Did I lose my mind to science?

That’s the title of a new article at the Patheos website, which describes itself as “the world’s homepage for all religion”. The article is the first in a series by Ted Peters, emeritus professor of theology at Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary, who understands the threat that materialism (aka physicalism) poses to traditional religious views regarding the self.

There are quite a few misconceptions in the article (and in the others in the series), but I think it’s a good springboard for continuing the discussion we’ve been having in CharlieM’s Body, Soul, and Spirit thread.

A taste:

Did I lose my mind to science? Actually, it was stolen. Who are the thieves? The thieves are the scientific materialists who have eliminated from our cosmology everything that is mental, conscious, meaningful, spiritual, and ideal. You’ll recognize the thieves when you hear them mutter, “the mind is only the brain, ya know.”

464 thoughts on “Did I lose my mind to science?

  1. Looking for a more intuitive demonstration of
    Swinburne’s error, I came up with this:

    You have a jar full of red and blue marbles. You randomly pull a marble from the jar without looking at it. It’s logically possible that the marble is red, and it’s logically possible that the marble is blue.

    You reason as follows: If the marble is red, it’s not logically possible that the marble is blue. But we just stated above that it’s that it is logically possible for the marble to be blue. The “red marble” assumption has led us to a contradiction. We must therefore reject that assumption. The marble cannot be red. It must be blue.

  2. The morals of the story: 1) if you think you’ve come up with an effective argument against your opponent’s position, try directing it at your own position; and 2) don’t mess with modal arguments unless you know what you’re doing.

  3. KN:

    Swinburne’s basic idea is this:

    1. It is logically possible for some aspect of my personal identity to persist after my body dies.

    2. But if materialism were true, then it would not be logically possible for any aspect of my personal identity to persist after my body dies.

    3. Therefore (by modus tollens) materialism is false. \

    It seems that both (1) and (2) are false.

    I have to disagree. “X is logically possible” just means that you aren’t violating any rules of logic by asserting X. “There is some aspect of my personal identity that persists after my body dies” doesn’t violate any rules of logic (though it’s obviously questionable for other reasons), so #1 is actually true.

    #2 also seems unobjectionable to me. Materialism asserts that you are fully physical and that there is nothing to you beyond your body. That means that if your body dies, you die. #2 characterizes materialism correctly.

  4. KN:

    The first premise also doesn’t have the implications that Swinburne thinks it does. . If it is logically possible that I have a soul, that means only that there exists some possible world in which my counterpart has a soul. That doesn’t tell me anything at all about whether I have a soul.

    Swinburne isn’t proceeding directly from “X is logically possible” to “X is true”. He would agree that the first premise doesn’t tell you anything about whether you have a soul.

    His argument depends on an additional premise that I phrased earlier as

    If A and B are the same thing, then what is logically possible for A must also be logically possible for B.

    In a nutshell, he is saying that if A is you and B is your body sans soul, A and B cannot be the same since something that is logically possible for you — continued existence after bodily death — is not logically possible for your body sans soul. Therefore you are more than just your body. You also have a nonphysical soul.

    The second premise is also false, because it completely misunderstands the basis for materialism. The reason to not believe in a soul is because it conflicts with our best empirical science. But our best empirical science only tells us what’s true about the actual world. It is fully consistent with materialism that I don’t have a soul in this world, but there’s some possible world in which I do.

    If there is a possible world in which materialism holds AND you have a soul, it follows that in that world the soul must be physical. But in that case your soul cannot survive your bodily death unless it is a separate physical entity from your body.

    In any case, Swinburne isn’t making an argument about all possible worlds. He’s arguing that in this world, the one we actually inhabit, we have souls.

  5. My Swinburne quote comes from his book The Evolution of the Soul, published in 1986. Turns out he has a new book, Are We Bodies or Souls?, published in 2019. I’m interested in seeing if he is still using the 1986 argument, so I’ve downloaded the book and will report what I find.

  6. keiths to KN: I have to disagree. “X is logically possible” just means that you aren’t violating any rules of logic by asserting X. “There is some aspect of my personal identity that persists after my body dies” doesn’t violate any rules of logic (though it’s obviously questionable for other reasons), so #1 is actually true.

    Yeah, the sleight of hand is in the “logical”. It is only logically possible for an aspect of one’s personality to persist after its earthly shell has perished as long as it has not been established yet that we only consist of physical parts. Of course, when a publication appears in Nature’s next issue to the effect that, yes, materialism IS true, then the statement above ceases to be a logical possibility.

    So the “logically possible” is a function of our ignorance about whether we do have a non-physical soul.

    Disclaimer: the poster of this comment is an absolute n00b in philosophy, so taking his arguments seriously is done at one’s own peril.

  7. Corneel:

    Of course, when a publication appears in Nature’s next issue to the effect that, yes, materialism IS true, then the statement above ceases to be a logical possibility.

    Swinburne would presumably respond that any such publication would necessarily be mistaken since he has already proven, on purely logical grounds, that materialism is false. If it’s logically impossible for materialism to be true, then any apparent counterevidence is only apparent. We can reject a paper claiming that air is not air, even if it appears in Nature. Evidence can never prove a logical impossibility.

    While it’s true that evidence can never prove a logical impossibility, Swinburne’s argument doesn’t even come close to showing that materialism is logically impossible. You can see why he’s hoping for such an argument, though. He and his fellow soul-pushers are losing the empirical battle — badly — so it would be awfully convenient if he were able to prove that any empirical defeats can’t be real defeats. The empirical doesn’t matter when you have logic on your side.

  8. Swinburne’s 1986 argument appears nowhere in his 2019 book, as far as I can tell. It’s possible that he realizes that the logic is faulty. Maybe someone showed him, or maybe he came to that conclusion himself in the 35 years since publication.

    One caveat — he does present a different argument, based on Descartes, that might depend on the same underlying reasoning as the 1986 argument. (I haven’t pondered it deeply enough to say for sure.) In that case he might have decided to substitute the 2019 argument for the 1986 argument despite continuing to believe that the 1986 argument is sound.

    It would certainly be a good marketing move, whether or not that was the intent. ‘Cartesian’ carries a lot more oomph than ‘Swinburnian’. 🙂

  9. I took a closer look at the 2019 Cartesian argument. Here’s how Swinburne presents it:

    first premise: I am a substance which is thinking.

    amended second premise: It is conceivable that ‘while I am thinking, my body is suddenly destroyed’.

    third premise: It is not conceivable that ‘I am thinking and I do not exist’.

    amended lemma: I am a substance which, it is conceivable, can continue to exist while my body is suddenly destroyed.

    fourth premise: It is inconceivable that any substance can lose all its parts simultaneously and yet continue to exist.

    amended conclusion: I am a soul, a substance, whose only essential property is the capacity for thought.

    The first premise is fine. The second premise is poorly expressed; what he’s really trying to say is that if his body is destroyed while he is thinking, it is conceivable that he will nevertheless continue to think. The third premise is tantamount to ‘I think, therefore I am.’ The lemma seems unobjectionable; it is at least conceivable that I am a soul capable of continued existence after bodily death. The fourth premise seems fine, too.

    The problem is with the conclusion. You may wonder, as I did, how the conclusion follows from the premises. The text accompanying the argument isn’t of much help; Swinburne is a terrible writer.* What I think he’s arguing is something like this:

    I have the property ‘can conceivably continue to exist when my body is destroyed’. My body lacks that property; it will (obviously) cease to exist if my body is destroyed. If I have a property that my body lacks, I cannot be identical to my body. If I am not identical to my body, it necessarily follows that I must include a nonphysical component, which we can call a ‘soul’.

    This relies on the same bogus logic as the 1986 argument, so it can be rejected as unsound. Even if it were sound, the argument (at least as I have paraphrased it) would only show that some nonphysical component exists. It wouldn’t show that this nonphysical component is capable of thought. Thought might be the province of the body alone.

    I’ll ponder some more to see if I can discern how Swinburne gets from a nonphysical soul to a thinking nonphysical soul. But this is just a curiosity since the argument as a whole depends on the same invalid reasoning as the 1986 argument.

    * It makes me wonder why philosophers never hire ghost writers. Working collaboratively with Swinburne, a good writer could produce clear, readable prose that accurately captures Swinburne’s thinking.

  10. keiths: While it’s true that evidence can never prove a logical impossibility, Swinburne’s argument doesn’t even come close to showing that materialism is logically impossible. You can see why he’s hoping for such an argument, though. He and his fellow soul-pushers are losing the empirical battle — badly — so it would be awfully convenient if he were able to prove that any empirical defeats can’t be real defeats. The empirical doesn’t matter when you have logic on your side.

    Is that appraisal correct? I seldom see claims that the concept of the soul is grounded in empirical research. The arguments in favor of a soul that I am familiar with usually rely on appeals to common sense, faith or (like Swinburne) logic. In fact, all this talk of non-physical realms to me seem to be a clear attempt to withdraw the soul from empirical scrutiny.
    Maybe I am mistaken. After all, the reason we are discussing this topic here is Rudolf Steiner’s “spiritual science”.

  11. Corneel:

    Is that appraisal correct? I seldom see claims that the concept of the soul is grounded in empirical research.

    Sorry, I guess my wording was ambiguous. I’m not saying that the soul-pushers are waging an empirical war againt the skeptics. I’m saying that they’re defending against empirical attack and losing battle after battle. The evidence is definitely not on their side.

    Logical “proofs” give them an excuse to brush off the empirical defeats. If the soul is a logical necessity, then nothing — literally nothing — can constitute evidence against it. Any counterargument is 100% certain to be wrong.

    It’s a soul-pusher’s wet dream.

    If only they could come up with a sound proof…

  12. I guess I should add that they do stage empirical attacks occasionally. Out-of-body and near-death experiences are a couple of their favorite weapons.

    Unfortunately for them, they lose those battles too.

  13. keiths:
    keiths: If those are compatible with physicalism, then why do you think they constitute evidence for an immaterial soul?

    CharlieM: Because it is only compatible with a physicalism that comprises both material and energy.

    keiths: That’s what physicalism is.So again, if those things are compatible with physicalism, why do you think they constitute evidence for an immaterial soul? (Meaning, as I keep stressing, a nonphysical soul.)

    Because I’m not sure what is meant by physical when applied to energy in general. According to the classical designation of the five elements, earth, water, air, fire and ether, there is a progression from the most material to the most energetic. Progressing through these states is also a movement away from what is directly perceived . A crystal of salt is observed to have a specific form. Clouds are more transient and we can see them but there is still water vapour in the air that is invisible to us.

    We only perceive energy through its effects. For instance, we do not see radio waves.

    There is a polarity between matter and energy. Solids are held together by forces of attraction towards a centre. Energy radiates outwards. But this is all still classed as physical. As I see it there is also a higher polarity in which the physical is one pole and the etheric the other. Here is a link to a book chapter dealing with projective geometry and the etheric.

    CharlieM: But how far are physicalists prepared to take the inclusion of energy into their worldview?

    keiths: Physicalists accept the existence of energy, for which there is ample evidence, but the energy they speak of is physical. You seem to include something nonphysical in your definition. So yes, physicalists accept the existence of energy, but no, they do not accept the existence of a nonphysical component of energy. There’s no evidence for it, and it isn’t a logical necessity, so why maintain that it exists?

    In what way is zero point energy physical? What about dark energy? If nothing is known about its constitution, how can we label it as physical?

    Biophotons are a relatively recent discovery and are far more subtle and difficult to detect than most electro-magnetic effects. It is argued that they have a very high level of coherence. This form of light has been undetected for so long because it is so subtle. It would be wrong to dismiss the etheric purely on the grounds that a person isn’t able to detect it.

    But it can be known through its effects. Substance is living due to the etheric component. Remove this component and what remains is dead matter.

  14. keiths:

    So again, if those things are compatible with physicalism, why do you think they constitute evidence for an immaterial soul?

    CharlieM:

    Because I’m not sure what is meant by physical when applied to energy in general.

    You’re unsure what ‘physical’ means in reference to energy, therefore the soul exists? How does your uncertainty establish the existence of the soul? Please explain the logic underlying that leap. I’m looking for an actual argument in support of that conclusion, not a mere recitation of anthroposophical dogma.

    In what way is zero point energy physical? What about dark energy? If nothing is known about its constitution, how can we label it as physical?

    Why are you raising all these questions about physicality? You’ve already told us that the body is physical and that the soul* isn’t. You’ve told us that the soul carries out our thinking and that the body doesn’t.

    That’s all we need to show that the Alzheimer’s example (as well as many other arguments against the soul) is a big problem for you. If the thinking soul is nonphysical, why does brain damage cause it to be unable to tell time?

    Alzheimer’s makes sense if physicalism is true. Brain damage causes thinking damage which causes an inability to tell time. Alzheimer’s makes no sense in terms of your model, because the physical damage of Alzheimer’s should leave the nonphysical soul untouched.

    The evidence is telling you that the soul doesn’t exist, but you are refusing to listen.

    *Or whatever Steinerian term you apply to it.

  15. CharlieM:

    It would be wrong to dismiss the etheric purely on the grounds that a person isn’t able to detect it.

    Enough with the straw men. No one here has argued that the failure of a person to detect “the etheric”, by itself, means that the etheric doesn’t exist.

    But it can be known through its effects. Substance is living due to the etheric component. Remove this component and what remains is dead matter.

    We’ve been over this already. Matter follows the laws of physics regardless of whether it is part of a living body, a dead body, or an inanimate object. The particles don’t care.You have acknowledged this.

    Consider a body in a particular physical state. The laws of physics predict what that body will do. For example, the laws of physics might predict that it will get up, walk to the refrigerator, and grab a Coke. Now suppose you remove the ‘etheric component’. According to you, the body will now be dead, and we know that dead bodies don’t get up, walk to refrigerators, and grab Cokes. Yet the laws of physics tell us that the body will get up, walk to the refrigerator, and grab a Coke.

    If the body did behave differently sans the ‘etheric component’, that would mean that the laws of physics were being violated, and you’ve affirmed that this never happens.

    Your position is self-contradictory.

  16. Me, yesterday:

    I’ll ponder some more to see if I can discern how Swinburne gets from a nonphysical soul to a thinking nonphysical soul. But this is just a curiosity since the argument as a whole depends on the same invalid reasoning as the 1986 argument.

    After letting it percolate overnight, I think I understand why Swinburne thought he had proven the existence of a thinking nonphysical soul. Allow me to amend my earlier paraphrase of his argument:

    I have the property ‘can conceivably continue to exist and think when my body is destroyed’. My body lacks that property; it will (obviously) cease to exist if my body is destroyed, and nonexistent bodies can’t think. If I have a property that my body lacks, I cannot be identical to my body. If I am not identical to my body, it necessarily follows that I must include a nonphysical component, which we can call a ‘soul’.

    Furthermore, the only way for me to have the property ‘can conceivably continue to exist and think when my body is destroyed’ is if that really is conceivable. If my soul isn’t capable of existing and thinking on its own, then it cannot conceivably have that property. The possession of that property becomes a logical impossibility.

    But we affirmed just a moment ago that it is conceivable that I have that property. Therefore, it cannot be true that my soul isn’t capable of existing and thinking on its own without the body.

    Therefore my soul must be able to do those things.

    It’s more of the same poor modal logic. I feel embarrassed for Swinburne.

    Here’s an analogous argument:

    It is conceivable that I am a direct descendent of Frederick the Great. If I am not a direct descendent of Frederick the Great, then it is not conceivable that I am a direct descendent of Frederick the Great. It becomes a logical impossibility. The assumption that I am not a direct descendent of Frederick the Great leads to a contradiction. Therefore, the assumption must be wrong. It is thus certain that I am a direct descendent of Frederick the Great.

    Swinburne equates conceivability with logical possibility, which is a controversial move, as KN noted earlier. But even if we grant the truth of that equation, the logic is still badly broken.

  17. keiths:
    CharlieM: Let me try to be a bit more clear. Through sense perception we observe objects in space. The ‘higher form of seeing” is a perception in time.

    keiths: Motion is a phenomenon in both space and time. Our senses are able to perceive motion, so it’s incorrect to limit them to the observation of objects in space while reserving ‘perception in time’ for your higher form of seeing.

    Yes but vision of movement is always in relation to space in the moment. The higher form of seeing (understanding) involves the use of memory of past events. Without observations and learning from past experiences and making connections to the present, we would not be able to ‘see’ (understand) explanatory facts by means of which we are no longer deceived by illusions like the Mario phenomenon. I understand that in the clip the figures are stationary while it gives the impression that they are moving through space.

    keiths: Also, you’ve changed your story regarding this higher form of seeing. Now it’s ‘perception in time’. In the previous thread, it was the mind’s awareness that the Mario phenomenon was an illusion, and its understanding of the causes of that illusion:

    “CharlieM: Through this higher form of “seeing” I know that the figures in the image are not moving as they appear to be for the senses. I understand the effect of the radiating, bright yellow which swamps the darker colours. It is the movement of this yellow within the figures that give them the appearance of movement. I now see the reality hidden in this optical image. Using my mind, I take the image I see before my and I combine it with the concepts that belong to it. And thus, I arrive at the complete picture.”

    There is no contradiction in my story. In trying to understand what is happening, I must use my mind to transcend the moment the clip is being viewed. It is necessary that I think about how the clip has been put together and how the programmer/s have arranged light and darkness in order to produce the effect. In my mind I can picture the various stages in the lengthy process of development involved in the production of this clip and try to understand the reason it has been arranged in such a way.

    keiths: The discussion will go nowhere if you keep changing the meaning of your terms.

    “CharlieM: In the Mario illusion the interplay of light and dark edges in time gives the impression of movement in space.”

    keiths: You just told us (in the previous paragraph, no less!) that the higher form of seeing is ‘perception in time’. Now you’re giving us an example of perception in time, and the example you’ve chosen is one in which the illusion occurs.

    You are therefore (presumably inadvertently) telling us that the ‘higher form of seeing’ is subject to the illusion, which undercuts the point you’ve been trying to make all along — namely, that while ordinary sense perception is vulnerable to the illusion, the higher form of seeing is not.

    There are two periods of time to think about. There is the time covered by the direct visual experience while looking at the clip. This is related to my spatial awareness while viewing. There is also the time out with this when I am using my mind to investigate the phenomena. Animals live in the moment. A cat might have the same impression of movement that I do, but it will not think to take it any further after it stops looking at it. I am different. I see a contradiction and I’m not satisfied to leave it at that. I carry my thoughts into the future and call upon my past experiences, and the experiences of others in order to clear up the seeming contradiction.

    This is what I am talking about when I say, ‘perception in time’. This time is independent of the space around me.

  18. Kantian Naturalist:
    CharlieM: It is wrong to assume that just because brain activity is coincident with thinking we can claim that thinking is caused by the brain.

    Kantian Naturalist: It’s not an assumption. It’s a warranted conclusion from the past two hundred years of scientific psychology and neurophysiology

    The geocentric view of the universe was a warranted conclusion based on thousands of years of astronomical observations. Like the Necker cube, there are usually two ways of looking at the same thing, with very little difference to confirm either.

  19. CharlieM:

    Yes but vision of movement is always in relation to space in the moment.

    Motion is a change in position over time. Our visual system detects motion, which inherently involves time, so it’s clearly incorrect to say, as you (and presumably Steiner) do, that

    Through sense perception we observe objects in space. The ‘higher form of seeing” is a perception in time.

    Another example is our ability to determine which direction a sound is coming from. Our auditory systems do this partly by detecting the difference in a sound’s arrival time at one ear versus the other. Sensory perception involves both space and time.

    The higher form of seeing (understanding)…we would not be able to ‘see’ (understand) …

    Why call it ‘a higher form of seeing’ when you keep parenthetically pointing out that it’s really just ‘understanding’? Sure, ‘a higher form of seeing’ sounds cooler, but it’s inaccurate, and it’s an example of how you confuse yourself by using anthroposophical terminology. ‘Understanding’ and ‘seeing’ are separate phenomena. Don’t confuse yourself by trying to use the same word for both.

    Here’s another example of how the terminology confuses you. You told us earlier that our ‘higher form of seeing’ involved the mind being out in the world, sensing things directly. After all, the word ‘seeing’ implies, you know, seeing, and you envisioned the mind being able to see things directly without using the eyes and the brain. We know it doesn’t work that way (recall my point about opaque refrigerator doors). The word ‘seeing’ fooled you (and presumably Steiner) into thinking that the mind was out in the world looking at objects, when in fact you’re really just thinking about them.

    Your ‘higher form of seeing’ isn’t seeing. It’s not ‘perception in time’, either. It’s just plain old understanding.

  20. CharlieM:

    It is wrong to assume that just because brain activity is coincident with thinking we can claim that thinking is caused by the brain.

    KN:

    It’s not an assumption. It’s a warranted conclusion from the past two hundred years of scientific psychology and neurophysiology.

    CharlieM:

    The geocentric view of the universe was a warranted conclusion based on thousands of years of astronomical observations.

    Therefore we should ignore the evidence and believe whatever we want, because scientific theories are sometimes overturned? Um, no.

    Like the Necker cube, there are usually two ways of looking at the same thing, with very little difference to confirm either.

    Certainly not in this case. The evidence fits with physicalism and clashes with dualism. The evidence fits with germ theory and clashes with miasma theory. The evidence fits with modern thermodynamics and clashes with caloric theory. The rational thing is to reject dualism, miasma theory, and caloric theory and stick with the theories that actually work.

    The evidence shows that the soul doesn’t exist. You don’t like what the evidence is telling you, so you are fighting against it. That’s your right, of course, but don’t kid yourself. What you are doing is just as irrational as what the Scientologists, the flat-earthers, and the 2020 election deniers are doing.

    You are trapped in the prison of belief. Don’t throw away the key. It’s not too late to unlock the cell and escape.

  21. CharlieM:

    The geocentric view of the universe was a warranted conclusion based on thousands of years of astronomical observations.

    Both geocentrism AND heliocentrism fit those early observations. The preference for geocentrism was motivated by philosophical and religious considerations, not scientific ones. It was later observations (such as Galileo’s telescopic observations of the phases of Venus) that caused us to abandon geocentrism in favor of heliocentrism.

    (I once had an interesting discussion with Neil Rickert on the subject of geocentrism vs heliocentrism. He argued that they are scientifically equivalent and that one can be converted to the other simply by changing the coordinate system. That’s a mistake, of course. Heliocentrism fits the evidence and geocentrism doesn’t, and that remains true even if you change from a heliocentric coordinate system to a geocentric one. Astronomers are fully justified in rejecting geocentrism on scientific grounds.)

    My point is that the historic geocentrism vs heliocentrism debate isn’t analogous to the current physicalism vs dualism debate. Geocentrism and heliocentrism were both compatible with observation for thousands of years, and they were therefore both viable scientifically. It was only later that observations “broke the tie” and favored heliocentrism. Physicalism and dualism are not both compatible with our observations, and they are not both viable scientifically. Physicalism fits the evidence and dualism does not, so the position of the dualist is not at all analogous to the position of the heliocentrist during geocentrist times.

    Physicalism works as a theory and dualism* does not. There is no scientific justification for being a dualist.

    * In a nod to the cognoscenti, I should note that I am referring here to substance dualism, not property dualism.

  22. keiths: The preference for geocentrism was motivated by philosophical and religious considerations, not scientific ones.

    I’m not sure that’s entirely true.

    He argued that they are scientifically equivalent and that one can be converted to the other simply by changing the coordinate system.

    I don’t think I ever said that they are “scientifically equivalent”. The comment about coordinate systems makes them mathematically equivalent, but that isn’t the same as scientifically equivalent.

    From a purely scientific point of view, both geocentrism and heliocentrism are false. As I see it, they were adopted on a pragmatic basis. As long as you main concern is with terrestrial navigation, geocentrism is a good choice. It is when you turn your attention to the rest of the cosmos, that helocentrism looks better. But that is still a pragmatic judgement.

  23. keiths:

    The preference for geocentrism was motivated by philosophical and religious considerations, not scientific ones.

    Neil:

    I’m not sure that’s entirely true.

    You’re right, it isn’t entirely true. There were some legitimate (though ultimately incorrect) scientific objections to heliocentrism. Still, I would argue that the preference for geocentrism was motivated more by philosophical and religious considerations than it was by the scientific objections to heliocentrism.

    I don’t think I ever said that they are “scientifically equivalent”. The comment about coordinate systems makes them mathematically equivalent, but that isn’t the same as scientifically equivalent.

    They’re neither scientifically nor mathematically equivalent. Pick a single coordinate system and express the paths of the sun and planets using that system, first for the geocentric model and then for the heliocentric model. If they were mathematically equivalent, you would get the same answers. In actuality, you don’t. The difference between the two models is fundamental, not merely descriptive.

    The models make different predictions. Galileo’s famous observation of the phases of Venus matched the predictions of the heliocentric model, not the geocentric one. That’s a difference in reality, not merely an artifact of the choice of coordinate system.

    From a purely scientific point of view, both geocentrism and heliocentrism are false. As I see it, they were adopted on a pragmatic basis. As long as you main concern is with terrestrial navigation, geocentrism is a good choice. It is when you turn your attention to the rest of the cosmos, that helocentrism looks better. But that is still a pragmatic judgement.

    There’s a difference between what is pragmatic and what is true. General relativity is truer than Newtonian mechanics, but the latter is easier to work with when planning spacecraft trajectories. Under spaceflight conditions, the difference between the two is small enough to be negligible, so physicists go with the simpler model. Their choice of model doesn’t mean that they think Newtonian mechanics is truer than general relativity, not even in the context of trajectory calculations. It’s just easier to use.

    Heliocentrism and general relativity are both rightly regarded as scientific advances because they model reality better than their competitors did. Ease of use is tangential.

  24. Corneel:
    “CharlieM: Me: If you still meant this to work as an explanation for the moving mario illusion, then you are wrong: The colours are optional: At this page you can see examples of the very same optical illusion in grayscale. Oh, AND an explanation that actually makes sense.

    Charlie: It works because of the properties of the edge colours. The greyscale version, as in the coloured version, works because of the manipulation of light and darkness. Black and white are equivalent to blue/violet and yellow/red taken to the extreme.

    Corneel: I said I would be silent on Goethe’s colour theory so I will refrain from stomping down on your freshly concocted ad hoc rationalization. I will however remind you of some previous statement of yours:

    CharlieM: I enjoy getting feedback and constructive criticism. I find that dialog with people like you who I know disagree with most of what I write is a great way to stimulate my thinking.

    Corneel: * hollow laugh*”

    My advice is to re-read your response above and ponder how on earth claiming that “[b]lack and white are equivalent to blue/violet and yellow/red taken to the extreme” harmonizes with saying that what you are doing is “stimulate my thinking”. What rubbish! The way I see it, you do not take any criticism seriously.

    Not sure what you are finding fault with. I would say if white has a luminance value of 100%, pure yellow is the closest colour to white and pure blue is closest to black.

    Can you explain where you think the fault lies in my understanding of the Mario illusion?

    Merry Christmas everyone.

  25. DNA_Jock,

    You ask me to consider things, to imagine, to think things through; in other words you are asking me to think. In doing so I am doing something which is a direct experience. A young child will be able to think even if they have no concept of the brain in their head. I am not claiming that the brain has no involvement in thinking. What I am talking about is direct experience.

    I believe that thinking and perception are intimately entwined. My perception of a mirage will have an element of thought to it. And as I think, perception and memories will be involved.

  26. CharlieM:

    I’ll leave any dualists here to argue their case.

    You are a dualist, Charlie. You believe in something beyond the physical. The fact that you subdivide the nonphysical into weird Steinerian categories does not negate that.

    In any case, ‘dualist’ is just a label. The arguments I’m making apply to your position regardless of how you label it, and you’ve tacitly acknowledged that by repeatedly responding to them. To suddenly bail out of the conversation by saying “I’ll leave it to the dualists” is a cop-out, an excuse to abandon a discussion that isn’t going well for you.

    My Alzheimer’s example shows clearly that your nonphysical mind/soul/spirit/whatever — the entity that you believe is responsible for cognition — does not exist. Your attempted counterarguments haven’t held up. I know you won’t acknowledge that the soul doesn’t exist — that’s a bridge too far — but could you at least acknowledge that you are unable to refute the Alzheimer’s argument? Or if you claim that you are able, present a new counterargument so that the discussion can continue?

  27. keiths:
    CharlieM: Can you demonstrate how my brain decided that I was going to switch on my laptop to comtinue the activity of replying here? Why would a group of cells in my head suddenly get urges like this?

    keiths: Why wouldn’t they? Tell us specifically why you think that what you describe is incompatible with physicalism.

    ETA:
    Hint: Don’t be tempted to say “because particles blindly following the laws of physics don’t get urges”. See my earlier comments about how the properties of a system can differ markedly from the properties of its components.

    I believe that this kind of decision making occurs at the level of the organism. I cannot say if what I describe is incompatible with physicalism because I’m not exactly sure what physicalism entails. It may be compatible with a holistic form of physicalism.

    Thoughts may be correlated with brain processes, but is this enough to claim that brain processes cause thinking? I believe that thinking happens at the level of the organism and the brain cannot be isolated as the agent.

  28. CharlieM, to DNA_Jock:

    You ask me to consider things, to imagine, to think things through; in other words you are asking me to think. In doing so I am doing something which is a direct experience. A young child will be able to think even if they have no concept of the brain in their head.

    You bring this up again and again, but you never explain why it constitutes evidence against physicalism. I’ve asked you multiple times, and I’ve even provided a template for your answer:

    Below is an outline of your presumed argument. Step 1 is the premise, and step N is the conclusion. What are steps 2 through N-1?

    1. Thinking is required in order to come to conclusions.
    <Steps 2 through N-1 go here>
    N. Therefore, thinking cannot be a physical process.

    What goes in the middle?

    Please answer.

  29. CharlieM:

    I am not claiming that the brain has no involvement in thinking.

    Well, that’s progress, I guess. In light of the Alzheimer’s example, do you acknowledge that telling the time from a clock is something that the soul (assuming it exists) cannot do on its own?

  30. There’s a phenomenon I think of as “the incredible shrinking soul”, in which dualists like Charlie are forced by the evidence to acknowledge that some of the activities they previously attributed to the soul are in fact carried out by the brain. This happens again and again, so that the role of the soul keeps shrinking. At some point you have to ask: “What exactly does the soul do, if all these things are carried out by the brain?”

    It’s even more awkward for the folks who believe that the soul can exist apart from the body or after the body has died. As I just noted, the Alzheimer’s evidence suggests that the soul, if it exists, cannot read the time from a clock face. And that’s just the tip of the iceberg.

    What’s the point of a profoundly debilitated soul that can’t perform basic cognitive tasks on its own?

  31. CharlieM:

    Can you demonstrate how my brain decided that I was going to switch on my laptop to comtinue the activity of replying here? Why would a group of cells in my head suddenly get urges like this?

    keiths:

    Why wouldn’t they? Tell us specifically why you think that what you describe is incompatible with physicalism.

    CharlieM:

    I cannot say if what I describe is incompatible with physicalism because I’m not exactly sure what physicalism entails.

    In other words, you can’t justify your intuition about urges being evidence against physicalism. Keep that in mind the next time you’re tempted to make an argument along those lines.

    Thoughts may be correlated with brain processes, but is this enough to claim that brain processes cause thinking?

    As I keep explaining, the physicalist view is based on far more than the mere correlation between brain activity and thinking.

    For example, we know that the brain is responsible for time-telling not just because the brain is active while we are telling time, but because physical damage to the brain can disrupt this ability.

  32. CharlieM, to Corneel:

    Can you explain where you think the fault lies in my understanding of the Mario illusion?

    Like Corneel, I have no desire to get into an extended discussion of Goethe’s color “theory”, but I will point out one thing. You argued that the illusion had something to do with Goethe’s claim regarding colors:

    According to Goethe we see the warm yellow/red spectral colours as advancing, and the violet/blue cold spectral colours as receding.

    That cannot be an explanation of the illusion, because we don’t see the Marios (or parts of the Marios) as advancing toward us or receding from us. They “move” laterally.

  33. keiths: There’s a difference between what is pragmatic and what is true. General relativity is truer than Newtonian mechanics, but the latter is easier to work with when planning spacecraft trajectories.

    “True” is a binary. If you are using “truer” then you are actually using pragmatics.

    Heliocentrism and general relativity are both rightly regarded as scientific advances because they model reality better than their competitors did.

    That’s a pragmatic judgement.

  34. Neil:

    “True” is a binary. If you are using “truer” then you are actually using pragmatics.

    No, because “truer” is not synonymous with “more useful”. Newtonian mechanics is more useful than general relativity when planning spacecraft trajectories, but even the people using it for that purpose will tell you that GR is truer.

    Likewise with your argument that terrestrial navigation is easier under an assumption of geocentrism.* “Easier to use” does not mean “truer”.

    Anyway, my larger point is that geocentrism and heliocentrism are not mathematically equivalent. Do you see that now?

    They make different predictions, and heliocentrism is preferred in modern times because its predictions succeed where geocentrism’s fail.

    * I disagree with that, by the way. I think you’re confusing geocentrism with geocentric coordinates again. Terrestrial navigation is definitely easier when using geocentric coordinates, but that does not in any way require that you adopt a geocentric model of the solar system.

  35. keiths:

    No, because “truer” is not synonymous with “more useful”. Newtonian mechanics is more useful than general relativity when planning spacecraft trajectories, but even the people using it for that purpose will tell you that GR is truer.

    Neil:

    “True” is still a binary, and “pragmatic” is not a synonym for “more useful.”

    From wiktionary.org:

    true (comparative truer or more true, superlative truest or most true)

    And:

    pragmatic

    concerned with making decisions and actions that are useful in practice, not just theory

  36. And we also have your own statement:

    As I see it, they were adopted on a pragmatic basis. As long as you main concern is with terrestrial navigation, geocentrism is a good choice. It is when you turn your attention to the rest of the cosmos, that helocentrism looks better. But that is still a pragmatic judgement.

    “Geocentrism is a good choice” because (you believe) it is more useful than heliocentrism when dealing with terrestrial navigation. Ditto for heliocentrism and “the rest of the cosmos”. Those are pragmatic judgments, as you say, meaning that in each case you are selecting the model that you think is most useful.

    Anyway, I’m not interested in having a discussion about the nature of reality and whether scientific theories can successfully model it. I’ve had those conversations with you before. My point is that geocentrism and heliocentrism are not mathematically equivalent. You can’t get from geocentrism to heliocentrism, and vice-versa, merely by changing your coordinate system. The models are fundamentally different, they make different predictions, and heliocentrism is regarded as a great scientific advance because its predictions are much more successful than those of geocentrism.

    Can you see now that they are not mathematically equivalent? I can go into more detail if you’re not convinced.

  37. keiths: From wiktionary.org:

    true (comparative truer or more true, superlative truest or most true)

    Yes, people use “truer” in ordinary discussion. Natural language is not a logic system. If you want to go by natural language usage, then “A is true” sometimes only means “I agree with A”. People are somewhat casual about meanings in ordinary discussion.

    Nevertheless, “true” is binary when used in its strictest sense. Or, if true is not binary, then logic is bullshit.

    And:

    pragmatic

    concerned with making decisions and actions that are useful in practice, not just theory

    So what? Yes, “pragmatic” is related to usefulness. It still isn’t synonymous with “more useful”. Your point about “truer” not being synonymous with “more useful” is not at all relevant.

    My point is that geocentrism and heliocentrism are not mathematically equivalent.

    You are mistaken about that. However, I’m not interested in a pointless argument about it.

    The models are fundamentally different, they make different predictions, and heliocentrism is regarded as a great scientific advance because its predictions are much more successful than those of geocentrism.

    The Ptolemaic system (geocentric) made better predictions than the Copernican system (heliocentric). However, Kepler’s system (heliocentric) made better predictions than either. You cannot use that kind of argument to discredit the mathematical equivalence.

    If people had continued to use geocentrism, they would eventually have needed to add cycles and epicycles to the motions of stars.

    I agree that heliocentrism was a scientific advance, but not because one was true and the other false. They are both false.

  38. Neil:

    Yes, people use “truer” in ordinary discussion. Natural language is not a logic system. If you want to go by natural language usage, then “A is true” sometimes only means “I agree with A”. People are somewhat casual about meanings in ordinary discussion.

    The idea that there are degrees of truth is not a sloppy concept confined to casual conversation. Scientists know very well that there are degrees of truth, and when evaluating competing theories and models, they prefer those that are truer — that is, they prefer theories and models that are closer than their competitors to being completely true. They don’t throw up their hands and say “Oh well, Aristotelian physics and general relativity are both false, and since truth is binary, that means they’re equally false.” They’re smarter than that. They prefer general relativity because it conforms to reality better than Aristotelian physics. It’s truer. There is nothing unscientific about that judgment.

    Nevertheless, “true” is binary when used in its strictest sense.

    Scientists are not obligated to use the word in what you consider to be its strictest sense. That truth admits of degrees is a perfectly intelligible and useful concept.

    Your point about “truer” not being synonymous with “more useful” is not at all relevant.

    Sure it is. It’s why the designers of spacecraft trajectories can use Newtonian mechanics for pragmatic reasons while nevertheless considering general relativity to be a superior (because truer) theory.

  39. Neil:

    The Ptolemaic system (geocentric) made better predictions than the Copernican system (heliocentric). However, Kepler’s system (heliocentric) made better predictions than either. You cannot use that kind of argument to discredit the mathematical equivalence.

    The mere fact that theory A and theory B make different predictions is sufficient to establish that they are not mathematically equivalent. Judgments about which theory makes better predictions are not needed.

    Odd that you acknowledge that these theories make different predictions while also insisting that they are mathematically equivalent. That doesn’t make sense. If they were equivalent, they would make the same predictions. Isn’t that obvious?

    I agree that heliocentrism was a scientific advance, but not because one was true and the other false. They are both false.

    We prefer heliocentrism these days because it is truer — that is, it conforms better to reality than geocentrism does. A truer theory constitutes a scientific advance.

  40. keiths:

    My point is that geocentrism and heliocentrism are not mathematically equivalent.

    Neil:

    You are mistaken about that. However, I’m not interested in a pointless argument about it.

    Yes, of course it would be totally pointless for you to provide an argument in support of the claim you’ve been making. What was I thinking?

  41. A pertinent quote from Isaac Asimov’s famous essay The Relativity of Wrong:

    The young specialist in English Lit, having quoted me, went on to lecture me severely on the fact that in every century people have thought they understood the universe at last, and in every century they were proved to be wrong. It follows that the one thing we can say about our modern “knowledge” is that it is wrong. The young man then quoted with approval what Socrates had said on learning that the Delphic oracle had proclaimed him the wisest man in Greece. “If I am the wisest man,” said Socrates, “it is because I alone know that I know nothing.” The implication was that I was very foolish because I was under the impression I knew a great deal.

    My answer to him was, “John, when people thought the earth was flat, they were wrong. When people thought the earth was spherical, they were wrong. But if you think that thinking the earth is spherical is just as wrong as thinking the earth is flat, then your view is wronger than both of them put together.”

    The basic trouble, you see, is that people think that “right” and “wrong” are absolute; that everything that isn’t perfectly and completely right is totally and equally wrong.

    As with “right” and “wrong”, so with “true” and “false”.

  42. keiths:
    Charlie,

    Allow me to point to a glaring asymmetry. You’ve been given reasons why the immaterial soul does not (and cannot) exist, with my Alzheimer’s comment being a recent example:

    “keiths: At most, in your model, the soul should be receiving confusing sensory data from the brain. That shouldn’t affect someone’s ability to name 10 animals or explain how to tell the time from a clock. Alzheimer’s does affect those things.

    Alzheimer’s produces cognitive deficits. In your model, that should be impossible. Patients should be as sharp as ever, just reporting that they’re having trouble seeing or hearing.”

    You haven’t been able to explain the mismatch between what your model predicts and what we actually observe. You also haven’t been able to name a single discrepancy between what physicalism predicts and what we actually observe.

    I’m not making models, I am going on experience. Through interacting with the “outer world” I have various feelings and passions. Lumped together I call these my soul. These feelings will be brought about by external events and actions which impact me, but just because these events may be physical, it does not automatically follow that my feelings are equally so. I don’t regard natural laws, mathematical truths, or concepts as physical/material, so why should I regard my inner feelings as physical/material?

    keiths: Rhetorical question: Physicalism is compatible with the evidence and dualism is incompatible with it. Why, then, are you a dualist?

    Non-rhetorical answer: Because you are attached, deeply and emotionally, to the idea of an immaterial soul. The thought that the soul might not exist is upsetting to you. You don’t want it to be true. To avoid the upset, you are fighting tooth and nail against the evidence. If truth collides with comforting belief, then truth is to be discarded and belief affirmed. I do not say this lightly or off the cuff. It is based on years of observing you here at TSZ.

    As Corneel points out, you characterize yourself as being open to constructive criticism, and you cite your presence here at TSZ as evidence of that. To some extent, it’s true. You’re open to criticism in the sense that you actually read our comments and you don’t altogether ignore the points that we raise. You will sometimes engage with them, and I think you’ve gotten better at that over time. However, there always seems to be a point at which you abandon the back-and-forth and go back to simply asserting the same things as before, as if the discussion had never taken place. That is what we find objectionable.

    If you were honest with yourself, you’d say “The evidence is against the soul, but I believe anyway for emotional reasons.” At the very least, you’d say “I believe the soul exists, and I think I’ll someday be able to make a rational argument for it, but for now the evidence points the other way and I am unable to refute the arguments of the physicalists.”

    As a baby step, see if you can get yourself to say “I don’t know that the soul exists.”

    I am not unsympathetic to your plight. My deconversion from Christianity was a wrenching process, and I’ll confess that I attempted to rationalize my beliefs beyond the point where they ceased to be tenable. Eventually I decided that truth was worth pursuing even if it meant abandoning some cherished beliefs. I reasoned that if my beliefs were true, they would withstand scrutiny, so there was no reason not to scrutinize them. I chose “to follow the evidence wherever it leads”, as the IDers like to say.

    I’ll also acknowledge that the process is probably more difficult for you than it was for me. You will be relinquishing beliefs that you’ve held for decades. I was in my teens and didn’t have such a long history to overcome.

    Painful though the transition may be, I think that in the long run you’ll find it to be a relief. It’s exhausting to maintain beliefs in the face of contrary evidence, and there’s always the nagging awareness that you aren’t being honest with yourself and others.

    I think we all need to be honest with ourselves. To know ourselves is the ideal, but it is the hardest path to follow and self-deception comes so easily. For instance, I tell myself I believe in Christ, but how strong is my belief? If I really believed in Christ for all of these years why do I have so many regrets about my past wrongdoings? Why have I done and continue to do so many selfish things? If my belief is so firm, I would follow Christ’s example and give up all the things I hold on to, and all the things I desire for selfish reasons. It turns out that my belief in Christ is nowhere near as strong as I’d like to think.

    My beliefs are not all of equal value. Some are very strong and some are tentative. I strongly believe that there is nothing of permanence in the physical. I agree with Heraclitus on that one.

    I believe in body, soul and spirit and in my ‘I’ which does the believing. I believe in my transitory body that through my will I have some control over. I believe that I have feelings and desires which is my soul life and is also transitory. I believe I can think thoughts which have a permanence and exist outwith my thinking mind. This is spirit, and the fact that I can apprehend these concepts which time and space do not influence, means I partake in spirit. My ‘I’ is that which connects body and spirit.

    Any further beliefs I have in the true nature of body, soul and spirit are tentative to say the least. If even the most competent nuclear physicists have difficulty with the paradoxes they run into in trying to fathom matter at its most fundamental level, where does that leave me regarding the nature of my body?

    It is even harder to progress in understanding the nature of soul and spirit, so I will stick to the description I have given above about what these terms mean to me. But I do have a strong belief that reality is far greater than anything I, with my average human capacities, can comprehend.

    If you feel that you have a better grasp on reality than I do and you are satisfied in that knowledge, then so be it. I would say actions are more important than beliefs and by your actions you may very well prove to be more of a Christian than I am. I certainly wouldn’t claim otherwise.

  43. keiths:
    CharlieM: Yes, but what she is claimng is that these neuroscientists have got it wrong. What she is actually saying is that they misappropriate consciousness. They are claiming that it is an epiphenomenon, it is produced by the brain, whereas she proposes it to be “the essence of the universe”.

    keiths: You’re right about her position. I shouldn’t have implied that she actually holds the view conveyed by that quote. My point is that the view expressed therein is the dominant one among neuroscientists, and Peters has completely misrepresented it by writing “It is the material brain that determines the delusion of a conscious mind, allegedly.”

    His jaws have clamped down on that straw man and he ain’t gonna let go.

    You may be right when you say “Peters may be conflating materialism with eliminative materialism”, but he does imply that he is talking about eliminative materialists in that quote.

  44. CharlieM:

    You may be right when you say “Peters may be conflating materialism with eliminative materialism”, but he does imply that he is talking about eliminative materialists in that quote.

    That’s exactly the problem. He not only implies that he’s talking about eliminative materialists, he says so explicitly. Yet the Woollacott quote he provides describes the mainstream view, not the eliminativist one:

    Not much sleuthing is required to discover that it is our laboratory brain researchers in cahoots with neurocentric philosophers who broke in to rob us of our consciousness. These perps are armed with mind-brain identity theory. This theory applies eliminative materialism to human consciousness. “According to the common neuroscientific view, the mind is the creation of the brain,” writes University of Oregon neuroscientist Marjorie Hines Woollacott. “In other words, material processes in the cerebral cortex—somehow!—generate thoughts and feelings” (Woollacott, 2017, p. Kindle 1153). It is the material brain that determines the delusion of a conscious mind,

    That paragraph is riddled with confusion. He thinks that “our laboratory brain researchers” and “neurocentric philosophers” are all eliminative materialists. He thinks that mind-brain identity theory “applies eliminative materialism to human consciousness”. In the same breath he supplies a Woollacott quote in which she directly states that she is talking about “the common neuroscientific view”, which Peters takes to be an eliminativist one. Her quote describes a non-eliminativist view, but he paraphrases it as an eliminativist one.

    I can’t find anything in the entire article to suggest that he understands the difference or recognizes that the mainstream view isn’t eliminativist. Can you?

  45. CharlieM:

    I’m not making models, I am going on experience.

    You aren’t making models, but you’ve adopted one hook, line, and sinker. And you’re going on Steiner’s experience far more than your own. It wasn’t through experience that you started talking about ‘astral’ and ‘etheric’ bodies, and ‘Manas’ and ‘Buddhi’.

    You didn’t experience that stuff, you imbibed it straight from Steiner’s firehose.

  46. keiths:
    CharlieM: Why would matter experience inwardness in this way?

    keiths: Why would the immaterial soul experience inwardness in this way?

    That is a valid question.

    keiths: When arguing against someone’s position, try to cultivate the habit of asking yourself whether the argument you’re making could be used against your own position.

    By asking this question of Alan I’m not denying the possibility of matter becoming conscious. I am asking him to explain why he thinks it would be necessary for it to have this experience. After all computers can accomplish a great deal without the need to experience themselves.

    To ask your question of anyone who believes in an immaterial soul is equally acceptable.

    I don’t like the term, “immaterial soul” because that definition requires us to know what “matter” is, and I am not confident that I fully grasp the concept, “matter”. You imply that it is not matter but the form taken up by matter that is having the experience. As I agree that the body is a form, then what I will say is that I believe it is because I have an embodied soul that I have inner experiences. And I’ll add that I need a body to experience the world around me.

    CharlieM: What is it about matter that gives you the impression that it can contemplate itself?

    keiths: What is it about matter that gives you the impression that it can’t contemplate itself? Keep in mind what I keep telling you about how the properties of a system can differ from the properties of its components.

    I didn’t say that matter can’t contemplate itself. In fact the properties of the material world are perfectly suited to allow matter to attain a form capable of contemplating itself. So the minimum needed is matter plus form. But static form isn’t enough. The body needs to have integral activity, so the minimum requirement is matter plus dynamic forming. In my opinion this dynamic forming is life.

    Conventional science speculates that matter precedes earthly life, and so scientific theories are built around this assumption. On the other hand I speculate that life produces matter as we know it. Life produces matter that is able to contemplate itself.

  47. keiths:
    CharlieM: And it demonstrates that correlation does not equal causation.

    keiths: You keep mentioning this as if it were an argument against physicalism. We’re not stupid, Charlie. We know that correlation doesn’t equal causation, and our case rests on far more than the mere fact that brain activity accompanies thinking.

    I’m looking forward to hearing your response to this (the Alzheimer’s part).

    You are arguing against someone who believes that we have a separate immaterial soul which somehow affects the body. That is not the position that I am trying to justify.

  48. CharlieM:

    Through interacting with the “outer world” I have various feelings and passions. Lumped together I call these my soul.

    See my comment about “the incredible shrinking soul”.

    I can’t keep up with Steiner’s terminology, and I have no desire to do so, but you clearly believe in a nonphysical something-or-other, a distinct entity that does your thinking and feeling, makes decisions, commands the body to move, and so on. (Most of us call that the ‘soul’.) This entity isn’t just your thoughts and feelings “lumped together”; it’s the entity that produces those thoughts and feelings.

    That entity does not exist. The evidence rules it out, and you (and Swinburne, and everyone else) have been unsuccessful in your attempts to defend it.

    I realize that this is a very big deal for you and that your Steinerian worldview collapses if the nonphysical something-or-other does not exist. I can sympathize, having experienced a collapsing worldview of my own when I left Christianity.

    We just passed what would have been my mom’s 100th birthday (she lived to be 99) and I would love to believe that she still exists somehow and that we will meet again. Sadly, the evidence is overwhelmingly against that, and I wouldn’t want to cling to a false hope.

    Truth can be painful sometimes, but it’s still the truth.

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