2,657 thoughts on “Elon Musk Thinks Evolution is Bullshit.”

  1. Neil:

    Yes, that’s what you are talking about. It is not what I have been talking about.

    As I said — miscommunication.

    It’s pitiful, though unsurprising, that you refuse to acknowledge another obvious error.

    You objected to this sentence of mine…

    The stream of sensory information changes, but it’s still the only information I’m receiving about that object.

    …because you said it meant that I was discounting the importance of actions in the context of perception:

    Perceiving involves action. Okay, you allow some (but too little) of that action with your mention of “move”. But then you discount it’s importance in your last sentence.

    The two experiments described above show that my sentence was correct and that it doesn’t discount the importance of actions, which can be crucial to perception.

    It wasn’t a miscommunication. Just sloppy thinking on your part.

  3. keiths, in response to walto’s Everett Hall quote:

    Here he falls victim to the circularity he warned against earlier in the passage. “Everyday and scientific pursuits” are already based on the tacit assumption that sensory information is basically reliable. When Hall takes “a greater agreement with actual thought and practice in everyday and scientific pursuits” as support for his principle, he is concluding his assumption!

    walto:

    Hall discusses the (incorrect) charge of circularity in another work, Philosophical Systems, which is devoted to metaphilosophy.

    walto,

    I’m planning to fetch that book from the library tonight. Can you point me to where Hall addresses the circularity charge?

  4. Regarding this, walto writes:

    Stay away from bookies, keiths.

    First Neil, then you.

    I’ve really got to finish up my OP on the psychology of admitting mistakes.

  5. As I’ve told you several times, we all look forward to another of your fine posts on how to act on the internet. But in the meantime, do send someone else to the bookie. And when someone tells you that they’ve got a 500-to-1 shot for you, let someone else hold your money.

  6. Oh, re the Hall book, I’d concentrate on chapters I and V. But I hope that won’t delay your promised post on admitting errors!! We need your expertise on that!

  7. walto:
    Oh, re the Hall book, I’d concentrate on chapters I and V. But I hope that won’t delay your promised post on admitting errors!! We need your expertise on that!

    Mine will be better, though. It’ll be titled, “The Numerous Faults of Everyone Here Except for Myself.”

    You’ll just have to guess what it’s about.

    Glen Davidson

  8. keiths: It’s pitiful, though unsurprising, that you refuse to acknowledge another obvious error.

    You don’t understand something. So you accuse me of error.

    I guess that’s the modern “Donald Trump” style of argumentation. I wonder which school of philosophy teaches that?

    What you are arguing is analogous (and probably equivalent to):

    “Physics can be done entirely by the use of logic applied to data, without any theory and without and laboratory experimentation.”

    It’s nonsense.

  9. walto,

    As I’ve told you several times, we all look forward to another of your fine posts on how to act on the internet.

    It’s a post on the psychology of admitting — and not admitting — mistakes, not a lecture on how to behave on the Internet.

    The topic does appear to hit a little too close to home, though, judging by your nervous reaction.

  11. Neil,

    What you are arguing is analogous (and probably equivalent to):

    “Physics can be done entirely by the use of logic applied to data, without any theory and without and laboratory experimentation.”

    Not at all. In fact, I’ve stated that actions are not only important to perception, they’re sometimes crucial.

    You made a mistake, Neil. That’s all. It isn’t the end of the world.

  13. Alan,

    Neil’s mistake seems to be attempting dialogue with Keiths.

    …without first checking to see if his own position makes sense.

  14. keiths:
    Alan,

    …without first checking to see if his own position makes sense.

    No qualification is needed.

  15. Alan,

    Do you think Neil was right to object to the following statement?

    keiths:

    The stream of sensory information changes, but it’s still the only information I’m receiving about that object.

    Here it is in context:

    Suppose I’m looking at an object and trying to identify it. I’m receiving a stream of sensory information, and it’s the only information I’m receiving about that object. I now move a few feet to the left to look at the object from a different angle. The stream of sensory information changes, but it’s still the only information I’m receiving about that object.

    I have moved in order to alter the sensory information I am receiving, but I am still utterly dependent on that sensory information in forming my impression of the object. (Which of course leaves me vulnerable to any distortion, alteration or manipulation of that information.)

  16. He was mistaken in attempting to discuss perception with you. There’s no black-and-white when discussing ideas.

    ETA: except if you’re colourblind, obviously. 🙂

  18. Alan,

    He was mistaken in attempting to discuss perception with you.

    Why was it a mistake? I’ve quoted his claims in his own words and responded to them, carefully explaining where I agree with him and where I disagree, and why. That’s how it’s supposed to work.

    Other than the fact that he wasn’t prepared to defend his position, why was it a mistake for him to discuss perception with me?

  21. If Elon Musk is reading this, can I ask what solution is in development for the huge problem with his Tesla? Apparently, a night-time journey in cold, rainy or snowy conditions will be short and uncomfortable. Battery storage does not stretch to supply additional power to lights, de-icing and to heat the passenger compartment.

  22. I’ve really got to finish up my OP on the psychology of admitting mistakes.

    🙂

  24. keiths:

    Also, when we favor certain theories based on the criteria you listed — simplicity, fecundity, unification — we’re not saying that the alternatives are false. It’s a pragmatic rejection, not an epistemic one.

    Sure, but we do say we know those theories. Or for a more extreme case, I know my tea is getting colder and the surrounding air warmer, even though 2LT does not make that certain.

    I suspect you are fine with that as long as one uses “know*”, not “know”. For me, the asterisk adds nothing, since it seems to just be adding that I only know if my belief is justified and true, but these two are already built into a basic concept of knowing.

  26. walto:

    I look forward to any amplifications/corrections/corroborations that anybody else may wish to share on this.

    On second look, my response rambles. So let me clarify that the initial paragraphs are meant to first to define heat death and then to show, assuming heat death and BBs are possible, that all that happened before heat death does not matter to the probability that one is a BB. So in that sense the reddit post is not relevant to the issue of this thread.

    The last two paragraphs are an attempt to explain my previous comment on why on I don’t think two probabilities can be estimated (and so compared) even without heat death, as the reddit post seems to attempt.

    Oh, by ‘thermodynamic principles’ I just meant expected declines in entropy. (But do we add at the end ‘all else equal’?)

    Of course, entropy increases (or remains constant) in closed systems. Perhaps you mean that entropy decreases are possible within an open system if that system dissipates entropy to its outside: as life does to allow metabolism or as the earth’s ecosystem does to allow evolution. So if by C-P you mean to refer to lowering entropy within an open dissipative system, then I agree. But that still leaves open the possibility and probability of BBs in that same system. In any event, my post was about the universe as a whole.

    Finally, I should say that according to Wiki, “Boltzmann proposed that we and our observed low-entropy world are a random fluctuation in a higher-entropy universe.” He then used anthropic reasoning to explain why we would find ourselves as aware entities in this situation. I am not sure why Boltzmann thought he needed to do this, but I can think of two possibilities:
    1. He thought the universe had no beginning, and so thought it was overwhelmingly likely we were already in infinite heat death phase.
    2. He recognized that time-reversibility of physics equations means entropy increases (almost always) in both directions of the time coordinate of physics equations and needed to explain how an ordered universe could still exist. Now we can explain why entropy increases overall in the universe only in one direction by the low entropy state just after the big bang.

  27. BruceS: 1. He thought the universe had no beginning, and so thought it was overwhelmingly likely we were already in infinite heat death phase.

    Isn’t the case that even in the universe had a beginning that we are overwhelmingly likely are already in an heat death phase.

    The only way to avoid this conclusion as far as I can see is to assume a relatively recent beginning and very low amount of entropy at the start.

    Funny but that is just what we find to be the case (assuming that our perceptions are indeed accurate)

    Peace

  28. fifthmonarchyman: Isn’t the case that even in the universe had a beginning that we are overwhelmingly likely are already in an heat death phase.

    The only way to avoid this conclusion as far as I can see is to assume a relatively recent beginning and very low amount of entropy at the start.

    Funny but that is just what we find to be the case (assuming that our perceptions are indeed accurate)

    Peace

    Fmm, you are the most result-oriented thinker I’ve ever met.

  29. BruceS,

    Thanks. I will think about this.

    BTW, I don’t think your response to keiths directly above is quite right. Just as he was attributing what is a actually a contribution of belief to justification, I think you are trying to handle a question about justification with a response about truth. There’s no doubt that if any of the disjuncts are true the whole disjunction is as well. The question is whether we are justified in believing any particular one of the disjuncts. Keiths says we aren’t: I say we are. But my answer relies on a type of foundationalism that, while not circular, is basic. That debate can’t be sidstepped by turning to truth, I don’t think.

  30. BruceS: assuming heat death and BBs are possible, that all that happened before heat death does not matter to the probability that one is a BB

    I *THINK* that conclusion relies on a modal fallacy.

  31. walto: I *THINK* that conclusion relies on a modal fallacy.

    After you think about it, let me know the details. If possible.

  32. walto:

    BTW, I don’t think your response to keiths directly above is quite right. Just as he was attributing what is a actually a contribution of belief to justification, I think you are trying to handle a question about justification with a response about truth. There’s no doubt that if any of the disjuncts are true the whole disjunction is as well. The question is whether we are justified in believing any particular one of the disjuncts. Keiths says we aren’t: I say we are. But my answer relies on a type of foundationalism that, while not circular, is basic. That debate can’t be sidstepped by turning to truth, I don’t think.

    I agree know* includes elements of justification.

    I claim we can achieve the same type of justification for ordinary objects as we achieve when we select scientific theories on pragmatic grounds from a disjunction of alternatives made available by underdetermination. Of course the details of the grounds differ. But still, based on that analogy, I say “know”applies equally to both.

    ETA: in other words, I think we can use those types of pragmatic arguments to claim that some disjuncts have better justification than others.

    Now one could argue that the grounds are different enough for the analogy between science knowing and ordinary objects knowing to fail, but I understand Keith to be saying only certainty allows us to claim knowledge in light of the disjunction. So that is not the type of argument he seems to be making.

    I am not clear on how your foundationalism helps with Keith’s points. Wouldn’t his disjunction apply to any of your basic perceptual beliefs? I understand you to have asserted that our intentionality is such that we have direct contact with external objects and that grounds those basic beliefs. But how does that help with global skepticism? (I am more used to that view dealing with the trllemma about knowledge or perhaps with justifying direct realism under intentionalism about perception).

  33. walto,

    There’s no doubt that if any of the disjuncts are true the whole disjunction is as well. The question is whether we are justified in believing any particular one of the disjuncts. Keiths says we aren’t: I say we are.

    No, I’m saying that Cartesian skepticism is justified unless all of the disjuncts are so unlikely that the entire disjunction is unlikely to be true.

    But my answer relies on a type of foundationalism that, while not circular, is basic. That debate can’t be sidstepped by turning to truth, I don’t think.

    I picked up the Hall book from the library last night. I’ll read chapters I and V, as you suggested, and get back to you.

  34. walto: I *THINK* that conclusion relies on a modal fallacy.

    Just for fun, maybe this is the sort of argument you are considering:
    If externalism about the contents of experience it true, then the experiences of a BB cannot be the identified with the intrinsically identical experiences of a brain in a world of ordinary objects (since the accuracy conditions of their contents differ).

    So we cannot compare probabilities of the brain in the two different possibilities, since we are making assertions about two different things in the different possible scenarios.

    I think I can counter argue to that by saying it does not matter if the two brains are identical; the comparison is between number of situations for an experiencing brain; since the intrinsic situation is the same, subjectively I cannot tell which I am.

  35. BruceS: Wouldn’t his disjunction apply to any of your basic perceptual beliefs?

    Yes, but it doesn’t matter. I think I’ve talked about that above. In my view there’s no actual evidence for any of the other disjuncts–only for the tree disjunct.So it’s like adding “or my mother was actually a raisin.”

  36. BruceS,

    No that’s too deep.

    keiths: No, I’m saying that Cartesian skepticism is justified unless all of the disjuncts are so unlikely that the entire disjunction is unlikely to be true.

    That’s a weird burden shift attempt. They don’t need to be UNlikely at all. It seems much more reasonable to hold that unless they are likely (i.e. there’s any evidence for them at all), they’re irrelevant–just like an infinite number of other disjuncts for which we have no evidence one way or the other.

  37. Bruce, I was thinking of something like this (I still don’t know if it’s right, though).

    I’ll call the assumed extremely high probability of BB (given heat death) “PBB.”

    So now I read the sentence I excerpted as

    If heat death then (<>BB ﬤ PBB) then PBB

    And then you conclude PBB.

    But even if you add in <>heat death as a premise–which I’m willing to concede–you can’t get PBB. You need heat death to be true, and that’s what you don’t have. So, again, I *think* that as you stated the BB argument above, there’s a fallacy in play.

  38. walto, Bruce,

    I think I’ve identified a major source of confusion in this thread. You and I are talking about different disjunctions.

    The disjunction I’m talking about is the original one that KN introduced in his summary of my position:

    If I understand your position, then in cases of simple perceptual beliefs — the noninferential use of high-order and/or low-order concepts guided by occurrences in sensory consciousness — we have something like, “I know* that there’s a glass of water next to me” where

    * unless I’m being deceived by a malign genie, or I’m a brain in a vat, or I’m a Boltzmann brain, or I’m in a hyper-advanced simulation designed by posthuman Engineers, or . . .

    where none of the items in that infinite disjunction can be eliminated on a priori grounds

    If that’s your position, I have no objections.

    At some point you guys switched to talking about a different disjunction — the one that appears in Bruce’s formulation here:

    I see a tree AND (the tree is an ordinary object OR it is a demon-induced hallucination OR I am a Boltzmann brain OR …)

    No wonder we’ve been talking past each other regarding the disjunction.

    ETA: Just to be clear, the disjunction that KN introduced, and that I’ve been referring to, does not include the “the tree is an ordinary object” term.

  39. The two disjunctions serve completely different purposes.

    Your disjunction is true in every possible world, as long as the list of disjuncts is complete.

    The original KN disjunction serves a different purpose: Cartesian skepticism is justified unless we can say that the disjunction is unlikely to be true.

  41. keiths: Cartesian skepticism is justified unless we can say that the disjunction is unlikely to be true.

    I’m still waiting to hear some basis for this claim.

  42. walto:

    I’ve been considering the KN-keiths version [of the disjunction]. I find Bruce’s confusing.

    But in that case, your comment below doesn’t make sense:

    There’s no doubt that if any of the disjuncts are true the whole disjunction is as well. The question is whether we are justified in believing any particular one of the disjuncts. Keiths says we aren’t: I say we are.

    Remember, “the tree is an ordinary object” is not part of the KN/keiths disjunction.

  44. Also, I don’t understand why you think “I see a tree and it’s an ordinary object or *” (i.e., I’m being deceived in some way) is true in all possible worlds. I don’t even exist in every possible world, never mind think I’m seeing a tree.

    ETA: BTW, I’m impressed that your library has a copy of that Hall book. Is it a university library?

  45. walto,

    ETA: BTW, I’m impressed that your library has a copy of that Hall book. Is it a university library?

    It’s a weird hybrid library that’s shared between San Jose State University and the City of San Jose:

    Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Library

    I love it.

  46. keiths:

    Remember, “the tree is an ordinary object” is not part of the KN/keiths disjunction.

    walto:

    But “there is a tree” is.

    No, it’s excluded also. Take a look at KN’s comment again:

    If I understand your position, then in cases of simple perceptual beliefs — the noninferential use of high-order and/or low-order concepts guided by occurrences in sensory consciousness — we have something like, “I know* that there’s a glass of water next to me” where

    * unless I’m being deceived by a malign genie, or I’m a brain in a vat, or I’m a Boltzmann brain, or I’m in a hyper-advanced simulation designed by posthuman Engineers, or . . .

    where none of the items in that infinite disjunction can be eliminated on a priori grounds

    If that’s your position, I have no objections.

    Every item in the disjunction is a scenario in which our perceptions aren’t trustworthy.

  47. keiths,

    That’s lucky. Plus it’s lucky to live in San Jose–one of my brothers did for a while. My own town library is in a beautiful building, but it doesn’t have a ton of books. And the library network it’s in isn’t great either. Because if some library discovers it’s mostly on the giving end, it will, sensibly, pull out of the network. So other than Framingham State–which will probably also pull out soon, it’s mostly a bunch of mediocre, suburban libraries, full of recent best sellers. The other colleges libraries don’t have much either. http://www.mln.lib.ma.us/info/index.htm

    In Boston, the BPL is good on paper, but inconvenient, and a lot of the books that are supposed to be there are….gone.

  48. keiths:
    keiths:

    walto:

    No, it’s excluded also. Take a look at KN’s comment again:

    Every item in the disjunction is a scenario in which our perceptions aren’t trustworthy.

    I’m not following you. He’s got

    “I know* that there’s a glass of water next to me” where

    * unless I’m being deceived by a malign genie, or I’m a brain in a vat, or I’m a Boltzmann brain, or I’m in a hyper-advanced simulation designed by posthuman Engineers, or . . .

    And the first disjunct, I know that there’s a glass of water next to me entails that there is a glass of water next to me.

  49. walto,

    Also, I don’t understand why you think “I see a tree and it’s an ordinary object or *” (i.e., I’m being deceived in some way) is true in all possible worlds. I don’t even exist in every possible world, never mind think I’m seeing a tree.

    Well, “walto sees a tree and it’s not illusory” is just a specific instance of the more general “X perceives Y and the perception is veridical”.

    But point taken about the possible worlds: not all possible worlds contain perceivers.

  50. walto,

    Plus it’s lucky to live in San Jose–one of my brothers did for a while.

    Yes, it’s a great place to live — once you’re established. I feel for the newcomers, though. The median house price in Santa Clara County is now more than a million bucks.

    In Boston, the BPL is good on paper, but inconvenient, and a lot of the books that are supposed to be there are….gone.

    Whenever I smell creosote, I think of the BPL. I lived in Holliston about 25 years ago, and I would take the Green Line to the library since driving was such a hassle.

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