perception. Manipulate the sensory information, as a Cartesian demon would, and you change the perception.
Hmmm. Maybe the result is what used to be called a ‘percept’ if you’re referring to an object; or an ‘ostensible perceptual experience,’ if you’re talking about an act. But, fwIw, I wouldn’t term the result ‘a perception.’ That way of looking at things seems to me part and parcel of your picture of perception, which involves perceiving sense-data or images that may or may not be veridical (i.e. match the cow).
Yes. That bit’s obvious though, My concern was that the vatters couldn’t contemplate being BIVs in vattish. I’d think we should start with the premise that they ought to be able to do that. Do you agree?
walto,
What else would you call the result of the perceptual process, if not a “perception”? It seems like the logical choice to me.
And there has to be some result, or else perception would be impossible.
That doesn’t imply that it happens in a central Cartesian theater. The perception can be distributed temporally and spatially in the brain, but it has to happen. If there’s no perception — no output from the perceptual process — then we haven’t perceived.
You haven’t supported this assertion. What is important?
That sentence, alone, seems to already imply a cartesian theater.
keiths:
Alan:
Of course I haven’t. I knew KN would understand. Why belabor the obvious?
keiths:
Neil:
Not at all. That’s why I wrote this:
keiths,
Since about the 1950s and Austin’s book, ‘perception’ and ‘perceive’ have generally been used as ‘success terms.’ To see what I would call the result of a perceptual process, see my last post. There’s more detail in my paper on disjunctivism, which is available on the net.
If you can appeal to neuroscience in order to motivate skepticism with regard to the senses, then why I can’t use neuroscience in order to block it?
Above I argued that if one thinks about perceptual systems along the lines suggested by ecological psychology and embodied/embedded cognitive science, skepticism about the senses doesn’t go through. You objected that I can’t appeal to neuroscience without assuming the reliability of the senses. But here you’re appealing to neuroscience in order to undermine the reliability of the senses. Wouldn’t you have to assume the reliability of the senses in order to appeal to neuroscience here yourself? And you can appeal to neuroscience, why can’t I?
In a nutshell: if you want to say this
then you cannot say this:
because what we know about how brains work is based on using our senses to observe them.
As I see it, success-terms require success-conditions: one is perceiving iff _________. But success-conditions require criteria for determining whether the success-condition is satisfied. If you can never tell whether the success-condition has ever be satisfied, then the success-condition is idle and the success-term is a flatus vocis.
BTW, re my broader understanding than keiths approves for “Cartesian Theater”–I’m just following Dennett. In addition to “Quining Qualia” (which I’ve already mentioned), there is this paper:
https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/msgisno.htm
He writes there, e.g.,
Theories according to which images either “match” or fail to match their originals (i.e., sense-data theories and the sort of qualia theories Dennett derides) make perceiving into a process in which “items in consciousness” are quite a bit like being on television. Either the pictures are accurate or they are not.
In a word, Dennett’s views of consciousness are contrary to Descartes’ in pretty much every respect. That’s why there are no other Cartesian Dennettians than the one found here. Indeed, even Block, Shoemaker, and Tye are derided as Cartesians in this paper! (NB: They don’t like it either, but Dennett is harsh–maybe even a little indiscriminate–in his attacks on the French rationalist and anybody who has ever said anything similar to what he said back in the 17th Century.)
walto,
“False perception” is no more of an oxymoron than “false memory”. But if you really dislike the word “perception” in this role, feel free to substitute another word that preserves the intended meaning.
Either way, try to avoid this misconception:
I think that we perceive by processing sensory information, not by perceiving it.
When I perceive a tomato, I am not perceiving the photons striking my retinas or the impulses traveling up my optic nerves. I’m perceiving the tomato.
If my perception is false, I may perceive a tomato where there is none, or where there is an apple instead. Perceptions, like beliefs, have referents, and those referents may not exist in reality.
I agree with those remarks.
KN,
Cartesian skepticism doesn’t depend on being expressed in terms of brains and neuroscience. That’s just an easy and intuitive way of explaining it to people.
At its most abstract, we’re just talking about minds (however they are instantiated) receiving information (however it is instantiated) from the outside world (however it is instantiated). Unless we can show that this information is veridical, we can’t show that perceptions based on it are veridical.
And the task is an impossible one, because the evidence on which the demonstration depends arrives via the same suspect causal chains whose veridicality we are trying to establish. It’s the circularity problem.
Such a ‘showing’ (or proof) is indeed impossible. One can’t ‘refute’ the skeptic. But we don’t need to ‘show that perception based on [what information we have] is veridical’ or no one could know anything–even regarding circularity problems. There’d be an infinite regress (or I suppose a ‘revelation’ saving the day).
We do know things, however. Many here think their pets do too. We can conclude from this that your criteria are mistaken. Knowledge does not require a refutation of solipsism. That position can simply be set aside as loony until and unless someone gives a good reason for believing IT.
I’ve repeated this endless times, not only to you, but to FMM. It obviously is falling on deaf ears. You say you don’t want certainty, but you repeatedly ask for this ‘showing.’
walto,
I’m not getting why you think your Dennett excerpt contradicts what I’ve been saying. You seem to think that the bolded statement of mine below somehow conflicts with the text to which you’ve appended it:
First of all, I’m talking about perception and Dennett is talking about consciousness. Those are distinct. We can perceive things unconsciously. and we can be conscious of things that aren’t perceptions.
Second, what Dennett is criticizing there is the idea that there are neural tissues that constitute the “medium of consciousness” — in other words, the screen of the Cartesian theater. I agree with that criticism, and I’m not sure how my words gave you the impression that I don’t. The fact that perception is distributed spatially and temporally in no way implies that there must be a Cartesian screen on which the perception is “viewed”.
walto,
After all this time, you still don’t recognize that Cartesian skepticism is orthogonal to “Cartesian theaterism”?
keiths:
walto:
I’m not asking for proof, just a persuasive argument.
Anyway, I’m glad you agree. Hopefully KN will come around to that view eventually.
Untrue. Not all knowledge is empirical, walto.
Of course it doesn’t, because it’s possible that solipsism is true. However, even non-solipsists can be Cartesian skeptics.
I hear you loud and clear, but I see your error and I don’t want to emulate it.
Right, and there’s nothing contradictory about that. Why on earth would you think that demonstrating something to someone requires the achievement of absolute certainty?
walto,
Let’s take stock:
The Cartesian skeptic has an argument against your position that you cannot refute, by your own admission. Meanwhile, the only argument you have in support of your position is circular.
Still you cling to your position. Why?
Bruce, responding to my “metaphysical tether” comment:
Here’s a thought experiment that illustrates the problem with that:
Assume the existence of a physically identical Twin Earth, where everything, even water, is physically identical to its earthly counterpart. Let’s also assume that your best friend is a guy named Anaximander Rodriguez.
In your scheme, when Twin Bruce says or thinks ‘Anaximander Rodriguez’, he means Twin Anaximander. For you, Earthly Bruce, it’s Earthly Anaximander. The “metaphysical tether” links to the local Anaximander, in other words.
Questions:
1. You and Twin Bruce are in the same physical state, and so are Earth and Twin Earth. If the states are identical, and if meaning supervenes on the physical, then what it is it about the Twin Earth physical state that links Twin Bruce’s ‘Anaximander’ to Twin Anaximander, while your ‘Anaximander’ is linked to Earthly Anaximander?
2. Now suppose that you and Twin Bruce are swapped in your sleep. In your scheme, the metaphysical tethers still attach to the original referents, so you still mean Earthly Anaximander when you say ‘Anaximander’, and Twin Bruce still means Twin. Why is that so, when swapping you and Twin Bruce left the physical states identical on both planets (assuming the swap was done in a symmetric fashion)?
They can contemplate-in-the-image BIVS-in-the-image.
We would say the vattish token “brain” refers to the electrical patterns created within the machine by (eg) autopsies-in-the-image which they would conduct-in-the-image.
In particular, the vattish token “brain” has no semantic ties to the physical brain we know they possess.
Now maybe one can argue that contemplation-in-the-image of BIVs-in-the-image is enough to defeat Putnam’s argument. That may be.
All I am trying to defend is that they can veridically-perceive-in-the-image.
As it happens, we know such “perception” involves a physical brain. But that fact is epistemically and perceptually hidden from them and not relevant to my point, as far as I can see.
I’ve no doubt made some errors in mixing English and vattish in the above, but hopefully the gist is there.
The Cartesian skeptic doesn’t have ‘an argument’: he has a stance based on a possibility. Look up ‘solipsism’: you’ll see there’s literally thousands of books and papers on it, nearly all indicating that it is neither refutable nor plausible. It’s the human condition.
When I take stock I’m forced to realize that you and Fmm are unwilling to accept that condition. You want more. It’s not available.
Your position, contrary to common sense as it is, would at least be consistent if you recognized that, on it, nobody can know anything. But you dream of knowing necessary truths and infinite disjunctions (as if the demon couldn’t confuse you about those), just as fmm dreams of Jesus.
Nothing can save either of you from the ravages of solipsism given your knowledge requirements. The way out is to recognize that ‘knowing’ doesn’t mean what you had thought.
BruceS,
I just wanted to know whether you agree that we should accept as a premise that BIVs must be able to contemplate (in vattish) that they are BIVs or there is something amiss with the game. Let’s get to that first before starting to analyze their capabilities.
I think I disagree with the picture you’ve drawn there, but I think we should take this one step at a time. I mean if it doesn’t matter to anything whether bIVs can do this, why should we care? So if you could go back and just try to answer my question, I’ll try to join you in the vat room and see what I think.
Two words: “externalist semantics”. Two more words “rigid designators”
If for the tokens “contemplate” and “BIV” you are using English semantics, they cannot do so.
I think the “in-the-image” stuff from the paper is important to clearly express the ideas. If you do not think it is needed, then we are at cross-purposes from the start.
keiths,
The theory makes identy of meaning depend on identity of causes for certain types of words. Causal connections are either to one guy or to the other. AR is not his twin. He doesn’t even know about the existence of any such twin.
What I think such examples show is that, if if you agree with the causal picture you must strictly limit its application. As you have said, surely both sets of twins can know how to bathe, and that those who don’t get smelly.
As best I can see, the neuroscience you put forward earlier only gets you veridical perception of the causal relations in the niche which is being sensed.
If these causal relations can be multiply instantiated, there is room for Cartesian skepticism to creep in with the uncertainty of the substrate (assuming one’s realism is not structural realism).
I see the BIV scenario as proposing a different substrate for the causal relations “veridically-perceived” by the BIVs. (The scare quotes are meant to imply those words are in vattish).
When I was doing my Masters, I heard that a lot from those of my fellow students who were clearly PhD material.
That is when I knew the academic life was not for me.
I’m not using English semantics. What I want to know is whether you think that BIVs must be able to contemplate (in vattish) that (vat) ‘they’ are in (vat) ‘vats.’ I take it from your last post that you think that they CAN do so. I want to know if you think that they HAVE to be able to do so or there’s something weird going on with this puzzle.
BruceS,
Right, although I take it that the rigidity is thought to be an effect of the causal baptism.
Imagine my difficulties with all the actuaries I have to work with….